Ayala et al v. Armstrong et al

Filing 66

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys Fees (Dkt. 61 ) is GRANTED in the amountof $227,195.00. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (alw)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
ADELA AYALA, individually, and as
next friend of L.O.A., a minor child,

Case No. 1:16-cv-00501-BLW
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

Plaintiffs,
v.
RICHARD M. ARMSTRONG, in his
official capacity as Director of the Idaho
Department of Health and Welfare and
ELKE SHAW-TULLOCH, in her official
capacity as Administrator of the Division
of Public Health, Bureau of Vital Records
and Health Statistics,
Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
The matter before the Court is the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Dkt. 61. Defendants ask the Court to reduce the award sought
by Plaintiffs. Dkt. 64. After reviewing the Parties’ briefs, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’
request in part. The Court will award Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees in the amount of
$227,195.00.
ANALYSIS
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), a court may award reasonable attorney fees and
costs to “the prevailing party” in an action to enforce a provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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Plaintiffs’ claims seeking to protect their federal Due Process and Equal Protection rights
through injunctive relief was appropriately raised under § 1983. See Matsuda v. City &
County of Honolulu, 512 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 2008).
After establishing that a plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees, the Court must
calculate a reasonable fee award. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983).
Generally, the “lodestar figure,” which multiplies the number of hours reasonably
expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate, determines the amount of the
award. Id. “There is a strong presumption that the lodestar figure represents a reasonable
fee. Only in rare instances should the lodestar figure be adjusted on the basis of other
considerations.” Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363 n.8 (9th Cir. 1996).
Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiffs were the prevailing party, nor do they
dispute that Plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
Additionally, Defendants do not object to the hourly rates charged by Plaintiffs’
attorneys. The sole disagreement between the Parties is whether the number of hours
expended on this case by Plaintiffs’ counsel is unreasonable. Plaintiffs’ counsel state that
they spent 1,011.60 hours working on this case, and they request attorneys’ fees in the
amount of $363,360.00. Defendants ask the Court to reduce the hours variable to 300
hours total, which would result in an attorneys’ fees award in the amount of $171,690.00.
1. Expended Hours by Plaintiffs’ Counsel
The total number of hours expended by Plaintiffs’ counsel on this case is
unreasonable. Under § 1988, prevailing parties may only be compensated for those hours

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2

of work that were “reasonably expended” on the litigation. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.
The moving party bears the burden of establishing the hours claimed and must carry this
burden by submitting adequate documentation of those hours. Id. at 437. Claimed hours
“may be reduced by the court where documentation of the hours is inadequate, if the case
was overstaffed and hours are duplicated, [or] if the hours expended are deemed
excessive or otherwise unnecessary.” Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205,
2010 (9th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added). As discussed below, the Court finds Plaintiffs’
counsels’ hours were unreasonable because: (1) the pre-filing hours expended by
Plaintiffs’ counsel were excessive, (2) Plaintiffs’ counsel filed poorly written briefs
throughout the proceeding, and (3) Plaintiffs’ counsel raised numerous legal arguments,
in a “shotgun” fashion, that were not dispositive in the litigation.
a. Plaintiffs’ Counsels’ Pre-Filing Expended Hours Are Excessive
To begin with, Plaintiffs’ counsel—who have a combined 50 years of experience
as attorneys—fail to explain why they required over 300 hours to prepare and file the
complaint. See Dkt. 61; Dkt. 65. The pre-filing hours amount to almost a third of the
total hours billed by Plaintiffs’ counsel. With such a large portion of the fee request
coming from this phase of the suit, the Court would expect a reasoned explanation from
Plaintiffs’ counsel justifying their hours. An experienced attorney, charging a high
hourly rate, is expected to be “more efficient at performing the necessary tasks[.]” See
Ferland v. Conrad Credit Corp., 244 F.3d 1145, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001). Absent a reasoned
explanation by Plaintiffs’ counsel, the Court finds that the 300 hours sought for pre-

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3

complaint work is excessive considering the experience of both attorneys and the relative
lack of complexity of the case. See id.; Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363,
364 n.9 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining that in lodestar calculations, to determine reasonable
attorneys’ fees award, the Court must take into account, among other factors, the novelty
and complexity of the issues, and the skill and experience of the attorneys).
b. Plaintiffs’ Briefing Was Generally Unhelpful
In general, Plaintiffs’ briefing throughout the proceedings was not of the high
quality that the Court expects of attorneys who practice before it. By way of example,
the reply brief filed by Plaintiffs’ counsel regarding their Motion for Permanent
Injunction was troubling. The Court expects that a reply brief, perhaps more so than any
other submission to the Court, will build upon the briefing already submitted, focus the
Court’s attention on what is really at issue, and will be very succinct and to the point.
In this case, Plaintiffs’ counsel simultaneously filed an overlength brief and
Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages, Dkt. 20, one day before the filing deadline. The
submitted reply brief was riddled with grammatical and substantive errors, was
unfocused, and was unjustifiably longer than permitted by Rule. The Court took virtually
nothing away from the brief, thereby rendering the writing the brief an exercise in futility.
c. Plaintiffs’ Counsels’ Advocacy Was Not A Major Factor in Plaintiffs
Securing A Favorable Resolution of Their Case
Finally, the Court notes that despite the excessive hours expended by Plaintiffs’
counsel in this case, Plaintiffs’ counsels’ advocacy was ultimately not a major factor in
securing the favorable result for Plaintiffs in this case. Undoubtedly, the issue of sameMEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4

sex marriage is a complex issue that this Court and others have wrestled with.
Furthermore, challenges to the constitutionality of state statutes also generally involve
nuanced and difficult arguments.
But, despite the complexity of the subject matter, this case was relatively
straightforward. It involved a Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause challenge
to an Idaho state statute. Rather than cogently laying out the legal analysis and relevant
facts in this case however, Plaintiffs’ counsel both in their briefs and at oral argument
repeatedly put forth duplicative and irrelevant arguments. Plaintiffs’ counsel spent
precious little time on the dispositive issues in this case. At times, counsels’ advocacy
shrouded, rather than illuminated, the dispositive issues in this case.
2. Plaintiffs’ Counsels’ Fee Award Will Be Reduced by 345 Hours
The attorneys’ fee award sought by Plaintiffs will be reduced by 345 hours, to
account for (1) the unreasonable number of hours expended by Plaintiffs’ counsel prior to
filing the complaint, (2) the unhelpful briefing filed by Plaintiffs’ counsel, and (3) the fact
that Plaintiffs’ counsel failed to offer much argument or analysis of the legal issues that
ultimately yielded a favorable result for Plaintiffs in this case. The 345-hour reduction
will be distributed pro rata based on the experience of each attorney. Thus, Howard A.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5

Belodoff’s hours will be reduced by 275 hours and Jennifer A. Giutarri’s hours will be
reduced by 70 hours.1
CONCLUSION
In sum, the Court will award Plaintiffs’ counsels fees as follows:
Requested
Hours
Howard A. Belodoff
Jennifer A. Giutarri

567.8
443.8

Hours
After
Reduction
292.8
373.8

Reduction
275
70

Hourly
Rate

Total
Award

$425
$275

$124,400
$102,795
$227,195

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (Dkt. 61) is GRANTED in the amount
of $227,195.00.

DATED: January 3, 2019
_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
U.S. District Court Judge

1

Plaintiffs’ counsel also ask the Court to award attorneys’ fees in the amount of $7,650 for time
expended on drafting and filing the Reply brief regarding their Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. Dkt. 65 at 10.
That request is denied in light of the foregoing opinion.

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