Burdge v. College of Western Idaho

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER denying 9 Plaintiff's MOTION for entry of Default Judgment; denying 15 Plaintiff's MOTION to Strike; granting 12 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint on or before 4/ 18/2016. Failure to file an amended complaint will result in this action being dismissed with prejudice (Amended Complaint due by 4/18/2016). Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (cjs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

CHRISTOPHER BURDGE,
Case No. 1:15-cv-00251-BLW
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

vs.
COLLEGE OF WESTERN IDAHO,
Defendant.

INTRODUCTION
The Court has before it Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Default Judgment (Dkt. 9),
Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike (Dkt. 15), and Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 12). The
Court will address each Motion below.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Christopher Burdge is a veteran of the United States Navy. Compl. ¶ 1,
Dkt. 1. In 2013, Burdge applied for education funding through the Veterans Retraining
Assistance Program (VRAP). Id. ¶ 3. Burdge’s VRAP application specified he sought to
pursue the Power-Sports and Small Engine Repair Technology degree at the College of
Western Idaho (CWI), though Burdge had not yet applied to CWI. Id. Burdge’s VRAP
application for that program was approved in June 2013. Id.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1

In July 2013, after his VRAP application had already been approved, Burdge
applied to CWI. Id. ¶¶ 7-8. Burdge had several discussions with CWI employees in June
and July 2013 before he applied to CWI. Id. ¶¶ 4-6. Those employees knew Burdge was
seeking to participate in a VRAP program and worked with Burdge to ensure CWI’s
Power-Sports and Small Engine Repair Technology program was an approved VRAP
program. Id. Later that month, CWI approved Burdge’s application. Id. ¶¶ 7-8.
When attempting to register for two core classes in the Power-Sports and Small
Engine Repair Technology program, Burdge learned the classes were full. Id. ¶ 9. In fact,
the two core classes had been full since April 2013. Id. Burdge, concerned about
remaining eligible for VRAP funding, immediately contacted CWI and arranged a
meeting with Will Fanning, Dean of Professional Technical Education. Id. ¶ 11. Fanning
informed Burdge that a waiting list of 11 students already existed for the two core
classes. Id. ¶ 11. Fanning further informed Burdge that he would have to join that waiting
list if he hoped to take the two core classes, despite the fact that Burdge would lose his
VRAP funding if he could not take the two core classes. Id.
Burdge was ultimately unable to register for the two core classes. Id. ¶¶ 12-13.
Accordingly, CWI could not certify that Burdge met VRAP’s eligibility requirements,
and Burdge lost his VRAP funding. Id. In July 2015, Burdge filed a pro se Complaint
against CWI. He contends CWI violated his due process rights because he could not
enroll in the two core classes necessary to retain his VRAP funding.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2

DISCUSSION
1.

Burdge’s Motion for Entry of Default Judgment
Burdge argues that a default judgment should be entered in his favor because CWI

defaulted by failing to plead or defend within 21 days from when Burdge served his
Complaint. Entry of default is proper when a party has failed to plead or otherwise
defend. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Only after a party has defaulted can a default judgment be
entered under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b).
The Court finds that a default judgment should not be entered in Burdge’s favor
because CWI has not defaulted. Burdge served his Complaint on CWI on July 10, 2015.
Summons, Dkt. 2. Though Burdge’s summons (1) failed to provide his name and address
and (2) was not directed at CWI, CWI did not contest Burdge’s service under Fed. R. Fed
R. Civ. P. 4(a). Instead, CWI promptly filed a waiver of service with the Court. Waiver,
Dkt. 5. Since it waived service, CWI had until September 8, 2015 to respond to Burdge’s
Complaint. CWI timely responded on August 28, 2015 by filing a Motion to Dismiss.
Accordingly, the Court will deny Burdge’s Motion for Entry of Default Judgment.
2.

Burdge’s Motion to Strike
Burdge seeks to strike CWI’s Motion to Dismiss. He argues CWI’s Motion to

Dismiss contains impertinent, redundant, and scandalous material because CWI
defaulted. Having found CWI did not default, the Court will deny Burdge’s Motion to
Strike as moot.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3

3.

CWI’s Motion to Dismiss
A.

