Vanzant v. Wilcox et al

Filing 41

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER. IT IS ORDERED: Plaintiff's Motion to Allow Amended Complaint 39 is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court shall enter the Amended Complaint (Dkt. 39-1) on the docket as a separate docket entry. The Corizon Defendants� 39; Motion to Dismiss 23 is DENIED as MOOT. Defendant Wilcox's Motion to Dismiss 32 is DENIED as MOOT. Plaintiff may proceed on (1) his Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Dave Wilcox, Christopher Craig, Casey Eggiman, Daniel Cole, Travis Ball, Effie Reed-Rodriguez, Officer Larsen, Veronica Ferro, and Corizon, LLC, and (2) his ADA claims against the IDOC. All other claims against all other Defendants are DISMISSED without prejudice. Defendants Wilcox, Craig, Eggiman, Cole, Bal l, Reed-Rodriguez, Larsen, Ferro, Corizon, and the IDOC shall answer the Amended Complaint within 21 days after entry of this Order. Signed by Judge Edward J. Lodge. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (st)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

BRAD VANZANT,
Case No. 1:15-cv-00118-EJL
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

v.
DEPUTY DAVE WILCOX; SGT.
CHRISTOPHER CRAIG; OFFICER
CASEY EGGIMAN; CPL. DANIEL
COLE; OFFICER TRAVIS BALL;
EFFIE REED-RODRIGUEZ;
VERONICA FERRO; LT.
GREENLAND; LT. CLARK;
CORIZON, LLC.; DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTION; OFFICER LARSEN;
DR. YOUNG; N.P. POLSON; and N.P.
GELOK,
Defendants.

Plaintiff Brad Vanzant, a prisoner in the custody of the Idaho Department of
Correction (“IDOC”) and currently incarcerated at Idaho State Correctional Institution
(“ISCI”), is proceeding pro se in this civil rights action. Plaintiff has been allowed to
proceed on Eighth Amendment claims (filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983) and/or claims
under the American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) against Defendants IDOC, Dave
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1

Wilcox, Christopher Craig, Casey Eggiman, Daniel Cole, Travis Ball, Effie ReedRodriguez, Officer Larsen, Veronica Ferro, and Corizon, LLC (“Corizon”). (Dkt. 12; see
also Dkt. 18-20 & 28, clarifying the true names of Defendants).
Now pending before the Court are two Motions to Dismiss for failure to state a
claim filed by (1) Defendants Corizon, Effie Reed-Rodriguez, and Veronica Ferro (“the
Corizon Defendants”) (Dkt. 23), and (2) Defendant Wilcox (Dkt. 32). Also pending is
Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend (Dkt. 39), in which Plaintiff seeks to add Dr. Young, Nurse
Practitioner Polson, and Nurse Practitioner Gelok as Defendants.1 Although Defendants
IDOC, Craig, Eggiman, Cole, and Ball (“the IDOC Defendants”) have waived service,
they have not responded to Plaintiff’s Complaint by filing a motion or an answer.
Defendant Larsen has not appeared or waived service.
Having fully reviewed the record, the Court finds that the facts and legal
arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record and that oral argument is
unnecessary. See D. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 7.1. Accordingly, the Court enters the following
Order granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend and denying as moot the two pending
Motions to Dismiss.
The Court has also reviewed the Amended Complaint pursuant to its screening
authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, applying the standards of Rules 8 and 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the Court concludes that the Amended
1

Plaintiff also seeks to name as Defendants “any other unnamed medical providers who work at
the Idaho State Correctional Institution, who have had contact with the Plaintiff concerning his in-ability
to walk without proper pain medication and a special built brace for his leg.” (Dkt. 23.) Because these
potential Defendants remain unidentified, Plaintiff may not proceed against them at this time. However,
he may move to amend his Complaint at a later date if later discovers the identities of these other medical
providers through the course of discovery.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2

Complaint states plausible claims upon which relief may be granted, under § 1983 and/or
the ADA, against Defendants Wilcox, Craig, Eggiman, Cole, Ball, Reed-Rodriguez,
Larsen, Ferro, Corizon, and the IDOC, those Defendants shall answer the Amended
Complaint within 21 days after entry of this Order. The Court will not entertain any
further Rule 12(b)(6) motions.
Finally, counsel for the IDOC Defendants must inform the Court and Plaintiff
within 21 days after entry of this Order whether counsel accepts service on behalf of
Defendant Larsen. If not, Plaintiff must effect service of process upon Defendant Larsen
within 90 days of the date of this Order.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed the instant civil rights complaint on March 31, 2015 (mailbox rule).2
The Complaint alleges that without pain medication and a special brace, Plaintiff cannot
walk due to severe pain and lack of strength in his legs. Plaintiff claims that (1)
Defendants denied him a wheelchair and adequate pain medication during at least some
of his incarceration, (2) Plaintiff was placed in a non-handicapped accessible cell and
required to use non-accessible showers, and (3) Plaintiff was placed in segregated
housing without a hearing.

