Sorenson v. City of Caldwell et al

Filing 32

MEMORANDUM DECISION & ORDER Caldwell's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 22 ) is GRANTED. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (jp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
LYNN SORENSON,
Case No. 1:14-cv-00221-BLW
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

v.
CITY OF CALDWELL, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho, CITY
OF CALDWELL DEPARTMENT OF
PARKS AND RECREATION,

Defendant.

INTRODUCTION
Pending before the Court is Defendant City of Caldwell's (Caldwell) Motion for
Summary Judgment (Dkt. 22). The Court has reviewed the briefs submitted by the parties
and, after a hearing on this matter conducted on July 20, 2015, enters the following Order
granting Caldwell’s motion.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Lynn Sorenson sued Caldwell claiming that he was constructively
discharged due to an age-based hostile work environment and that he was retaliated
against by Caldwell, all in violation of the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment
Act ("ADEA") and the Idaho Human Rights Act ("IHRA"). Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23-36.
Caldwell seeks summary judgment on Sorenson’s claims.

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Sorenson was hired to work for Caldwell’s Parks Department in April 2008. Def.
Statement of Facts ¶ 1, Dkt. 22-2. Sorenson’s direct supervisor was Vinton Howell, who
reported to ElJay Waite, the City Finance Director and Treasurer, who reported to Mayor
Garret Nancolas. Id. Sorenson's work would often take him to the Purple Sage and
Fairview golf courses, where Ken Wheeler worked as the Golf Superintendent. Id. ¶ 2.
Wheeler would often use inappropriate age-related language and profanities with
Sorenson. Am. Compl. ¶ 10. Sorenson alleges that this problem was not adequately
addressed despite multiple complaints to city officials. Id. ¶¶ 10-13.
In August 2011, Caldwell merged the Parks Department, city golf courses, and
cemetery to become the Land and Facilities Department. Def. Statement of Facts ¶ 2, Dkt.
22-2. As part of this merger, Wheeler was promoted to the newly created position of
Land and Facilities Superintendent, overseeing all three parts of the new department. Id.
Under the new structure, the Parks employees, including Sorenson, were supervised by
Howell, who reported to Wheeler. Id. ¶¶ 1-2.
On February 27, 2012, Monica Jones, Caldwell's Human Resources Director, had
a series of meetings with Sorenson and other Parks employees. Id. ¶ 4. During the course
of those meetings, Jones received information that Wheeler was making age-related
comments to Sorenson as well as profane comments to other employees. Id.
Subsequently, Wheeler was instructed to not enter the Park’s building, to not directly
contact Parks employees, and to not make age-related comments to Sorenson. Pl.’s
Statement of Facts, ¶¶ 8-9, Dkt. 25-1. Determined to resolve the conflict, Sorenson

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encouraged the other Parks employees to work together with Wheeler. Id. ¶ 12. In
violation of his superior’s orders, Wheeler entered the Parks building on March 20, 2012,
made derogatory age-related remarks to Sorenson, and physically assaulted another Parks
employee who was under the age of 40. Id.
Although Sorenson attempted to contact Howell by phone that same day, he did
not tell Howell about the March 20th incident until March 21st. Id. ¶ 13. The following
day, Sorenson met with Jones and Waite to discuss the encounter. Id. ¶ 14. After the
meeting, Waite ordered Wheeler to not have any contact with Sorenson. Def. Statement of
Facts ¶ 9, Dkt. 22-2. Wheeler appears to have complied since that time. Id.
Jones commenced an investigation into the incident on April 2, 2012 and placed
Wheeler on administrative leave. Id. ¶ 10. After the investigation was concluded,
Wheeler was suspended for three days without pay, placed on six-month probation, and
ordered to attend training. Id. ¶ 14. In addition, Caldwell essentially disbanded the Land
and Facilities Department and put Wheeler back in his prior position as Golf
Superintendent of the Golf Department. Id.
Jones and Waite met with Sorenson on April 16, 2012 to discuss the investigation.
Pl.’s Statement of Facts, ¶ 16, Dkt. 25-1. Sorenson asked Jones and Waite to disclose the
disciplinary actions taken against Wheeler but they refused, citing Caldwell’s policy to
keep all disciplinary actions confidential. Def.’s Audio Recording, Track 4, 5:13 – 5:30,
Dkt. 22-14. However, Waite continually stated that appropriate action had been taken
against Wheeler and that Sorenson was protected and did not need to worry about

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Wheeler anymore. Id. at 1:06:25 – 1:06:35. During that same meeting, Jones expressed
her frustration that Sorenson did not follow Caldwell’s policy in reporting the
harassment, and threatened Sorenson that she could “fire him right now.” Pl.’s Statement
of Facts, ¶ 16, Dkt. 25-1.
On April 20, 2012, Sorenson met with Howell and resigned. Def. Statement of
Facts ¶ 19, Dkt. 22-2. Sorenson stated that he was not comfortable working at the Parks
Department anymore even though Wheeler was now separated from the Parks
Department. Def.’s Audio Recording, Track 3, 25:25 – 25:50, Dkt. 22-14. Sorenson did
not believe it was possible to avoid contact with Wheeler and that Wheeler would
inevitably lash out against him again. Id. at 28:05 – 28:52.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate where a party can show that, as to any claim or
defense, “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). One of the principal purposes of the
summary judgment “is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims . . . .”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). It is “not a disfavored procedural
shortcut,” but is instead the “principal tool[ ] by which factually insufficient claims or
defenses [can] be isolated and prevented from going to trial with the attendant
unwarranted consumption of public and private resources.” Id. at 327. “[T]he mere
existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise
properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

