Knight v. Yordy
Filing
52
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - Respondents Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 49 ) is GRANTED. This entire consolidated action is DISMISSED with prejudice. A certificate of appealability will not issue, because the Courts decision is not reasonably debatable . See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). If Petitioner files a timely notice of appeal, the Clerk of Court must forward a copy of the notice of appeal, together with this Order, to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Petitioner may seek a certificate of appealability from that Court by filing a request there. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (jd)
Case 1:16-cv-00459-BLW Document 52 Filed 08/03/20 Page 1 of 14
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
RICHARD KNIGHT,
Case No. 1:16-cv-00459-BLW
(lead case)
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER
v.
KEITH YORDY,
Defendants.
RICHARD KNIGHT,
Case No. 1:19-cv-00041-BLW
(consolidated case)
Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN RAMIREZ,
Respondent.
Pending before the Court in Petitioner Richard Knight’s habeas corpus
consolidated case is Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, which is now fully briefed. (Dkts.
49, 50.) The Court has reviewed the entire matter in both cases and is ready to rule on the
Motion to Dismiss. For clarity’s sake, the Court will refer to the lead case as the “2016
case” and the member case as the “2019 case.”
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1
Case 1:16-cv-00459-BLW Document 52 Filed 08/03/20 Page 2 of 14
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 20, 2019, acting with the consent of all parties, United States Magistrate
Judge Ronald E. Bush entered final judgment in the 2016 case, which challenged
Petitioner’s 2012 state court convictions on two counts of lewd conduct with a minor
under the age of sixteen and one count of sexual abuse of a minor under the age of
sixteen. (Dkt. 29 and 30). Unbeknownst to Judge Bush and before entry of that judgment
in the 2016 case, Petitioner filed a separate, second habeas action challenging the same
2012 convictions in the 2019 case.1
Judge Bush construed the second petition in the 2019 case as a motion to amend
the petition in the 2016 case. See Goodrum v. Busby, 824 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 2016)
(when a petitioner files a second petition while a first petition is already pending, the
Court “must construe the new petition as a motion to amend” the previous petition—not
“as an unauthorized second or successive petition”). Judge Bush vacated the judgment in
the 2016 case and reopened the 2016 case for consideration of the petition filed in the
2019 case and any further amendments in the 2016 case. (Dkt. 31.) Both cases were then
reassigned to this Court for a final determination.
The Court agrees with Judge Bush’s analysis that, although Petitioner identified two different state court
case numbers in the petitions in these two habeas cases, both habeas cases challenge the same 2012
convictions, as Petitioner identified the same docket number for his direct and post-conviction appeals in
both petitions, as well as the same date of sentencing on all three convictions. Compare Dkt. 3, p.1, in
1:16-cv-00459-REB, with Dkt. 3, p.1, in Case No. 1:19-cv-00041-REB; see also State v. Knight, No.
40614, 2014 WL 668503 (Idaho Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2014) (unpublished); Knight v. State, No. 43042, 2016
WL 2841098, at *1 (Idaho Ct. App. May 13, 2016) (unpublished). The Court has been unable to locate
the state court case number identified in the new petition, Case No. 1:19-cv-00041-REB, in the Canyon
County iCourt Database, https://icourt.idaho.gov/.
1
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2
Case 1:16-cv-00459-BLW Document 52 Filed 08/03/20 Page 3 of 14
OUTLINE OF PETITIONER’ CLAIMS
Petitioner is proceeding on his Third Amended Petition in Case 2016 (Dkt. 46 in
this case), and the original Petition in Case 2019 (Dkt. 3 in that case). The Court will first
identify the claims presented.
1.
Third Amended Petition in Case 2016
A.
First Claim
Petitioner asserts that he is actually innocent. The United States Supreme Court
has determined that a claim of actual innocence is not cognizable on collateral review in a
federal habeas corpus action. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404-05 (1993) (“[O]ur
habeas jurisprudence makes clear that a claim of ‘actual innocence’ is not itself a
constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass
to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.”).
