Szanto v. College of Southern Idaho et al

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER. NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the motion to dismiss 8 is GRANTED. Claims against defendants Dr. Jeff Fox and Curtis Eaton in their official capacity are DISMISSED, and claims against defendants Dr. Thad Scholes, Karl Kleinkopf, Bob Keegan, Jan Mittleider, and Laird Stone in their official and individual capacities are DISMISSED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff has leave to amend her complaint within 10 days. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (st)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

EDIT SZANTO
Case No. 1:15-CV-00262-BLW
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

v.
COLLEGE OF SOUTHERN IDAHO, a
community college; THAD SCHOLES;
KARL KLEINKOPF; BOB KEEGAN;
JAN MITTLEIDER; LAIRD STONE;
JEFF FOX; and CURTIS EATON, in
their individual and official capacities;
Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
The Court has before it defendants’ motion to dismiss some, but not all, claims in
this action. The motion is fully briefed and at issue. For reasons explained below, the
Court will grant the motion, allow plaintiff Szanto to amend her complaint, and permit
her to conduct discovery on some claims being dismissed.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Szanto claims that she was harassed and ultimately fired from her job
with the College of Southern Idaho (CSI) because she was a woman born in Romania.
She seeks damages, injunctive relief, and reinstatement based on violations of Title VII,
§ 1981, and § 1983. She has sued CSI, its former president, Curtis Eaton, its current
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 1

president, Dr. Jeff Fox, and each of the five members of the Board of Trustees, in their
official and individual capacities.
All of the individual defendants seek to dismiss the claims against them in their
official capacities on the ground that these allegations are more properly made against
CSI. The five members of the Board of Trustees seek to dismiss the claims made against
them in their individual capacities on the ground that the amended complaint fails to
identify any actions taken by them personally.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” in order to “give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 545 (2007). While a complaint attacked by a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “does not need detailed factual allegations,” it must set forth
“more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.” Id. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Id. at 570.
A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. Id. at 556. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,”
but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id.
Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, it
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 2

“stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’ ” Id.
at 557.
The Supreme Court identified two “working principles” that underlie Twombly in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). First, the court need not accept as true, legal
conclusions that are couched as factual allegations. Id. Rule 8 does not “unlock the
doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Id. at 67879. Second, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must state a plausible claim for
relief. Id. at 679. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief
will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id.
A dismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it is beyond doubt that the
complaint “could not be saved by any amendment.” Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 573 F.3d 728,
737 (9th Cir. 2009) (issued 2 months after Iqbal). The Ninth Circuit has held that “in
dismissals for failure to state a claim, a district court should grant leave to amend even if
no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could
not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v.
Northern California Collection Service, Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990). The
issue is not whether plaintiff will prevail but whether he “is entitled to offer evidence to
support the claims.” See Hydrick v. Hunter, 466 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2006).

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 3

ANALYSIS
Official Capacity Claims
Szanto’s amended complaint contains numerous allegations against CSI, and
numerous separate allegations against the individual defendants in their official
capacities. Szanto explains that her legal research left her uncertain whether CSI was an
arm of the state with Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Fearing that CSI might be

dismissed, she decided to sue the individual defendants in their official capacity to get the
same result.
The uncertainty over CSI’s entitlement to immunity has now been resolved
because CSI agrees that it is a proper defendant. See CSI Brief (Dkt. No. 16) at p. 5. If
CSI had any Eleventh Amendment immunity, this concession waived that protection. See
Hill v. Blind Industries & Services, 179 F.3d 754, 757-59 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that
immunity under Eleventh Amendment may be waived). There is now no reason to
maintain this action against the individual defendants in their official capacity. See
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985) (holding that naming an individual in
his official capacity is only another way of naming the entity).
Accordingly, the Court will grant the motion to dismiss all the individual
defendants sued in their official capacity. This will require Szanto to file a third amended
complaint that deletes any allegations against these individual defendants in their official
capacity and substitutes CSI in their place.
Personal Capacity Claims

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 4

The defendants seek to dismiss the claims made against the Board members – Dr.
Thad Scholes, Karl Kleinkopf, Bob Keegan, Jan Mittleider, and Laird Stone – in their
individual or personal capacities on the ground that the amended complaint fails to
identify any specific actions of these Board members that support personal liability. The
amended complaint often refers collectively to these five Board members as the “Board
of Trustees” (or “Board”) but only alleges actions taken in their official capacity.
Szanto counters that she tried to get information before filing this lawsuit that
might reveal how the five Board members acted outside their official duties to influence
decisions affecting her employment but was rebuffed by the defendants. They rejected
her public records request on the ground that she would be entitled to discover the
information under the federal discovery rules, obviously anticipating this lawsuit. Taking
the defendants at their word, Szanto argues that “she should have the opportunity to
discover what role each individual played in the decision to dismiss her separate from
their collective action as a Board.” See Szanto Brief (Dkt. No. 13) at p. 7.
The Court will also take defendants at their word. The Court will permit Szanto to
make discovery inquiries into not only whether the Board members engaged in official
actions affecting her employment, but also whether they individually took actions outside
of their official duties (but still under color of state law) that had some impact on her
employment.
At the same time, the defendants are correct that Szanto’s amended complaint as
presently constituted identifies no specific actions that individual Board members took in
their personal capacity, outside of their official duties.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 5

So the claims against the

individual Board members in their individual capacities fails to pass the Iqbal/Twombly
test. The Court will therefore dismiss the claims against the individual Board members
acting in their individual capacities without prejudice to the rights of Szanto to amend her
complaint to add these claims if the discovery discussed above reveals supporting
evidence.
Conclusion
The defendants’ motion to dismiss does not challenge claims brought against CSI
or claims brought against Dr. Jeff Fox and Curtis Eaton in their personal capacities.
Thus, this decision has no impact on those claims.
The Court will grant defendants’ motion to dismiss the claims against all the
individual defendants in their official capacities, and the claims against the five members
of the Board of Trustees in their individual capacities. Szanto shall amend her complaint
to substitute CSI as a defendant in any claim where an individual (or the Board of
Trustees) was previously named in an official capacity, and shall file that third amended
complaint within ten (10) days of this Order.
ORDER
In accordance with the Memorandum Decision set forth above,
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the motion to dismiss
(docket no. 8) is GRANTED, and that (1) claims against defendants Dr. Jeff Fox and
Curtis Eaton in their official capacity are DISMISSED, and (2) claims against defendants
Dr. Thad Scholes, Karl Kleinkopf, Bob Keegan, Jan Mittleider, and Laird Stone in their
official and individual capacities are DISMISSED.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 6

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that Court will permit Szanto to make discovery
inquiries into not only whether the Board members engaged in official actions affecting
her employment, but also whether they individually took actions outside of their official
duties (but still under color of state law) that had some impact on her employment.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that granting the motion to dismiss does not affect
claims against defendant College of Southern Idaho, and does not affect claims against
Dr. Jeff Fox and Curtis Eaton in their individual capacities.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff has leave to amend her complaint to
add the College of Southern Idaho as a defendant in any claim where an individual
defendant (or the Board of Trustees) was named in his or her official capacity within ten
(10) days.

DATED: February 15, 2016

_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
Chief Judge
United States District Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 7