Taylor v. Blades
Filing
50
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - Claim B(2) of the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. 18 ) is DENIED on the merits. Because all other claims have already been dismissed (see Dkt. 33 ), this entire action is DISMISSED with prejudice. Signed by Judge Candy W. Dale. (jd)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
CHRISTOPHER TAYLOR,
Case No. 1:15-cv-00552-CWD
Petitioner,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
v.
RANDY E. BLADES,
Respondent.
Pending before the Court is an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed
by Idaho state prisoner Christopher M. Taylor (“Petitioner” or “Taylor”), challenging
Petitioner’s Jerome County convictions of aggravated battery and aggravated assault on a
peace officer, including sentencing enhancements for use of a deadly weapon and
persistent violator status. Dkt. 18. The Court previously dismissed Claims A, B(1), and
B(3) with prejudice as procedurally defaulted without legal excuse. Dkt. 33.
Claim B(2)—the only remaining claim—is now fully briefed and ripe for
adjudication. The Court takes judicial notice of the records from Petitioner’s state court
proceedings, which have been lodged by Respondent. Dkt. 25; see Fed. R. Evid. 201(b);
Dawson v. Mahoney, 451 F.3d 550, 551 n.1 (9th Cir. 2006).
All parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge
to conduct all proceedings in this case in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 73. See Dkt. 23. Having carefully reviewed the record in this
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1
matter, including the state court record, the Court concludes that oral argument is
unnecessary. See D. Idaho L. Civ. R. 7.1(d). Accordingly, the Court will enter the
following Order denying habeas corpus relief.
BACKGROUND
Absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1),
the following facts of Petitioner’s case, as described by the Idaho Court of Appeals, are
presumed correct:
An officer attempted a traffic stop on a car driven by Taylor.
Taylor attempted to elude the officer. A chase ensued with
Taylor reaching a speed of 100 mph at times. At one point
Taylor briefly stopped his vehicle and fired a shotgun at the
officer. The officer was hit but returned fire and continued the
pursuit after Taylor again attempted to flee. Another officer
tried to block Taylor’s path but Taylor turned his vehicle
toward the officer’s vehicle, resulting in the aggravated
assault charge. Ultimately, Taylor crashed his car and was
captured. The officer who was wounded by the shotgun is
now blind in his left eye. When Taylor committed these
crimes he was a three-time convicted felon and was on
probation.
State’s Lodging B-4 at 3.
In the Fifth Judicial District Court in Jerome County, Idaho, Petitioner pleaded
guilty to (1) one count of aggravated battery on a peace officer, with sentencing
enhancements for use of a deadly weapon and for being a persistent violator, and (2) one
count of aggravated assault on a peace officer, with a persistent violator sentencing
enhancement. Petitioner received two concurrent fixed life sentences. Id. at 1.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2
DISCUSSION
In Claim B(2), Petitioner asserts that, before he pleaded guilty, his attorney failed
to advise him that he could receive a fixed life sentence. Dkt. 18 at 10. The Idaho Court
of Appeals rejected this claim in Petitioner’s post-conviction proceedings, concluding
that the trial court properly warned Petitioner of the potential maximum sentence and,
therefore, Petitioner could not show prejudice from any deficient performance on the part
of his counsel. State’s Lodging D-4 at 9.
For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that the Idaho Court of Appeals’
rejection of Claim B(2) was not unreasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Therefore,
Petitioner is not entitled to relief on the merits of Claim B(2).1
1.
Habeas Corpus Standard of Law
A federal court may grant habeas corpus relief when it determines that the
petitioner “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). If the state court has adjudicated a claim on the merits,
habeas relief is further limited by § 2254(d), as amended by the Anti-terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Under AEDPA, federal habeas relief
may be granted only where the state court’s adjudication of the petitioner’s claim:
(1)
resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or
For this reason, the Court need not address Respondent’s alternative argument that Claim B(2) is
procedurally defaulted based on an adequate and independent state procedural ground.
1
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3
(2)
resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light
of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Petitioner does not assert that the state court’s rejection of Claim B(2) was
contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, federal law under § 2254(d)(1). Rather,
Petitioner contends that the state court’s factual finding—that the trial judge informed
Petitioner that the maximum potential sentence was a fixed term of life imprisonment—is
unreasonable under § 2254(d)(2).
A “state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the
federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.”
Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010); see also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465,
473 (2007) (“The question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state
court’s determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable—a
substantially higher threshold.”). State court factual findings are presumed to be correct
and are binding on the federal court unless the petitioner rebuts this presumption by clear
and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
If a petitioner satisfies § 2254(d), the federal habeas court must review the
petitioner’s claim de novo, meaning without deference to the state court’s decision.