Accordingly, this is not a cognizable federal habeas corpus claim, but may be used to
excuse the procedural default of other claims.
Petitioner also asserts in the First Claim that the prosecutor misstated facts,
committed prosecutorial misconduct based on a deficient investigation, withheld
exculpatory evidence, and participated in a trial that resulted in Petitioner’s conviction
upon insufficient evidence.
B.
Second Claim
Petitioner’s second claim is “deficient and ineffective assistance of counsel.” He
asserts that trial counsel failed to investigate a medical condition defense, failed to retain
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3
Case 1:16-cv-00459-BLW Document 52 Filed 08/03/20 Page 4 of 14
an expert regarding Petitioner’s mental psychosis, and restricted his right to present
evidence,
Petitioner also asserts that counsel had an ulterior purpose for his poor
performance (to end his employment with the public defender’s office at the time of
trial), and thus counsel abandoned him. Petitioner was appointed another attorney from
the public defender’s office after his counsel left his employment there, but the new
attorney entered the case only the day before the sentencing hearing.
C.
Third Claim
Petitioner asserts that a structural error occurred when the prosecutor and defense
counsel “did not give a due process notice [that] the criminal action would be prosecuted
under Idaho Sessions Laws Chapter 368 (1982), the whole legislative act.” (Id., p. 12.) As
a result, Plaintiff asserts that the jury did not have notice, and that “he was denied the
opportunity for a fair and just trial, denied the reasonable ability to decide whether to
plead guilty or go to trial, and denied the opportunity to a mens rea hearing,” as well as
denied the right to an “I.S.L. – ch 368 (title 19) sentencing,” the opportunity “to an I.S.L.
chapter 368, (title 66) conditions of confinement; and access to release.” (Id., pp. 12-13.)
D.
Fourth Claim
Petitioner asserts that the trial court committed clear and plain error because his
conviction was based on “less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt” of every element of
the charged crime. He asserts that “no instruction was given on Idaho Code § 28-307(c),
mens rea and specific intent, and a mens rea hearing was not offered.” As a result, he
alleges, “the court failed to recognize the crime being the result of a mental psychosis
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4
Case 1:16-cv-00459-BLW Document 52 Filed 08/03/20 Page 5 of 14
required assignment of a psychiatrist to the defense team.” (Id., p. 13.) “Mitigating
mental status [was] not regarded by the court or jury, see the Whole Legislative Act,
Idaho Session Laws Chapter 368 (1982). The jury instructions diluted the reasonable
doubt standard of proof. Jury instructions on every essential element of the crime were
not given. Jury instructions were fundamentally defective in defining elements of the
crime. The jury instructions improperly shifted the burden of proof. The jury instructions
lightened the prosecution’s burden of proof. Jury voir dire was interfered with or limited
in an unreasonable manner. (Id., pp. 13-16.)
2.
Petition in Case 2019
A.
First Claim
The first claim in Case 2019 is the same as the first claim in Case 2016.
B.
Second Claim
The second claim in Case 2019 is the same as the second claim in Case 2016.
C.
Third Claim
The third claim has multiple subclaims: that Petitioner’s confrontation rights were
denied; that the conviction is based on evidence known to be false; that the elements of
the crime charged were not established, including mens rea; that cross-examination was
denied; that there was a collusive effect of all violations; that the prosecutor unfairly
impeached his credibility; that he was denied the right to present evidence and witnesses;
that he was denied jury instructions on his theory of defense; that he suffered
discrimination in law enforcement; that the evidence was insufficient to establish his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt; that the prosecution did not disclose impeachment evidence
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5
Case 1:16-cv-00459-BLW Document 52 Filed 08/03/20 Page 6 of 14
material to Petitioner; that the prosecution knowingly used perjured testimony; that an
element of the offense was misconstrued, and so there was no proffer of evidence to
support specific intent; that Petitioner was denied peremptory challenges in jury
selection; that the prosecutor used perjured testimony and denied him a fair trial; that
Petitioner’s speedy trial rights were denied; that state law was violated to obtain the
conviction; that the statute under which he was convicted was vague; that he was
subjected to vindictive prosecution; that he suffered an unlawful search of his home; that
the arrest warrant as obtained by “misdetermined” probable cause; that he was subjected
to a police interrogation without counsel; and that the police failed to give him selfincrimination warnings.
