Roman v. Blades et al

Filing 8

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER Plaintiff shall have 30 days within which to file an amended complaint as described above. If Plaintiff does so, he must file (along with the amended complaint) a Motion to Review the Amended Complaint. If Plaintiff does not amend within 30 days, his case may be dismissed without further notice. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (jp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

ALFREDO ROMAN,
Case No. 1:15-cv-00241-BLW
Plaintiff,
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER
v.
RANDY BLADES and BRIAN
KLINGENSMITH,
Defendants.
The Clerk of Court conditionally filed Plaintiff Alfredo Roman’s Complaint as a
result of his status as an Idaho state prisoner. The Court now reviews the Complaint to
determine whether it should be summarily dismissed in whole or in part under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A. Having reviewed the record, and otherwise being fully informed, the Court
enters the following Order requiring Plaintiff to file an amended complaint if he intends
to proceed.
REVIEW OF COMPLAINT
1.

Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is a prisoner in the custody of the Idaho Department of Correction

(IDOC), currently incarcerated at Idaho State Correctional Center (ISCC). Plaintiff

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alleges that on March 7, 2015, he was given a urinalysis test at ISCC. The urine test was
“properly stored until it was shipped by Fed Ex to the Redwood Toxicology Lab on
March 10, 2015.” (Compl., Dkt. 2, at 5.) The laboratory sent an email to IDOC staff on
March 18, 2015, stating that Plaintiff’s urine sample tested positive for “THC
(marijuana).” ISCC medical staff then verified that Plaintiff had not been prescribed any
medication that could have resulted in a positive urine test. (Id.)
Based on Plaintiff’s urine test, ISCC investigative officer Maes issued Plaintiff a
Disciplinary Offense Report (“DOR”) for “possession of drugs . . . in a secure facility.”
Lieutenant Ross approved the DOR, and, at 9:15 p.m. on March 18, 2015, Plaintiff was
served with the DOR. On March 19, 2015, less than 24 hours later, Defendant
Klingensmith called for a hearing on Plaintiff’s DOR. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, IDOC
policy provides that an inmate served with a DOR must be provided at least 24 hours to
prepare for the hearing. Plaintiff asked for a continuance, which was granted. Defendant
Klingensmith rescheduled the hearing for 9:30 a.m. on March 20, 2015. (Id.)
At the hearing, Plaintiff reviewed the laboratory report on the urinalysis test, but
Defendant Klingensmith allegedly allowed Plaintiff only a “cursory review,” before
Klingensmith “reached over with an act of ascendency of his dominion and took [the
report] from Plaintiff’s hands.” (Id. at 6.) Defendant Klingensmith conducted the hearing,
read the DOR into evidence, and found Plaintiff guilty of the DOR. Plaintiff states that he
is not certain that Klingensmith established a proper chain of custody. Plaintiff was

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sentenced to 30 days detention, presumably in a restrictive housing unit, as well as
restitution of $13.50 as reimbursement for the cost of the urinalysis test.
Plaintiff appealed the DOR, arguing that he was not allowed an adequate review of
the lab report, that he was not given enough time to prepare a defense, and that he was
not notified, prior to the hearing, of the amount of restitution that he could be required to
pay if found guilty of the DOR. Plaintiff states that, pursuant to IDOC policy, restitution
for costs relating to a DOR can be required “when requested in the DOR content.” (Id. at
9.) Defendant Warden Randy Blades affirmed the DOR, stating, “The UA reading is
difficult to dispute. The DOR is affirmed based on the body of DOR and evidence of the
report.” (Id. at 7 & Ex. 2.)
Plaintiff claims that after he served his 30-day sentence in detention, he was
reclassified as a close custody prisoner and spent an additional 17 days as a close custody
inmate “with that level’s liberty and property interest.” (Id. at 2.) IDOC officials deducted
the $13.50 in restitution from Plaintiff’s prison trust account.
Plaintiff claims that pursuant to IDOC policy, as well as an order in Balla v. Idaho,
Case No. 1:81-cv-01165-BLW, he was entitled to certain procedural due process
protections in connection with the DOR. Plaintiff alleges he was not provided with these
required protections. He seeks monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief. (Id. at 12.)
2.

