Macik v. Blades

Filing 42

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER Petitioner's Motion Requesting Records (Dkt. 28 ) is DENIED. Petitioner's Motion Request Court Order Compelling Ada County Clerk of Court to Produce the Requested Records (Dkt. 33 ) is DENIED. Petitioner 9;s Motion to Reopen Case Based on Newly Discovered Evidence and Request for Evidentiary Hearing (Dkt. 34 ) is DENIED. Petitioner's Motion Requesting Summary Judgment (Dkt. 38) is DENIED. Petitioner's Motion Requesting Change of Venue Out side of the District of Idaho (Dkt. 40 ) is DENIED. Respondent's Motion for Summary Dismissal (Dkt. 29 ) is GRANTED, andthe Petition is DISMISSED with prejudice. Signed by Judge Edward J. Lodge. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (jp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

RONALD LEE MACIK,
Case No. 1:15-cv-00226-EJL
Petitioner,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

v.
RANDY BLADES,
Respondent.

This habeas corpus action has been reopened after remand from the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals. Currently pending before the Court is Petitioner Ronald Lee Macik’s
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Dkt. 3.) Respondent has filed a Motion for
Summary Dismissal, arguing that Petitioner’s claims are barred by the one-year statute of
limitations and are procedurally defaulted. (Dkt. 29.) The Motion is now ripe for
adjudication. Several other motions are also pending. (Dkt. 28, 33, 34, 38, & 40.)
The Court takes judicial notice of the records from Petitioner’s state court
proceedings, which have been lodged by Respondent. (Dkt. 27.) See Fed. R. Evid.
201(b); Dawson v Mahoney, 451 F.3d 550, 551 (9th Cir. 2006).
Having carefully reviewed the record, including the state court record, the Court
finds that the parties have adequately presented the facts and legal arguments in the briefs
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1

and record and that oral argument is unnecessary. See D. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 7.1(d).
Accordingly, the Court enters the following Order granting the Motion and dismissing
this case with prejudice.
BACKGROUND
The facts of the case underlying Petitioner’s conviction are set forth clearly and
accurately in State v. Powers, 537 P.2d 1369 (Idaho 1975), the decision on appeal from
the conviction of one of Petitioner’s co-defendants. (See also State’s Lodging F-11 at 2
(quoting the Powers decision).) The facts will not be repeated here except as necessary to
explain the Court’s decision.
In 1972, Petitioner pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and was sentenced to life
in prison without the possibility of parole. (State’s Lodging A-1 at 10-12.) There is no
record of a direct appeal.1
In 1994, Petitioner filed his first federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. See
Macik v. Brennan, Case No. 1:94-cv-00503-BLW. That petition was dismissed, and
Petitioner did not appeal.
Petitioner filed a second federal habeas petition in 2008, which was dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction. See Macik v. Hardison, Case No. 1:08-cv-00360-EJL. Petitioner did
not appeal. Over four-and-a-half years later, Petitioner filed a motion to reopen, which
was denied. Again, Petitioner did not appeal.

1

The Idaho Court of Appeals later found that either (1) Petitioner did not appeal, or (2) any such
appeal was dismissed. (State’s Lodging B-4 at 1.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2

Petitioner did not take any action in state court to challenge his conviction until
nearly forty years after his conviction. On March 14, 2011, Petitioner sent a letter to the
state trial court, which construed the letter as a motion to withdraw Petitioner’s guilty
plea. (State’s Lodging A-1 at 13-18.) The state district court denied the motion for lack of
jurisdiction, because the motion was filed long after the judgment of conviction became
final. (Id. at 31-32.) The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Idaho Supreme Court
denied review. (State’s Lodging B-4, B-6.)
Petitioner filed his first petition for state post-conviction relief in July 2012.
(State’s Lodging C-1 at 3-9.) The state district court dismissed the petition as untimely
pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4902. (Id. at 29-32.) The Idaho Court of Appeals reversed
and remanded because the trial court had not provided Petitioner with the required
twenty-day period before dismissing the petition. (State’s Lodging D-4.) Following the
remand, the trial court again dismissed the petition because it was untimely. (State’s
Lodging G-1 at 41-51, 77-88.) The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Idaho
Supreme Court denied review. (State’s Lodging H-3, H-6.)
By this point, Petitioner had litigated a second petition for post-conviction relief.2
The state district court dismissed the petition pursuant to Idaho’s successive petitions bar,
found in Idaho Code § 19-4908, because Petitioner had not shown a sufficient reason

