Lejardi v. Homedale Joint School District et al

Filing 40

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER denying 36 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (st)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
GLORIA LEJARDI,
Case No. 1:14-cv-00539-BLW
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

v.
HOMEDALE JOINT SCHOOL
DISTRICT, a school district; BOARD
OF TRUSTEES OF THE HOMEDALE
JOINT SCHOOL DISTRICT; DION
FLAMING, in both his official and
individual capacities; and ROB SAUER,
in his official and individual capacity,
Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3). Dkt. 36. The Motion is fully briefed and at issue, and
the Court finds that oral argument would not significantly aid the decisional process. For
the reasons explained below, the Court will deny the Motion.
BACKGROUND
The facts of this case were laid out in detail in the Court’s last memorandum
decision and order (Dkt. 34) and will not be repeated again here. Necessary to deciding
this Motion is the following: Plaintiff Gloria Lejardi was hired in 1989 by Defendant

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Homedale Joint School District.1 After her termination in June of 2014, Lejardi filed suit,
alleging four causes of action within her Complaint: (1) a deprivation of her property
interest without due process and in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) wrongful
termination in violation of the Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act; (3) failure to
allow her to grieve her discharge in violation of Idaho Code § 33-517; and (4) breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Compl., Dkt. 1, p. 2.
On October 21, 2015, the District moved for summary judgment as to Lejardi’s
Section 1983 claim. Dkt. 9. Thereafter, Lejardi moved for partial summary judgment as
to her Section 33-517 claim, and the District then moved for summary judgment on that
claim as well. Dkts. 13, 19. After oral argument on January 26, 2016, the Court entered a
Memorandum Decision and Order on March 14, 2016. Dkt. 34. Therein, the Court found
that the District was entitled to summary judgment as to Lejardi’s Section 1983 claim,
and that Lejardi was entitled to summary judgment as to her Section 33-517 claim. Id.
The Court also decided to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law
claims. Id.
On March 28, 2016, the District filed this motion, arguing that the Court lacked
original jurisdiction over Lejardi’s Section 1983 claim, and therefore lacks jurisdiction to

1

All Defendants will be referred to collectively as “the District.”

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retain any of the remaining state law claims. Dkt. 36. Lejardi responded on April 7, 2016,
and the District filed its reply on April 18, 2016. Dkts. 38, 39. Trial in this matter is
currently set for September 26, 2016.
ANALYSIS
If a court determines it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the action.
FED.R.CIV.P. 12(h)(3). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), supplemental jurisdiction is
constitutional if the pendent state law claims are part of the same case or controversy as
the federal claim. Trustees of Construction Industry and Laborers Health and Welfare
Trust v. Desert Valley Landscape & Maintenance, Inc., 333 F.3d 923, 925 (9th Cir.2003).
In other words, the supplemental jurisdiction power extends to all state and federal claims
which one would ordinarily expect to be tried in one judicial proceeding. See Penobscot
Indian Nation v. Key Bank of Maine, 112 F.3d 538, 563–64 (1st Cir.1997); Coastal Fuels
of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Caribbean Petroleum Corp., 79 F.3d 182, 190 (1st Cir.1996). Such
is the case here, since all claims flow from the termination of Lejardi’s employment.
A district court may nevertheless decline jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)
“if (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially
predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original
jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for
declining jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); see also United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383

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U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (stating that “pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of
plaintiff’s right”); Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)
(recognizing that a federal court should also consider and weigh the values of judicial
economy, convenience, fairness, and comity in order to decide whether supplemental
jurisdiction would be proper).
In its previous order, the Court concluded that “[m]aintaining supplemental
jurisdiction over Lejardi’s state law claims is appropriate, efficient, and judicially
economical. The District has not provided any compelling reason as to why the Court
should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Accordingly, this portion of the
District’s motion for summary judgment shall be denied.” Dkt. 34, p. 15.
Now, the thrust of the District’s argument is that this Court lacked original
jurisdiction over Lejardi’s sole federal claim—her due process claim under Section
1983—and that therefore, the Court lacks the discretion to retain the rest of Lejardi’s
state-based claims. Dkt. 36-1, p. 2. The District argues that the Court is without original
jurisdiction over Lejardi’s Section 1983 claim because, in dismissing Lejardi’s Section
1983 claim on the grounds that she lacked a constitutionally protected property interest,
the Court “effectively divested itself of original jurisdiction.” Id., p. 8. The Court is not
persuaded by these arguments as explained below.
1.