D.
Fourth Claim
The fourth claim in Case 2019 is the same as the fourth claim in Case 2016.
E.
Fifth Claim
The fifth claim is based on “common error (the plain error rule).” Petitioner asserts
that the record does not contain the proper and reasonable protections of “Idaho Session
Laws, chapter 368, §§19.2522/2523”; that his sentence is excessive; that his sentence is
disproportionate; that he was denied release on parole; and that “Ida Sess Laws, ch. 368,
merges as a sentence with ch 336 (2009) implementation [sic].”
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6
Case 1:16-cv-00459-BLW Document 52 Filed 08/03/20 Page 7 of 14
PROCEDURAL DEFAULT
Petitioner first asserts that his Petitions should be construed under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 because of “the unique mental health nature of the criminal conduct” and his
status as a “patient.” (Dkt. 46, p. 2.) There is no factual or legal basis for this assertion.
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is a “general grant of habeas corpus authority” that applies
to persons held in state custody for reasons other than a state court criminal judgment,
including circumstances of “pre-conviction custody, custody awaiting extradition, or
other forms of custody that are possible without a conviction.” White v. Lambert, 370
F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal citation omitted). Once a person has been
convicted in state court, § 2254 is the proper provision to obtain habeas corpus relief.
In any event, petitions for habeas corpus submitted under both §§ 2241 and 2254
require exhaustion of state court remedies before presentation of federal claims to the
federal district court. See Carden v. State of Montana, 626 F.2d 82, 83 (9th Cir. 1980) (a
pre-requisite to bringing a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is
exhausting one’s federal claims in state court). The exhaustion doctrine requires that a
petitioner give the state courts, through the designated appellate process, “a full and fair
opportunity to resolve federal constitutional claims” before bringing those claims to
federal court. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) (explaining
exhaustion in the context of § 2254 petitions). This means that a person in state custody
must follow his state court challenge of federal constitutional issues through the Idaho
Supreme Court, and then, if he is not granted relief after exhausting all state court
remedies through the Idaho Supreme Court, he may then proceed to federal court.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 7
Case 1:16-cv-00459-BLW Document 52 Filed 08/03/20 Page 8 of 14
Respondent’s procedural default argument is simple—Petitioner failed to file a
petition for review asking the Idaho Supreme Court to review any of his federal claims.
(Dkt. 49-1.) The Court agrees that the record supports Respondent’s contention with
respect to all federal claims. The record shows that Petitioner brought a state law
excessive sentence claim on direct appeal (not brought as a federal claim), which the
Idaho Court of Appeals heard and rejected. (See State’s Lodging B-1.) Thereafter,
Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Idaho Supreme Court on the state law claim,
which was denied. (See State’s Exhibit B-7.)
Petitioner filed a post-conviction appeal, which was heard by the Idaho Court of
Appeals, but he did not file a petition for review with the Idaho Supreme Court after
denial of the post-conviction petition was affirmed on appeal. (See State’s Lodgings D-10
to D-11; Dkt. 19.) Therefore, all of the claims in both Petitions are procedurally
defaulted on federal habeas corpus review, because it is now too late to bring them
properly in state court.
CAUSE AND PREJUDICE EXCEPTION
If a claim has not been properly exhausted in the state court system, the claim is
considered “procedurally defaulted.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731. A procedurally defaulted
claim will not be heard in federal court unless the petitioner shows either that there was
legitimate cause for the default and that prejudice resulted from the default, or,
alternatively, that the petitioner is actually innocent and a miscarriage of justice would
occur if the federal claim is not heard. Id.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 8
Case 1:16-cv-00459-BLW Document 52 Filed 08/03/20 Page 9 of 14
To show “cause” for a procedural default, a petitioner must ordinarily demonstrate
that some objective factor external to the defense impeded his or his counsel’s efforts to
comply with the state procedural rule at issue. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488
(1986). To show “prejudice,” a petitioner bears “the burden of showing not merely that
the errors [in his proceeding] constituted a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked
to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire [proceeding] with errors of
constitutional dimension.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982).
