Huntsman v. State of Idaho

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER. Respondent's Motion for Summary Dismissal 13 is GRANTED, and the Petition is DISMISSED with prejudice. The Court does not find its resolution of this habeas matter to be reasonably debatable, and a certificate of appealability will not issue. Signed by Judge Edward J. Lodge. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (st)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

RONALD JOHN HUNTSMAN, SR.,
Case No. 1:15-cv-00057-EJL
Petitioner,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

v.
RANDY BLADES,
Respondent.

Pending before the Court is Petitioner Ronald John Huntsman Sr.’s Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Dkt. 3.) Respondent has filed a Motion for Summary Dismissal,
arguing that Petitioner’s claims are noncognizable or procedurally defaulted. (Dkt. 13.)
The Motion is now ripe for decision.
Having carefully reviewed the record, including the state court record, the Court
finds that the parties have adequately presented the facts and legal arguments in the briefs
and record and that oral argument is unnecessary. See D. Idaho L. Civ. R. 7.1(d).
Accordingly, the Court enters the following Order granting the Motion and dismissing
this case with prejudice.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1

BACKGROUND
The facts underlying Petitioner’s conviction are set forth clearly and accurately in
State v. Huntsman, 199 P.3d 155 (Idaho Ct. App. 2008), which is contained in the record
at State’s Lodging B-8. The facts will not be repeated here except as necessary to explain
the Court’s decision.
Petitioner and two other defendants were indicted in the Fourth Judicial District
Court in Ada County, Idaho on one count of first-degree murder, along with a deadly
weapon enhancement for the use of a firearm during the murder, and two counts of
kidnaping. Huntsman, 199 P.3d at 582. After Petitioner chose not to waive his speedy
trial rights and objected to the prosecution’s request for a continuance of the trial, the
state moved to dismiss the charges without prejudice. The trial court granted the motion,
and Petitioner did not file an immediate appeal of the dismissal without prejudice.
Petitioner was later re-charged in a second indictment. Id. at 583.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss in the second case, arguing that his “state and
federal constitutional rights to a speedy trial had been intentionally violated when the
prosecution dismissed and re-filed the identical charges.” Id. Defense counsel agreed to
continue the hearing on the motion to allow the state more time. (State’s Lodging A-4 at
131.) During a later hearing, the trial court noted that the motion to dismiss was still
pending. Defense counsel then stated, “I am less concerned about that,” to which the
court responded, “I think the case law is fairly clear on that.” (Id. at 208.) The trial court
noted that it would take up that motion the next week. However, it appears that the
motion to dismiss was not argued, and the court never ruled on it.
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The jury found Petitioner guilty of all charges, and Petitioner received a unified
life sentence with 30 years fixed for first-degree murder, along with concurrent unified
terms of 20 years in prison with 10 years fixed on the kidnaping charges. Huntsman, 199
P.3d at 583. Petitioner appealed both the judgment of conviction and the dismissal of the
first case without prejudice. The appeals were consolidated. (State’s Lodging B-1.)
On appeal, Petitioner argued—among other things—that his right to a speedy trial
was violated by the dismissal and re-filing of charges. (State’s Lodging B-2.) The Idaho
Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the
appeal from the dismissed case because the notice of appeal was untimely. Huntsman,
199 P.3d at 584. According to the court, the proper procedure to preserve Petitioner’s
appellate rights as to the dismissal and refiling of the charges would have been either (1)
to file a timely appeal of the dismissal without prejudice of the first indictment, or (2) to
file and pursue a motion to dismiss the second indictment. Id. The court of appeals also
held that Petitioner had forfeited the argument that the trial court should have granted his
motion to dismiss, because (1) it was Petitioner’s “burden to obtain a ruling on his
motion” to dismiss the second indictment, and (2) the trial court never ruled on the
motion to dismiss. Id. at 586. The Idaho Supreme Court denied review. (State’s Lodging
B-11.)
Petitioner later filed a petition for state postconviction relief, arguing that his trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance in several ways, including by (1) failing to file a
timely appeal in the dismissed case, and (2) failing to ensure that the court ruled on the
motion to dismiss the second indictment, thereby preserving Petitioner’s statutory and
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constitutional speedy trial arguments. (State’s Lodging C-1 at 41-44.) The trial court
denied the petition, holding (1) that it lacked jurisdiction to grant relief on the claim that
counsel failed to file a timely appeal, (2) that the postconviction petition was untimely as
to that claim in any event, and (3) that Petitioner could not show prejudice from counsel’s
failure to pursue his speedy trial motion in the second case because the motion would not
have been granted. (Id. at 598-99, 727-29.)
The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed. (State’s Lodging D-4.) The court denied, on
two alternative grounds, Petitioner’s claim that counsel should have appealed the
dismissal of the first indictment. First, the Court held that Idaho’s postconviction
statutory scheme does not allow relief to be granted unless the Petitioner was convicted in
the case under review. Because Petitioner was not convicted in the dismissed case, he
could not obtain postconviction relief. (Id. at 5-7.) Second, the court of appeals held that
the claim was untimely. A postconviction petition must be filed within one year of the
expiration of the time to appeal, and more than one year had elapsed between the date
when the dismissal of the first indictment became final (November 18, 2005, 42 days
after the dismissal order), and the date Petitioner filed his postconviction petition
(February 20, 2009). (Id. at 7.) Therefore, Petitioner’s claim that counsel should have
appealed the dismissed case was untimely. (Id. at 8.) As to Petitioner’s other claim—that
counsel should have pursued his motion to dismiss the indictment in the second case—
the court of appeals held that Petitioner had not shown a reasonable probability that the
motion would have been granted. (Id. at 13.) The Idaho Supreme Court denied review.
(State’s Lodging D-6.)
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4

