Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Hetemi et al
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER granting 14 Motion for Default Judgment; 15 Memorandum in Support of Motion. Default Judgment is HEREBY ENTERED against the Defendants Afrim Hetemi and Burhan Hetemi, individually, and as officers, directors, shareho lders and/or principals of Bumpin Bernies a/k/a 3D Nightclub for two violations of 47 U.S.C. § 605(a). Plaintiff is awarded damages in the amount of $8,200.00 plus costs in the amount of $545.42 for a total award of $8,745.42. The Court will reserve entry of final judgment until it determines the amount of reasonable attorneys fees Plaintiff may recover pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(B)(iii). The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on all part ies with the Defendants being served at the address listed on the Affidavits of Service. (Dkt. 5 - 8.) Signed by Judge Candy W. Dale. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (cjs)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
JOE HAND PROMOTIONS, INC.,
Case No. 1:16-cv-00473-CWD
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
AFRIM HETEMI, et. al.,
Before the Court in the above-entitled matter is the Plaintiff’s Motion for Default
Judgment as to the Defendants Afrim Hetemi and Burhan Hetemi, individually, and as
officers, directors, shareholders or principals of Bumpin’ Bernies a/k/a 3D Nightclub
(“Defendants”). (Dkt. 15.) Having fully reviewed the record, the Court finds the facts and
legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record. Accordingly, in the
interest of avoiding delay, and because the Court conclusively finds that the decisional
process would not be significantly aided by oral argument, the motion will be decided on
the record without oral argument.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1
On October 24, 2016, Plaintiff filed its complaint in this matter against
Defendants. Plaintiff is a Pennsylvania corporation that specializes in distributing and
licensing premier sporting events to commercial locations such as bars, restaurants,
lounges, clubhouses and similar establishments. Defendants Afrim and Burhan Hetemi
operate Bumpin’ Bernies, also known as the 3D Nightclub, in Twin Falls, Idaho. Since
2001, Plaintiff has been the exclusive domestic distributor for the world’s premier mixed
martial arts promotion company, the Ultimate Fighting Championship®. By contract,
Plaintiff held the exclusive commercial exhibition rights to the broadcasts of UFC® 183:
Silva v. Diaz, telecast nationwide on January 31, 2015 (“UFC 183 Program”), and UFC®
199: Rockhold v. Bisping 2, telecast nationwide on June 4, 2016 (“UFC 199 Program”)
The Programs’ broadcast originated via satellite uplink, and was later retransmitted interstate to cable systems and satellite television companies via satellite
signal. Plaintiff entered into agreements with various commercial establishments in the
State of Idaho that, in exchange for a fee, allowed them to broadcast the Programs to their
patrons. The fee is calculated based on the maximum occupancy of the commercial
establishment. (Dkt. 15-2 at 2 and 4.) In return, Plaintiff expended funds to market,
advertise, promote, administer and transmit the Programs broadcast to those
establishments in the State of Idaho.
Once an establishment paid the sublicense fee and was authorized to broadcast the
events, it was provided with electronic decoding equipment and the satellite coordinates
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2
necessary to receive the signal. Joe Hand, Jr., explained that, to intercept the broadcasts
without obtaining the decoding equipment from Plaintiff, signal pirates must use black
boxes, smartcards, or other means of interception. (Dkt. 15-1 at 5.)
To ensure no commercial establishment obtained the programming without paying
Plaintiff, Plaintiff engages outside independent auditors to identify and visit
establishments that it finds are broadcasting the programming without authorization.
Plaintiff’s outside auditor visited Bumpin’ Bernies on January 31, 2015, and noted that it
had an approximate capacity of one hundred people, with fifteen patrons present
watching the broadcast of the UFC 183 Program on four televisions. Another auditor
visited Bumpin’ Bernies on June 4, 2016, and estimated an approximate capacity of at
least seventy-five patrons, with seventeen patrons present watching the broadcast of the
UFC 199 Program on three televisions.
Defendants did not contract with Plaintiff or pay a fee to Plaintiff to obtain the
proper license or authorization to broadcast the Programs at either establishment. At no
time did Plaintiff give Defendants license, permission or authority to broadcast the
Programs in Bumpin’ Bernies. According to the rate sheets for the respective programs,
the fee for a commercial establishment for the UFC 183 Program if the establishment had
a capacity of 51-100 persons was $1,100.00. The fee for the UFC 199 Program was
$998.00 for a similar occupancy rate.
