Meyer v. Corizon Medical Services et al
Filing
50
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: Corizon, LLC and Dr. Scott Eliason's Motion for Summary Judgment 39 is GRANTED. Keith Yordy's Motion for Summary Judgment 40 is GRANTED. Brandon M. Meyer's Motion for Summary Judgment 43 is DENIED. Signed by Judge David C. Nye. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (st)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
BRANDON M. MEYER,
Case No. 1:15-cv-00466-DCN
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
v.
CORIZON MEDICAL SERVICES et al.,
Defendants.
I. OVERVIEW
Plaintiff Brandon Meyer complains that Defendants provided him with inadequate
mental health treatment, in violation of the Eight Amendment to the Constitution, while
the Idaho Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) housed him as an inmate at the Idaho
State Correctional Institution (“ISCI”) outside of Kuna, Idaho. Defendant Corizon, LLC
(“Corizon”) is a company that provides medical services to inmates at ISCI. Defendant
Dr. Scott Eliason is a Corizon employee and one of Meyer’s treating psychologists at
ISCI. Defendant Keith Yordy is the warden at ISCI.
This matter comes before the Court on three motions for summary judgment: one
filed jointly by Corizon and Eliason, one filed by Yordy, and one filed by Meyer. Dkts. 39,
40, 43. Having reviewed the record and briefs, the Court finds that the facts and legal
arguments are adequately presented. Accordingly, in the interest of avoiding further delay,
and because the Court finds that the decisional process would not be significantly aided by
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1
oral argument, the Court will decide the pending motions without oral argument. Dist.
Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(2)(ii). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the
Defendants’ motions and DENIES Meyer’s motion.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
In October of 2014, Meyer was transferred to ISCI. Meyer has a history of
depression, anxiety, bipolar disorder, suicidal ideations, and drug and alcohol abuse.
Eliason “treated [Meyer] in the outside community before his incarceration and was well
aware of his medical records, substance abuse history, and mental health history upon his
arrival at ISCI.” Dkt. 27-1, at 4. When Meyer arrived at ISCI on October 2, 2014, he
filled out a “medical history and screening form.” Dkt. 27-2, at 2–7. On that form, Meyer
indicated that he was taking Zyprexa, Clonazepam, Effexor, and Prilosec and indicated
that he had been hospitalized several times for suicidal ideations. Id. at 4–6. That day, a
licensed nurse practitioner named Effie Reed screened the form, cleared Meyer for
general housing, and referred Meyer to “mental health” for a follow up evaluation within
24 hours. Id. On October 3, a licensed professional counselor named C. Bennett
evaluated Meyer. Id. at 6. The counselor determined that Meyer was exhibiting some
depression, but that his risk of self-harm was low. Id. The counselor also scheduled
Meyer for another mental health assessment within fourteen days. Id.
On October 7, a licensed master of social work named B. Lewis performed a
“secondary mental health assessment/evaluation” of Meyer. Id. at 7. During this
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2
evaluation, Meyer reported four previous suicide attempts and stated that he had
previously been prescribed Haldol, Effexor, “lithium, Geodon, Zyprexa, Buspar,
‘everything.’” Id. at 7–8. Meyer also reported that he was concerned about bipolar
disorder and that he had experienced auditory and visual hallucinations, PTSD, and had a
history of alcohol abuse. Id. at 12. The social worker formulated an initial treatment plan,
on which Meyer signed off, and recommended that Meyer be referred to ISCI’s
“specialized Mental Health unit.” Id. at 13–14.
On October 9, 2014, Eliason “assessed and evaluated [Meyer] in person.” Dkt.
27-1, at 6. Meyer reported increased anxiety “since he was taken off [K]lonopin
recently.” Id. Eliason noted that at that time Meyer was taking Zyprexa, Effexor, and
Cogentin. Dkt. 27-2, at 15. Eliason determined that the Cogentin was unnecessary and
discontinued Meyer’s Cogentin prescription. Id.; Dkt. 27-1, at 6. Finally, Eliason
diagnosed Meyer with alcohol and cannabis use disorder, bipolar disorder, and
generalized anxiety disorder. Dkt. 27-1, at 6.