Petitioner raises of variety of “causes” for the procedural default of his claims.
Petitioner asserts that the State created barriers that frustrated, hindered, and chilled his
rights. He asserts he was at a disadvantage because the prison does not provide a law
library or legal assistance for mentally challenged prisoners. (Id., p. 3.)
Petitioner also asserts that “there are many deliberate (intentional) forms of
retaliation or coercion that State Prosecutors can engage in, to prejudice an individual’s
(prisoner’s) U.S. First Amendment rights; to gain an undue advantage.” (Id., pp. 4-5.)
Petitioner also asserts that he is a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA,
that he has been denied services because of his disability, and has suffered prejudice from
denial of services.
In all of these excuses, Petitioner ties none directly to his failure to file a petition
for review in the Idaho Supreme Court. He has not shown that the prison legal resource
center did not have the Idaho Appellate Rules available for his use at the time the petition
for review was due in his case. Nor has he shown that the “State Prisoner Self-Help
Packet [for] Federal Habeas Corpus Petition” (created by federal court staff) was not
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 9
Case 1:16-cv-00459-BLW Document 52 Filed 08/03/20 Page 10 of 14
available to him. The Packet instructions from 2011 clearly outline the requirement of
presentation of federal claims to the Idaho Supreme Court. (See State Prisoner Self-Help
Packet - Federal Habeas Corpus Petition instructions, attached to this Order as an
exhibit.)
Neither has Petitioner shown that he is mentally disabled to the degree that he
could not have gone to the prison legal resource center and reviewed the Idaho Appellate
Rules or the federal habeas corpus packet rules. Indeed, his prolific filings in multiple
cases show that he is fully capable of researching claims and issues, filing court
documents by himself and with the help of other prisoners, and protecting his interests.
The Idaho Court of Appeals issued its opinion in his post-conviction case on May 13,
2016. During the same approximate time frame, Petitioner filed three civil rights cases in
federal court: Case No. 1:16-cv-00096-REB, Knight v. State of Idaho et al., filed
03/07/16; Case No. 1:16-cv-00358-REB, Knight v. Idaho Board of Corrections et al.,
filed 08/08/16; and Case No. 1:17-cv-00147-REB, Knight v. State of Idaho, filed
03/23/17.
All of Petitioner’s other excuses are too vague to support a “cause” argument. Nor
does Petitioner show that any of the excuses actually “caused” the default of his claims,
that is, the failure to file the petition for review. Hence, the Court rejects Petitioner’s
assertion that adequate “cause” exists to excuse the default of his claims.
MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE EXCEPTION
If a petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice for a procedurally defaulted claim,
he can still raise the claim if he demonstrates that the court’s failure to consider it will
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 10
Case 1:16-cv-00459-BLW Document 52 Filed 08/03/20 Page 11 of 14
result in a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494
(1991). A miscarriage of justice means that a constitutional violation has probably
resulted in the conviction of someone who is actually innocent. Murray v. Carrier, 477
U.S. at 496.
To show a miscarriage of justice, a petitioner must make a colorable showing of
factual innocence, Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993), meaning that the new
evidence presented shows “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have
found Petitioner guilty.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). Types of evidence
that “may establish factual innocence include credible declarations of guilt by another,
see Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 340 (1992), trustworthy eyewitness accounts, see
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 331, and exculpatory scientific evidence.” Pitts v. Norris, 85 F.3d
348, 350-51 (8th Cir. 1996). The evidence supporting the actual innocence claim must be
“newly presented” evidence of actual innocence, meaning that “it was not introduced to
the jury at trial”; it need not be “newly discovered,” meaning that it could have been
available to the defendant during his trial, though it was not presented to the jury. Griffin
v. Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 962–63 (9th Cir. 2013).
