Hayes v. Nettles et al

Filing 79

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION TO STRIKE. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendants' Third Affirmative Defense (Dkt. 76 ) is DENIED. Signed by Judge David C. Nye. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (ckh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT COURT OF IDAHO
MICHAEL T. HAYES,
Case No. 1:16-cv-00534-DCN

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER RE: MOTION TO STRIKE

v.
RACHEL NETTLES; MICHAEL
MONTGOMERY; AND
CHARLES JOHANNESSEN,
Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Michael T. Hayes’ Motion to Strike. Dkt. 76.
Having reviewed the record and briefs, the Court finds that the facts and legal arguments
are adequately presented. Accordingly, in the interest of avoiding further delay, and
because the Court finds that the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral
argument, the Court will decide the motion without oral argument. Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ.
R. 7.1(d)(1)(B). For reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to
Strike.
II. BACKGROUND
On December 12, 2016, Plaintiff Michael T. Hayes filed a Complaint alleging that,
while incarcerated at Idaho Maximum Security Institution, Defendant Correctional
Officers Rachel Nettles, Michael Montgomery, and Charles Johannessen (collectively

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“Defendants”) severely beat him, causing serious injuries.
On October 26, 2017, Defendants filed their answer to Hayes’ Complaint.1
On May 10, 2019, the Idaho Court of Appeals vacated Hayes’ state judgment of
conviction for battery on a correctional officer and remanded the case back to the district
court for a new trial. It did so on the grounds that the district court 1) erred in failing to
issue subpoenas for two medical professionals upon Hayes’ pre-trial request and 2) abused
its discretion in admitting multiple instances of Hayes’ prior conduct which necessarily
affected the jury’s perception of Hayes’ credibility. State v. Hayes, No. 45601, 2019 BL
169904 (Idaho Ct. App. May 10, 2019).
On May 31, 2019, Hayes mailed to the Court the pending Motion to Strike. Dkt. 76.
His motion was formally docketed on June 4, 2019.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the court to strike from
“any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or
scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). The purpose of a Rule 12(f) motion is to avoid
the costs that arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to
trial. Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). A defense may
be found “insufficient” as a matter of pleading or as a matter of substance. With respect to
substantive insufficiency, a motion to strike a defense is proper “when the defense is
insufficient as a matter of law.” Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale

1

Hayes has since filed an amended complaint. Dkt. 54. Defendants did not file an amended answer to his
amended complaint.

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Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1057 (5th Cir. 1982). Rule 12(f) motions are “generally
regarded with disfavor[.]” Neilson v. Union Bank of Cal., 290 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1152 (C.D.
Cal. 2003). See also Colaprico v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 1335, 1339 (N.D.
Cal. 1991) (“[M]otions to strike should not be granted unless it is clear that the matter to
be stricken could have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the litigation.”).
Whether to grant a motion to strike is within the courts’ discretion. See Whittlestone, Inc.
v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 2010).
IV. DISCUSSION
Hayes seeks to strike Defendants’ Third Affirmative Defense, which asserts that
“Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Nettles are barred by the United State Supreme
Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).” Dkt. 36, at 3. He argues that
this Third Affirmative Defense is legally insufficient in light of the Idaho Court of Appeals’
May 10, 2019 decision.
Defendants contend that Hayes’ motion to strike should be denied because it is
untimely and premature. In its decision, the Idaho Court of Appeals vacated Hayes’ state
conviction and remanded the case back to the district court for a new trial for evidentiary
reasons. Defendants argue that even if Hayes is acquitted, that would go to the factual
support for the affirmative defense, but “does not make asserting it ‘redundant, immaterial,
impertinent, or scandalous.’” Dkt. 76, at 3 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)).
1. Timeliness
Under Rule 12(f), a court may, on its “own” initiative at any time or “on motion
made by a party either before responding to the pleading or, if a response is not allowed,
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within 21 days after being served with the pleading,” strike from a pleading an insufficient
defense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Here, Hayes’ filed his motion to strike almost two years after
Defendants filed their answer. While the Court agrees this motion was untimely, it
understands that Hayes’ reasons for filing this motion did not arise until May 10, 2019,
when the Idaho Court of Appeals vacated his state conviction. There was no substantive
delay from the decision to his filing of this motion. However, even if the Court were to
hold Hayes’ motion as timely, it would deny it on the merits.
2. Legal Sufficiency of Defense
In Heck, the Supreme Court held:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness
would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove
that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged
by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make
such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that
relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not
cognizable under § 1983.
512 U.S. at 486–87. Here, Defendants argue that Heck may preclude Hayes from
succeeding in his § 1983 claim because the Supreme Court “has restricted opportunities
for collateral attacks such as Mr. Hayes’ excessive force claim” due to concerns of finality
and judicial consistency. Dkt. 76, at 3.
At this time, the Court agrees Heck may be a relevant legal defense to Hayes’ §
1983 claim excessive force claim. “[A] motion to strike which alleges the legal
insufficiency of an affirmative defense will not be granted unless it appears to a certainty
that plaintiffs would succeed despite any state of the facts which could be proved in support
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of the defense.” Barnes v. AT & T Pension Ben. Plan–Nonbargained Prog., 718 F. Supp.
2d 1167, 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Hayes’
conviction was vacated, rather than reversed on direct appeal; a new trial has been ordered.
It is not certain that Hayes would succeed regardless of the outcome of the state case in
overcoming Defendants’ defense. Thus, the Court denies his motion to strike the
Defendants’ Third Affirmative Defense.
V. ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendants’ Third Affirmative Defense (Dkt. 76) is
DENIED.

DATED: October 29, 2019
_________________________
David C. Nye
Chief U.S. District Court Judge

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