On October 21, 2014, a licensed master of social work from the Behavioral Health
Unit named T. Ruth assessed Meyer, this time to develop a longer-term treatment plan.
Id.; Dkt. 27-2, at 17. Among other things, Meyer reported his Effexor prescription had
been discontinued after he had stopped taking it three days prior and that he wanted to
have it restarted. Dkt. 27-2, at 17. The social worker recommended that IDOC house
Meyer in the Behavioral Health Unit for a 30-day assessment period. Id. The social
worker also drafted a treatment plan, on which Meyer signed off. Id. at 17.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3
Through 2014 and 2015, Eliason and T. Ruth continued to meet with Meyer to
assess his mental health and treatment plan about once a month. Both encouraged Meyer
to enroll in anxiety and depression groups and to engage in “behavioral activation,” such
as group therapy, taking classes, or exercising, to improve his mood. In 2014, T. Ruth
met with and evaluated Meyer on November 13 and December 17. In 2015, T. Ruth met
with Meyer on at least all of the following dates: January 14, February 18, March 4, April
8, April 22, June 23, August 3, October 5, October 22, October 28, and November 26.
During 2015, several other mental health professionals met with and evaluated Meyer on
occasion. T. Ruth and these other mental health professionals created, implemented, and
adjusted several individualized treatment plans for Meyer.
Eliason continually monitored and adjusted Meyer’s medication to find a formula
that worked for him, based on objective observations and Meyer’s subjective reports. In
2014, Eliason saw Meyer on November 26 and December 17. At the November 26
examination, Eliason increased Meyer’s dosage of Effexor. During the December 17
examination, Eliason discontinued Meyer’s Zyprexa prescription and replaced it with
Depakote. In 2015, Eliason saw Meyer (and adjusted his medications) on the following
dates: February 18 (increased Effexor), April 1 (increased Depakote), May 27, June 10
(added Abilify), July 8 (added Buspar), August 26 (added Inderal), September 23
(stopped Inderal, increased Abilify), September 30 (increased Abilify), November 18
(started Zyprexa), and December 15 (discontinued Zyprexa, started Vistaril, increased
Burspar). Eliason was always informed if Meyer refused his medication on three
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4
consecutive occasions. This pattern of refusal occurred at least twice during 2014 and
2015.
During the spring of 2015, Meyer twice filed medical grievances. On March 31,
2015, Meyer filed Grievance No. II 150000349, in which he complained about Eliason’s
medical decision to change Meyer’s prescription mental health medications. On initial
review, Corizon employees advised Meyer that he could raise his medication concerns
with Eliason during his scheduled appointments. Meyer appealed this response. In April
of 2015, Rona Siegert, IDOC’s Health Services Director, reviewed the grievance on
appeal and Meyer’s medical files. Siegert did not find any indifference to Meyer’s
medical needs in her review. She concluded that Eliason had evaluated and diagnosed
Meyer before determining, in his professional judgment and opinion, what medications
he felt were best to treat his mental health condition. She issued a written decision on the
grievance and directed Meyer to discuss any concerns he had with Eliason directly.
On May 19, 2015, Meyer filed Grievance No. II 150000550, in which he
complained that Eliason had not written a diagnosis of Meyer’s health conditions in
completing the reply section of a concern form. Upon initial review, Corizon employees
advised Meyer that he could see Eliason or his clinician to review his diagnosis and
treatment plan. Meyer again appealed. Seigert reviewed the grievance on appeal in June
of 2015. She answered the grievance by stating Meyer would not be given copies of his
medical records, but he could clarify his diagnosis with Eliason or his clinician.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5
Meyer submitted concern forms to Warden Yordy on August 20, 2015, and
August 27, 2015. In these forms, Meyer again complained about Eliason’s treatment of
his mental health conditions and his prescribed medications. Yordy replied stating that he
would forward the concern forms to an IDOC Contract Monitor for review. Megan
Austin, a registered nurse and contract monitor, received and reviewed the two concern
forms. Thereafter, she reviewed Meyer’s medical files and concluded that Meyer was
being treated appropriately.
