Chatterton v. Little

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER granting 17 Petitioner's Motion for Extension of Time; granting 14 Respondent's Motion for Summary Dismissal. the Petition 3 is DISMISSED with prejudice. The Court does not find its resolution of this habeas matter to be reasonably debatable, and a certificate of appealability will not issue. Signed by Judge Ronald E. Bush. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (cjs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

PATRICK D. CHATTERTON,
Case No. 1:16-cv-00185-REB
Petitioner,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

v.
RANDY BLADES,1
Respondent.

Pending before the Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Idaho
state prisoner Patrick Chatterton, challenging Petitioner’s Twin Falls County conviction
of felony driving under the influence (“DUI”). (Dkt. 3.) Respondent has filed a Motion
for Summary Dismissal, arguing that Claim 1 is noncognizable (meaning that it cannot be
heard on federal habeas review), that the Petition is barred by the one-year statute of
limitations, and that all of Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted. (Dkt. 14.) The
Motion is now ripe for consideration by the Court.

As Petitioner’s current custodian, Respondent Randy Blades, warden of the Idaho State
Correctional Center, is substituted for Steven Little, warden of the South Idaho Correctional Institution.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
1

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1

The Court takes judicial notice of the records from Petitioner’s state court
proceedings, which have been lodged by Respondent. (Dkt. 13.) See Fed. R. Evid.
201(b); Dawson v Mahoney, 451 F.3d 550, 551 n.1 (9th Cir. 2006).
The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge
to conduct all proceedings in this case in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Dkt. 15.)
Having carefully reviewed the record, including the state court record, the Court finds
that the parties have adequately presented the facts and legal arguments in the briefs and
record and that oral argument is unnecessary. See D. Idaho L. Civ. R. 7.1(d).
Accordingly, the Court enters the following Order granting the Motion and dismissing
this case with prejudice.
BACKGROUND
In the Fifth Judicial District Court in Twin Falls County, Idaho, Petitioner pleaded
guilty to felony DUI, along with a persistent violator enhancement. (State’s Lodging A-1
at 2.) The judgment of conviction was entered on May 1, 2013. Petitioner was sentenced
to a unified term of fifteen years in prison with five years fixed. (Id. at 4.) Petitioner filed
a late notice of appeal, which was dismissed by the Idaho Supreme Court as untimely on
December 3, 2013. (State’s Lodging A-2, B-3.) The remittitur was issued on January 6,
2014.
Petitioner states that, in the meantime, on August 28, 2013, he filed a motion for
reduction of sentence under Idaho Criminal Rule 35, which was denied on September 3,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2

2013. (Dkt. 3 at 9.) Petitioner did not appeal the denial of this motion. On March 4 or
March 9, 2015, Petitioner filed a second Rule 35 motion.2 (Dkt. 3 at 9; Dkt. 19 at 4.)
The second Rule 35 motion alleged that a blood draw, which was done without a
warrant and which led to the DUI charge in his case, was unconstitutional under Missouri
v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013). (Dkt. 19 at 4.) In McNeely, the Supreme Court held
that the natural metabolization of alcohol in a person’s blood does not present “a per se
exigency that justifies an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement for
nonconsensual blood testing in all drunk-driving cases” and that, therefore, exigency
“must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 1556.
The trial court denied the Rule 35 motion on March 12, 2015, stating that, because
Petitioner claimed that his conviction (rather than his sentence) was illegal, the “proper
mechanism” to challenge that conviction was a petition for state post-conviction relief.
(Id. at 5.)
Petitioner filed such a petition on March 23, 2015, again claiming that the
warrantless blood draw that led to his DUI charge was unconstitutional under McNeely.
(State’s Lodging C-1 at 5-12.) On April 27, 2015, the state district court dismissed the
petition as untimely because it was not filed within one year of the date Petitioner’s
conviction became final. (Id. at 34-37, 52, citing Idaho Code § 19-4902.)

