Fletcher v. Corizon Health Services

Filing 30

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER denying 20 Plaintiff's Motion Request for Discovery; denying 20 Plaintiff's Request for Appointment of Counsel; denying 23 Plaintiff's Motion for Stipulation to Attend Settlement Conference; denying 23 Plaintiff's Request for Appointment of Counsel; denying 23 Plaintiff's Motion for Stay; denying 24 Plaintiff's Motion for Joinder. The Clerk is directed to reassign this matter to a District Judge due to lack of all parties consent under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. Signed by Judge Candy W. Dale. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (cjs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

WILLIAM FLETCHER,
Case No. 1:14-cv-00532-CWD
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

v.
CORIZON, LLC; MICHAEL
BLURTON; BOBETTE WHITING; and
DR. ANDREW THUERNAGLE,
Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
Pending before the Court are three non-dispositive motions ripe for adjudication in
this prisoner civil rights case. (Dkts. 20, 23, and 24.) 1 The Court finds that the decisional
process would not be aided by oral argument. Dist. Idaho L. Rule 7.1(d). After reviewing
the record and the arguments of the parties, the Court enters the following Order
addressing the pending motions.

1

Additionally pending is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. 21.) This matter was
conditionally assigned to the undersigned Magistrate Judge. However, not all parties filed their
consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction. Therefore, this matter must be reassigned to a District
Judge for the consideration of the dispositive motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff William Fletcher is in the custody of the Idaho Department of Correction
(IDOC) and is currently incarcerated at Idaho State Correctional Center (ISCC).
Plaintiff’s claims arise from dental treatment he received at ISCC. The IDOC contracts
with Defendant, Corizon Health Services, a private entity, for the medical treatment of its
inmates.
On August 1, 2014, Fletcher sought emergency dental treatment at the prison, but
was turned away by Defendant Michael Blurton, a registered nurse at the prison, who told
Fletcher the pain in his mouth was not an emergency. Compl., ¶ 2. (Dkt. 3 at 3.) Fletcher
later attempted to seek treatment from Defendant B. Whiting, a dental assistant at the
prison. Whiting allegedly “refuse[d] to make the necessary appointment” for Fletcher to
be evaluated by a dentist and said that Fletcher would have to wait to see the dentist. Id.
Whiting informed Fletcher there was only one part-time dentist available to treat all the
inmates in need of dental care. Id.
Fletcher was examined by the dentist, Dr. Thuernagle, on September 2, 2014, just
over one month after first complaining of the pain in his mouth. Dr. Thuernagle informed
Fletcher that he had two abscessed teeth and two cavities and which would ordinarily
require a root canal, crowns, and fillings. Id. However, Briggs alleges Dr. Thuernagle
stated that this treatment was too expensive and would take too much time, so he
recommended that the teeth be extracted instead. Id.
Fletcher names, as defendants in this case, in addition to Corizon, Michael
Blurton, B. Whiting, and Dr. Thuernagle; each defendant is being sued in his individual
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2

capacity. He seeks compensatory damages in the amount of $125,000 and punitive
damages in the amount of $200,000.
The Court issued an initial review order, finding Fletcher sufficiently stated
colorable Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Blurton, Whiting, and
Thuernagle, based on his dental treatment, and also against Corizon, based on alleged
understaffing with respect to dental services. Further, the Court found Fletcher
sufficiently stated negligence and medical malpractice claims against all Defendants.
ANALYSIS
1.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Discovery (Dkt. 20)
“[D]iscovery documents must be served upon other counsel and parties but must

not be filed with the Clerk of the Court unless on order of the Court or for use in the
proceeding.” Dist. Idaho L. Rule 5.4. This Court’s Order provides, “[d]iscovery is
exchanged between parties, not filed with the Court.” (Dkt. 19).
Fletcher filed a Motion for Discovery (Dkt. 20), requesting several documents
from Defendants. Fletcher’s motion is improper, as discovery is permissible without a
motion and it is not necessary for Briggs to file his initial discovery requests with the
Court; instead, he should serve his discovery requests by sending them to Defendants
directly. Therefore, the Court will deny the motion for discovery.
2.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Stipulation to Attend a Settlement Conference (Dkt. 23)
“At any time after a civil action or proceedings is commenced, any party may