Deciding Lejardi’s Section 1983 claim on the merits did not divest this
Court of original jurisdiction.

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In support of its argument that this Court has no authority to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction, the District relies on the case of Herman Family Revocable Trust v. Teddy
Bear, 254 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 2001). But the Herman case is inapposite. Indeed, the
District even cites to the very language that immediately disposes of its argument:
This case, however, is not about the district court’s discretionary exercise
of supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c). Rather, it concerns the
authority of the court to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction under §
1367(a). A dismissal on the merits is different from a dismissal on
jurisdictional grounds. If the district court dismisses all federal claims on
the merits, it has discretion under § 1367(c) to adjudicate the remaining
claims; if the court dismisses for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it has
no discretion and must dismiss all claims.
Dismissal on jurisdictional grounds means that the court was without
original jurisdiction and has no authority to do anything other than to
determine its jurisdiction.
Herman, 254 F.3d at 806 (emphasis added).
Here, the Court dismissed the Section 1983 claim on the merits, not on a
jurisdictional ground; accordingly, it may exercise its discretion under Section 1367(c) to
adjudicate the remaining claims. In the Court’s previous order, it ultimately concluded—
after embarking on a thorough review of the parties’ briefing and an extensive review of
relevant case law—that Lejardi did not have a constitutionally protected property interest.
This was not a dismissal on jurisdictional grounds; this was—plainly—a decision on the
merits of the case.
2.

Lejardi’s Section 1983 claim was substantial.

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A related question is whether Lejardi’s Section 1983 claim was a “substantial”
constitutional claim. Under the substantiality doctrine, a district court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction when the question presented is too insubstantial to consider. Hagans v.
Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536–39, 66 S.Ct. at 1378–80 (1974). The claim must be “so
insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court or otherwise
completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy within the jurisdiction
of the District Court, whatever may be the ultimate resolution of the federal issues on the
merits.” Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666, 94 S.Ct. 772,
776, 39 L.Ed.2d 73 (1974).
The District argues that the Section 1983 claim was insubstantial because clearly
established law foreclosed it. Specifically, the District asserts that Lejardi’s Section 1983
claim “never had any chance of surviving dismissal for the well-accepted reason that an
at-will employee will never have a constitutionally protected property interest.” Dkt. 39,
p. 6.
Contrary to the District’s assertion, Lejardi’s Section 1983 claim was substantial.
The District seems to forget that Lejardi disputed her at-will status, and that the primary
issue at the summary judgment level was whether Lejardi could overcome the at-will
presumption, and relatedly, whether “the circumstances surrounding the employment
relationship could cause a reasonable person to conclude that the parties intended a
limitation on discharge.” Bollinger v. Fall River Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 152 Idaho 632,

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638, 272 P.3d 1263, 1269 (2012). While the Court ultimately concluded that Lejardi did
not rebut the at-will presumption and did not have a constitutionally protected property
interest, that conclusion is a far cry from dismissing the claim as “insubstantial,
implausible, [or] foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court.” Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons
Co., 775 F.2d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir.1985) (internal citations omitted).
Because the Court dismissed Lejardi’s Section 1983 claim on the merits, it was not
divested of its original jurisdiction and it properly exercised supplemental jurisdiction
over the remaining state-law claims. The District’s Motion is denied.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED:
1.

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Dkt. 36) is

DENIED.

DATED: May 18, 2016

_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
Chief Judge
United States District Court

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