Prince v. Oregon Mutual Insurance Company

Filing 54

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER Oregon Mutual's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 31 ) is GRANTED. Prince's Motion for Summary (Dkt. 38 ) Judgment is DENIED as MOOT. Signed by Judge David C. Nye. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (jp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

JOSEPH PRINCE,

Case No. 1:17-cv-00139-DCN

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

v.
OREGON MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, an Oregon corporation,
Defendant.

I. OVERVIEW
Pending before the Court are cross Motions for Summary Judgment filed by the
parties. Dkts. 31, 38. After holding oral argument on the motions, the Court took the
matters under advisement. Upon review, the Court now issues the following decision
GRANTING Defendant Oregon Mutual Insurance Company’s (“Oregon Mutual”)
Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 31) and DENING Plaintiff Joseph Prince’s Motion
for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 38) as moot.
II. BACKGROUND 1
On June 28, 2011, Prince was driving his father’s truck northbound on State Route
225 in Elko County, Nevada. Prince had been working in Nevada and was returning to
his Idaho residence that he shared with his mother.

1

The facts of this case are not in dispute. See Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts (“JSOUF”).
Dkt. 33.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1

Courtney Spring was driving his truck southbound on State Route 225 at this same
time. Unfortunately, Spring was intoxicated. As Spring approached Prince, he drove his
truck across the center line and struck Prince head-on. There is no dispute that Prince was
a fault-free victim in this circumstance. Prince sustained serious injuries because of the
accident, and was flown to St. Alphonus Regional Medical Center in Boise for treatment.
Prince incurred $99,728.32 in medical bills. Furthermore, because of his injuries, Prince
could not return to work for approximately 14 months and lost $96,492.64 in wages.
Accordingly, Prince’s special or out-of-pocket damages in this matter were $196,220.96.
At the time of the accident, Spring had an insurance police with Mid-Century
Insurance Company (“Mid-Century”). This policy provided bodily injury liability
coverage in the amounts of $100,000 per individual, and $300,000 per occurrence.
Prince’s father, Douglas Smith, owned the truck Prince was driving at the time of
the accident. Smith had an insurance policy with Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho
(“Farmers”). This policy provided underinsured motorist bodily injury (“UIM”) coverage
of $100,000 per person, and $300,000 per occurrence. 2
Prince’s mother, Ronetta Smith, had an insurance policy (“the Policy” or “Oregon
Mutual Policy”) with Defendant Oregon Mutual. This Policy likewise provided UIM
coverage of $100,000 per person, and $300,000 per occurrence. The Oregon Mutual
Policy delineates that any family member who resides in the household is a covered
motorist. Therefore, Prince was an insured and permissive user under the Policy.

2

Neither Farmers Insurance nor its policy are involved in this lawsuit.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2

Prince filed a personal injury action against Spring in Nevada state court. Spring’s
insurance carrier, Mid-Century, settled with Prince by tendering the bodily injury liability
limits of Spring’s policy in the amount of $100,000.
The $100,000 was inadequate to compensate Prince for his damages. Accordingly,
Prince filed the instant suit against Oregon Mutual. The sole cause of action in Prince’s
Complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that Oregon Mutual is required to pay Prince
$100,000 in UIM coverage under the Policy.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). This Court’s role at summary judgment is not “to weigh the evidence and
determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Zetwick v. Cty. of Yolo, 850 F.3d 436, 441 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). In
considering a motion for summary judgment, this Court must “view[] the facts in the
non-moving party’s favor.” Id. To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the respondent
need only present evidence upon which “a reasonable juror drawing all inferences in
favor of the respondent could return a verdict in [his or her] favor.” Id. (citation omitted).
Accordingly, this Court must enter summary judgment if a party “fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986). The respondent cannot simply rely on an unsworn affidavit or the
pleadings to defeat a motion for summary judgment; rather the respondent must set forth
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3