Instead of paying the sublicense fee, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, by
unauthorized satellite transmission or, alternatively, by unauthorized receipt over a cable
system, willfully intercepted or received the interstate communication of the Programs or
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3
assisted in such actions. Defendants then transmitted, divulged and published the
communication, or assisted in transmitting, divulging and publishing the communication
to patrons in Bumpin’ Bernies, without authorization, license, or permission to do so
from Plaintiff. Plaintiff contends Defendants pirated Plaintiff’s licensed exhibition of the
Programs and infringed upon Plaintiff’s exclusive rights, while avoiding proper
authorization and payment to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff alleges Defendants’ acts constitute violations of the Communications Act
of 1934, specifically sections 47 U.S.C. § 605 (prohibiting cable piracy), or alternatively
47 U.S.C. § 553 (prohibiting satellite piracy). The Complaint contends Bumpin’ Bernies
broadcast the UFC 183 Program on January 31, 2015, and the UFC 199 Program on June
4, 2016. Defendants were served with the Summons and Complaint on November 7,
2016. (Dkt. 7, 8.) On April 21, 2017, Plaintiff sought entry of default, which the Clerk
granted on April 24, 2017. This motion followed on May 8, 2017.
Plaintiff argues it is entitled to damages under 47 U.S.C. § 605, which allows a
plaintiff to recover statutory damages of up to $10,000.00 for each violation. 47 U.S.C.
§ 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II). Additionally, Plaintiff seeks additional damages of up to
$100,000.00 per violation, on the grounds that the violations were committed “willfully
and for purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage or private financial gain….”
47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(ii). Plaintiff contends that $5,000 for each violation of Section
605(e)(3)(c)(i)(II), and $20,000 for each violation of Section 605(e)(3)(C)(ii), plus costs
of $545.42, would compensate it for its losses and adequately deter future conduct.
Plaintiff seeks also to collect attorney fees, in an amount to be determined at a later time.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4
Defendants have not appeared in this action. Plaintiff, the only party who has
appeared, has consented in writing to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to enter final
orders in this case. 1
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2), the Court may enter a
default judgment where default under Rule 55(a) has been previously entered based upon
failure to plead or otherwise defend the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). Once a party’s
default has been entered, the factual allegations of the complaint, except those concerning
damages, are deemed to have been admitted by the non-responding party. Fed. R. Civ.
Proc. 8(b)(6); see also Geddes v. United Fin. Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977);
Garamendi v. Henin, 683 F.3d 1069, 1080 (9th Cir. 2012). “A default judgment must not
differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 54(c).
A defendant’s default does not, however, automatically entitle the plaintiff to a
court-ordered default judgment. Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924–25 (9th Cir.
1986). The court “must still consider whether the unchallenged facts constitute a
legitimate cause of action, since a party in default does not admit mere conclusions of
law.” Landstar Ranger, Inc. v. Parth Enterprises, Inc., 725 F.Supp.2d 916, 920 (C.D.
See United States v. Real Property, 135 F.3d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding a magistrate judge had
jurisdiction to enter final judgment over defaulted person who was technically not a “party” to the
litigation); see also, Walters v. Astrue, 2008 WL 618933 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (dismissing complaint pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) where only plaintiff consented to magistrate judge, and defendants, who had
not been served, were not considered parties to the action).
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5
Cal. 2010) (citation omitted). “[N]ecessary facts not contained in the pleadings, and
claims which are legally insufficient, are not established by default.” Cripps v. Life Ins.
Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Doe v. Qi, 349 F.Supp.2d
1258, 1272 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (“[Although] the factual allegations of [the] complaint
together with other competent evidence submitted by the moving party are normally
taken as true ... this Court must still review the facts to insure that the Plaintiffs have
properly stated claims for relief.”)). Where the pleadings are insufficient, the Court may
require the moving party to produce evidence in support of the motion for default
judgment. See TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987).
Whether default judgment should be entered is within the discretion of the Court.
Shanghai Automation Instrument Co. v. Kuei, 194 F. Supp. 2d 995, 999 (N.D. Cal. 2001);
Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980) (“The district court’s decision
whether to enter a default judgment is a discretionary one.”). In deciding whether to
exercise its discretion to impose judgment by default, the Court is directed to consider the
following: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of plaintiff's
substantive claim; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of money at stake in
the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the
default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d
1470, 1471B72 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted); see also Landstar, 725 F.Supp.2d at
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6
Possible Prejudice to Plaintiff
As to the first factor, the possibility of prejudice to the Plaintiff, the Court finds
this factor supports the issuance of a default judgment. Without a judgment, Plaintiff
will be unable to collect amounts they contend are statutorily owed, which would
compensate them for the unlawful broadcast of the programs that Plaintiff otherwise
would have been paid a fee for under the terms of a sublicense agreement.