The record lodged with the Court does not contain Petitioner’s Rule 35 motions or the trial
court’s orders denying them. Nonetheless, the Court accepts Petitioner’s assertions regarding these
motions, including the filing dates and dates of denial, for purposes of this decision.
2

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3

Petitioner appealed. However, Petitioner’s appointed counsel later moved to
withdraw, finding no meritorious issues; the Idaho Supreme Court granted the motion.
(State’s Lodging D-1 through D-3.) Petitioner voluntarily dismissed the appeal, and the
remittitur was issued on February 5, 2016. (State’s Lodging D-4 through D-6.)
Petitioner states that he then filed a state petition for writ of habeas corpus. The
petition was dismissed on March 8, 2016, because, under Idaho law, a challenge to the
validity of a conviction cannot be brought in a state habeas petition, but instead must be
raised in a post-conviction petition.3 (Dkt. 3 at 10-11.)
Petitioner filed the instant federal Petition in this Court, at the earliest, on April 28,
2016.4 Petitioner asserts the following claims: (1) violation of the Fourth Amendment
based on the warrantless blood draw; (2) violation of due process based on Petitioner’s
inability “to access new information regarding U.S. Supreme Courts [sic] decision
concerning 4th amendment ‘warrantless,’ unreasonable search and seizures”; (3)
ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s advice regarding the persistent
violator enhancement; and (4) violation of due process and the Double Jeopardy Clause
based on Petitioner’s conviction of both the underlying felony DUI charge and the
persistent violator enhancement. (Dkt. 3 at 6-14; Dkt. 7 at 2-3.)

3

The Court accepts Petitioner’s assertions regarding this state habeas petition. See n.2, supra.

4

See Rule 3(d) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases; Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 27072 (1988) (holding that, if a prisoner is entitled to the benefit of the mailbox rule, a legal document is
deemed filed on the date a Petitioner delivers it to the prison authorities for filing by mail, rather than the
date it is actually filed with the clerk of court).

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4

The Court previously reviewed the Petition and allowed Petitioner to proceed on
his claims to the extent those claims “(1) are cognizable in a federal habeas corpus action,
(2) were timely filed in this Court, and (3) were either properly exhausted in state court or
subject to a legal excuse for any failure to exhaust in a proper manner.” (Dkt. 7 at 3.)
DISCUSSION
The Rules Governing § 2254 Cases (“Habeas Rules”) call for the Court to
summarily dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus when “it plainly appears from the
face of the petition and any attached exhibits,” as well as those records subject to judicial
notice, “that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the [federal] district court.” Habeas
Rule 4; see Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); Dawson, 451 F.3d at 551 n.1. Where appropriate, a
respondent may file a motion for summary dismissal, rather than an answer. White v.
Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989).
Respondent argues that Claim 1 is not cognizable and that Petitioner’s claims are
barred by the one-year statute of limitations. For the following reasons, the Court agrees
and will dismiss the Petition with prejudice.5
1.

Claim 1 is Not Cognizable in this Federal Habeas Proceeding
Claim 1 asserts a violation of the Fourth Amendment based on the nonconsensual,

warrantless blood draw that led to Petitioner’s felony DUI prosecution. However, the
Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule is “not a personal constitutional right” but, rather,
a practical way to deter police conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment. Hence,

5

Therefore, the Court need not address Respondent’s alternative procedural default argument.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5

Fourth Amendment claims generally are not cognizable in federal habeas corpus
proceedings. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976). The Stone rule is based on the
principle that social costs of the exclusionary rule are heavy—the rule “deflects the
truthfinding process and often frees the guilty.” Id. at 490. On collateral review of a
criminal conviction, “the contribution of the exclusionary rule, if any, to the effectuation
of the Fourth Amendment is minimal, and the substantial societal costs of application of
the rule persist with special force.” Id. at 494-95.
Therefore, so long as the state courts provided the petitioner an opportunity for full
and fair litigation of his Fourth Amendment claim in state court, a federal court cannot
grant habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence was obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 494. To determine whether a petitioner had a full and fair
opportunity to challenge his Fourth Amendment claim in state court, the Court
“inquire[s] into the adequacy and fairness of available state court procedures for the
adjudication of Fourth Amendment claims.” Sanna v. Dipaolo, 265 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.
2001). If the Court determines that the available state court procedures are adequate, the
inquiry ends there. Id. at 8-9. That is, if “a state prisoner has had an opportunity to litigate
his Fourth Amendment claims by means of such a set of procedures, a federal habeas
court lacks the authority, under Stone, to second-guess the accuracy of the state court’s
resolution of those claims.” Id. at 9. Stated another way, “[t]he relevant inquiry is
whether petitioner had the opportunity to litigate his claim, not whether he did in fact do
so or even whether the claim was correctly decided.” Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6