the “specific facts,” supported by evidence, with “reasonable particularity” that precludes
summary judgment. Far Out Prods., Inc. v. Oskar, 247 F.3d 986, 997 (9th Cir. 2001).
The standard applicable to motions for summary judgment do not generally
change if the parties file cross motions. See, e.g., Cady v. Hartford Life & Accidental Ins.,
930 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1223 (D. Idaho 2013). However, the Court must evaluate each
party’s motion on its own merits. Fair Housing Council of Riverside Cty., Inc. v.
Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001).
IV. ANALYSIS
The outcome of the motions for summary judgment in this case is predicated on
the Court’s determination of two main issues: first, whether Spring is an underinsured
motorist as defined under Oregon Mutual’s Policy; and second, whether Oregon Mutual’s
“policy stacking” language is void and unenforceable.
The parties disagree on where the Court should begin its analysis of these two
topics. They disagree for good reason. Depending on where the Court chooses to start
determines—to a certain extent—whether it even reaches the other issue.
Oregon Mutual urges the Court to begin by taking up the underinsured motorist
question. It postures that the language in the Policy is clear: Spring is not an underinsured
motorist and summary judgment in its favor is appropriate. In light of the clear language,
Oregon Mutual claims the Court will not even need to address policy stacking because
that discussion only applies under the “Other Insurance” clause within the UIM section of
the Policy and that section is only triggered if UIM coverage exists in the first place. In
short, Oregon Mutual’s position is that Spring is not underinsured by definition, UIM
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4

coverage is not available to Prince for this incident, and the “Other Insurance” section
and policy stacking are irrelevant issues.
Prince, on the other hand, urges the Court to begin by determining whether
Oregon Mutual’s policy stacking language is void. Prince reasons that if the Court makes
that determination first, the question of UIM coverage will automatically follow. If the
Court allows policy stacking, then the language in the Policy’s “Other Insurance” clause
within the UIM section is void, coverages can stack, Spring by definition will be an
underinsured motorist, and Prince will have UIM coverage. 3 Conversely, if the Court
does not allow policy stacking, then the UIM limits are equal, Spring is not an
underinsured motorist, and UIM coverage is not available.
In its discretion, the Court will begin with the issue regarding the UIM definition.
Not only was Oregon Mutual’s Motion filed first, but the Court’s determination on UIM
coverage controls to what extent policy stacking even needs to be addressed. As a
preface, however, the Court will outline the various provisions of the Policy at issue.
1. Oregon Mutual Policy
The Oregon Mutual Policy contains an endorsement that provides UIM coverage,
contingent upon several requirements:
We will pay damages for bodily injury which a covered person shall be
legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an underinsured
motor vehicle. The bodily injury must be sustained by a covered person and
be caused by an auto accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance or
use of the underinsured motor vehicle.

3

As will be explained, the Court disagrees with Prince that UIM coverage is automatically
present if the Court allows policy stacking.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5

JSOUF, ¶ 23 (Endorsement G0097 AI (1-09)). Simply put, to recover bodily injury
damages under the Policy arising out of an accident caused by the operator of an
underinsured motor vehicle, the motor vehicle involved must meet the definition of
“underinsured motor vehicle.” The parties agree on this. The Policy defines
“underinsured motor vehicle” as follows:
[A] land motor vehicle or trailer, the ownership, maintenance, and use of
which is insured or bonded for bodily injury liability at the time of the
covered auto accident for which the sum of all policies or bonds at the time
of the covered auto accident provides at least the amounts required by the
applicable law where a covered auto is principally garaged but which sum is
less than the applicable limits of liability under this insurance.
JSOUF, ¶ 28 (Endorsement G00097AI (1-09))(emphasis added). The parties also agree
that, under this definition, there are essentially three requirements necessary to qualify as
an “underinsured motor vehicle.” First, the motor vehicle must be a land motor vehicle;
second, the motor vehicle must meet applicable legal insurance minimums; and third, the
sum of the bodily injury coverage must be “less than the applicable limits of liability
under this insurance.” Id. Here it is undisputed that Spring’s truck was a land motor
vehicle and that he carried adequate insurance under Nevada law. Thus, the Court will
not discuss the first or second requirements further. The third requirement, however, is
contested and will be addressed in detail in Section 2 – Underinsured Motorist.
Finally, under the Policy, if a vehicle meets the definition of underinsured, another
provision determines how UIM coverage is applied if other insurance coverage is present.
This “Other Insurance” section provides:
If there is other similar insurance on a loss covered by this SECTION, we
will pay our proportionate share as our limits of liability bear to the total
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6