In the instant federal habeas corpus petition, Petitioner asserts the following
claims:
Claim 1:

The state court erred in concluding that it did
not have jurisdiction to grant postconviction
relief with respect to the dismissed case.

Claim 2:

Petitioner’s trial counsel was ineffective in
failing to file a timely appeal from the dismissal
of the first indictment.

Claim 3:

The Idaho state constitution and “common law”
required some sort of postconviction relief,
even though there was no judgment of
conviction in the dismissed case.

Claim 4:

The state court erred in concluding that the
postconviction petition was untimely as to
Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance for
failing to appeal the dismissed case.

(Dkt. 3 at 2-3.) Petitioner does not claim that his trial counsel was ineffective in the
second case for failing to pursue Petitioner’s motion to dismiss based on a statutory or
constitutional right to a speedy trial.
Respondent has moved for summary dismissal of the Petition.
DISCUSSION
1.

Standards of Law
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases authorizes the Court to summarily

dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus when “it plainly appears from the face of the
petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district
court.” The Court may also take judicial notice of relevant state court records in

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5

determining whether to dismiss a petition.1 Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); Dawson v Mahoney,
451 F.3d 550, 551 (9th Cir. 2006). Where appropriate, a respondent may file a motion for
summary dismissal, rather than an answer. White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir.
1989).
2.

Claims 1, 2, and 4: Alleged Errors during State Postconviction Proceedings
Federal habeas corpus relief may be granted on claims adjudicated on the merits in

a state court judgment when the federal court determines that the petitioner “is in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(a) (emphasis added). Accordingly, claims of error during state postconviction
proceedings, like any state law errors, are not cognizable on federal habeas review.
Franzen v. Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26, 26 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
Claims 1, 2, and 4 all allege that the Idaho state courts erred during their
adjudication of Petitioner’s state postconviction proceedings. Therefore, they are not
cognizable in this federal habeas corpus action and must be dismissed. See id.
3.

Claim 2: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Based on Counsel’s Failure to
Appeal the Dismissal without Prejudice in the First Case
A.

Standard of Law for Procedural Default

A habeas petitioner must exhaust his or her remedies in the state courts before a
federal court can grant relief on constitutional claims. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S.
838, 842 (1999). To do so, the petitioner must invoke one complete round of the state’s
established appellate review process, fairly presenting all constitutional claims to the state
1

The Court takes judicial notice of the records from Petitioner’s state court proceedings, lodged by
Respondent on July 20, 2015. (Dkt. 12.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6