Meyer submitted two more grievances about his mental health treatment on
August 14, 2015, and September 24, 2015. These grievances were not accepted pursuant
to IDOC’s Standard Operating Procedures because they were repetitive of Meyer’s
March 31, 2015 grievance.
On October 5, 2015, Meyer filed his initial complaint in this case. Dkt. 1. After
Meyer filed his complaint, Meyer continued to have mental health problems. On
November 5, 2015, IDOC placed Meyer on “suicide watch” after he was found to have
cut himself. Dkt. 27-2, at 64–67. IDOC placed Meyer on suicide watch again on
November 11, November 21, and November 25, after he reported swallowing razor
blades and cutting himself. Id. at 73-77, Dkt. 27-3, at 9–39. Subsequent x-rays did not
confirm the presence of razor blades in Meyer’s system. After each incident, Corizon
employees monitored him closely. Each time IDOC released Meyer’s from suicide
watch, he had three follow-up clinical visits scheduled.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6
After these incidents, Eliason continued to monitor and adjust Meyer’s medication
regiment. Meyer also continued to meet with mental health professionals who monitored
his mental health and progress under his treatment plan.
B. Procedural Background
Meyer filed two separate cases in October of 2015. Judge B. Lynn Winmill
allowed Meyer to consolidate the two cases and then conducted an initial review of the
case to determine whether summary dismissal was appropriate under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(d)(2) and 1915A(b). Dkt. 11. Judge Winmill determined that Meyer had asserted
colorable Eighth Amendment claims only against Corizon and Yordy. Id. Shortly
thereafter, Meyer filed an Amended Complaint. Dkt. 18. Judge Winmill conducted
another initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(d)(2) and 1915A(b). Dkt. 19. This time
Judge Winmill concluded Meyer had stated a colorable Eighth Amendment claim against
“Defendant Eliason, based on [his] allegation that Eliason is the medical provider who, in
October 2014, removed Plaintiff from his mental health medications without examining
Plaintiff himself or Plaintiff’s medical records.” Dkt. 19, at 3. Judge Winmill reaffirmed
that Meyer may proceed on his claim against Yordy (for injunctive relief alone), as he is
“the official who appears to have direct responsibility over Plaintiff’s conditions of
confinement.” Id. Judge Winmill also reaffirmed that Meyer’s allegations stated a
plausible policy claim against Corizon for failure to provide adequate mental health
treatment based on the alleged removal of Meyer from his medications without an
examination, as well as Meyer’s subsequent mental health treatment. Accordingly, Judge
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 7
Winmill allowed Meyer to proceed against Corizon for damages and injunctive relief. Id.
at 3–4. Finally, Judge Winmill dismissed Meyer’s Eighth Amendment claims to the
extent they were based on alleged inadequate treatment of his chronic back pain (id. at 4–
5), and Meyer’s Americans With Disabilities Act claims (id. at 5–7).
Meyer’s Amended Complaint asserts four claims related to his mental health
treatment (on which Judge Winmill allowed Meyer to proceed). Dkt. 18. In Claim I,
Meyer asserts that Defendants discontinued four medications he was taking as part of his
mental health treatment—Wellbutrin, Clonazepam (Klonopin), Abilify, and Neurontin—
without any mental health evaluation. Dkt. 18, at 2. In Claim II, Meyer asserts that since
October 2, 2014, he has reported his need for mental health treatment to Defendants and
they have put him through a “series of trials and errors” during which he was required to
take ineffective medication that he had already tried with negative results. Id. at 3. In
Claim III, Meyer asserts he has “not been able to make [his] mental health concerns
known,” Corizon employees evaluated him “in an [un]professional manner,” and that his
mental health “evaluations [were not] done in person.” Id. Finally, in Claim IV, Meyer
asserts that Defendants knew “of my worsening mental health conditions and . . .
willingly and knowing ignored [his] need for specific mental health treatments.” Id. at 4.