limits of all applicable similar insurance. If this policy and any other policy
affording similar insurance apply to the same accident, the maximum limits
of liability under all the policies are the highest limits of liability under any
one policy. But any insurance we provide with respect to a vehicle you do
not own is excess over any other collectible insurance.
JSOUF, ¶ 32 (Endorsement G00097 AI (1-09)). Here too, the parties are divided on the
interpretation and enforceability of the language in the Policy. With the applicable
contract provisions laid out, the Court will first take up the dispute of whether Spring was
an underinsured motorist.
2. Underinsured Motorist
As mentioned, the first dispute in this case is whether or not, under the third
provision of Oregon Mutual’s definition of underinsured motorist, Spring actually
qualified as an underinsured motorist. Oregon Mutual asserts that because the limits of
Spring’s Mid-Century Policy and its own Policy were identical, the coverage was not
“less than the applicable limits of liability under this insurance.” Prince, on the other
hand, believes that the language at issue is ambiguous and should be construed in his
favor to allow him to combine his mother and father’s UIM limits and then measure that
aggregated total against Spring’s Policy to determine whether or not he [Spring] was
underinsured.
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Oregon Mutual states that a plain and
simple reading of its policy language is all that is necessary for the Court to rule in its
favor. A person is an underinsured motorist if the sum of their bodily injury coverage “is
less than the applicable limits of liability under this insurance.” Spring’s Mid-Century
Policy provided bodily injury liability coverage in the amount of $100,000 per person,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 7

and $300,000 per occurrence. The Oregon Mutual Policy provided that the applicable
limits of liability for UIM coverage are $100,000 per person, and $300,000 per
occurrence. Because the Mid-Century Policy limits are not “less than” the Oregon Mutual
UIM limits—but are in fact identical—Oregon Mutual asserts that Spring’s vehicle does
not meet the definition of underinsured motorist and UIM coverage is not available under
these circumstances.
In support of this proposition, Oregon Mutual cites to multiple cases in which
Idaho Courts found that because the tortfeasor’s liability was not less than, but rather
equal to, the insured’s UIM coverage limits, no underinsured coverage was available. See
Baker v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 941 P.2d 1316 (Idaho Ct. App. 1997);
Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho v. Buffa, 806 P.2d 438 (Idaho 1991); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Scarlett, 780 P.2d 142 (Idaho 1989). The Court will not undertake a lengthy analysis of
these cases because it appears that Prince does not dispute the “less than” language in the
underinsured definition; rather, he disputes the final two words of this section: “this
insurance.” In other words, Prince agrees that in order for the tortfeasor—in this case,
Spring—to qualify as underinsured, his (Spring’s) limits must be less than the limits of
his (Prince’s) own limits. Only then can Prince hope to obtain coverage. The dispute then
is what limits can be used in calculating the appropriate amount of coverage to determine
if Spring’s coverage was less than Prince’s.
In his Motion for Summary Judgment, while he takes up policy stacking first,
Prince argues that the language of the underinsured motorist provision is ambiguous.
Prince postures that a reasonable interpretation of the final two words “this insurance”
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 8