Hurles, 752 F.3d at 778. When considering a habeas claim de novo, a district court may,
as in the pre-AEDPA era, draw from both United States Supreme Court and circuit
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precedent, limited only by the non-retroactivity rule of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288
(1989).
Generally, even if a petitioner succeeds in demonstrating a constitutional error in
his conviction, he is entitled to federal habeas relief only if the petitioner “can establish
that [the error] resulted in ‘actual prejudice.’” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637
(1993). Under the Brecht standard, an error is not harmless, and habeas relief must be
granted, only if the federal court has “grave doubt about whether a trial error of federal
law had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.”
O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).
However, some types of claims “are analyzed under their own harmless error standards,
which can render Brecht analysis unnecessary.” Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1070
(9th Cir. 2008). Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are included in this category.
Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 830, 834 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]here a habeas petition
governed by AEDPA alleges ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), we apply
Strickland’s prejudice standard and do not engage in a separate analysis applying the
Brecht standard.”).
2.
Clearly Established Law Governing Claims of Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that a criminal
defendant has a right to the effective assistance of counsel in his defense. The standard
for ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) claims was set forth by the Supreme Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5
in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). A petitioner asserting ineffective
assistance of counsel must show that (1) “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was
not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment,” and
(2) those errors prejudiced the defendant by “depriv[ing] the defendant of a fair trial, a
trial whose result is reliable.” Id. at 687. A petitioner must establish both deficient
performance and prejudice to prove an IAC claim. Id. at 697. On habeas review, the court
may consider either prong of the Strickland test first, or it may address both prongs, even
if one prong is not satisfied and would compel denial of the IAC claim. Id.
Whether an attorney’s performance was deficient is judged against an objective
standard of reasonableness. Id. at 687-88. A reviewing court’s inquiry into the
reasonableness of counsel’s actions must not rely on hindsight:
Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly
deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to secondguess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse
sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining
counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to
conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was
unreasonable. A fair assessment of attorney performance
requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting
effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of
counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct
from counsel’s perspective at the time. Because of the
difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must
indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance;
that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that,
under the circumstances, the challenged action might be
considered sound trial strategy. There are countless ways to
provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best
criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular
client in the same way.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6
Id. at 689 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
If a petitioner shows that counsel’s performance was deficient, the next step is the
prejudice analysis. “An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not
warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on
the judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. To satisfy the prejudice standard, a petitioner
“must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. As the
Strickland Court instructed:
In making this determination, a court hearing an
ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the
evidence before the judge or jury. Some of the factual
findings will have been unaffected by the errors, and factual
findings that were affected will have been affected in
different ways. Some errors will have had a pervasive effect
on the inferences to be drawn from the evidence, altering the
entire evidentiary picture, and some will have had an isolated,
trivial effect. Moreover, a verdict or conclusion only weakly
supported by the record is more likely to have been affected
by errors than one with overwhelming record support. Taking
the unaffected findings as a given, and taking due account of
the effect of the errors on the remaining findings, a court
making the prejudice inquiry must ask if the defendant has
met the burden of showing that the decision reached would
reasonably likely have been different absent the errors.
Id. at 695-96.
To constitute Strickland prejudice, “[t]he likelihood of a different result must be
substantial, not just conceivable.” Richter, 562 U.S. 86 at 112. To show prejudice based
on deficient performance of counsel in a case where, as here, the Petitioner pleaded
guilty, the Petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 7
counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
3.
State Court Decision
The Idaho Court of Appeals assumed, without deciding, that Petitioner’s counsel
performed deficiently by failing to inform Petitioner that the maximum potential sentence
on each charge was fixed life imprisonment. However, the appellate court went on to
hold that Petitioner had not established prejudice from any such failure because, before
he pleaded guilty, Petitioner was informed of the maximum penalties by the trial court:
Taylor argues that his trial counsel never informed him
that he could face two fixed life sentences and allowed him to
plead guilty pursuant to a plea bargain that netted an end
result potentially less favorable than if he had proceeded to
trial. Taylor argues that, had he known the consequences of
his guilty pleas, there would be no reason for him to plead
guilty. However, as the state correctly argues, Taylor did not
plead guilty to two fixed life sentences—he pled guilty to
offenses that subjected him to maximum life sentences, which
the district court imposed. Because Taylor might regret
pleading guilty without an agreement as to sentencing does
not mean that he was not advised of the maximum
penalties….