2

Error! Main Document Only.Prisoners are usually entitled to the benefit of the “mailbox rule,”
which provides that a legal document is deemed filed on the date a petitioner delivers it to the prison
authorities for filing by mail, rather than the date it is actually filed with the clerk of court. See Houston v.
Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-71 (1988); Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2009).

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3

The Court previously reviewed the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A3 and
determined that the Complaint stated plausible Eighth Amendment claims against
Defendants Wilcox, Craig, Eggiman, Cole, Ball, Reed-Rodriguez, Larsen, Ferro, and
Corizon, as well as plausible ADA claims against the IDOC based on the accessibility
issues identified in the Complaint (but not the denial of a wheelchair). (See Dkt. 12 at 67, 9, 11, 13.) The Complaint did not state colorable claims under the Due Process Clause.
Moreover, the Court did not allow Plaintiff to proceed on any state law claims because he
had not identified any such claims, though Plaintiff was instructed that he could move to
amend his Complaint to assert state law claims. (Id. at 13-14.) Though Plaintiff has
moved to amend and submitted a proposed amendment, he has still not identified any
state law claims that he intends to assert. (See generally Dkt. 39-1.)
The Corizon Defendants and Defendant Wilcox now claim that the Complaint
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Dkt. 23, 32.)
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND and
THE COURT’S REVIEW OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
In considering whether Plaintiff should be allowed to amend his Complaint and in
reviewing the Amended Complaint, the Court has applied the screening requirements of
28 U.S.C. § 1915A, as well as the pleading requirements of Rule 8, the standards
applicable to motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), and the
standards for amendment under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In its

3

Prior to the Court’s initial review, the case was dismissed due to an internal processing error and
then reopened. (See Dkt. 11.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4

review of the Amended Complaint, the Court has also considered the arguments asserted
by the Corizon Defendants and Defendant Wilcox in their respective motions to dismiss.
1.

Standards of Law
The Court is required to review complaints filed by prisoners seeking relief against

a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity, to determine
whether summary dismissal is appropriate. The Court must dismiss a complaint or any
portion thereof that states a frivolous or malicious claim, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Review of a complaint under § 1915A is akin to a
review following a motion to dismiss—the Court applies Rule 8 pleading standards, as
well as Rule 12(b)(6) standards, to determine whether the complaint fails to state a claim
for relief. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216-17 (9th Cir. 2011); Mitchell v. South
Carolina, 2012 WL 786349, at *4 n.5 (D.S.C. Feb. 27, 2012) report and recommendation
adopted, No. CA 3:12-153-CMC-PJG, 2012 WL 786345 (D.S.C. Mar. 9, 2012) aff'd sub
nom. Mitchell v. South Carolina, 474 F. App’x 298 (4th Cir. 2012).
A complaint fails to state a claim for relief under Rules 8 and 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if the factual assertions in the complaint, taken as true,
are insufficient for the reviewing court plausibly “to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. In other words, although the Rules “do[] not
require detailed factual allegations, . . . [they] demand[] more than an unadorned, theMEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If
the facts pleaded are “merely consistent with a defendant’s liability,” the complaint has
not stated a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Amendments to pleadings are governed by Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The courts “should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(2). The Ninth Circuit has explained the reasoning behind allowing the opportunity
to amend:
In exercising its discretion with regard to the amendment of
pleadings, a court must be guided by the underlying purpose
of Rule 15—to facilitate decision on the merits rather than on
the pleadings or technicalities. This court has noted on several
occasions that the Supreme Court has instructed the lower
federal courts to heed carefully the command of Rule 15(a)
. . . by freely granting leave to amend when justice so
requires. Thus Rule 15’s policy of favoring amendments to
pleadings should be applied with extreme liberality.
Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1987) (internal citations, quotation
marks, and alterations omitted). “In the absence of any apparent or declared reason—such
as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to
cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing
party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.”—it is
appropriate for a court to grant leave to amend. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182
(1962).
This liberal amendment policy is even more important with respect to pro se
plaintiffs, who generally lack legal training. Courts must liberally construe civil rights
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6

