Anderson v. Colvin

Filing 37

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER. Because the Court does not have jurisdiction to review the ALJs decision not to reopen Anderson's Title II claim, and because Anderson lacks standing to challenge the ALJ's fully favorable decision finding h im disabled and entitled to Title XVI benefits, the Court will dismiss Anderson's Petition for Review. Based upon the foregoing, the Court being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is hereby ORDERED that the Petition for Review is DISMISSED. Signed by Judge Candy W. Dale. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (st)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

RANDY ANDERSON,
Case No. 1:14-CV-00468-CWD
Petitioner,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Respondent.

INTRODUCTION
Pending before the Court is Petitioner Randy Anderson’s Petition for Review of
Respondent’s fully favorable decision finding Petitioner disabled beginning on March 29,
2010, after reopening a prior Title XVI application for benefits. (Dkt. 5.) Anderson
challenges the ALJ’s decision not to re-open his prior Title II application for disability
insurance benefits. Anderson contends also that the ALJ made several errors in the
favorable decision, including improperly determining his disability onset date.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties consented to the exercise of jurisdiction
over this matter by the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. (Dkt. 20.) The Court
has reviewed the Petition for Review and the Answer, the parties’ memoranda, and the
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1

administrative record (AR), and for the reasons that follow, will dismiss the Petition for
Review.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Anderson filed an application for Title XVI Supplemental Security Income
Benefits 1 and an application for Title II Disability Insurance Benefits 2 in March of 2010,
claiming disability beginning December 30, 2008, due to severe back pain, bilateral
sciatic pain, and degenerative arthritis in the lumbar area. (AR.126.) On May 19, 2010,
the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied both claims. Id. Anderson’s Title XVI
claim was denied based on his “ability to do past work,” and his Title II claim was denied
due to insufficient medical documentation of his disability. Id. Anderson did not appeal
either decision within the 60 day time period to do so.
Anderson re-applied for Title XVI benefits on November 21, 2011, claiming
disability beginning on May 20, 2010, due to severe back and bilateral sciatic pain and
migraines. (AR. 128.) The SSA denied this claim on February 24, 2012. (AR. 151.) The
following month, Anderson retained counsel, who requested on Anderson’s behalf,
reconsideration of the SSA’s denial of Anderson’s November 21, 2011 application for
Title XVI benefits and Anderson’s March 1, 2010 application for Title II benefits. (Dkt.

1

Eligibility for Title XVI benefits is determined “on the basis of [the claimant’s] income and resources,
rather than on insured status. See 42 U.S.C. § 1381a; 20 C.F.R.§ 416.202(d).

2

A claimant seeking benefits under Title II must show that he became disabled when he had “insured
status.” See 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(3); 20 C.F.R. § 404.101. “[O]ne can collect DIB under Title II that covers
up to 12 months of disability prior to the filing of a DIB application, provided that one had insured DIB
status during that period of disability.” Perkins v. Chater, 107 F.3d 1290, 1295 (7th Cir. 1997); See
C.F.R. §§ 404.131, 404.315.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2

162.) The Administration denied the request for reconsideration of both claims. (Dkt.
166.) A hearing was held on December 19, 2012, before Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) Lloyd Hartford.
After hearing testimony from Anderson, ALJ Hartford issued a written decision on
February 4, 2013. (AR. 35.) ALJ Hartford did not find a basis under 20 C.F.R. § 404.988
or SSR 91-5p to reopen Anderson’s Title II claim. (AR. 40.) However, ALJ Hartford
determined that, due to new and material evidence, good cause existed to reopen
Anderson’s March 2010 application for Title XVI benefits pursuant to 20 C.F.R.
§§ 416.1488 and 404.989. Id. ALJ Hartford issued a fully favorable decision for
Anderson’s Title XVI claim, finding Anderson disabled as of March 29, 2010 (the date
Anderson filed his original application for supplemental security income). 3
On February 24, 2013, Anderson requested review of ALJ Hartford’s decision by
the Appeals Council. (AR. 32.) While Anderson agreed with ALJ Hartford’s disability
finding, Anderson alleged ALJ Harford improperly determined his disability onset date.
Anderson contended, for the first time, his disability onset date was sometime in
December of 2002. Id. Anderson attached to his appeal medical records Anderson had
recently recovered from the Veterans Administration dated March 18, 2001, through

3

The March 2010 Title II and Title XVI applications are not part of the administrative record. It is not
clear what date Anderson filed these applications. Anderson’s previous attorney indicates in his
reconsideration request, that the Title II application was filed on March 1, 2010. However, the ALJ’s
decision indicates the Title II application was filed on March 29, 2010. As explained in this decision, the
date the application was filed is immaterial.