See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans., 238 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1176 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
Additionally, Plaintiff argues that, without adequate consequences, signal pirates will
continue to harm its lawful business interests.
Sufficiency of the Complaint / Merits of Plaintiff’s Substantive Claims
The second and third factors concerning the merits of Plaintiff’s case and the
sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Complaint are commonly analyzed together. PepsiCo, 238
F.Supp.2d at 1175B76. These two factors “require that a plaintiff state a claim on which
[it] may recover.” Id. Again, the Court takes the factual allegations in the Complaint as
true. Geddes, 559 F.2d at 560.
The Complaint in this case raises two claims for relief, both under 47 U.S.C.
§ 605(a). Section 605 provides, in relevant part:
No person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any
radio communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication
to any person. No person not being entitled thereto shall receive or assist in
receiving any interstate or foreign communication by radio and use such
communication (or any information therein contained) for his own benefit
or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto. No person having received
any intercepted radio communication or having become acquainted with the
contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such communication (or
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 7
any part thereof) knowing that such communication was intercepted, shall
divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of such communication (or any part thereof) or use such
communication (or any information therein contained) for his own benefit
or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto.
47 U.S.C. § 605(a). Although § 605(a) refers to radio communication, Congress
brought satellite communications and cable television services within the purview
of the section when it added subsections (b)-(e). See 47 U.S.C. § 605(b)-(e); see
also Nat'l Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis, Inc., 253 F.3d 900, 911–912 (6th
Cir.2001) (discussing legislative history of § 605).
Based on the factual allegations in the complaint, Plaintiff satisfies the elements
for stating a violation under Section 605(a). Plaintiff alleges the Defendant restaurant
and its owners broadcast the Programs to its patrons on multiple televisions and did so
without a proper license. To obtain the broadcast signal for the Programs, Defendants had
to intercept a cable or satellite communication, or both. The act of intercepting cable or
satellite communications and broadcasting that signal to its patrons without a license is a
violation of § 605.
The Sum of Money at Stake in the Action
The third default judgment factor balances “the amount of money at stake in
relation to the seriousness of the [d]efendant’s conduct.” PepsiCo, 238 F.Supp.2d at
1176; see also Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72. “This requires that the court assess whether the
recovery sought is proportional to the harm caused by defendant’s conduct.” Landstar,
725 F.Supp.2d at 921 (citation omitted).
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 8
The amount of damages sought by Plaintiff here is based upon a statutory
provision of damages, which are difficult to quantify. In addition, Plaintiff seeks an
enhanced damage award, which is left to the Court’s discretion, for the willful acts of
piracy. The Court finds that the statutory provisions providing for damages within the
Court’s discretion are proportional to the harm and wrongdoing claimed.
The Possibility of a Dispute Concerning Material Facts
Plaintiff has alleged facts and pointed to evidence supporting its claims.
Defendants have not filed any materials challenging the accuracy of the allegations in the
complaint or the affidavits supporting Plaintiff’s motion. As determined above, the Court
finds the uncontested facts, when taken as true, establish the merits of the claims for
violations of 47 U.S.C. § 605(a). Therefore, the Court finds there are no factual disputes
precluding entry of default judgment on Plaintiff’s claims.
Whether the Default was Due to Excusable Neglect
The entry of default here is not attributable to excusable neglect. Plaintiff
served Defendants, who have failed to appear.
The Strong Policy Favoring Decisions on the Merits
The general rule or preference is that cases “be decided upon their merits
whenever reasonably possible.” Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. However, “this preference,
standing alone, is not dispositive.” PepsiCo, 238 F.Supp.2d at 1177 (citation omitted).
“Defendant’s failure to answer plaintiffs’ complaint makes a decision on the merits
impractical, if not impossible.” Id. Thus, Rule 55(a) allows the Court to “decide a case
before the merits are heard if defendant fails to appear and defend.” Landstar, 725
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 9
F.Supp.2d at 922. Because the Defendants have failed to properly appear or respond to
Plaintiff’s claims in this case, the general policy does not preclude the entry of default
judgment against the Defendants.
Based on the record and the Court’s analysis, the Court finds the Eitel factors
weigh in favor of entering default judgment in this matter on the two claimed violations
of 47 U.S.C. § 605(a).
