Panuski v. MassMutual Idaho

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER. NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Partial Motion to Dismiss 8 is GRANTED. Signed by Judge Edward J. Lodge. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (st)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

DONALD PANUSKI,

Case No. 1:15-CV-00600-EJL

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

v.
MASSMUTUAL IDAHO,
Defendant.

INTRODUCTION
Before the Court in the above-entitled matter is Defendant’s Partial Motion
to Dismiss. The extended deadline for responsive briefing has passed and the
matter is ripe for the Court’s consideration. Having fully reviewed the record
herein, the Court finds that the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented
in the briefs and record. Accordingly, in the interest of avoiding further delay, and
because the Court conclusively finds that the decisional process would not be
significantly aided by oral argument, this Motion shall be decided on the record
before this Court without oral argument.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are taken from Defendant’s
Partial Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 8). Plaintiff Donald Panuski (“Plaintiff”) was a
sales manager for MassMutual Idaho (“Defendant”), but parties dispute whether
Panuski was an employee. Plaintiff alleges that he was terminated in August,
2014, on the basis of his age.
Plaintiff has brought this action against Defendant, asserting: (1) breach of
contract (“Count I”); (2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing (“Count II”); (3) termination on the basis of age under the federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) and the state Idaho Human Rights
Act (“IHRA”) (“Count III”); and (4) termination in violation of public policy
(“Count IV”). Defendant has filed the instant Partial Motion to Dismiss for
Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted in Count IV.
Plaintiff has since filed two stipulations to extend the deadline for response, both
of which were granted by the Court. (Dkt. 11-12, 13-14.) Despite the Court’s
allowance of both extensions, resulting in a May 30, 2016 deadline, Plaintiff has
failed to file a response to Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss. The Court
accordingly finds as follows.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion to dismiss made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a party’s claim for relief. When considering such a
motion, the Court’s inquiry is whether the allegations in a pleading are sufficient
under applicable pleading standards. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) sets
forth minimum pleading rules, requiring only a “short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
A motion to dismiss will only be granted if the complaint fails to allege
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility
standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (citations omitted). Although “we must take all of the factual
allegations in the complaint as true, we are not bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id. at 1949-50; see also Manzarek v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Therefore,
“conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Caviness v. Horizon Comm.
Learning Cent., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
ANALYSIS
As Defendant notes, Idaho law does not recognize public policy claims for
conduct that is covered by a statute that already provides a remedy. In Van v.
Portneuf Med. Ctr., for instance, the Idaho Supreme Court dismissed a similar
public policy claim, explaining, “when the relevant public policy is contained in a
statute and the statute provides a remedy, the common law cause of action of
wrongful discharge is not available.” 212 P.3d 982, 991 (Idaho 2009) (citing 82
Am. Jur. 2d, Wrongful Discharge § 62 (2009)). In other words, when the
Legislature enacts legislation that provides a remedy, the statutory cause of action
displaces common law causes of action based on the same facts and allegations.
Id. “To hold otherwise would allow plaintiffs to recover twice for the same
underlying facts.” Id.
Here, Defendant argues Count IV of the Complaint should be dismissed
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because the claim is based on
the exact allegations that form the basis for Plaintiff’s ADEA and IHRA claims.
Specifically, Count III alleges wrongful termination on the basis of age in violation
of the ADEA and IHRA, and Count IV relies on the same facts to allege wrongful
termination in violation of public policy. As Defendant notes, the ADEA and
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

IHRA are comprehensive statutes that already provide specific remedy for age
discrimination. See, e.g., Idaho Code § 67-5908(3); 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). Thus, the
Court finds that Plaintiff’s public policy claim (Count IV) is subsumed by his
ADEA and IHRA claims (Count III).
Plaintiff has failed to file a response to Defendant’s Partial Motion to
Dismiss, and thus has not disputed that Judgment should be entered for Defendant
on Count IV.
The Court accordingly grants Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Count IV
claim of wrongful termination in violation of public policy.
ORDER
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Partial Motion to
Dismiss (Dkt. 8) is GRANTED.

DATED: June 28, 2016

_________________________
Edward J. Lodge
United States District Judge

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER