Sparks v. Blades

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. 3 ) is DENIED, and this entire action is DISMISSED with prejudice. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (jp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

MICHAEL SPARKS,
Case No. 1:15-cv-00036-BLW
Petitioner,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

v.
RANDY BLADES, Warden,
Respondent.

Pending before the Court is Petitioner Michael Sparks’s Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus, challenging his Bannock County conviction of second-degree murder.
(Dkt. 3.) Respondent has filed an answer and brief in support of dismissal (Dkt. 11);
Petitioner did not file a reply. The Court takes judicial notice of the records from
Petitioner’s state court proceedings, lodged by Respondent on August 4, 2015. (Dkt. 10.)
See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); Dawson v. Mahoney, 451 F.3d 550, 551 (9th Cir. 2006).
Having carefully reviewed the record in this matter, including the state court
record, the Court concludes that oral argument is unnecessary. See D. Idaho L. Civ. R.
7.1(d). Accordingly, the Court enters the following Order denying habeas corpus relief.
BACKGROUND
In May 2011, Petitioner killed his wife by beating her with a baseball bat and a
rifle. (State’s Lodging A-2 at 26-28.) Pursuant to a binding plea agreement, Petitioner
pleaded guilty in the Sixth Judicial District Court in Bannock County, Idaho, to secondMEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1

degree murder. (State’s Lodging D-4 at 1.) In Idaho, second-degree murder carries a
minimum sentence of 10 years and a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. Idaho
Code § 18-4004. Petitioner’s plea agreement provided for a fixed term of 20 years in
prison, “with the indeterminate term open for argument.” (State’s Lodging D-4 at 1.) The
trial court accepted the plea and sentenced Petitioner to a unified term of life
imprisonment with 20 years fixed.
Petitioner filed a direct appeal, contending that the indeterminate portion of his
sentence was excessive. (State’s Lodging B-1.) Petitioner also filed an unsuccessful
motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35. (State’s Lodging C1 at 17-18, 21.) The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s sentence, and the Idaho
Supreme Court denied review. (State’s Lodging B-4 & B-6.)
Petitioner, proceeding pro se, then filed a second Rule 35 motion in the state
district court, contending that his sentence was illegal because the trial court was required
to set the fixed portion of his sentence at the statutory minimum of 10 years in prison.
(State’s Lodging C-1 at 24-30.) The motion was denied. (Id. at 31-34.) The Idaho Court
of Appeals affirmed the denial of the Rule 35 motion, and the Idaho Supreme Court
denied review. (State’s Lodging D-4 & D-7.)
In his federal Petition, Petitioner asserts the following claims: (1) that his sentence
violates due process because it is not authorized under state law; and (2) that the trial
court violated Petitioner’s due process rights by “failing to follow its own laws by
increasing petitioners [sic] punishment in access [sic] of what is allowable” under the
second-degree murder statute. (Dkt. 3 at 5-6.) These claims, though listed separately in
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2

the Petition, are essentially the same claim: that because Idaho Code § 18-4004 requires a
10-year mandatory minimum sentence, the only sentence that the trial court had the
authority to impose, as a fixed term, was 10 years. In essence, Petitioner claims that the
statutory minimum is also the statutory maximum for purposes of the fixed portion of his
sentence for second-degree murder.
HABEAS CORPUS STANDARD OF LAW
Federal habeas corpus relief may be granted on claims adjudicated on the merits in
a state court judgment when the federal court determines that the petitioner “is in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(a). Under § 2254(d), as amended by the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), federal habeas relief is further limited to instances
where the state court’s adjudication of the petitioner’s claim
(1)

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light
of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Although a federal habeas court reviews the state court’s “last
reasoned decision” in determining whether a petitioner is entitled to relief. Ylst v.
Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991), a state court need not “give reasons before its
decision can be deemed to have been ‘adjudicated on the merits’” under § 2254(d).
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011).
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3

When a party contests the state court’s legal conclusions, including application of
the law to the facts, § 2254(d)(1) governs. That section consists of two alternative tests:
the “contrary to” test and the “unreasonable application” test.
Under the first test, a state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established
federal law “if the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in
[the Supreme Court’s] cases, or if it decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court]
[has] done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694
(2002).
Under the second test, to satisfy the “unreasonable application” clause of
§ 2254(d)(1) the petitioner must show that the state court—although identifying “the
correct governing legal rule” from Supreme Court precedent—nonetheless “unreasonably
applie[d] it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000). “Section 2254(d)(1) provides a remedy for instances in which
a state court unreasonably applies [Supreme Court] precedent; it does not require state
courts to extend that precedent or license federal courts to treat the failure to do so as
error.” White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1706 (2014).
A federal court cannot grant habeas relief simply because it concludes in its
independent judgment that the decision is incorrect or wrong; rather, the state court’s
application of federal law must be objectively unreasonable to warrant relief. Lockyer v.
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003); Bell, 535 U.S. at 694. If there is any possibility that
fair-minded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision, then
relief is not warranted under § 2254(d)(1). Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4