Standard of Law for Summary Dismissal
The Court is required to review complaints filed in forma pauperis, or complaints

filed by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee

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of a governmental entity, to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. The
Court must dismiss a complaint or any portion thereof that states a frivolous or malicious
claim, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(d)(2) & 1915A(b).
A complaint fails to state a claim for relief under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure if the factual assertions in the complaint, taken as true, are insufficient
for the reviewing court plausibly “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Id. In other words, although Rule 8 “does not require detailed
factual allegations, . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If the facts pleaded are
“merely consistent with a defendant’s liability,” the complaint has not stated a claim for
relief that is plausible on its face. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff brings his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the civil rights statute.1 To state
a valid claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the
Constitution or created by federal statute proximately caused by the conduct of a person
acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991).
Prison officials generally are not liable for damages in their individual capacities under §

1

Although Plaintiff also states that he is bringing claims pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (see Dkt. 2 at 1), Bivens applies only to
suits against federal, not state, officials. Thus, the Court construes Plaintiff’s Complaint as asserting only
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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1983 unless they personally participated in the alleged constitutional violations. Taylor v.
List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (“[E]ach
Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own
misconduct.”). “A defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 ‘if there
exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a
sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the
constitutional violation.’” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)). This causal connection “can be
established by setting in motion a series of acts by others, or by knowingly refusing to
terminate a series of acts by others, which the supervisor knew or reasonably should have
known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury.” Id. at 1207-08 (internal
quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted).
Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to proceed with his Complaint. The Court
will grant Plaintiff 30 days to amend his Complaint, however. Any amended complaint
must comply with the following standards.
3.

Due Process Claims
Plaintiff asserts procedural due process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Due Process Clause prohibits the government from depriving an individual of a
liberty or property interest without following the proper procedures for doing so. Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558-66 (1974).

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A.

Liberty Interest Claim Regarding Segregation

Plaintiff claims that he was not provided with adequate time to prepare for his
DOR hearing, that the urine sample was not shown to have had an appropriate chain of
custody, and that Plaintiff was only allowed a cursory review of the lab report. Plaintiff
claims that, therefore, the DOR proceedings improperly deprived him of liberty without
due process.
To succeed on a procedural due process claim regarding disciplinary proceedings
in prison, a plaintiff must establish (1) that he possessed a liberty interest in avoiding
discipline and (2) that the defendants deprived him of that interest as a result of
insufficient process. The Supreme Court has held that a prisoner possesses a liberty
interest under the federal Constitution only if a change occurs in confinement that
imposes an “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of
prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). A district court considering
whether an inmate possesses such a liberty interest must analyze three factors: (1)
whether disciplinary segregation was essentially the same as discretionary forms of
segregation [such as administrative segregation and protective custody]; (2) whether a
comparison between the plaintiff's confinement and conditions in the general population
showed that the plaintiff suffered no “major disruption in his environment;” and (3)
whether the length of the plaintiff's sentence was affected. Id. at 486-87. If these factors
are not met, a court may find that there is no liberty interest in not being placed in
disciplinary segregation, which results in a prisoner not being entitled to sue prison

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officials for due process violations arising from the disciplinary hearing. Applying these
factors in Sandin, the Supreme Court determined that a prisoner lacked a protectable
liberty interest in avoiding 30 days of confinement in disciplinary segregation. Id. at 487.
If a prisoner possesses a protectable liberty interest with respect to prison
disciplinary proceedings, then a court must consider to what process the prisoner was
due. This determination must be made on a case-by-case basis. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 560 (1974) (“Consideration of what procedures due process may require under
any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of
the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected
by governmental action.”) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). The Due
Process Clause requires that the inmate receive notice of the charges against him and an
opportunity to respond. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976).
Due process in a prison disciplinary hearing is satisfied if the inmate receives
written notice of (1) the charges, (2) the evidence against him, and (3) the reasons for the
disciplinary action. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-66. An inmate has a right “to call witnesses
and present documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not
be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.” Id. at 566.
Plaintiff has not alleged specific facts giving rise to a plausible inference that he
possessed a liberty interest in avoiding 47 days of segregation in a restricting housing
unit. Plaintiff has not described the conditions of the housing unit to which he was
confined, nor has he offered a comparison of the differences between that unit and

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general population. Further, even assuming that Plaintiff possessed a liberty interest in
avoiding segregation, he has not shown that he was not afforded due process. Plaintiff
was given notice of the charge and an opportunity to review the evidence at the hearing.
Plaintiff does not allege that he was denied the opportunity to present his case or to
present evidence at the hearing.
Plaintiff should keep these standards in mind if he intends to file an amended
complaint.
B.