2

Petitioner instigated the successive post-conviction action by filing a “Verified Motion to Reopen
Case Based on Newly Discovered Evidence. (State’s Lodging E-1 at 5-11.) After Petitioner was
appointed counsel, his attorney “suggested that [Petitioner’s] claims would be more appropriately
considered in a post-conviction petition” and then filed the second post-conviction petition. (State’s
Lodging G-1 at 43; see also State’s Lodging E-1 at 3.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3

why the claims could not have been included in the first post-conviction petition. (State’s
Lodging E-1 at 251-56.)
Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, at the earliest, on
June 17, 2015.3 The Court has construed the Petition as asserting the following claims:
Claim 1(a):

Petitioner was deprived of his right to be
free from compelled self-incrimination.

Claim 1(b):

Petitioner’s guilty plea was involuntary.

Claim 1(c):

The prosecutor withheld exculpatory
evidence.

Claim 2:

Petitioner was deprived of his Sixth
Amendment right to the effective
assistance of trial counsel.

Claim 3(b):

There was insufficient evidence to
support the conviction.

Claim 3(b):

Petitioner is actually innocent.

Claim 4:

Petitioner was deprived of his right to
due process and equal protection because
he was denied access to documents in his
criminal case.

(Dkt. 3, 25.)4
Petitioner was allowed to proceed on his claims to the extent those claims “(1) are
cognizable in a federal habeas corpus action, (2) were timely filed in this Court, and (3)

3

See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-72 (1988) (holding that, if a prisoner is entitled to the
benefit of the mailbox rule, a legal document is deemed filed on the date a Petitioner delivers it to the
prison authorities for filing by mail, rather than the date it is actually filed with the clerk of court); Rule
3(d) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

4

Petitioner has not objected to the Court’s construction of his claims.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4

were either properly exhausted in state court or subject to a legal excuse for any failure to
exhaust in a proper manner.” (Dkt. 25 at 2-3.)
DISCUSSION
1.

Motions Filed by Petitioner
The Court will first address the several motions filed by Petitioner.
A.

Petitioner’s Motions Requesting Records

In Petitioner’s Motion Requesting Records, Petitioner has filed two motions that
request copies of the following state court records:
1.

State Preliminary Hearing Transcript, Docket No. 5L2742 (11/23/71)

2.

State Exhibits List (1 through 10)

3.

Plea Entered by Attorney (March 9, 1972)

4.

Mental Evaluation Report of (June 5, 1972)

5.

Plea Change Hearing (Aug. 31, 1972)

6.

Polygraph Exzamination [sic] Results Report (1972)

7.

Document of United States Attorney General’s
Authorization to Extradite and accept Petitioner in
Federal Jurisdiction (Twice) Idaho to U.S. Prison at
Lewisburg Penn (Dec. 1st Through 3rd 1972) and from
U.S. Prison at Terre Haute Indiana to Vacaville
California (1980-81)

8.

A Complete History of Petitioner’s Custody Care
Treatment and behavior while in Idaho or on Transfer
to Lewisburg Federal Prison and Vacaville California
(1977-78).

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5

(Dkt. 28 at 1.) Petitioner also requests “records documented in the 11/21/13 ROA report
in Case CR-FE-1971-0004949 before Judge Cheri C. Copsey (2011 Through 2013).” (Id.
at 2.)
In Petitioner’s second motion requesting copies of records, entitled “Motion
Request Court Order Compelling Ada County Clerk of Court to Produce the Requested
Records,” Petitioner renews his request for copies of the first seven documents listed
above. (Dkt. 33.)
Petitioner has not explained how any of the documents listed in his motions relate
in any manner to whether his claims are barred by the statute of limitations or are
procedurally defaulted. Rather, these documents appear to be relevant—if at all—only
with respect to the merits of Petitioner’s claims. Because Respondent has filed a Motion
for Summary Dismissal, the merits of the claims are irrelevant at this point in the
proceedings. Therefore, Petitioner’s motions for copies of certain identified records will
be denied.
B.

Petitioner’s Motion to Reopen Case and Motion for Summary Judgment

Petitioner asks that the Court reopen his underlying criminal case and requests an
evidentiary hearing. (Dkt. 34). Petitioner also moves for summary judgment. (Dkt. 38.)
As an initial matter, an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary for the Court to determine
whether the Petition is subject to summary dismissal. Further, in these two motions,
Petitioner argues the merits of his claims. As explained above, the Court’s determination
of whether the claims in the Petition are subject to summary dismissal does not involve

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6

consideration of the merits of those claims. For these reasons, Petitioner’s Motion to
Reopen Case and Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied.
C.