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U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). There must be a genuine dispute as to any material fact – a fact
“that may affect the outcome of the case.” Id. at 248.
The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
and the Court must not make credibility findings. Id. at 255. Direct testimony of the
non-movant must be believed, however implausible. Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d
1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). On the other hand, the Court is not required to adopt
unreasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence. McLaughlin v. Liu, 849 F.2d
1205, 1208 (9th Cir. 1988).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a
genuine dispute as to material fact. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir.
2001)(en banc). To carry this burden, the moving party need not introduce any
affirmative evidence (such as affidavits or deposition excerpts) but may simply point out
the absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. Fairbank v. Wunderman
Cato Johnson, 212 F.3d 528, 532 (9th Cir.2000).
This shifts the burden to the non-moving party to produce evidence sufficient to
support a jury verdict in her favor. Deveraux, 263 F.3d at 1076. The non-moving party
must go beyond the pleadings and show “by her [ ] affidavits, or by the depositions,
answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file” that a genuine dispute of material fact
exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
However, the Court is “not required to comb through the record to find some
reason to deny a motion for summary judgment.” Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch.

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Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted). Instead, the “party
opposing summary judgment must direct [the Court’s] attention to specific triable facts.”
Southern California Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 2003).
ANALYSIS
Both of Sorenson’s claims are brought under the ADEA and the IHRA. Because
federal law guides the interpretation of the IHRA, the Court’s analysis is the same under
both statutes. Hatheway v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Idaho, 310 P.3d 315, 322 (Idaho
2013). Sorenson’s claims are based on circumstantial evidence of age-based
discrimination. Therefore, the Court evaluates the claims by using the burden-shifting
framework laid out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Diaz v.
Eagle Produce Ltd. P'ship, 521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008). Under this framework,
Sorenson must first establish a prima facie case under the ADEA. Id.
In order to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, Sorenson must
prove, among other elements, that he was discharged by Caldwell. See Diaz, 521 F.3d at
1207. Sorenson admits that he resigned and, therefore, relies on the theory of constructive
discharge. In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Sorenson must prove,
among other elements, that he suffered an adverse employment action. See University of
Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, __ U.S. __, __, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2534
(2013). Sorenson alleges that he suffered an adverse employment action because he was
constructively discharged. Therefore, if Sorenson was not constructively discharged, both
of his claims fail as a matter of law.

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Whether the circumstances of employment amount to a constructive discharge is
an objective inquiry: “Did working conditions become so intolerable that a reasonable
person in the employee’s position would have felt compelled to resign?” Poland v.
Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1184 (9th Cir. 2007). (Internal citation and quotation omitted).
There is a high bar for a claim of constructive discharge because “federal
antidiscrimination policies are better served when the employee and employer attack
discrimination within their existing employment relationship, rather than when the
employee walks away and then later litigates whether his employment situation was
intolerable.” Id. Sorenson cannot clear this high bar.
The record shows that a reasonable person in Sorenson’s position would not have
felt compelled to resign because of age-based discrimination. In Montero v. AGCO Corp.,
the Ninth Circuit held that there is no constructive discharge when the harassing behavior
has not occurred for a significant period of time and the employee is aware that the
employer has taken significant steps to prevent further harassment. Montero v. AGCO
Corp., 192 F.3d 856, 861 (9th Cir. 1999). The facts of this case fit squarely within that
mold.
First, Sorenson’s resignation came a month after the harassing behavior stopped.
Second, even though Sorenson was not told the particulars of the disciplinary action
taken, he was made aware that Wheeler had been disciplined, that Wheeler was no longer
in charge of the Parks Department where Sorenson worked, and that Sorenson would be
in a safe work environment. Dkt. 22-14. From that point, Wheeler had no contact with

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Sorenson. A reasonable person in Sorenson’s position would not have considered these
intolerable circumstances warranting resignation. Therefore, Sorenson cannot prove
constructive discharge. In turn, summary judgment must be granted on Sorenson’s
claims.
Additionally, Sorenson takes issue with Jones’ statement that she could fire him
for not following proper protocol in reporting the alleged age-discrimination. Even
assuming the statement was a threat, as suggested by Sorenson, such a threat would not
compel a reasonable person to resign. Pl.’s Statement of Facts, ¶ 16, Dkt. 25-1. Resigning
in the face of a threat of termination would only accomplish the feat of beating the
employer to the punch. Sorenson cannot cogently argue that the threat was so overbearing
that he felt compelled to carry out the object of the threat. Therefore, summary judgment
must be granted because the alleged retaliatory actions were insufficient to compel a
reasonable person to resign.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that Caldwell’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 22) is
GRANTED.
DATED: August 13, 2015

_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
Chief Judge
United States District Court

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