request…a Judicial Settlement Conference.” Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 16.4(b)(1)(B). The
Court’s Scheduling Order provides: “[s]hould Plaintiff and any Defendant wish to attend
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3

a settlement conference, they shall file a stipulation to attend a settlement conference, and
the case will then be referred to the Court’s ADR Director.” (Dkt. 19 at 5.)
Fletcher filed a Motion for Stipulation to Attend a Settlement Conference (Dkt.
23). Fletcher’s motion is mislabeled as a “stipulation,” as Defendants did not join in the
request. Instead, Defendants object to attending a settlement conference, at least at this
time. 2 Because both parties do not join in the request for a settlement conference, the
Court will deny Fletcher’s request.
3.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Stay on 8/17/15 Scheduling Order (Dkt. 23.)
A party seeking to amend a scheduling order must demonstrate “good cause” to do

so. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). This good cause standard “primarily considers the diligence
of the party seeking the amendment.” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d
604, 609 (9th Cir.1992). A court may modify the scheduling order if the deadline cannot
be reasonably met despite the diligence of the party seeking the modification. Id.
Here, Fletcher requests the Court issue an order staying the Scheduling Order.
(Dkt. 19.) Other than including “Motion for Stay on 08/17/15 Scheduling Order” in the
caption of his multi motion document, Fletcher does not provide any support as to why
the Court should stay the scheduling order. Because Fletcher has not alleged or shown
“good cause” to support a modification of the Court’s order, the Court will deny
Plaintiff’s motion without prejudice.

2

Defendants expressed their desire to wait until the Court issues its order on the pending Motion for
Summary Judgment (Dkt. 21) before discussing the possibility of settlement with Fletcher.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4

4.

Plaintiff’s Requests to Amend Complaint
“A party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or

the court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a)(2). In a court’s determination to grant leave to amend, the court considers
“whether amendment would prejudice the defendant and whether amendment would be
futile.” Ridenour v. Bank of Am., N.A., 23 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1204 (D. Idaho 2014) (citing
Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051–52 (9th Cir.2003).
Fletcher timely makes two requests for leave to amend his complaint. 3 First, he
requests leave to join an additional defendant to this lawsuit. (Dkt. 23.) Second, in his
motion for discovery, he requests to amend the amount of relief sought in his complaint.
(Dkt. 20.) The Court will discuss each request more fully below.
A. Join P.A. C. Brown, employee of Corizon
Fletcher requests permission to join C. Brown, a physician’s assistant employed
by Corizon, as a defendant in this law suit. Fletcher alleges, on July 31, 2015, nearly
three months shy of one year after the events giving rise to his dental claims, he visited
ISCC medical and was seen by Brown for recurring chest pain. Fletcher desires to join
Brown, because, allegedly, Brown deliberately failed to treat Fletcher’s severe chronic
chest pain. Essentially, in addition to Fletcher’s desire to join Brown as a party to this
lawsuit, Fletcher is requesting to add claims to the current suit—against Brown. The
Court finds joinder, as proposed by Fletcher, would be improper.
3

The deadline in this case for the parties to file motions to amend or to join parties is November 15, 2015.
Schd. Ord, ¶ 2. (Dkt. 19 at 2.)
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5

