Hanson v. Blaine County et al

Filing 51

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - IT IS ORDERED: 1. Defendant Kevin Wayts Second Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial (Dkt. 49 ) is Granted. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (cjs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
SCOTT HANSON,
Case No. 1:16-cv-00421-BLW
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

v.
BLAINE COUNTY, GENE D.
RAMSEY, GOODING COUNTY,
SHAUN GOUGH, KEVIN WAYT,
WILLIAM SHUBERT, JESUS
GONZALEZ, JUDITH PETERSON,
AND JOHN DOES I-X,
Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
The Court has before it Defendant Kevin Wayt’s Second Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial (Dkt. 49). Earlier, the
Court addressed motions to dismiss by all defendants. The Court denied some motions,
granted some motions with leave to amend, and granted some motions without leave to
amend. Defendant Kevin Wayt’s motion was granted with leave to amend in part.
Hanson amended his complaint, but Wayt once again asks the Court to dismiss the claims
against him. Hanson failed to respond to the motion, and the deadline for such a response
has passed.

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LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” in order to “give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007). While a complaint
attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “does not need detailed factual
allegations,” it must set forth “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555. To survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 556.
The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. Where a complaint
pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, it “stops short of the
line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’ ” Id. at 557.
The Supreme Court identified two “working principles” that underlie Twombly in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). First, the court need not accept as true, legal
conclusions that are couched as factual allegations. Id. Rule 8 does not “unlock the
doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Id. at 67879. Second, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must state a plausible claim for

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relief. Id. at 679. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief
will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id.
A dismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it is beyond doubt that the
complaint “could not be saved by any amendment.” Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 573 F.3d 728,
737 (9th Cir. 2009) (issued 2 months after Iqbal).1 The Ninth Circuit has held that “in
dismissals for failure to state a claim, a district court should grant leave to amend even if
no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could
not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v.
Northern California Collection Service, Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990). The
issue is not whether plaintiff will prevail but whether he “is entitled to offer evidence to
support the claims.” Diaz v. Int’l Longshore and Warehouse Union, Local 13, 474 F.3d
1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2007)(citations omitted).
BACKGROUND
The factual background is set forth in detail in the Court’s earlier Memorandum
Decision and Order. Dkt. 44. The Court will not repeat all of it here, but will generally
note that as to Wayt, Hanson alleges that Wayt arrested him for a parole violation on

1

The Court has some concern about the continued vitality of the liberal amendment policy adopted in
Harris v. Amgen, based as it is on language in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), suggesting
that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim. . ..” Given Twombly and Iqbal’s rejection
of the liberal pleading standards adopted by Conley, it is uncertain whether the language in Harris v.
Amgen has much of a life expectancy.

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September 19, 2014. At the time of his arrest, Hanson informed Wayt that he had recently
had eye surgery and required prescription eye drops. Wayt refused to allow Hanson to
take his prescription eye drops with him to the county jail. Id.
Hanson’s initial claim against Wayt was that Wayt was deliberately indifferent
towards his serious medical needs by refusing to transport his prescription eye drops to
the county jail. Wayt argued he was entitled to qualified immunity. The Court agreed,
and granted Wayt qualified immunity. But the Court allowed Hanson to amend his
complaint against Wayt to allege facts which would satisfy the “state created danger”
doctrine. In granting Hanson leave to amend, the Court explained that, construed
liberally, the original complaint can be seen as alleging that Wayt placed Hanson in a
situation that would otherwise not exist. But the Court concluded that Hanson failed to
satisfy the last two elements of the “state created danger” doctrine. There were no
allegations that Wayt was aware of an immediate and known danger to Hanson if he
refused to take the prescription eye drops to the jail. Therefore, the complaint did not
adequately allege the facts necessary to assert liability under a “state created danger.” The
Court cautioned Hanson that if he amended his complaint, he must allege specific facts
about what the immediate and known danger was, and how Wayt was aware of the
danger. Simply stating that Wayt did not allow Hanson to take his eye drops would not be
enough to allege a valid claim. Furthermore, the Court explained that the allegations must
be specific – the Court stated that it would not entertain a simple statement that Hanson
acted with deliberate indifference.

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ANALYSIS
In his Amended Complaint, Hanson alleges that Wayt was a parole officer who
arrested him for a parole violation. He states that he told Wayt on at least three occasions
the details of his recent series of eye surgeries, and that he required his prescription eye
drops to avoid complications. He states that Wayt refused to let him take the eye drops
with him to jail, and that Wayt told him that he would be seen by medical staff at the jail.
He further states that after he was returned to the jail after an appointment with an
optometrist, he told Wayt that he had lost sight in his right eye and that he would likely
need more surgery, to which Wayt replied, “I don’t care, maybe IDOC will.”
As explained in the Court’s earlier decision, “the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause . . . does not confer any affirmative right to governmental aid” and
“typically does not impose a duty on the state to protect individuals from third parties.”
Henry A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 998 (9th Cir. 2012)(citing Patel v. Kent Sch. Dist.,
648 F.3d 965, 971 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations and alterations omitted). The “state created
danger” doctrine is an exception to this rule, so that liability exists when “the state
affirmatively places the plaintiff in danger by acting with ‘deliberate indifference’ to a
‘known and obvious danger.’” Henry A., 678 F.3d at 998.
To determine whether the “state created danger” doctrine applies, courts must look
at “(1) whether any affirmative action of the official placed the individual in danger he
otherwise would not have faced; (2) whether the danger was known or obvious; and (3)
whether the officer acted with deliberate indifference to that danger.” Id. at 1002. In other

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words, Wayt must have known something was going to happen, but ignored the risk and
knowingly exposed Hanson to it.
Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Hanson, the Court can conclude that
Wayt arrested Hanson and transported him to the jail. The Court can conclude that
Hanson made his eye condition and need for prescription eye drops known to Wayt
during that time. The Court can conclude that Wayt did not allow Hanson to take his eye
drops with him to the jail, but that he informed Hanson that he could get medical care at
the jail. There is no evidence that Wayt told the jail what he knew about Hanson’s eye
condition.
Under these fleshed out allegations, the Court now concludes that Wayt did not
place Hanson in danger he otherwise would not have faced. At most, Wayt did not allow
Hanson to bring and use his eye drops during transport to the jail. But there is no
allegation that Hanson’s loss of sight or other complications occurred during this
relatively short period of time. Wayt transported Hanson to a jail facility with medical
care, and specifically told Hanson that he could get medical care at the jail. Whether
Hanson got the care he needed at the jail, and what Hanson did when he arrived at the jail
as far as requesting a prescription for his eyes is left for another day. But it cannot be said
that Wayt placed Hanson in danger by transporting him to a jail with medical care. It
cannot be said that Wayt knew Hanson was in danger when he placed him in the custody
of a jail with medical care. And it certainly cannot be said that Wayt was deliberately
indifferent to any potential danger when he specifically informed Hanson that he could

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obtain medical care at the jail. Finally, the Court notes that Hanson likely does not
dispute these conclusions given his failure to even respond to the motion to dismiss.
Accordingly, the Court will grant the motion to dismiss.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED:
1. Defendant Kevin Wayt’s Second Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial (Dkt. 49) is Granted.

DATED: October 27, 2017
_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
Chief Judge
United States District Court

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