891, 899 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Caldwell v. Cupp, 781 F.2d 714, 715 (9th Cir. 1986)
(“All Stone v. Powell requires is the initial opportunity for a fair hearing.”) Petitioner
bears the burden of establishing that the state did not provide a full and fair opportunity
for him to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim. Mack v. Cupp, 564 F.2d 898, 901 (9th
Cir. 1977).
Here, Petitioner could have raised his Fourth Amendment claim by litigating the
issue in the trial court (for example, in a motion to withdraw his guilty plea) or by timely
filing an appeal asserting such a claim in the state appellate court. McNeely was decided
on April 17, 2013—before Petitioner’s judgment of conviction was entered.6 Idaho’s
procedures are adequate and offered Petitioner a full and fair opportunity to raise his
Fourth Amendment claim. Therefore, Claim 1 is subject to summary dismissal as
noncognizable.
2.

Claims 2, 3, and 4 Are Barred by the Statute of Limitation
A.

Standard of Law for Timeliness of Habeas Petitions

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) generally requires
a petitioner to seek federal habeas corpus relief within one year from “the date on which
the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time

6

This discussion does not intend to suggest that if Petitioner raised a Fourth Amendment claim in
state court immediately upon the issuance of McNeely, the state court would have been obligated to grant
him relief. Rather, the Court merely notes that Petitioner’s own proffered excuse—that he could not have
raised a Fourth Amendment claim before McNeely was decided—does not render the state procedures
unfair or inadequate.

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for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).7 One year in this context actually
means 366 days, for example, from January 1, 2001, to January 1, 2002. See Patterson v.
Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
6(a) to AEDPA, where the calculation excludes the day the conviction became final).
The first step in a statute of limitations analysis under § 2244(d)(1)(A) is
determining the date on which the petitioner’s conviction became final. The date of
“finality” that begins the one-year time period is marked as follows, depending on how
far a petitioner pursues his case:

Action Taken

Finality Occurs

No appeal is filed after state district court order or judgment

42 days later, see
Idaho Appellate
Rule 14

Appeal is filed and Idaho Court of Appeals issues a
decision, but no petition for review is filed with the Idaho
Supreme Court

21 days later, see
Idaho Appellate
Rule 118

7

Several other triggering events for the statute of limitations exist—but are less common—and are
set forth in subsections 2244(d)(1)(B), (C), and (D):
(B)

the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was
prevented from filing by such State action;

(C)

the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the
Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D)

the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been
discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 8

Appeal is filed and Idaho Supreme Court issues a decision
or denies a petition for review of an Idaho Court of Appeals
decision, and Petitioner does not file a petition for writ of
certiorari with the United States Supreme Court

90 days later, see
United States
Supreme Court
Rule 13

After Idaho Supreme Court issues a decision or denies a
petition for review, Petitioner files a petition for writ of
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, and the
petition is denied

Date of denial

After Idaho Supreme Court issues a decision or denies a
petition for review, Petitioner files a petition for writ of
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, the petition is
granted, and the United States Supreme Court issues a
decision

Date of decision

In each of the above instances, if the petitioner stops pursuing the case and does
not take the next step within the time specified, “finality” is measured from entry of final
judgment or order, not from a remittitur or mandate, which are mere formalities.
Gonzales v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 150-51 (2012); Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522,
529 (2003); Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.3d 894, 898 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001).
The one-year statute of limitations can be tolled (meaning suspended) under
certain circumstances. AEDPA provides for tolling for all of “[t]he time during which a
properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review . . . is
pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). A motion to reduce a sentence that is not a part of the
direct review process and that requires re-examination of the sentence qualifies as a
collateral review application that tolls the one-year statute of limitations. Wall v. Kholi,
562 U.S. 545, 555-56 (2011). Thus, to the extent that a petitioner properly filed an
application for postconviction relief or other collateral challenge in state court, the one-