“[U]nrelated claims against unrelated parties may not be brought in a single
action.” Bishop v. Harrington, 2013 WL 1962684, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 10, 2013), aff’d,
586 Fed. Appx. 386 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir.
2007). “Plaintiff may bring a claim against multiple defendants so long as (1) the claim
arises out of the same transaction or occurrence, or a series of transactions and
occurrences, and (2) there are common[ ] questions of law or fact.” Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P.
20(a)(2). “Only if the defendants are properly joined under Rule 20(a) will the Court
review the other claims to determine if they may be joined under Rule 18(a), which
permits joinder of multiple claims against the same party.” Id.
The events giving rise to the current claims of inadequate dental care are not
related to the events giving rise to Fletcher’s claims against Brown for inadequate
medical care for his chest pain. For this reason, joinder is improper. In addition, taking
into consideration that a dispositive motion has already been filed and the parties are in
the middle of discovery, the Court finds joinder of parties and additional claims, at this
time, would result in unnecessary delay. For these reasons, the Court will deny Fletcher’s
motion. If Fletcher desires to pursue his claims against Brown, he may do so by filing
another lawsuit. 4

4

In Fletcher’s motion for joinder of Brown, he indicated he was in the process of exhausting his
administrative remedies. But, in his response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment Part 2 (Dkt.
29), though Fletcher primarily references his claims related to dental care, he attaches the grievances and
appeal form related to his proposed claims against Brown. The Court will construe the attached
documents as Fletcher’s reply to Defendant’s response to Fletcher’s motion for joinder of Brown.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6

B. Revise amount of relief sought
Hidden in Fletcher’s motion requesting discovery, he requests permission also to
amend his complaint to increase the amount of damages requested. In his complaint,
Fletcher requested $125,000 in compensatory damages and $200,000 in punitive
damages. 5 Compl. (Dkt. 3 at 18.) He now seeks to recover $1.4 million in compensatory
and punitive damages. Defendants have not expressed opposition to this motion, as they
did not file a response. Should this case proceed to trial, Defendants will have an
opportunity to contest the amended figure. Under these circumstances, leave for the
amendment will be granted. See Cimino v. Glaze, 228 F.R.D. 169, 174 (W.D.N.Y. 2005)
(“courts have held that an amendment increasing the amount of claimed damages should
generally be allowed, absent some demonstrable prejudice to the defendant.”).
5.

Plaintiff’s Requests for Appointment of Counsel (Dkt. 20, 23)
Fletcher also asks the Court to reconsider its earlier order denying his request for

appointment of counsel. He contends that, because he is inexperienced with the discovery
process and trial, it would be unfair to proceed without counsel.
A pro se prisoner’s confusion or ignorance of the law is not, by itself, a reason to
appoint counsel. (Dkt. 12.) Fletcher has not established “exceptional circumstances”
warranting the appointment of counsel under the standards applicable in the Ninth
Circuit. See Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986). Nor has
Fletcher met his burden under Louen v. Twedt, 2007 WL 915226 (E.D. Cal. March 26,

5

In his request to increase damages sought, Fletcher asserts he originally asked for $550,000 in damages.
The Court is unclear how Fletcher computed this total.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 7

2007), establishing grounds for reconsideration for the Court’s prior order. He has offered
no compelling reason for the Court to reconsider its previous denial of appointment of
counsel at this time. Therefore, Fletcher’s request for counsel will be denied.
CONCLUSION
The Court will deny Fletcher’s Motion Request for Discovery, Motion for
Stipulation to Attend a Settlement Conference, Motion for Stay on 08/17/15 Scheduling
Order, Motion to Join Defendant Brown, and his requests for appointment of counsel.
The Court will, however, grant Fletcher’s motion to amend the complaint to increase the
relief originally sought.
ORDER
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1) Plaintiff’s Motion Request for Discovery (Dkt. 20) is DENIED;
2) Plaintiff’s Motion for Stipulation to Attend a Settlement Conference (Dkt.
23) is DENIED;
3) Plaintiff’s Motion for Stay on 08/17/15 Scheduling Order (Dkt. 23) is
DENIED without prejudice;
4) Plaintiff’s Motion for Joinder for P.A. C. Brown Employee of Corizon
Medical (Dkt. 24) is DENIED;
5) Plaintiff’s request to amend relief sought in complaint is GRANTED;
6) Plaintiff’s requests for Appointment of Counsel (Dkt. 20, 23) are DENIED;
and

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 8

7) The Clerk is directed to reassign this matter to a District Judge due to lack
of all parties’ consent under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

November 23, 2015

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 9