actions filed by pro se prisoners so as not to close the courthouse doors to those truly in
need of relief. Eldridge, 832 F.2d at 1135, 1137. A pro se litigant bringing a civil rights
suit must have an opportunity to amend the complaint to overcome deficiencies unless it
is clear that those deficiencies cannot be overcome by amendment. Id. at 1135-36.
Although several factors contribute to the analysis of whether a plaintiff should be
allowed an opportunity to amend, futility alone can justify denying such an opportunity.
Johnson v. Buckley, 356 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004).
2.

Discussion
After careful review of all of the parties’ submissions in this case, the Court

concludes that the proposed Amended Complaint states plausible Eighth Amendment
claims against Defendants Wilcox, Craig, Eggiman, Cole, Ball, Reed-Rodriguez, Larsen,
Ferro, and Corizon, as well as plausible ADA claims against the IDOC.
A.

Eighth Amendment Medical Care Claims

Plaintiff asserts Eighth Amendment claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state
a colorable § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the
Constitution or created by federal statute proximately caused by the conduct of a person
acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991).
Prison or jail officials generally are not liable for damages in their individual capacities
under § 1983 unless they personally participated in the alleged constitutional violations.
Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677
(“[E]ach Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her
own misconduct.”). However, “[a] defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under §
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 7

1983 ‘if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional
deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful
conduct and the constitutional violation.’” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir.
2011) (quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)).
As explained in the Court’s Initial Review Order, the Eighth Amendment
guarantees the right to adequate medical care in prison. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
106 (1976). To state a plausible Eighth Amendment medical treatment claim, a plaintiff
must show that a defendant acted with deliberate indifference to the Plaintiff’s serious
medical needs. Id. “[D]eliberate indifference entails something more than mere
negligence, [but] is satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very
purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at
835. A prison official or prison medical provider acts with “deliberate indifference . . .
only if the [prison official] knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health
and safety.” Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). Medical malpractice, negligence, or mere
disagreements between an inmate and medical personnel as to necessary treatment do not
support a cause of action under the Eighth Amendment. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240,
242 (9th Cir. 1989); Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (per
curiam).
i.

Claim against Defendant Wilcox

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment medical care claim against Defendant Wilcox—an
Ada County sheriff’s deputy—is based on Wilcox’s conduct in transporting Plaintiff
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 8

from the Ada County Jail to ISCI. According to the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff had
been allowed a wheelchair when he was incarcerated in the Ada County Jail, and
Defendant Wilcox was aware of this. When Wilcox transported Plaintiff to ISCI (in a
wheelchair), he allegedly told ISCI officials that Plaintiff “could walk[,] . . . did not need
a wheelchair, and . . . was ‘faking it.’” (DKt. 39-1 at 2.) Allegedly as a result of this
statement, the wheelchair in which Plaintiff was transported “was taken away.” (Id.)
The Court concludes that the Amended Complaint states a plausible Eighth
Amendment claim against Defendant Wilcox. Plaintiff’s assertions that he used a
wheelchair while incarcerated in Ada County Jail and that Wilcox transported Plaintiff to
ISCI in a wheelchair give rise to a reasonable inference that Wilcox was aware of a
substantial risk that Plaintiff required the use of a wheelchair as a part of his medical
treatment. Further, Wilcox’s alleged statement that Plaintiff was “faking it” is sufficient
to support an inference that Wilcox deliberately disregarded that substantial risk.
As noted earlier, for a defendant to be liable under § 1983, that defendant’s
conduct must have proximately caused the injury of which the plaintiff complains.
Defendant Wilcox contends that, even assuming he made the statements attributed to him
in the complaint, those statements could not have caused the alleged constitutional
violations. According to Wilcox, common sense dictates that it is “unrealistic that the
IDOC Defendants would disregard this obvious method of transport [a special
handicapped vehicle in which Plaintiff was brought to ISCI], and instead rely on an
unofficial and contradictory comment made by a transporting deputy.” (Dkt. 33 at 6.)
Although Defendant Wilcox’s argument may prove to be well-taken, the Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 9

concludes—at this early stage of the proceedings—that it is plausible Defendant
Wilcox’s alleged statements, at the very least, swayed the opinion of the prison staff
initially responsible for Plaintiff’s custody upon his arrival at ISCI, and that those staff
members denied Plaintiff the use of a wheelchair on the basis of that opinion. Therefore,
Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Deputy Wilcox requires further factual
development and cannot be dismissed at this time.
ii.