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 9

year federal limitations period stops running on the filing date of the state court action
and resumes when the action is completed. To warrant tolling, the collateral relief
application must be “properly filed,” meaning that it conforms to state rules governing
conditions to filing, including filing deadlines. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414
(2005).
The time before a petitioner files an initial application for collateral review in state
court does not toll the statute of limitation. Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir.
1999) (“AEDPA’s statute of limitations is not tolled from the time a final decision is
issued on direct state appeal and the time the first state collateral challenge is filed
because there is no case ‘pending’ during that interval.”), abrogated on other grounds as
stated in Nedds v. Calderon, 678 F.3d 777, 781 (9th Cir. 2012). In addition, AEDPA
“does not permit the reinitiation of the [federal] limitations period that has ended before
the state petition was filed.” Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 822 (9th Cir. 2003).
Finally, each time statutory tolling ends, the statute of limitations does not restart at one
year, but begins running at the place where it stopped before the tolling period began.
If, after applying statutory tolling, a habeas petition is deemed untimely, a federal
court can still hear the merits of the petition if the petitioner can establish that “equitable
tolling” should be applied to toll the remaining time period. See Jorss v. Gomez, 311 F.3d
1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A] court must first determine whether a petition was
untimely under the statute itself before it considers whether equitable tolling should be
applied.”). The limitations period may be equitably tolled under exceptional

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 10

circumstances. “[A] petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows (1) that he
has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance
stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649
(2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A petitioner requesting equitable tolling must show “reasonable diligence, not
“maximum feasible diligence,” id. at 653, and “whether a petitioner acted with
reasonable diligence is a fact-specific inquiry,” Fue v. Biter, 842 F.3d 650, 654 (9th Cir.
2016). “Ordinarily, a petitioner must act with reasonable diligence both before and after
receiving delayed notice that the state denied his habeas petition.” Id. at 656.8
B.

Petitioner’s Conviction Became Final on June 12, 2013

The statute of limitations with respect to Claims 2 through 4 began to run when
Petitioner’s conviction became final.9 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Because Petitioner
did not timely file a direct appeal from his conviction—entered on May 1, 2013—that

8

In addition to statutory and equitable tolling, the statute of limitations is also subject to an actual
innocence exception. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931-32 (2013); Lee v. Lampert, 653
F.3d 929, 937 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). However, Petitioner does not contend that he is actually
innocent. (See generally Dkt. 19.)
9

Petitioner argues that the statute of limitation was not triggered by the date of finality of his
conviction pursuant to § 2244(d)(1)(A) but, instead, that the Court should analyze the timeliness of his
claims under § 2244(d)(1)(C) or (D). (Dkt. 19 at 12-13.) However, Petitioner’s arguments with respect to
these subsections—that McNeely established a new constitutional right, under subsection (d)(1)(C), and
that he could not have known of the factual predicate for his claim earlier because he had no access to the
McNeely decision, under subsection (d)(1)(D)—apply only to Claim 1.
The Court must analyze the issue of timeliness on a claim-by-claim basis, rather than giving the
Petition as a whole a single limitations period. Mardesich v. Cate, 668 F.3d 1164, 1171 (9th Cir. 2012)
(“Therefore, we hold that AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations in § 2244(d)(1) applies to each claim
in a habeas application on an individual basis.”). Because Claim 1 is noncognizable and because
Petitioner does not contend that his other claims are subject to the triggering events found in subsection
(d)(1)(C) or (D), the statute of limitations for Claims 2 through 4 began to run when Petitioner’s
conviction became final. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).

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conviction became final on June 12, 2013, when Idaho’s 42-day period for filing an
appeal expired. See Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a). The Idaho Supreme Court’s later
dismissal of the untimely appeal and issuance of the remittitur did not restart the statute
of limitations period. See Randle v. Crawford, 604 F.3d 1047, 1054-55 (9th Cir. 2010).
Absent tolling, the statute of limitations period would have expired one year later,
on June 12, 2014. Therefore, the claims in the Petition are barred by AEDPA’s one-year
statute of limitations unless Petitioner establishes that he is entitled to statutory or
equitable tolling.
C.