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December 9, 2009, 4 and two personal statements, one from Anderson, and the other from
his girlfriend. (AR. 327, 324, 376-450.) On September 2, 2014, the Appeals Council
denied Anderson’s request for review. On November 3, 2014, Anderson appealed this
final decision to the Court. Anderson is no longer represented by counsel and is
proceeding pro se.
DISCUSSION
Anderson alleges ALJ Hartford committed a variety of errors. Specifically,
Anderson contends ALJ Hartford: (1) failed to provide specific and legitimate reasons for
his decision not to reopen Anderson’s Title II application for benefits; (2) improperly
determined his disability onset date; (3) failed to fully develop the record; and (4) failed
to provide specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting the opinions of one of Anderson’s
treating physicians and a lay witness. At the end of his forty-seven page opening brief,
Anderson requests the Court “modify” ALJ Hartford’s decision by amending the onset
date to January 1, 2008, and by converting his award of Title XVI benefits into an award
for Title II benefits. (Dkt. 22-1 at 19.)
The Court will discuss first ALJ Hartford’s decision not to reopen Anderson’s
Title II application for benefits, and next will discuss Anderson’s remaining three
arguments related ALJ Hartford’s fully favorable decision to award Title XVI benefits.

4

Anderson contends he did not receive these records until February 19, 2014, after the ALJ issued his
favorable decision. (AR. 32.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4

II. The Court does not have jurisdiction to review the ALJ’s decision not to reopen
the Title II application for benefits
Anderson seeks review of ALJ Harford’s decision not to reopen his Title II
application for disability benefits. However, the Court lacks jurisdiction to review the
refusal to reopen the Title II application for the following reasons.
A decision not to reopen a prior, final benefits decision is discretionary and
ordinarily does not constitute a final decision; therefore, it is not subject to judicial
review. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 107–09 (1977). However, the Court has
jurisdiction to review the decision not to reopen an application when the Petitioner
presents a “colorable constitutional claim of [a] due process violation that implicates a
due process right either to a meaningful opportunity to be heard or to seek
reconsideration of an adverse benefits determination.” Rolen v. Barnhart, 273 F.3d 1189,
1191 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Evans v. Chater, 110 F.3d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1997)); see
also Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 108 (1977); Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197,
1202-03 (9th Cir. 1990). “A claim is ‘colorable’ if it is not ‘wholly insubstantial,
immaterial, or frivolous.’” Rolen, 273 F.3d at 1191.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has recognized due
process violations in this context where the Petitioner “presents evidence that mental
incapacity prevented [him] from requesting timely review of an administrative action and
[he] had no one legally responsible for prosecuting a claim on [his] behalf.” Youssef v.
Astrue, 487 F. App'x 414 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Udd v. Massanari, 245 F.3d 1096, 1099
(9th Cir. 2001). In addition, colorable constitutional claims are recognized “where the
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5

[Petitioner] can show that mental impairment prevented [him] from understanding how to
contest the denial of benefits.” Id. (citing Klemm v. Astrue, 543 F.3d 1139, 1144–45 (9th
Cir. 2008).
Here, Anderson argues ALJ Hartford erred by failing to provide “legitimate and
germane reasons” in support of his decision not to reopen his Title II application.
Anderson appears to suggest that the same “new and material evidence” that satisfied the
good cause standard to reopen his Title XVI claim also provided good cause to reopen
the Title II claim. 5 However, ALJ Hartford was not required to support his decision not to
reopen Anderson’s application for Title II benefits with “legitimate and germane
reasons.” Rather, the ALJ’s decision was discretionary. Under the general rule, the Court
lacks jurisdiction to review ALJ Harford’s decision unless it violated Anderson’s
constitutional due process right to seek reconsideration of an adverse benefits
determination. Anderson does not argue his due process rights were violated.
Accordingly, because Anderson’s request for review does not fit within the narrow
exception that otherwise affords this Court jurisdiction to review ALJ Harford’s decision
not to reopen his Title II application, the Court will dismiss Anderson’s claim. 6