Furthermore, Taylor’s assertions directly contradict the
record. The record shows that, after the district court advised
Taylor of the maximum penalties for both charges to which
he pled guilty, the district court also advised Taylor of the
consequences of the persistent violator enhancement to which
Taylor also agreed to plead guilty. The district court
specifically asked Taylor if he understood that the “maximum
penalty that [he] would face would be a minimum of five
years in the state penitentiary, which could be extended to
life.” In response, Taylor replied, “Yes, sir.” Thus, even
assuming Taylor’s claim that trial counsel did not advise him
of the maximum sentence was truthful, he has not shown that,
but for counsel’s error, he would not have pled guilty because
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 8
the record shows that the district court informed Taylor of the
maximum penalties he faced before he changed his plea in
conformance with [Idaho Criminal Rule] 11(c). Therefore,
Taylor’s assertion that his counsel was ineffective for failing
to advise him that the district court could impose maximum
life sentences is without merit[,] and Taylor has not shown
error in the district court’s denial of this claim.
State’s Lodging D-4 at 8–9 (emphasis added).
4.
The State Court’s Rejection of Claim B(2) Was Not Based on an
Unreasonable Finding of Fact
As noted previously, Petitioner claims that the Idaho Court of Appeals made an
unreasonable factual finding when it found that the trial court accurately informed
Petitioner that the maximum potential sentence on each count was fixed life
imprisonment.
At the plea hearing, the trial court advised Petitioner as follows with respect to the
persistent violator enhancements:
THE COURT:
Now, with respect to the
Information Part 3, the state
charges you as a persistent
violator pursuant to 19-2514 ….
…
THE COURT:
Sir, do you understand the nature
of the allegations as alleged in the
Information Part 3?
THE DEFENDANT:
Yes, sir.
THE COURT:
And do you understand that if you
are adjudged to be a persistent
violator, the maximum penalty
that you would face would be a
minimum of five years in the state
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 9
penitentiary, which could be
extended to life?
THE DEFENDANT:
Yes, sir.
State’s Lodging A-2 at 14–15 (emphasis added). Petitioner contends that the trial court’s
statement to Petitioner can only be reasonably interpreted as advising Petitioner that the
maximum fixed portion of his sentence was five years, followed by “a life indeterminate
tail”—meaning that Petitioner could be sentenced to life imprisonment but would be
eligible for parole after five years. Dkt. 48 at 13–14.
The Court disagrees. Though the judge’s statement is not a model of clarity—
particularly given that the judge described the “maximum” penalty in terms of a
“minimum” penalty—that statement is susceptible to two reasonable interpretations. The
first is that advanced by Petitioner: that Petitioner could be sentenced to a “maximum”
fixed term of five years, but that, following the fixed term, his sentence could be
“extended to life” as the result of an indeterminate term of life imprisonment. State’s
Lodging A-2 at 15.
The second reasonable interpretation of the trial judge’s comments is that the
“minimum [term] of five years in the state penitentiary … could be extended to life.” Id.
(emphasis added). That is, the minimum period of confinement could be anywhere from
five years to life. And a minimum period of confinement for life necessarily means a
fixed life sentence—an accurate description of the maximum potential penalty.
Because both of these interpretations of the trial judge’s statement are reasonable,
the Idaho Court of Appeals’ finding that the judge’s statement accurately informed
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 10
Petitioner that he could be sentenced to a maximum of life imprisonment—that is, a fixed
life sentence—was also reasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Therefore, this Court is
bound by that factual finding.
In turn, because the trial judge accurately informed Petitioner of the maximum
potential sentence before Petitioner pleaded guilty, Petitioner has not established that,
absent the alleged failure of trial counsel to inform him of the maximum potential
sentence, he would not have pleaded guilty but would have insisted on going to trial. See
Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. Thus, Petitioner has not shown prejudice from trial counsel’s
allegedly deficient performance, and Claim B(2) must be denied.
CONCLUSION
The Idaho Court of Appeals’ rejection of Claim B(2) was not based on an
unreasonable factual finding under § 2254(d)(2). Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to
habeas relief on Claim B(2).
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED:
1.
Claim B(2) of the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. 18) is
DENIED on the merits. Because all other claims have already been
dismissed (see Dkt. 33), this entire action is DISMISSED with prejudice.
2.
The Court does not find its resolution of this habeas matter to be reasonably
debatable, and a certificate of appealability will not issue. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c); Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. If
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 11
Petitioner wishes to appeal, he must file a timely notice of appeal with the
Clerk of Court. Petitioner may seek a certificate of appealability from the
Ninth Circuit by filing a request in that court.
DATED: February 24, 2020
_________________________
Honorable Candy W. Dale
United States Magistrate Judge
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