“If the court determines that the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to
establish liability, it must then determine the amount and character of the relief that
should be awarded.” Landstar, 725 F.Supp.2d at 920 (citations omitted). The complaint’s
factual allegations relating to the amount of damages are not taken as true. Geddes, 559
F.2d at 560. Upon entering default judgment under Rule 55(b)(2), the Court “may
conduct hearings or make referrals...when, to enter or effectuate judgment, it needs
to...determine the amount of damages.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). Accordingly, the amount
of damages must be proven at an evidentiary hearing or through other means. Microsoft
Corp. v. Nop, 549 F.Supp.2d 1233, 1236 (E.D. Cal. 2008).
In this case, Plaintiff seeks an award of statutory damages. Section 605 allows
Plaintiff to recover either actual damages suffered or statutory damages for each violation
“in a sum not less than $1,000 or more than $10,000, as the court considers just.” 47
U.S.C. 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(I)-(II). Plaintiff seeks an award of $10,000 in statutory damages
($5,000.00 per broadcast), rather than an award based on actual damages.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 10
Plaintiff argues it would be impossible to determine the full extent of profits lost
by Plaintiff, which includes the loss of goodwill and the additional damages sustained by
Defendants’ actions. (Dkt. 15 at 8.) Plaintiff relies on the difficulty to fully assess
damages from the unauthorized broadcast of the Programs for why the Court should, in
its discretion, award statutory damages.
The Court agrees with Plaintiff that it would be difficult to completely assess the
damages suffered as the result of Defendants’ unlawful broadcast of the Programs. The
only concrete damages known in this case are the sublicense fee, which Defendants failed
to pay to Plaintiff for the right to broadcast the Programs. Based upon its approximate
capacity of 100 patrons, Bumpin’ Bernies would have had to pay $1,100 for the
sublicense fee to broadcast the UFC 183 Program, and $998.00 for the UFC 199
These amounts, however, do not take into account the difficulty of detecting these
types of violations. In this case, Plaintiff had to expend resources to send an auditor to
Bumpin’ Bernies to see if the restaurant had unlawfully broadcasted the Programs on two
separate dates. This type of piracy is no doubt widespread and costly to enforce.
Further, Bumpin’ Bernies presumably received some profit from showing the
Programs to its patrons. On the night of the UFC 183 Program, Bumpin’ Bernies showed
the Program on four large screen televisions. See Aff. of Justin Boggs (Dkt. 15-4.)
Plaintiff's auditor counted approximately 8 to 15 patrons in Bumpin’ Bernies at various
times during the broadcast. Id. On the night of the UFC 199 Program, Bumpin’ Bernies
showed the Program on three large screen televisions. See Aff. of Jennifer Acheson (Dkt.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 11
15-5.) Plaintiff’s auditor counted approximately 15 – 17 patrons in the establishment at
various times during the broadcast. Id. It is reasonable to believe that one reason Bumpin’
Bernies broadcast the Programs was to increase sales and profits.
Most importantly, awarding actual damages does not take into account the
deterrence needed in cases like this one. Plaintiff in this case has had to “at considerable
expense” retain “auditors and law enforcement personnel to detect and identify signal
pirates.” Aff. of Joe Hand ¶ 6 (Dkt. 15-1 at 3.) A commercial establishment will be less
likely to pay the sublicense fee, and instead illegally intercept the signal, if the penalty for
intercepting the signal is not substantial.
Courts have generally employed two methods to determine damages under this
section. One option is to use a flat amount, determined by the Court based on the
sublicense fee that was not paid, and another is to use a per patron rate. Joe Hand
Promotions, Inc. v. Wing Spot Chicken & Waffles, Inc., 920 F.Supp.2d 659, 667 (E.D.
Va. Jan. 30, 2013). In Wing Spot, the court commented that other courts employing the
per patron method utilize a rate of one hundred dollars per patron as an appropriate
penalty when an award of what the plaintiff would have received for its sublicense fee is
insufficient to deter future conduct, fully compensate the plaintiff for its losses, and
disgorge the defendant of its unlawful gain. Id.
Utilizing the per patron method, the Court finds Plaintiff should be awarded
$1,500.00 for the night of the UFC 183 Program based upon the 15 patrons seen in the
establishment during that broadcast, and $1,700.00 for the night of the UFC 199
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 12
Program, based upon an approximate count of 17 patrons in the establishment that
Section 605 allows the Court to award up to $100,000 in additional damages when
a defendant violates the section “willfully and for purposes of direct or indirect
commercial advantage or private financial gain.” 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(ii). Plaintiff
seeks additional damages in the sum of $40,000 ($20,000 per violation) against
Defendant in this case. See Pl.’s Mem at 13 (Dkt. 15 at 13.) Plaintiff argues this amount
“will fairly achieve the statutory goals of restitution and deterrence.” Id. at 12.