Claims against the Corizon Defendants

Like the initial complaint, the Amended Complaint states a plausible claim against
Defendants Effie Reed-Rodriguez, Veronica Ferro, and Corizon. Plaintiff claims that
Reed-Rodriguez and Ferro would not allow Plaintiff the use of a wheelchair despite his
protests that he could not walk—even on the crutches Reed-Rodriguez offered him—
without severe pain. (Dkt. 39-1 at 8.) These Defendants allegedly told Plaintiff, “[W]e
will not give you a wheel chair . . . .” (Id.) Contrary to Reed-Rodriguez’s and Ferro’s
arguments in their Motion to Dismiss, these allegations raise a plausible inference that
these Defendants knew of, and disregarded, a risk that Plaintiff needed a wheelchair. The
inference is not strong, and Plaintiff will be required at summary judgment to support his
assertions with evidence, but Plaintiff has provided enough at the pleading stage to
survive a motion to dismiss by the individual medical provider Defendants.
As to Defendant Corizon, the Court previously concluded that the complaint stated
a plausible Eighth Amendment policy claim against Corizon based on (1) Plaintiff’s
assertions that Corizon did not employ a medical provider who was qualified to prescribe
a wheelchair, and (2) the alleged statement of a Corizon employee that, as a matter of
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 10

policy, Corizon does not allow its employees to prescribe narcotic pain medication. (Dkt.
12.) That conclusion remains unchanged.
Corizon contends Plaintiff’s allegation that he can walk only with a special brace
and sufficient pain medication is implausible because Plaintiff is a convicted drug
offender and because “pain medications do not cure illness or disease; they relieve pain.”
(Dkt. 23-1 at 7.) Although these assertions may be true, they are irrelevant. It is common
knowledge that, in general, treatment provided by appropriate pain medication can reduce
pain, thereby allowing a person to engage in activities he would otherwise be in too much
pain to withstand. Further, “the existence of chronic and substantial pain” is a serious
medical need for purposes of an Eighth Amendment analysis. McGuckin v. Smith, 974
F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted), overruled on other
grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
Though Corizon is correct that a prison inmate cannot dictate a specific pain
medication, medical providers who consistently prescribe a medication that they know is
ineffective and refuse even to consider other potential medications might well exhibit
deliberate indifference. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against Corizon cannot be dismissed
on the pleadings alone.
iii.

Claims against the IDOC Defendants and Defendant Larsen

The Amended Complaint also states plausible Eighth Amendment claims against
IDOC Defendants Craig, Eggiman, Cole, and Ball. Plaintiff claims he informed these
Defendants that he had no strength in his legs and could not walk without proper medical
treatment, but that they required him nonetheless to move about on his own, resulting in
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 11

severe pain and injury, and that they placed him in a cell that was not handicappedaccessible. Although non-medical personnel such as Defendants Craig, Eggiman, Cole,
and Ball are generally entitled to rely on the opinions of medical professionals with
respect to the treatment of an inmate, such reliance will not shield an officer of liability if
“a reasonable person would likely determine [the medical treatment] to be inferior.”
Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 986 (9th Cir. 2012), overruled in part on other grounds
by Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). At this point, the Court
concludes that there is at least a plausible inference of deliberate indifference on the part
of the IDOC Defendants.
The Complaint also states a colorable claim against Defendant Larsen, based on
Larsen’s alleged knowledge of Plaintiff’s inadequate medical treatment and failure to
intervene. (Dkt. 39-1 at 6.) Plaintiff informed Larsen that Plaintiff’s cell “had no hand
rails or any way to use the toilet, nor did it have any available means to walk in the cell,
or to use the sink.” (Id.) Larsen allegedly told Plaintiff that “any further attempts to get a
wheel chair will result in a [Disciplinary Offense Report] for manipulating staff.” (Id.)
These allegations are sufficient to withstand screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
According to Plaintiff, Defendant Larsen is an employee of the IDOC. Because
Larsen has not waived service, the Court will require counsel for the IDOC to disclose
whether service will be waived on behalf of Defendant Larsen. If counsel notifies the
Court and Plaintiff that counsel does not accept service on behalf of Defendant Larsen,
Plaintiff shall have 90 days from the date of this Order within which to effect service of
process on Defendant Larsen.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 12

iv.

