Joyner v. IDOC

Filing 27

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER. IT IS ORDERED: The Judgment at Docket 21 is VACATED. Petitioner's Motion for Extension of Time 22 is DENIED as MOOT in part and granted in part. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (st)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
MIGUEL CHARLES JOYNER,
Petitioner,

Case No. 1:15-cv-00489-BLW
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

v.
RANDY E. BLADES,
Respondent.

On March 21, 2017, Magistrate Judge Ronald E. Bush dismissed Petitioner
Miguel Charles Joyner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with prejudice and entered a
Judgment closing the case. (Dkts. 20, 21.) Judge Bush did not grant a certificate of
appealability. (Dkt. 20.) Within 30 days after entry of judgment, Petitioner filed a Motion
for Extension of Time to File a Notice of Appeal and a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order of Dismissal.
After Judge Bush entered the dismissal order in this case, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2017),
which interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) to require the consent of all named parties, not
just all appearing parties, to constitute full consent to enter final orders. Therefore, the
District Court now reviews de novo the entirety of this case, including the final order of
dismissal. (Dkt. 20).
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1

As applicable to the circumstances in this case, Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 4(a)(5) permits the district court to extend the time to file a notice of appeal if
a party so moves during the original 30-day period and shows good cause. Oregon v.
Champion International Corp., 680 F.2d 1300, 1301 (9th Cir. 1982). Petitioner asserts
that he did not receive the judgment until 17 days after it was entered. (Dkt. 22, pp. 1-2.)
While Petitioner would qualify for an extension of time under these facts, an extension is
unnecessary, because the Court will vacate the existing Judgment and enter an Amended
Judgment from which Petitioner can appeal.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration more than 28 days after Judgment
was entered; therefore, neither Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) nor Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 4(A) applies. Rather, Petitioner’s Motion falls under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure Rule 60(b), which provides for relief from a final order or judgment on
the following grounds:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud
(whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or
misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the
judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier
judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is
no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Relief under the “catch-all” provision of Rule 60(b)(6) should be granted only in
extraordinary circumstances “as an equitable remedy to prevent manifest injustice,” U.S.
v. State of Washington, 98 F.3d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal citation and
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2

punctuation omitted).
To set the stage for Petitioner’s reconsideration arguments, the Court reviews the
state court record to determine the time periods during which proper state court actions
related to Petitioner’s conviction were pending. The Idaho Supreme Court denied
Petitioner’s petition for review on direct appeal on September 21, 2011. (State’s Lodging
B-9.) Because Petitioner did not file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court, his judgment of conviction became final 90 days later, on December 20,
2011.
The federal statute of limitations began on December 20, 2011, and continued
running for 107 days until Petitioner filed his state post-conviction petition on April 6,
2012 (mailbox rule date). (State’s Lodging C-1.) The statute was tolled during the
pendency of that action. The post-conviction action ended on October 14, 2014, when the
Idaho Court of Appeals entered the remittitur following its decision affirming the
dismissal of the post-conviction action. (State’s Lodging D-7, D-8.) Petitioner did not file
a petition for review before the Idaho Supreme Court.
The federal statute began running again on October 15, 2014, with 258 days
remaining, and it expired on June 30, 2015. Petitioner’s federal Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus was filed after the statute’s expiration, on October 14, 2015 (mailbox
rule).
Petitioner now asserts that tolling for the statute of limitations was miscalculated

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3

in Judge Bush’s dismissal order. Petitioner argues that, on March 4, 2014, his postconviction appellate counsel filed a motion requesting that he be permitted to withdraw
from the case and that the briefing schedule be suspended. Petitioner’s argument is not
well-taken, because Judge Bush did, in fact, toll the time period between April 6, 2012
(when the original post-conviction action was filed) and October 14, 2014 (when the state
post-conviction appeal was completed).
Petitioner next argues that the time period during which the State had neglected to
file a response to his original post-conviction petition should have been tolled. After
receiving no response from the State in that action, Petitioner filed a request for default
that neither the State nor the state court addressed for four months. Petitioner asserts that
the state district court granted Petitioner’s request for counsel months later and ordered
the State to file an answer. Petitioner is correct that this time period should have been
tolled, but he is wrong in assuming that it was not. Judge Bush tolled the statute from the
first day the post-conviction action was filed on April 6, 2012—regardless of when the
State responded—through the appeal’s conclusion on October 14, 2014, when the action
was deemed completed by issuance of a remittitur from the Idaho Court of Appeals.
To the extent Petitioner argues that the time period between October 15, 2014, and
October 14, 2015 (the date of his federal habeas filing), should have been tolled, or that
his statute of limitations period should have been re-started, there is no factual or legal
basis to support such an argument. Many inmates miscalculate the statute of limitations,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4

believing they have one full year after completion of their last state post-conviction
matter. In fact, every time period between different post-judgment state court actions
must be counted toward the one-year federal statute of limitations. Because Petitioner
used 107 days between completion of his direct appeal and the filing of his state postconviction action, he did not have one year left after his post-conviction appeal
concluded.
The Ninth Circuit has held that an inmate’s “inability correctly to calculate the
limitations period is not an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.”
Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); cf. Hughes v. Idaho State
Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1986) (illiteracy not a ground for equitable
tolling). Based on a de novo review, the Motion for Reconsideration will be denied, and
Judge Bush’s dismissal order will be adopted and confirmed. Upon a further review of
the record and this decision, the Court has determined that a certificate of appealability
will not issue. Therefore, Petitioner may file a notice of appeal and request a certificate of
appealability from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED:
1. The Judgment at Docket 21 is VACATED.
2. Petitioner’s Motion for Extension of Time (Dkt. 22) is DENIED as MOOT.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5