could mean this type of insurance, i.e. UIM coverage, as opposed to “this insurance”
meaning the Oregon Mutual insurance contract. In essence, Prince wants to aggregate all
UIM coverage available to him ($100,000 from his mother’s Oregon Mutual Policy and
$100,000 from his father’s Farmers Policy) and measure that amount against Spring’s
$100,000 rather than just the Oregon Mutual Policy amounts. If the Court were to allow
this, his $200,000 in coverage would be greater than Spring’s $100,000 in coverage and
Spring would be an underinsured motorist by definition.
Prince cites to Gordon v. Three Rivers Agency, Inc., an Idaho Court of Appeal
case, where interestingly, Oregon Mutual, is one of the defendants. In Gordon, the Court
was faced with a similar question regarding an ambiguity in the definition of an
“underinsured highway vehicle.” In Gordon, the Court found that Oregon Mutual’s
definition of “underinsured highway vehicle” was ambiguous and resolved the ambiguity
in the insured’s favor. 903 P.2d 128, 132 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995). Gordon’s policy defined
“underinsured highway vehicle” as:
A highway vehicle with respect to the ownership, maintenance or use of
which the sums of the limits of liability under all other bodily injury liability
bonds and insurance policies applicable at the time of the accident is less than
the applicable limits of liability under this insurance.
Id. Prince believes the present case is sufficiently similar to Gordon and that the Court
can make a comparable finding under the present facts. Oregon Mutual, however, points
out that even though the language in Gordon is identical to the language at issue here, the
sentence structure, and connecting phrase, is distinguishable. In Gordon, the Idaho Court
of Appeals concluded:

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 9

The definition refers to “other bodily injury liability bonds and insurance
policies” in the same sentence and immediately prior to the reference to “the
applicable limits of liability under this insurance.” This juxtaposition of
references to bodily injury liability insurance and “applicable limits of
liability under this insurance” could lead a reasonable insured to believe that
the “applicable limits” means the comparable or equivalent limits under the
Gordons’ policy, i.e., the bodily injury liability limit.
Id. In Gordon, the placement of the phrase in question (“less than the applicable limits of
liability under this insurance”)—in context, and in connection with the phrase before it,
(“other bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies”)—is what caused the
ambiguity. Before the Court today there is no such connecting phrase. The Court agrees
with Oregon Mutual that, although similar, the context of the disputed phrase in Gordon
is different from the one at issue here and context makes or breaks the issue. That aside,
Prince argues the analysis of the Gordon court is applicable in this case. The Court
disagrees.
In Gordon, the Court found that because the phrase “this insurance” was used
elsewhere in the policy to collectively refer to all provided coverages, it was not logical
to believe (as Oregon Mutual postured) that the same phrase was somehow limiting in the
underinsured highway vehicle section. Id. at 133. Herein lies the main distinction
between Gordon and this case. The confusion in the underinsured highway section of the
policy at issue in the Gordon Policy turned on the fact that “this insurance” could have
meant the limits of the UIM section, or the other bodily limits of the entire policy. Here,
Prince does not think “this insurance” is ambiguous within the policy itself, but only as it
relates to other UIM policies in effect (namely his father’s). In essence, Prince does not
want the Court to look elsewhere in the Oregon Mutual Policy, but outside of the Policy
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 10