Claims against new Defendants: Young, Polson, and Gelok

The Amended Complaint’s only allegations against Defendants Young, Polson,
and Gelok are that these Defendants acted with deliberate indifference “by denying both
the medication and leg brace,” confining Plaintiff to a wheelchair, and “allowing
[Plaintiff] to live in constant pain.” (Dkt. 39-1 at 12-13.) Such allegations do not establish
that these Defendants personally participated in the alleged inadequate medical treatment
or that they are subject to supervisory liability. For these reasons, Plaintiff may not
proceed against these Defendants.
B.

ADA Claims

Plaintiff also asserts claims under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. Title II of
the ADA applies to an “individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
modifications to rules, policies, or practices . . . meets the essential eligibility
requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities
provided by a public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). Title II extends to prison inmates
who are deprived of the benefits of participation in prison programs, services, or
activities because of a disability. See Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 211
(1998).
In order to proceed with an ADA claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege (1) that
he has a disability; (2) that he is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive a public
entity’s services, programs, or activities; (3) that he was denied the benefits of those
services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public
entity; and (4) that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 13

his disability. See Weinreich v. Los Angeles Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976,
978 (9th Cir. 1997).
By statutory definition, a Title II ADA claim must be brought against the state or
the state entity. See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006); Becker v. Oregon,
170 F. Supp. 2d 1061 (D. Or. 2001). The state entity is required to “make reasonable
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary
to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate
that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service,
program, or activity.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7).
The ADA is not a remedy for inadequate medical treatment. See Simmons v.
Navajo County, 609 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d
246, 249 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The ADA does not create a remedy for medical
malpractice.”)) However, the statute can be used to challenge the lack of accessible
prison facilities when officials deny a prisoner the use of assistive devices. See St. Pierre
v. McDaniel, 1999 WL 109927, at *1, (9th Cir. March 2, 1999) (unpublished) (“Given
the evidence presented by [the plaintiff] concerning the effect of defendants’ failure to
provide him with his crutches, we conclude the district court erred by granting summary
judgment on his Eighth Amendment and ADA claims concerning access to the showers,
recreation, meals, and medical services.”).
Like the initial Complaint, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint states a plausible ADA
claim against IDOC for the accessibility issues identified by Plaintiff. However, because
Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that he was denied a wheelchair or other medical
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 14

treatment on account of his disability, he may not proceed on any ADA claims other than
those based on accessibility.
C.

Remaining Claims

The Amended Complaint does not correct the deficiencies identified by the Court
in its Initial Review Order with respect to Plaintiff’s due process claims against
Defendants Greenland and Clark or his state law claims against any Defendant. Plaintiff
has not adequately alleged a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause, nor has
he identified any specific state law claims he intends to assert against Defendants. (See
Dkt. 12 & 39-1).
With respect to Plaintiff’s reference to an injunction in the separate class action
case of Balla v. Idaho (see Dkt. 39-1 at 9), Plaintiff has not stated an independent and
actionable constitutional claim. Any argument that the IDOC is not complying with a
court order in another case cannot be brought in a separate action, but must instead be
asserted in the original action, through class counsel.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED:
1.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Allow Amended Complaint (Dkt. 39) is GRANTED.
The Clerk of Court shall enter the Amended Complaint (Dkt. 39-1) on the
docket as a separate docket entry.

2.

The Corizon Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 23) is DENIED as
MOOT.

3.

Defendant Wilcox’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 32) is DENIED as MOOT.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 15

4.

Plaintiff may proceed on (1) his Eighth Amendment claims against
Defendants Dave Wilcox, Christopher Craig, Casey Eggiman, Daniel Cole,
Travis Ball, Effie Reed-Rodriguez, Officer Larsen, Veronica Ferro, and
Corizon, LLC, and (2) his ADA claims against the IDOC. All other claims
against all other Defendants are DISMISSED without prejudice.

5.

Defendants Wilcox, Craig, Eggiman, Cole, Ball, Reed-Rodriguez, Larsen,
Ferro, Corizon, and the IDOC shall answer the Amended Complaint within
21 days after entry of this Order.

6.

Counsel for the IDOC Defendants shall inform the Court, within 21 days
after entry of this Order, whether counsel accepts service on behalf of
Defendant Larsen. If not, Plaintiff must effect service of process upon
Defendant Larsen within 90 days of the date of this Order.

DATED: January 6, 2016

_________________________
Edward J. Lodge
United States District Judge

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 16