Petitioner’s Motion to Change Venue

Finally, Petitioner asks that the Court transfer this case to another district.
However, in support of his Motion he offers nothing more than bare, conclusory
assertions of judicial bias. Therefore, the Court will deny this Motion.
2.

Respondent’s Motion for Summary Dismissal
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases authorizes the Court to summarily

dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus when “it plainly appears from the face of the
petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district
court.” Where appropriate, a respondent may file a motion for summary dismissal, rather
than an answer. White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989).
Respondent argues that Petitioner’s claims are barred by the one-year statute of
limitations and are procedurally defaulted. Because Petitioner (1) is not entitled to
statutory tolling, (2) is not entitled to equitable tolling, and (3) has not made a colorable
showing of actual innocence, the Court will dismiss the Petition with prejudice as
untimely.5
A.

Standards of Law

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) generally
requires a petitioner to seek federal habeas corpus relief within one year from “the date
on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration
5

The Court need not address Respondent’s procedural default argument.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 7

of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). However, Because
Petitioner’s conviction became final before AEDPA’s enactment, Petitioner “had a oneyear grace period in which to file [his] petition[].” Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243,
1245 (9th Cir. 2001). That is, any federal petition filed after the enactment of AEDPA
must have been filed on or before April 24, 1997. Id. at 1246.
The one-year statute of limitations can be tolled (or suspended) under certain
circumstances. First, AEDPA provides for tolling for all of “[t]he time during which a
properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review . . . is
pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). A motion to reduce a sentence that is not a part of the
direct review process and that requires re-examination of the sentence qualifies as a
collateral review application that tolls the one-year statute of limitations. Wall v. Kholi,
562 U.S. 545, 555-56 (2011). Thus, to the extent that a petitioner properly filed an
application for post-conviction relief or other collateral challenge in state court, the oneyear federal limitations period stops running on the filing date of the state court action
and resumes when the action is completed.
The time before a petitioner files an initial application for collateral review in state
court, however, does not toll the statute of limitation. Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003,
1006 (9th Cir. 1999) (“AEDPA’s statute of limitations is not tolled from the time a final
decision is issued on direct state appeal and the time the first state collateral challenge is
filed because there is no case ‘pending’ during that interval.”), abrogated on other
grounds as stated in Nedds v. Calderon, 678 F.3d 777, 781 (9th Cir. 2012). That is,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 8

AEDPA “does not permit the reinitiation of the [federal] limitations period that has ended
before the state petition was filed.” Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 822 (9th Cir.
2003). Additionally, any post-conviction petition or other collateral proceeding that is
untimely under state law is not considered “properly filed” and thus does not toll the
statute of limitation. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005).
If, after applying statutory tolling, a habeas petition is deemed untimely, a federal
court can still hear the merits of the claims if the petitioner can establish that “equitable
tolling” should be applied to toll the remaining time period. See Jorss v. Gomez, 311 F.3d
1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A] court must first determine whether a petition was
untimely under the statute itself before it considers whether equitable tolling should be
applied.”). The limitations period may be equitably tolled under exceptional
circumstances. “[A] petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows (1) that he
has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance
stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649
(2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In addition, the statute of limitations is subject to an actual innocence exception. A
petitioner who satisfies the actual innocence gateway standard may have his otherwise
time-barred claims heard on the merits. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931-32
(2013); Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 937 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). Actual innocence in
this context means “factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.” Bousley v. United
States, 523 U.S. 614, 624 (1998). Although “habeas petitioners who assert convincing

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 9

actual-innocence claims [need not] prove diligence to cross a federal court’s threshold,” a
court “‘may consider how the timing of the submission and the likely credibility of a
petitioner’s affiants bear on the probable reliability of evidence of actual innocence.’”
McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1935 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 332) (alterations omitted).
B.

The Petition Is Barred by the Statute of Limitations

Absent tolling, the statute of limitations period expired on April 24, 1997, and the
Petition—filed on July 17, 2015—is untimely. See Patterson, 251 F.3d at 1245-46.
Therefore, the claims in the Petition are barred by AEDPA’s one-year statute of
limitations unless Petitioner establishes that he is entitled to sufficient statutory or
equitable tolling or that he is actually innocent.
i.