all together. Therefore, to say the phrase “this insurance” is ambiguous simply based
upon the fact that the same phrase was found ambiguous in Gordon is not persuasive.
This case is much closer to Baker v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 941 P.2d
1316 (Idaho Ct. App. 1997) than to Gordon. In Baker, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated:
In Gordon, we held that the placement of the phrase “applicable limits of
liability under this insurance” next to the phrase “other bodily injury
liability” in the UIM coverage was ambiguous and could lead a reasonable
insured to believe that the “applicable limits” meant the bodily injury liability
limit. We noted that elsewhere in the policy the term “this insurance” was
used to refer collectively to all of the provided coverages, which indicated
that the term as used in the quoted phrase did not mean only the UIM
coverage. By contrast, in subsection three of the Farm Bureau policy, the
phrase, “the limit of this coverage,” placed subsequently to the phrase “the
sum of liability limits,” is not ambiguous because “the limit of this coverage”
unequivocally refers to the UIM limit. It would be unreasonable to interpret
this language as referring to the bodily injury liability limit. Therefore, we
conclude that the district court did not err in finding the above provision
unambiguous.
Id. at 1319. Because the Court finds Gordon distinguishable, the question, however,
remains: is “this insurance” ambiguous in Oregon Mutual’s Policy as it relates to the type
of insurance at issue, i.e., UIM coverage.
As already noted, Oregon Mutual cites Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v.
Scarlett, 780 P.2d 142 (1989), for the proposition that equivalent coverage does not
qualify as “less than” under UIM definitions. Prince also cites to Scarlett, and believes
that it actually helps him more than Oregon Mutual. In Scarlett, the Nationwide policy at
issue contained a similar “is less than the limits of this coverage” phrase when defining
an underinsured motorist. In that policy, however, a follow-up sentence stated, “[t]hese
limits are shown in your policy’s declarations.” Id. at 143. Prince believes Scarlett

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 11

supports its proposition that Oregon Mutual’s definition is vague and that—like in
Scarlett—Oregon Mutual should have used restrictive language such as “under this
insurance policy,” “under these UIM limits,” or “under this insurance policy’s
declarations,” rather than just “this insurance” if it had wanted to limit the amount of
coverage to just the UIM limits of its own policy. Prince contends that it is just as logical
to infer “this type of insurance” as to infer “this insurance policy,” and that he should be
allowed to look outside the Policy and use all UIM coverage available to him.
In an effort to illustrate varying interpretations, Prince recognizes “the language
may, as Defendant urges, be interpreted to involve only a comparison of the sum of all
policies providing the tortfeasor with bodily injury coverage to the UIM limits only in
Defendant’s policy.” Dkt. 37, at 9. This aside, Prince urges the Court to accept his
“reasonabl[e], and more fair[]” conclusion, find ambiguity, and construe the Policy in his
favor.
The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly stated “a contract is ambiguous if reasonable
people could find its terms susceptible to more than one interpretation.” Kennewick Irr.
Dist. v. United States, 880 F.2d 1018, 1032 (9th Cir. 1989). However, the Court has also
warned that ambiguity does not automatically exist where there is complexity, confusion,
or simply because a party can think up a different interpretation. See, e.g., Crawford v.
Ranger Ins. Co., 653 F.2d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding “mere complexity in an
insurance policy does not make it ambiguous.”); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ellison, 757 F.2d
1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding the “fact that the parties have two different
interpretations of the contract does not make it ambiguous”).
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Idaho Courts have likewise found that ambiguity exists if the policy is “reasonably
subject to conflicting interpretations.” Cherry v. Coregis Ins. Co., 204 P.3d 522, 524
(2009). Again, however, the Courts have stressed that there is a thin line between true
ambiguity and general confusion or the creation of ambiguity where none exists. See,
e.g., Swanson v. Beco Const. Co., 175 P.3d 748, 752 (2007) (holding “A contract is not
rendered ambiguous on its face because one of the parties thought that the words used
had some meaning that differed from the ordinary meaning of those words”); Verska v.
Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 265 P.3d 502, 509 (2011) (when referring to statutes,
finding “an alternative interpretation that is unreasonable [does] not make it ambiguous”).
Here, the Court finds that Prince’s interpretation is not reasonable. Prince alleges
that Oregon Mutual needs to clarify the clause’s meaning with additional words as noted
above, but so too would Prince. In order to accept Prince’s definition, the Court would
need to read in “under this type of insurance” or “under all UIM insurance.” This is not
something the Court is willing to do. Oregon Mutual has met its burden. The plain and
ordinary meaning and use of the phrase “under this insurance” refers to the Policy itself
and does not allow for the aggregation of outside UIM coverage. Prince, on the other
hand, has not met his burden in convincing the Court that it should read anything
additional into the definition or that any ambiguity exists.
Finally, Prince argues that because the second part of Oregon Mutual’s UIM
definition allows for the sum of all the tortfeasor’s policies to be combined, the Could
should likewise allow him to aggregate any applicable UIM policies. In support of this
position, Prince cites numerous cases where other jurisdiction have allowed this type of
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 13