The Court finds this case presents an example for when an award of additional
damages based upon Defendants’ willful acts to intercept the Programs is appropriate.
Plaintiff asserts the transmission signal “cannot be mistakenly, innocently, or accidentally
intercepted.” Aff. of Joe Hand ¶ 9 (Dkt. 15-1 at 5.) As one court opined, “signals do not
descramble spontaneously, nor do television sets connect themselves to cable distribution
systems.” Time Warner Cable v. Googies Luncheonette, 77 F.Supp.2d 485, 490 (S.D.N.Y
1999). The act of intercepting an encrypted broadcast is not done by accident, but
requires an affirmative action by the defendant. Wing Spot, 920 F.Supp. at 668. Stated
bluntly, the Court finds Defendants took willful action to unlawfully intercept and
broadcast the Programs.
Next, the Court finds that the willful acts were done for either “direct or indirect
commercial advantage or private financial gain.” 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(ii). Bumpin’
Bernies is a commercial establishment, and on the two occasions it broadcast the
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 13
Programs, it hosted approximately seventeen patrons who were able to enjoy the
Programs at no cost to Defendants. Each of the restaurant's four televisions showed the
Programs. Because Defendants showed the Programs on four of its televisions at no cost,
the Court concludes Defendant acted willfully for commercial advantage and private
Other courts when determining additional statutory damages have considered
factors “such as allegations of: (1) repeated violations over an extended period of time;
(2) substantial unlawful monetary gains; (3) significant actual damages to plaintiff; (4)
defendant's advertising for the intended broadcast of the event; and (5) defendant's
charging a cover charge or charging premiums for food and drinks.” Kingvision Pay-PerView v. Rodriguez, 2003 WL 548891, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2003); see also Joe Hand
Promotions, Inc. v. Bougie, Inc., 2010 WL 1790973, at *6 (E.D. Va. April 12, 2010).
Based upon these factors, the Court finds that a modest fine is appropriate in this
case. Here, there were two repeated violations. However, based upon the number of
patrons attracted, there does not appear to have been substantial unlawful monetary gains
beyond nonpayment of the sublicense fee. The establishment is not large, and is located
in a small town in Idaho. Although the broadcast of the Programs likely led to some
unlawful monetary gain by Defendant, it is not likely enough that the financial gain on
the two occasions would be considered “substantial.” Similarly, the amount of actual
damages, equivalent to the two unpaid sublicense fees, would have been $1,100 for the
sublicense fee to broadcast the UFC 183 Program, and $998.00 for the UFC 199
Program. Neither auditor contends Defendants charged a cover or a premium for food or
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 14
drink that evening, although Defendants did advertise the Programs on its Facebook page.
(Dkt. 15-6 at 5 – 14.) The Court acknowledges, however, that additional damages to
Plaintiff such as lost revenue, devaluation of its product, and loss of goodwill, are
The Court recognizes the need to deter signal pirates in cases like this one. The
Court also agrees with other courts that, “although the amount of damages should be an
adequate deterrent, the violation is not so serious as to warrant putting the restaurant out
of business.” Garden City Boxing Club, Inc. v. Polanco, No. 05 Civ. 3411, 2006 WL
305458, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2006) (awarding an additional $10,000 for a single
violation against a small business).
Here, in the exercise of its discretion, the Court finds an award of an additional
$5,000 ($2,500 for each of the two broadcasts) is appropriate, in light of all the
circumstances considered and as explained above.
Costs and Fees
Plaintiff seeks also recovery of $545.42 in filing fees and service incurred in
bringing this action. The Court finds this amount is properly recoverable by Plaintiff in
this case and is therefore awarded. Plaintiff has reserved its right to file a motion seeking
recovery of its attorney’s fees in this matter pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(B)(iii).
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 15
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: Plaintiff’s Motion for
Default Judgment (Dkt. 15) is GRANTED as follows:
Default Judgment is HEREBY ENTERED against the Defendants Afrim Hetemi
and Burhan Hetemi, individually, and as officers, directors, shareholders and/or
principals of Bumpin’ Bernies a/k/a 3D Nightclub for two violations of 47 U.S.C.
Plaintiff is awarded damages in the amount of $8,200.00 plus costs in the
amount of $545.42 for a total award of $8,745.42.
The Court will reserve entry of final judgment until it determines the amount of
reasonable attorney’s fees Plaintiff may recover pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(B)(iii).
The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on all parties
with the Defendants being served at the address listed on the Affidavits of Service. (Dkt.
5 - 8.)
DATED: June 6, 2017
Honorable Candy W. Dale
United States Magistrate Judge
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 16
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