After Judge Winmill’s ruling on his Amended Complaint, Meyer filed a motion
for preliminary injunction, a motion to file another amended complaint, and a motion for
appointment of counsel. Judge Winmill denied all of these motions. Dkt. 31.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 8
On November 10, 2016, Corizon and Eliason, together, and Yordy, separately,
filed motions for summary judgment. Dkts. 39, 40. The Court sent Meyer a notice of his
rights and obligation to respond to the motions. Dkt. 41. Instead of filing a direct
response, on November 28, 2016, Meyer filed his own (two page) motion for summary
judgment together with an affidavit. Dkt. 43. Defendants responded to this motion, (Dkts.
44, 45), and Meyer never filed a reply brief.
On May 12, 2017, Meyer notified the Court that IDOC had released him and that
he had moved to Florida. Dkt. 48.
On August 1, 2017, Judge Winmill transferred this case to the undersigned. Dkt.
49.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). This Court’s role at summary judgment is not “to weigh the evidence and
determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Zetwick v. Cty. of Yolo, 850 F.3d 436, 441 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). In
considering a motion for summary judgment, this Court must “view[] the facts in the
non-moving party’s favor.” Id. To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the respondent
need only present evidence upon which “a reasonable juror drawing all inferences in
favor of the respondent could return a verdict in [his or her] favor.” Id. (citation omitted).
Accordingly, this Court must enter summary judgment if a party “fails to make a showing
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 9
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986). The respondent cannot simply rely on an unsworn affidavit or the
pleadings to defeat a motion for summary judgment; rather the respondent must set forth
the “specific facts,” supported by evidence, with “reasonable particularity” that precludes
summary judgment. Far Out Productions, Inc. v. Oskar, 247 F.3d 986, 997 (9th Cir.
2001).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Applicable Law
Plaintiff brings his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the civil rights statute. To
succeed on a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must establish the existence of four elements:
“(1) a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute (2)
proximately caused (3) by conduct of a ‘person’ (4) acting under color of state law.”
Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991).
To bring a successful § 1983 claim against a governmental entity or a private
entity performing a government function, a plaintiff must establish that the execution of
an official policy or unofficial custom inflicted the injury of which the plaintiff
complains, as required by Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S.
658, 694 (1978). See also Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir.
2012) (applying Monell to private entities). Under Monell, the requisite elements of a
§ 1983 claim against a municipality or private entity performing a state function are the
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 10
following: (1) the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the municipality or
entity had a policy or custom; (3) the policy or custom amounted to deliberate
indifference to plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) the policy or custom was the
moving force behind the constitutional violation. Mabe v. San Bernardino Cnty., 237
F.3d 1101, 1110–11 (9th Cir. 2001).
Meyer asserts that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights. The Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution protects prisoners against cruel and unusual
punishment. Initially, the Supreme Court only applied the Eighth Amendment to claims
of “inhuman techniques of punishment.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). The
Supreme Court has subsequently “held that the Amendment proscribes more than
physically barbarous punishments.” Id. Now, “[t]he Amendment embodies ‘broad and
idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency . . . ,’ against
which we must evaluate penal measures.” Id. (internal citation omitted). Accordingly,
“punishments which are incompatible with ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society’” violate the Eighth Amendment. Id. (quoting Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). Under these standards, the government has an
“obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration.” Id.
at 103. The standard for these types of claims is “deliberate indifference.” Id. In other
words, “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the
‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’ proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” Id.