“same insurance” combining. However, none of the cases come from the within the Ninth
Circuit, let alone the District of Idaho. The Court finds these sources unpersuasive.
This final argument dovetails into Prince’s Motion for Summary Judgment,
wherein he alleges that language in Oregon Mutual’s UIM “Other Insurance” Section is
void. Because it is void, Price asserts that he can stack his insurance policies in order to
determine coverage. Even though the Court finds no ambiguity in the Policy’s UIM
definition, the Court must briefly address this topic, as Price believes it is so intertwined
with the UIM definition, that—had the Court begun its discussion with this topic—he
could have prevailed.
The Court finds Prince’s argument regarding stacking unconvincing, as it relies
upon two false premises. First, the two sections at issue are not connected in the way
Prince wants them to be. The “Other Insurance” clause is a part of the UIM Section of the
Policy, and does not create coverage in itself, but rather outlines how coverages are
coordinated when UIM coverage already exists. Here, where no UIM coverage exists, the
Court does not even reach the “Other Insurance” delineation of coverage.
Second, had the Court begun with the topic of stacking, and even assuming
arguendo that it had found Oregon Mutual’s anti-stacking clause void, that result would
only allow Prince to stack the policies once he got to the “Other Insurance” Section,
which—as was just explained—he never does. It would not, as Prince postures, work in
reverse and automatically allow him to stack the policies under the UIM definition just
because he could stack them in the “Other Insurance” Section because the Court would

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 14

still need to find ambiguity in the UIM definition to allow the combination of UIM
policies. 4
In short, the Court never reaches Prince’s Motion for Summary Judgment or the
topic of stacking 5 because of its determination regarding UIM coverage. In this case, the
Court is not willing to accept Prince’s reading of the definition of “this insurance.” As a
result, the Court does not find any ambiguity and Prince’s coverage is not less than
Spring’s. Spring was, therefore, not an underinsured motorist.
///
///
///
///
///
///

4

The Court understands Prince’s position, and it could actually be a valid position (that stacking
would apply in both scenarios) were that the precedent in Idaho. As noted, this argument relies
on practices and a method for calculating UIM coverage that is not present in the state of Idaho.
In the cases Prince cites, the respective state legislatures have adopted certain policies and
practices that allow for that “aggregate coverage scheme.” If that were the practice in Idaho,
maybe, the outcome of the one would affect the other, but here that simply is not the case.
5

Finally, the Court will note that the principle case that Prince relies upon in support of his
Motion is Gearhart v. Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Company, 378 P.3d 454 (Idaho 2016). In
that case, the Court did find that the anti-stacking provision at issue was void because it was
ambiguous. The outcome was that the Plaintiffs got to stack their policies for coverage.
Importantly, however, they were able to stack policies because it had already been determined
that the other driver was underinsured. So even though Gearhart may (and the Court emphasizes
may) have resulted in a finding today that Oregon Mutual’s anti-stacking language is void, it
would not have changed the fact that the Court would still have needed to address the UIM
definition to determine if Prince had coverage.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 15

VI. ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Oregon Mutual’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 31) is GRANTED.
2. Prince’s Motion for Summary (Dkt. 38) Judgment is DENIED as MOOT.
3. The Court will enter a separate Judgment in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 58.

DATED: May 31, 2018
_________________________
David C. Nye
U.S. District Court Judge

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 16