Property Interest Claim Regarding Restitution Order

Plaintiff claims that he was also deprived of $13.50 in violation of the Due Process
Clause because he was not notified in the DOR that he could be required to reimburse the
IDOC in that amount if found guilty of the DOR.
It is well-established that a prisoner retains a property right in the money in his
prison trust account. Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1523 (9th Cir. 1985). Before a state
or one of its departments can take money from a prisoner’s trust account, it must have
provided him with due process of law. As noted above, however, due process is a flexible
concept and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334.
As to the first Mathews factor, while Plaintiff has a private interest in the money in
this trust account, that interest is not as compelling as a non-incarcerated person’s interest
in controlling his or her own bank account. A prisoner’s management of a trust account
can be limited by numerous reasonable restrictions. See, e.g., Foster v. Hughes, 979 F.2d

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130, 132-33 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that prisoners have no right to place their money in
interest bearing accounts). More generally, a prisoner’s constitutional rights are subject to
regulations that bear a reasonable relationship to the legitimate penological needs of the
prison. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
Next, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of Plaintiff’s money was minimized by
the procedures used in this case. This is not a case in which a prisoner’s funds were
seized without any advance notice or an opportunity to be heard. Plaintiff acknowledges
that IDOC policy specifically states that an inmate found guilty of a DOR may be
required to pay restitution for costs associated with that DOR. Therefore, Plaintiff had
notice that he could be required to reimburse the IDOC for the cost of the urinalysis test,
and he had an opportunity at the DOR hearing to present a defense to the drug charge.
Although Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated their own policy by not explicitly
stating in Plaintiff’s DOR that he could be subjected to a restitution order of $13.50, a
prison need not comply with its “own, more generous procedures” so long as minimum
constitutional due process requirements are met. Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1420
(9th Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. 472; see also Huron
Valley Hosp. v. City of Pontiac, 887 F.2d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 1989) (“[Section 1983] is
thus limited to deprivations of federal statutory and constitutional rights. It does not cover
official conduct that allegedly violates state law.”)
Finally, the government has a compelling interest in seeing that the costs of
enforcing its prison disciplinary rules, and of punishing inmates who take illegal drugs,

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are reimbursed in an orderly and efficient manner. This interest is legitimate, and
ordering restitution is reasonably related to that legitimate penological interest. For these
reasons, the Court concludes that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted with respect to Plaintiff’s property interest claim.
4.

Claims Based on Court Order in Balla v. Idaho
In addition to Plaintiff’s argument that the Constitution and IDOC policy required

additional procedural protections with respect to Plaintiff’s DOR proceedings, he also
claims that such protections were required by an order in the separate class action case of
Balla v. Idaho. However, any argument that the IDOC is not complying with a court
order in another case cannot be brought in a separate action but must instead be asserted
in the original action, through class counsel.
5.

Standards for Amended Complaint
If Plaintiff chooses to amend his § 1983 complaint, he must demonstrate how the

actions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. See Ellis
v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227, 229 (9th Cir. 1980), abrogated on other grounds by Kay v.
Ehler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991). Plaintiff must also allege a sufficient causal connection
between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045;
Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). “Vague and conclusory allegations
of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient . . . .” Ivey v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual

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enhancement.” (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)). Rather, the complaint
must allege in specific terms the following: (1) the particular governmental policy or
custom which caused the deprivation of his constitutional rights or the names of the
persons who caused or personally participated in causing the alleged deprivation of his
constitutional rights; (2) the dates on which the conduct of each defendant allegedly took
place; and (3) the specific conduct or action Plaintiff alleges is unconstitutional.
Further, any amended complaint must contain all of Plaintiff’s allegations in a
single pleading, and cannot rely upon or incorporate by reference prior pleadings. Dist.
Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 15.1 (“Any amendment to a pleading, whether filed as a matter of
course or upon a motion to amend, must reproduce the entire pleading as amended”); see
also Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[An] amended
complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.”),
overruled in part on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, (9th Cir.
2012) (en banc); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542,
1546 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the district court erred by entering judgment against a
party named in the initial complaint, but not in the amended complaint).
Plaintiff shall set forth each different factual allegation in a separate numbered
paragraph. The amended complaint must be legibly written or typed in its entirety, and it
should be clearly designated as the “Amended Complaint.” Plaintiff’s name and address
should be clearly printed at the top left corner of the first page of each document filed
with the Court.

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If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, he must also file a “Motion to Review the
Amended Complaint.” If Plaintiff does not amend within 30 days, or if his amendment
does not comply with Rule 8, this case may be dismissed without further notice. See
Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2013) (“When a litigant knowingly and
repeatedly refuses to conform his pleadings to the requirements of the Federal Rules, it is
reasonable to conclude that the litigant simply cannot state a claim.”).
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff shall have 30 days within which to file an
amended complaint as described above. If Plaintiff does so, he must file (along with the
amended complaint) a Motion to Review the Amended Complaint. If Plaintiff does not
amend within 30 days, his case may be dismissed without further notice.

DATED: November 12, 2015

_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
Chief Judge
United States District Court

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