5

The SSA’s regulations permit a final decision to be reopened under limited circumstances. Title II
claims may only be reopened: (1) [w]ithin 12 months of the date of the notice of the initial determination,
for any reason,” (2) [w]ithin four years of the date of the notice of initial determination if the [agency]
find[s] good cause as defined in § 404.989, to reopen the case;” or (3) “[a]t any time” if the determination
was obtained by fraud or in certain other specified circumstances. 20 C.F.R. § 404.988. Title XVI claims
may be reopened for the same reasons as Title II claims, but the time to reopen for good cause is limited
to two years. 20 C.F.R. § 416.988(b).

6

To the extent Anderson requests that his award of Title XVI benefits be “converted” to an award of Title
II benefits, the Court has no such authority to do.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6

II. No Standing to Challenge ALJ’s Alleged Errors in Fully Favorable Decision
The ALJ issued a fully favorable decision, finding Anderson disabled and entitled
Title XVI benefits. However, Anderson contends the ALJ made the following errors in
his decision: (1) the ALJ improperly determined his disability onset date; (2) he failed to
fully develop the record; and (3) he failed to provide specific and legitimate reasons for
rejecting the opinions of one of Anderson’s treating physicians and a lay witness. For the
following reasons, the Court finds Anderson lacks standing to challenge these alleged
errors.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), “(a)ny individual, after any final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party ... may
obtain a review of such decision by a civil action.” “Implicit in the statute is the
requirement that the party seeking review of the Commissioner's decision must have been
aggrieved by the decision.” Social Security Disability Law & Procedure in Federal Court
§ 7:2; see Buck v. Secretary, 923 F.2d 1200, 1203 (6th Cir. 1991) (“The claimant has no
standing to appeal a fully favorable decision.”); Jones v. Califano, 576 F.2d 12, 18 (2d
Cir. 1978) (“Section 405(g) assumes as a condition for judicial review that the
determination by the Secretary ... will be adverse to the claimant of benefits. It makes no
provision for judicial review of a determination favorable to the complainant.”).
Moreover, under Article III of the Constitution, “a party may not appeal from a favorable
judgment simply to obtain review of findings it deems erroneous.” Mathias v. WorldCom
Techs., Inc., 535 U.S. 682, 684 (2002).

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In this case, ALJ Hartford’s decision was fully favorable to Anderson. ALJ
Hartford specifically stated in his decision that, “[a]fter careful review of the entire
record, the undersigned finds that the claimant was disabled as of March 29, 2010, the
date [sic] prior application for supplemental security income was filed, and that the
claimant’s disability has continued through the date of this decision.” (AR. 40.) The
Court considered whether an error in Anderson’s disability onset date could result in a
decision that is otherwise not fully favorable. However, the Court concludes Anderson
would be entitled to the same amount of benefits with a disability onset date of March 29,
2010 or January 1, 2008 (the onset date Anderson now alleges). See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382(c)(7) (regardless of the alleged disability onset date, Title XVI benefits are only
payable beginning the month after the application was filed, regardless of how long the
applicant suffered from a particular infirmity). Accordingly, because ALJ Hartford’s
decision was fully favorable to Anderson, Petitioner lacks standing to challenge the
decision.
CONCLUSION
Because the Court does not have jurisdiction to review the ALJ’s decision not to
reopen Anderson’s Title II claim, and because Anderson lacks standing to challenge the
ALJ’s fully favorable decision finding him disabled and entitled to Title XVI benefits, the
Court will dismiss Anderson’s Petition for Review.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 8

ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, the Court being otherwise fully advised in the premises,
it is hereby ORDERED that the Petition for Review is DISMISSED.

September 30, 2016

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 9