(internal citation omitted). Examples of actionable Eighth Amendment medical claims
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 11
include a prison doctor’s indifference to a prisoner’s medical needs or a prison guard’s
intentional interference with prescribed treatment. Id. at 104–05. An accident or mere
negligence, however, cannot form the basis of a medical-based Eighth Amendment claim.
Id.
An actionable Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate medical care must meet
two elements. Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014). First, the
plaintiff must allege “the existence of a serious medical need.” Id. An objective standard
applies to this element. Id. “Such a need exists if failure to treat the injury or condition
‘could result in further significant injury’ or cause ‘the unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain.’” Id. (quoting Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006)). “Indications
that a plaintiff has a serious medical need include ‘[t]he existence of an injury that a
reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment;
the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily
activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.’” Id. (quoting McGuckin v.
Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 1992)). Second, the plaintiff must allege that a
prison official was “deliberately indifferent.” Id. A subjective standard applies to this
element. Id. “A prison official is deliberately indifferent” under this standard “only if the
official ‘knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.’” Id.
(quoting Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004)). “[T]he official must
both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. (quoting Farmer v.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 12
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). Differences in judgment between an inmate and
prison medical personnel regarding appropriate medical diagnosis and treatment are not
enough to establish a deliberate indifference claim. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242
(9th Cir. 1989). “[T]o prevail on a claim involving choices between alternative courses of
treatment, a prisoner must show that the chosen course of treatment ‘was medically
unacceptable under the circumstances,’ and was chosen ‘in conscious disregard of an
excessive risk’ to the prisoner’s health.” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (alteration omitted)
(quoting Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996)).
1. Eliason’s Liability
As an initial matter, the Court assumes that Meyer’s mental health problems
constitute a serious medical need. Nevertheless, the Court finds summary judgment in
favor of Eliason is proper because Meyer has failed to produce evidence that Eliason was
deliberately indifferent to Meyer’s mental health needs. As explained above, Meyer
asserts that Eliason was deliberately indifferent to his mental health needs in four ways:
(1) by discontinuing four medications he was taking as part of his mental health
treatment—Wellbutrin, Clonazepam (Klonopin), Abilify, and Neurontin—without any
mental health evaluation when he arrived at ISCI; (2) by putting him through a “series of
trials and errors” during which he was required to take ineffective medication; (3) by
preventing him from making his mental health concerns known and evaluating him in an
unprofessional manner; and (4) ignoring his need for specific mental health treatments.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 13
The record shows several ISCI employees evaluated Meyer within his first week at
ISCI. In particular, Eliason, who was familiar with Meyer’s mental health needs before
he entered ISCI, assessed and evaluated Meyer in person on October 9, 2014. Eliason
determined what medication Meyer was taking, assessed what medication was necessary
based on Meyer’s needs, and adjusted his medication accordingly. Thus, Eliason’s
assertion that Eliason took him off of several medications without any evaluation appears
to be inaccurate. Thereafter, Eliason, and other ISCI employees, periodically met with
Meyer and assessed his mental health condition. Eliason continued to adjust Meyer’s
medication throughout his time at ISCI. While there may have been some “trial and
error” in prescribing, nothing in the record indicates Eliason was deliberately indifferent
to Eliason’s mental health needs. Rather, he continued to adjust and change Eliason’s
medication in an attempt to find the combination that would maximally assist Meyer in
his ongoing mental health struggles. If anything, Meyer’s complaints amount only to a
difference in opinion about the appropriate medical treatment. See Lopez v. Corizon, Inc.,
No. 115-CV-00123-EJL-CWD, 2016 WL 3014645, at *11 (D. Idaho May 24, 2016)
(“Plaintiff’s disagreement with this treatment plan and desire for a prescription of
Wellbutrin is just that—a disagreement, which is not actionable under Section 1983.”).