Judge Bush thoroughly analyzed and rejected this assertion. (See Dkt. 29, pp. 1112.) After a full de novo review, this Court agrees with that analysis. Plaintiff has made
no showing of factual innocence, and therefore, he does not qualify to proceed to the
merits of his claims under this exception to the procedural default rule.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 11
Case 1:16-cv-00459-BLW Document 52 Filed 08/03/20 Page 12 of 14
CLAIM FIVE IN 2019 CASE: SENTENCING ERRORS
Petitioner asserts here that his sentence is excessive and disproportionate to the
crimes. He relies mainly on state law theories, which cannot provide a basis for federal
habeas corpus relief. He did not properly exhaust any sentencing claim based on a federal
constitutional theory. Regardless, the Court will review the sentence for constitutionality.
In his direct appeal, Petitioner admitted that his sentence was within the maximum term
set forth in the applicable statute. (See State’s Lodging B-1, p. 3.)
In Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 372 (1982), the Supreme Court stated that it had
“never found a sentence for a term of years within the limits authorized by statute to be,
by itself, a cruel and unusual punishment.”2 That is, because the crime allowed for a 30year sentence and the state court provide an adequate justification for the sentence,
Petitioner’s sentence of 28 years does not violate the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause (or the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause).
As to disproportionality, harsher sentences for lesser crimes have been upheld by
the United States Supreme Court. In Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), the
Supreme Court held that a sentence of life imprisonment with an opportunity for parole
after twelve years did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in a situation where a
defendant with two prior felony convictions was convicted of obtaining $120.75 by false
Where a particular Amendment “provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection” against
a particular sort of government behavior, “that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of
‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386, 395 (1989). The Eighth Amendment is the more particular provision in this instance.
2
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 12
Case 1:16-cv-00459-BLW Document 52 Filed 08/03/20 Page 13 of 14
pretenses. In Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), the Supreme Court affirmed a
Michigan court judgment sentencing the defendant to a statutory mandatory life sentence
without the possibility of parole for possessing more than 650 grams of cocaine, rejecting
a disproportionate sentence argument. In Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), the United
States Supreme Court reviewed the “disproportionality” of a sentence to the crime, but
that was a case where the convicted felon had a term of life without parole.
Here, Petitioner was charged with performing oral sex and touching the breasts of
his 14-year-old granddaughter, and putting his hand down the pants of his
granddaughter’s friend, who was also a minor. Petitioner was sentenced to a unified
sentence of 20 years, with 10 years indeterminate for the lewd conduct charges, and 15
years, with 5 years indeterminate, for the sexual abuse charge. There is no federal
precedent demonstrating that the sentences Petitioner received violate the Constitution.
Therefore, Petitioner’s sentencing claims—to the extent they can be construed as federal
and not state claims—do not warrant habeas corpus relief.
3.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, all of the claims in Petitioner’s Third Amended
Petition in Case 2016 and original Petition in Case 2019 are procedurally defaulted.
Alternatively, the sentencing claim is denied on the merits. Adequate cause and prejudice
or a miscarriage of justice to excuse procedural default has not been shown. Therefore,
Petitioner’s entire action will be dismissed with prejudice.
ORDER
1. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 49) is GRANTED.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 13
Case 1:16-cv-00459-BLW Document 52 Filed 08/03/20 Page 14 of 14
2. This entire consolidated action is DISMISSED with prejudice.
3. A certificate of appealability will not issue, because the Court’s decision is not
reasonably debatable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).
4. If Petitioner files a timely notice of appeal, the Clerk of Court must forward a copy
of the notice of appeal, together with this Order, to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Petitioner may seek a certificate of appealability
from that Court by filing a request there.
DATED: August 3, 2020
_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
U.S. District Court Judge
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 14
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?