(2011). The Supreme Court has emphasized that “even a strong case for relief does not
mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Id. (internal citation
omitted). To be entitled to habeas relief under § 2254(d)(1), “a state prisoner must show
that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in
justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law
beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697,
1702 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Though the source of clearly established federal law must come from the holdings
of the United States Supreme Court, circuit precedent may be persuasive authority for
determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme
Court precedent. Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir. 2000). However,
circuit law may not be used “to refine or sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court
jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that th[e] Court has not announced.” Marshall v.
Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1450 (2013).
When a petitioner contests the reasonableness of the state court’s factual
determinations, the petitioner must show that the state court decision was based upon
factual determinations that were “unreasonable . . . in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). A “state-court factual determination
is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a
different conclusion in the first instance.” Wood v. Allen, 130 S. Ct. 841, 849 (2010).
This strict deferential standard of § 2254(d) applies to habeas claims except in the
following narrow circumstances: (1) where the state appellate court did not decide a
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5

properly-asserted federal claim; (2) where the state court’s factual findings are
unreasonable under § 2254(d)(2); or (3) where an adequate excuse for the procedural
default of a claim exists. Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). In those
circumstances, the federal district court reviews the claim de novo. In such a case, as in
the pre-AEDPA era, a district court can draw from both United States Supreme Court and
well as circuit precedent, limited only by the non-retroactivity rule of Teague v. Lane,
489 U.S. 288 (1989).
DISCUSSION
Petitioner claims that his right to due process was violated when he was sentenced
to a fixed term of imprisonment that exceeded the statutory minimum of 10 years.
1.

Clearly-Established Law
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that the states may not deprive any person of

life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const., amend. XIV. “Liberty
interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment may arise from two sources—the Due
Process Clause itself and the laws of the States.” Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466
(1983), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
Petitioner’s habeas claims are, at bottom, a contention that Idaho’s second-degree
murder statute creates a liberty interest in a sentence of which the fixed portion is 10
years in prison. A state statute creates a liberty interest only in limited circumstances.
First, the statute must contain “substantive predicates” to govern the official’s decision—
here, the trial judge’s decision regarding Petitioner’s sentence. Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v.
Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 463 (1989). Second, the statute must include “explicitly
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6

mandatory language, i.e., specific directives to the decisionmaker that if the regulations’
substantive predicates are present, a particular outcome must follow.” Id.
2.

State Court Decision
The Idaho Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s claim that the 20-year fixed

portion of his sentence was in excess of the sentence authorized by the second-degree
murder statute. The court cited the following provisions of the Idaho Code:
Idaho Code Section 18-107 provides:
Whenever, in this code, the punishment for a
crime is left undetermined between certain
limits, the punishment to be inflicted in a
particular case, must be determined by the court
authorized to pass sentence within such limits as
may be prescribed by this code.
Idaho Code Section 19-2513 provides in part:
The court shall specify a minimum period of
confinement and may specify a subsequent
indeterminate period of custody. The court shall
set forth in its judgment and sentence the
minimum period of confinement and the
subsequent indeterminate period, if any,
provided that the aggregate sentence shall not
exceed the maximum provided by law. . . .
The sentence authorized for second degree murder is set forth
in [Idaho Code] § 18-4004 as “imprisonment not less than ten
(10) years and the imprisonment may extend to life.”
(State’s Lodging D-4 at 2 (emphasis added).)
The state court of appeals held that Idaho Code § 18-107 “gives the trial court
authority to impose a sentence anywhere within th[e] limits” of § 18-4004, that is, a
sentence anywhere between 10 years and life in prison. (Id.) Therefore, the court held
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 7

that Petitioner’s sentence “is within the limits set by . . . § 18-4004 and is not illegal.”
(Id.)
3.

Petitioner Is Not Entitled to Habeas Relief
The decision of the Idaho Court of Appeals was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly-established Supreme Court precedent, nor was it
based on an unreasonable factual finding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Further, Petitioner’s
claims would fail even under de novo review.
Idaho Code § 19-2513 clearly requires a trial judge to “specify a minimum period
of confinement” and allows the judge to also impose a “subsequent indeterminate period
of custody.” Pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-107, a person convicted of a crime has a due
process right to be sentenced to a minimum period of confinement “within such limits as
may be prescribed” by the particular statute at issue, and the second-degree murder
statute applicable here clearly delineates 10 years as the minimum period of confinement.
Because that statute also authorizes a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, Petitioner
had a due process right to be sentenced anywhere between 10 years and life
imprisonment. This right was plainly satisfied by the trial court’s imposition of a fixed
20-year term followed by an indeterminate life term. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled
to relief on his habeas claims.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Petition will be denied.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 8

ORDER
IT IS ORDERED:
1.

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. 3) is DENIED, and this entire
action is DISMISSED with prejudice.

2.

The Court does not find its resolution of this habeas matter to be reasonably
debatable, and a certificate of appealability will not issue. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c); Habeas Rule 11. If Petitioner wishes to appeal, he must file a
timely notice of appeal with the Clerk of Court. Petitioner may seek a
certificate of appealability from the Ninth Circuit by filing a request in that
court.

DATED: March 24, 2016

_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
Chief Judge
United States District Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 9