Statutory Tolling

As set forth above, AEDPA’s one-year limitations period is tolled for all of the
time “during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other
collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(2).
However, Petitioner did not institute any state collateral proceeding until decades
after the statute of limitation had already expired. None of Petitioner’s state postconviction actions can resurrect the expired limitations period under AEDPA, and
Petitioner is therefore not entitled to statutory tolling. See Ferguson, 321 F.3d at 822.
ii.

Equitable Tolling

As noted previously, equitable tolling will apply if (1) the petitioner has pursued
his rights diligently and (2) extraordinary circumstances stood in his way and prevented a
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 10

timely filing. Holland, 560 U.S. at 649. “[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable
tolling under AEDPA is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v.
Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and alteration
omitted). As to the diligence issue, the Supreme Court has held that a petitioner who
“waited years, without any valid justification” to bring his post-conviction claims in state
court, and then waited “five more months after his [post-conviction] proceedings became
final before deciding to seek relief in federal court,” had not acted diligently in pursuing
his rights. Pace, 544 U.S. at 419.
Petitioner has not established extraordinary circumstances that would justify the
application of equitable tolling in this case. Nothing in Petitioner’s submissions suggests
that he was unable to file the instant Petition on time because of any external
circumstances. Indeed, Petitioner instituted two previous federal petitions—one before
AEDPA’s enactment, and one after. Petitioner has not established any reason why he
could not have filed the instant petition before April 1997, or at any time between the
dismissal of his second federal petition and the filing of the instant Petition.
Petitioner has simply not met his burden of showing that extraordinary
circumstances beyond his control prevented him from filing a timely habeas petition or
that he pursued his rights diligently. Thus, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling of
the statute of limitations.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 11

iii.

Petitioner Has Not Established Actual Innocence to Excuse the
Untimely Filing

Petitioner claims he is actually innocent. To take advantage of the actual
innocence gateway exception to the statute of limitations, a petitioner must demonstrate
“that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found [the] petitioner
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. Stated another way, a
petitioner must show it is more likely than not that every reasonable juror would vote to
acquit.
This is an extremely stringent standard that “permits review only in the
‘extraordinary’ case.” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006). A court considering
whether a petitioner has established actual innocence must consider “all the evidence, old
and new, incriminating and exculpatory, admissible at trial or not.” Lee v. Lampert, 653
F.3d 929, 938 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). The actual
innocence analysis “does not turn on discrete findings regarding disputed points of fact,
and ‘[i]t is not the district court’s independent judgment as to whether reasonable doubt
exists that the standard addresses.’” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 539-40 (2006) (quoting
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329 (alteration in original)). Rather, the court must “make a
probabilistic determination about what reasonable, properly instructed jurors would do.”
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329.
Petitioner has not presented any credible evidence that he did not commit the
murder to which he pleaded guilty. Because Petitioner comes nowhere near to meeting
the extremely stringent standard for actual innocence gateway claims, the Court need not

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 12

address Respondent’s argument that Petitioner’s guilty plea prohibits him from raising an
actual innocence argument. (See Dkt. 35 at 3-5.)
CONCLUSION
Petitioner’s claims are barred by AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitation.
Petitioner is not entitled to statutory or equitable tolling, nor has he shown that he is
actually innocent. Therefore, the Petition must be dismissed with prejudice as untimely.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED:
1.

Petitioner’s Motion Requesting Records (Dkt. 28) is DENIED.

2.

Petitioner’s Motion Request Court Order Compelling Ada County Clerk of
Court to Produce the Requested Records (Dkt. 33) is DENIED.

3.

Petitioner’s Motion to Reopen Case Based on Newly Discovered Evidence
and Request for Evidentiary Hearing (Dkt. 34) is DENIED.

4.

Petitioner’s Motion Requesting Summary Judgment (Dkt. 38) is DENIED.

5.

Petitioner’s Motion Requesting Change of Venue Outside of the District of
Idaho (Dkt. 40) is DENIED.

6.

Respondent’s Motion for Summary Dismissal (Dkt. 29) is GRANTED, and
the Petition is DISMISSED with prejudice.

7.

The Court does not find its resolution of this habeas matter to be reasonably
debatable, and a certificate of appealability will not issue. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c); Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. If

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 13

Petitioner wishes to appeal, he must file a timely notice of appeal with the
Clerk of Court. Petitioner may seek a certificate of appealability from the
Ninth Circuit by filing a request in that court.

DATED: January 11, 2017

_________________________
Edward J. Lodge
United States District Judge

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 14