Legal Standard

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief,” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the
. . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
554 (2007). While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “does not
need detailed factual allegations,” it must set forth “more than labels and conclusions,
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient facts, accepted
as true, that “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. A claim is
facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads sufficient facts to allow the Court to
reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 556. The
plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a
sheer possibility that the defendant acted unlawfully. Id. Where a complaint pleads facts
that are “merely consistent with” the defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line
between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. at 557.
Two “working principles” underlie the pleading standard. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Id. “Rule 8 marks a
notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior
era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more
than conclusions.” Id. at 678-79. Second, only a complaint stating a plausible claim for
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4

relief survives a motion to dismiss. Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a
plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing
court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.
Generally, under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court may not consider any evidence outside
the pleadings without converting the motion into one for summary judgment and giving
the non-moving party an opportunity to respond. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); United States
v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907-08 (9th Cir. 2003). “A court may, however, consider certain
materials—documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in
the complaint, or matters of judicial notice—without converting the motion to dismiss
into a motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 908.
Dismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it is beyond doubt that the
complaint “could not be saved by any amendment.” Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 573 F.3d 728,
737 (9th Cir. 2009). The Ninth Circuit has held that “in dismissals for failure to state a
claim, a district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the
pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by
the allegation of other facts.” Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. N. Calif. Collection Serv.,
Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990). The issue is not whether the plaintiff will prevail
but whether she “is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” See Hydrick v.
Hunter, 466 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2006).
Pro se complaints are evaluated under the Iqbal and Twombly pleading standards.
Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). At the same time, pro se complaints
are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v.
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Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Pro se complaints must therefore be liberally
construed, and pro se plaintiffs must receive the benefit of any doubt. Bretz v. Kelman,
773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
B.

Analysis

Burdge brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of due process.
Because Burdge does not specify whether he seeks to vindicate substantive or procedural
due process rights, the Court will analyze both.
(1)

Substantive Due Process

“The protections of substantive due process have for the most part been accorded
to matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity.”
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994). Under the Fourteenth Amendment’s
substantive due process prong, the “shocks the conscience” test is applied. Cnty. of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998). The threshold question is “whether the
behavior of the governmental officer is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be
said to shock the contemporary conscience.” Id. at 848 n.8.
Taking Burdge’s allegations as true, the Court finds his Complaint fails to state a
claim for deprivation of substantive due process. Burdge has not alleged any facts that
“may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.” Id. More specifically, CWI’s
refusal to enroll Burdge in two core classes that were already full is not “the most
egregious official conduct . . . [and] arbitrary in the constitutional sense.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Thus, Burdge has not pleaded a substantive due process claim.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6

(2)

Procedural Due Process

To state a claim for deprivation of procedural due process, Burdge must establish
he (1) possessed a constitutionally protected property interest, and (2) was denied that
interest without adequate procedural protections. See Lawson v. Umatilla Cnty., 139 F.3d
690, 691-92 (9th Cir. 1998). This Circuit has explained that, “[i]n some instances, a
person can have a constitutionally protected property interest in a government benefit,
such as a license or permit.” Gerhart v. Lake Cnty., 637 F.3d 1013, 1019 (9th Cir. 2011).
But a person cannot simply unilaterally hope or expect to receive the benefit. “He must
instead have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Id. (quoting Bd. Of Regents of State
Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
Here, Burdge has not demonstrated he possessed a property interest. Burdge
argues he had a property interest in VRAP funding because he applied and was approved
for VRAP. Burdge’s argument overlooks that his initial receipt of VRAP funding
remained conditional on his participation in a program meeting VRAP’s requirements.
See The Vow to Hire Heroes Act, Pub. L. No. 112-56, Title II, § 211(b), 125 Stat. 713.
Indeed, Burdge had not yet applied to CWI when he applied and was approved for VRAP
funding. That Burdge would have received VRAP funding if CWI had bypassed the 11
students on the wait list to enroll Burdge in the two core classes does not change the
Court’s analysis. As CWI argues, VRAP imposes no obligation on CWI, or any other
educational institution, to admit VRAP students to any particular program or classes.
Burdge further contends he need not show he possessed a property interest since
he alleges state law tort claims for negligence, gross negligence, and breach of fiduciary
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duty. Burdge, however, has brought suit under § 1983, a cause of action requiring
deprivation of a federal right. See, e.g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 5-8 (1980). Thus,
Burdge cannot raise state law claims against CWI under § 1983.
In sum, Burdge’s Complaint fails to state a claim for deprivation of due process.
Because it is possible that Burdge can cure the defects in his Complaint, the Court will
dismiss the Complaint with leave to amend.
ORDER
1.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Default Judgment (Dkt. 9) is DENIED.

2.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike (Dkt. 15) is DENIED.

3.

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 12) is GRANTED. Plaintiff may file
an amended complaint on or before April 18, 2016. Failure to file an
amended complaint will result in this action being dismissed with
prejudice. Moreover, any amended complaint must address the deficiencies
explained above or it will be subject to dismissal with prejudice.

DATED: March 17, 2016
_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
Chief Judge
United States District Court

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