Moreover, the chosen course of action was not “medically unacceptable under the
circumstances,” or chosen “in conscious disregard of an excessive risk” to Meyer’s
health. Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058. The record also shows Meyer was able to make his
mental health concerns known during his periodic appointments with Eliason, T. Ruth,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 14
and other Corizon employees. And, there is nothing in the record that indicates Eliason,
or any other Corizon employee, was unprofessional during Meyer’s appointments, or
dismissive of Meyer’s medical needs. In sum, there is no evidence that Eliason was
deliberately indifferent to Meyer’s mental health needs. Accordingly, the Court must
grant summary judgment in favor of Eliason.
2. Corizon’s Liability
Corizon, a corporation performing a government function, may be held liable only
if a policy or custom of the corporation caused the alleged deprivation of constitutional
rights. The Court finds it appropriate to grant summary judgment in Corizon’s favor first
because Meyer has failed to establish his Eighth Amendment rights were violated. As
explained above, multiple Corizon employees evaluated and met with Meyer on a regular
basis to assess his mental health needs. They also worked with Meyer to develop an
individualized long-term treatment plan. During these appointments he was given an
avenue to have his mental health concerns heard. Eliason adjusted Meyer’s medication
according to their efficacy and Meyer’s needs. Nothing indicates Corizon employees
were unprofessional or dismissive. Thus, Meyer has failed to establish that Corizon
employees were deliberately indifferent to his mental health needs. Further, even if
Meyer’s allegations regarding his mental health treatment were taken as true, nothing in
the record supports a finding that Corizon’s custom or policy caused Meyer’s injury.
Corizon does not have a pattern or policy of taking inmates off of their prescribed
medication without proper evaluation, prescribing ineffective medication, ignoring
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 15
inmates mental health needs, or blocking inmates attempts to have their mental health
concerns heard. Therefore, summary judgment in Corizon’s favor is appropriate.
3. Yordy’s Liability
A supervisory official is not liable for the actions of subordinates on a respondeat
superior theory under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 915 (9th Cir.
2001). “A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 only if there exists either (1) his or her
personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal
connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.”
Id. (internal quotations omitted). A causal connection is “an affirmative link” between a
constitutional deprivation and “the adoption of any plan or policy by [a supervisor,]
express or otherwise showing [his or her] authorization or approval of such misconduct.”
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976).
Meyer has not alleged that Yordy had any personal involvement in the alleged
violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Rather, Meyer’s allegations focus on the
treatment Eliason provided. Yordy cannot be liable for Eliason’s actions under a
respondeat superior theory. Even if Yordy could be liable under such a theory, his claims
would still be unsuccessful because, as explained above, Meyer received constitutionally
adequate mental health treatment from Eliason and other Corizon employees while at
ISCI. Yordy’s only personal involvement with Meyer’s treatment was his reception of
two complaints filed by Meyer about his mental health treatment. Yordy ensured these
complaints received a full review and decision. Thus, the record does not show that
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 16
Yordy, individually, was deliberately indifferent to Meyer’s mental health needs. There is
also no evidence in the record that Yordy adopted any plan or policy that caused a
violation of Meyer’s Eighth Amendment rights or otherwise approved of any conduct that
was deliberately indifferent to Meyer’s mental health needs. Accordingly, the Court finds
it appropriate to grant summary judgment in Yordy’s favor.
V. CONCLUSION
There are no disputes of material fact in this case. Defendants Eliason, Corizon,
and Yordy have established, based on the undisputed facts, that they are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law on Meyer’s Eighth Amendment claims. Accordingly, this
Court enters summary judgment in Defendants’ favor and against Meyer.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Corizon, LLC and Dr. Scott Eliason’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 39) is
GRANTED.
2. Keith Yordy’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 40) is GRANTED.
3. Brandon M. Meyer’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 43) is DENIED.
4. The Court will enter judgment separately in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 58.
DATED: November 14, 2017
_________________________
David C. Nye
U.S. District Court Judge
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 17
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?