courts so that they have a full and fair opportunity to correct alleged constitutional errors
at each level of appellate review. Id. at 845. In a state that has the possibility of
discretionary review in the highest appellate court, like Idaho, the petitioner must have
presented all of his federal claims at least in a petition seeking review before that court.
Id. at 847. “Fair presentation” requires a petitioner to describe both the operative facts
and the legal theories upon which the federal claim is based. Gray v. Netherland, 518
U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996).
The mere similarity between a federal claim and a state law claim, without more,
does not satisfy the requirement of fair presentation. See Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364,
365-66 (1995) (per curiam). General references in state court to “broad constitutional
principles, such as due process, equal protection, [or] the right to a fair trial,” are likewise
insufficient. See Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999). The law is clear
that, for proper exhaustion, a petitioner must bring his federal claim before the state court
by “explicitly” citing the federal legal basis for his claim. Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d
666, 669 (9th Cir. 2000), as amended, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001).
When a habeas petitioner has not fairly presented a constitutional claim to the
highest state court, and it is clear that the state court would now refuse to consider it
because of the state’s procedural rules, the claim is said to be procedurally defaulted.
Gray, 518 U.S. at 161-62. Procedurally defaulted claims include those within the
following circumstances: (1) when a petitioner has completely failed to raise a claim
before the Idaho courts; (2) when a petitioner has raised a claim, but has failed to fully
and fairly present it as a federal claim to the Idaho courts; and (3) when the Idaho courts
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have rejected a claim on an adequate and independent state procedural ground. Id.;
Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750
(1991).
To be an “adequate” state ground, a procedural bar must be one that is “‘clear,
consistently applied, and well-established at the time of the petitioner’s purported
default.” Martinez v. Klauser, 266 F.3d at 1093-94 (quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d
1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994)). A state procedural bar is “independent” of federal law if it
does not rest on, and if it is not interwoven with, federal grounds. Bennett v. Mueller, 322
F.3d 573, 581 (9th Cir. 2003).
The state bears the ultimate burden of establishing that a state procedural bar is
adequate and independent. However, “[o]nce the state has adequately pled the existence
of an independent and adequate state procedural ground as an affirmative defense, the
burden to place that defense in issue shifts to the petitioner. The petitioner may satisfy
this burden by asserting specific factual allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of
the state procedure, including citation to authority demonstrating inconsistent application
of the rule.” Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586.
B.

Claim 2 Is Procedurally Defaulted

Respondent argues that Claim 2 is procedurally defaulted because (1) the Idaho
Court of Appeals concluded it lacked jurisdiction over the claim, (2) the state court of
appeals’ conclusion that the claim was untimely was based on an adequate and
independent state procedural ground, and (3) Petitioner’s petition for discretionary review
in the Idaho Supreme Court requested review on briefs already submitted. (Dkt. 13 at 13.)
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 8

Because the Court agrees that the Idaho Court of Appeals applied an adequate and
independent timeliness bar in rejecting Claim 2, the Court need not address Respondent’s
other arguments.
Petitioner raised Claim 2 in his petition for state postconviction relief. However,
the Idaho Court of Appeals determined that the petition was untimely. (State’s Lodging
D-4 at 7-8.) Respondent has sufficiently alleged that Idaho’s one-year statute of
limitations for filing a postconviction petition, found in Idaho Code § 19-4902, is an
adequate and independent state procedural ground, and Petitioner has not offered any
evidence to suggest otherwise. See Bennett, 332 F.3d at 586. Therefore, Claim 2 is
procedurally defaulted.
C.

Petitioner Has Not Established That He Is Excused from the Procedural
Default of Claim 2

If a petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted, a federal district court cannot hear
the merits of the claim unless the petitioner meets one of two exceptions: (1) a showing
of actual innocence, which means that a miscarriage of justice will occur if the
constitutional claim is not heard in federal court, Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 329
(1995); or (2) a showing of adequate legal cause for the default and prejudice arising
from the default, Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986).
However, Petitioner has not argued that cause and prejudice or actual innocence
excuses the default of Claim 2, despite having been alerted to the existence of these
doctrines by the state’s Motion for Summary Dismissal. (See Dkt. 13, 15, 16.) Therefore,
Claim 2 must be dismissed as procedurally defaulted.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 9

CONCLUSION
Claims 1, 2, and 3 of the Petition are not cognizable on federal habeas review, and
Claim 2 is procedurally defaulted. Therefore, the Petition must be dismissed with
prejudice.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED:
1.

Respondent’s Motion for Summary Dismissal (Dkt. 13) is GRANTED, and
the Petition is DISMISSED with prejudice.

2.

The Court does not find its resolution of this habeas matter to be reasonably
debatable, and a certificate of appealability will not issue. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c); Habeas Rule 11. If Petitioner wishes to appeal, he must file a
timely notice of appeal with the Clerk of Court. Petitioner may seek a
certificate of appealability from the Ninth Circuit by filing a request in that
court.

DATED: February 25, 2016

_________________________
Edward J. Lodge
United States District Judge

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