At Most, Petitioner Is Entitled to 48 Days of Statutory Tolling

As set forth above, AEDPA’s one-year limitations period is tolled for all of the
time “during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other
collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(2). The statute of limitations began to run on June 12, 2013. The earliest
possible date when the statute was tolled under § 2244(d)(2) was August 28, 2013, when
Petitioner states that he filed his first Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence. (Dkt. 3 at
9.) At that time, 77 days of the limitations period had already passed. See Nino, 183 F.3d
at 1006.
The court denied Petitioner’s motion on September 3, 2013 (Dkt. 3 at 9), and
Petitioner had 42 days to file an appeal. See Idaho App. R. 14. Because he did not do so,
the statute of limitation was tolled until October 15, 2013 (42 days after the motion was
denied, see Idaho App. Rule 14). Therefore, Petitioner is entitled to, at most, 48 days of

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 12

statutory tolling with respect to his initial Rule 35 motion (August 28 to October 15,
2013). When the statute of limitation restarted on October 15, 2013, Petitioner had 289
days remaining in the one-year period (366 days minus the 77 days that had passed
before Petitioner filed his first Rule 35 motion). Therefore, his federal petition was due in
this Court no later than July 31, 2014—289 days after October 15, 2013.
Because Petitioner’s second Rule 35 motion, his state post-conviction petition, and
his state habeas petition were not filed until well after July 31, 2014, none of those
proceedings could have resurrected the statute of limitation under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
See Ferguson, 321 F.3d at 822. Therefore, even with statutory tolling, Petitioner’s April
28, 2016 federal Petition10 was still filed nearly 21 months too late. Therefore,
Petitioner’s claims can be deemed timely only if he is also entitled to equitable tolling.
D.

Equitable Tolling

As noted above, equitable tolling will apply if (1) the petitioner has pursued his
rights diligently and (2) extraordinary circumstances stood in his way and prevented a
timely filing. Holland, 560 U.S. at 649. “[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable
tolling under AEDPA is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v.
Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and alteration
omitted). As to the diligence issue, the Supreme Court has held that a petitioner who
“waited years, without any valid justification” to bring his post-conviction claims in state
court, and then waited “five more months after his [post-conviction] proceedings became

10

Petitioner asserts at one point that he filed his federal Petition on February 11, 2016. (Dkt. 19 at
9.) However, Petitioner clearly signed the Petition on April 28, 2016. (Dkt. 3 at 15.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 13

final before deciding to seek relief in federal court,” had not acted diligently in pursuing
his rights. Pace, 544 U.S. at 419.
Petitioner has not established extraordinary circumstances that would justify the
application of equitable tolling in this case. The only facts asserted to justify the delay in
filing have to do Claim 1—Petitioner alleges he could not have known about the McNeely
decision earlier because he had no access to the decision. Petitioner has offered no
justification for the delay in filing with respect to Claim 2, 3, or 4.
Thus, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling on these claims, which are timebarred.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Claim 1 is noncognizable in this federal habeas
proceedings, and the remaining claims are barred by AEDPA’s one-year statute of
limitations. Therefore, Respondent’s Motion for Summary Dismissal will be granted.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED:
1.

Petitioner’s Motion for Extension of Time (Dkt. 17) is GRANTED.

2.

Respondent’s Motion for Summary Dismissal (Dkt. 14) is GRANTED, and
the Petition is DISMISSED with prejudice.

3.

The Court does not find its resolution of this habeas matter to be reasonably
debatable, and a certificate of appealability will not issue. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c); Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. If

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 14

Petitioner wishes to appeal, he must file a timely notice of appeal with the
Clerk of Court. Petitioner may seek a certificate of appealability from the
Ninth Circuit by filing a request in that court.

DATED: July 24, 2017

Honorable Ronald E. Bush
United States Magistrate Judge

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 15