Bodda et al v. State of Idaho CPS et al

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER Because the undersigned Magistrate Judge lacks the authority to enter final orders in this case, the Clerk is directed to reassign this matter to a District Judge for review and consideration of an order either dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint, or granting leave to amend. Signed by Judge Candy W. Dale. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (jp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

MELISSA BODDA; MINOR APDB,
Case No. 1:16-cv-00267-CWD
Plaintiffs,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

v.
STATE OF IDAHO CHILD
PROTECTIVE SERVICES; CANYON
COUNTY D.A.; CANYON COUNTY
JUDGES; NAMPA POLICE,
Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
The Court has before it pro se Plaintiff Melissa Bodda’s complaint and in forma
pauperis request, which the Clerk of Court conditionally filed. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915, this Court must review Bodda’s in forma pauperis complaint to determine whether
it may be summarily dismissed. Bodda, the only party appearing in this action, has not
filed a consent to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. §
636(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 73. The Court therefore reviews the complaint and enters this
order directing the Clerk of the Court to reassign this matter to a District Judge to
determine whether the complaint, or any of the claims therein, should be summarily
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1

dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), or whether Bodda should be granted leave to
amend.
BACKGROUND
Melissa Bodda, appearing pro se on behalf of herself and her minor child, appears
to allege that her child APDB was wrongfully taken from her by Caldwell Child
Protective Services, the Nampa Police Department, and certain named individuals with
Caldwell Child Protective Services. (Dkt. 2-3.) Bodda does not indicate when these
events occurred. She alleges the taking of her child violates her rights and her child’s
rights under the “American Constitution for the United States also under UCC 1-308
formerly UCC 1-207 (reservation of rights, Title 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (felonious restraints),
and they also violated my rights and my child’s rights under title 18 U.S.C. § 241 and 242
(Conspiracy against rights and deprivations of rights under the color of law), also under
title 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” She seeks a remedy for these violations and demands the return
of her child. The Court assumes there are state court proceedings involving Bodda’s
parental rights.
Attached to Bodda’s complaint appears to be a “commercial lien” purporting to
give notice to Magistrate Frank Paul Kotyk, Michael Nelson, Shannon Marshall, or any
other involved parties that “all properties taken unlawfully” must be immediately
returned, or else she will charge them with criminal fraud, theft, conspiracy of extortion,
theft and fraud, and will place commercial liens against their real and personal property.
Bodda filed also an “Affidavit of Truth,” indicating that, if anything happens to her

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during the pendency of this action, she “did NOT commit suicide or have an ‘Accident’”.
(Dkt. 2-2.)
ANALYSIS
1.

Standard of Review
Once a complaint has been conditionally filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the

Court must conduct an initial review of the complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The
Court must dismiss a complaint or any portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious;
(2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii).
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the complaint must be liberally construed,
and Plaintiff must be given the benefit of any doubt. See Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443,
447 (9th Cir. 2000). Additionally, if the complaint can be saved by amendment, Plaintiff
should be notified of the deficiencies and provided an opportunity to amend. See Jackson
v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 758 (9th Cir. 2003). A dismissal without leave to amend is
improper unless it is beyond doubt that the complaint “could not be saved by any
amendment.” Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 573 F.3d 728, 737 (9th Cir. 2009).
Plaintiff appears to be asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the civil rights
statute. To state a valid claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights
protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute proximately caused by the
conduct of a person acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418,
1420 (9th Cir. 1991).

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2.

Failure to State A Claim
A complaint fails to state a claim for relief under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure if the factual assertions in the complaint, taken as true, are insufficient
for the reviewing court plausibly “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Id. In other words, although Rule 8 “does not require detailed
factual allegations, ... it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If the facts pleaded are
“merely consistent with a defendant's liability,” the complaint has not stated a claim for
relief that is plausible on its face. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Bodda has not alleged sufficient facts to proceed with her complaint. It is not clear
how any of the named individuals violated Bodda’s constitutional rights. She asserts no
violation of any federal statute or constitutionally derived right. Rather, she states alleged
violations of the Uniform Commercial Code under state law, and various alleged criminal
violations. Further, the complaint is completely devoid of the “who, what, why, where,
and when” necessary for the complaint to set forth a claim for relief.
3.

The Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff’s Family Law Claims
The Court cannot offer review, reversal, or stay of any proceedings involving

Bodda’s parental rights that may be proceeding in the Idaho state courts. “A federal
district court has no jurisdiction over challenges to state-court decisions in particular
cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state
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court's action was unconstitutional.” District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983). “This rule applies even though ... the challenge is anchored to
alleged deprivations of federally protected due process and equal protection rights.” Id. at
486 (internal citation omitted). The Rooker–Feldman doctrine prohibits district courts
from exercising jurisdiction over an appeal, reversal, or modification of a state-court
judgment. Such federal jurisdiction is lodged exclusively with the United States Supreme
Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1257. The doctrine is “confined to cases ... brought by state-court
losers complaining of injuries caused by state court judgments rendered before the district
court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus., 544 U.S. 280 (2005).
Additionally, in the area of family law, the United States Supreme Court has long
held that “[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and
child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States.” Ex parte
Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890); see also Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 587
(1989) (concluding that “domestic relations are preeminently matters of state law”).
“While rare instances arise in which it is necessary to answer a substantial federal
question that transcends or exists apart from the family law issue, in general it is
appropriate for the federal courts to leave delicate issues of domestic relations to the state
courts.” Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 13 (2004).
The Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to proceed in this action.

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4.

Unauthorized Practice of Law
Finally, upon review of the complaint, it appears Bodda seeks to represent her

minor child. However, the only appropriate plaintiff in this matter is Ms. Bodda.
Nonetheless, it appears Bodda seeks to represent her child’s rights. Because legal
representation may be provided only by a licensed attorney, Bodda may not represent her
child in this action unless she is a licensed attorney admitted to practice before the Court
or a lawfully appointed guardian appearing pro se. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654; see also In re
Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 715 F.3d 747, 748 (9th Cir. 2013); Dist. Idaho L. Rule
83.4; Idaho Code. § 3-104.
ORDER
Because the undersigned Magistrate Judge lacks the authority to enter final orders
in this case, the Clerk is directed to reassign this matter to a District Judge for review and
consideration of an order either dismissing Plaintiffs’ Complaint, or granting leave to
amend.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

July 01, 2016

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