D.T. et al v. Armstrong

Filing 30

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER denying 4 Motion for Preliminary Injunction; and, granting 11 Motion to Take Judicial Notice. Signed by Judge Edward J. Lodge. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (dmc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
D.T. and R.T., as guardians and next
friends of L.T.,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. 1:17-cv-00248-EJL
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

v.
RICHARD ARMSTRONG, in his official
capacity as Director of the Idaho
Department of Health and Welfare,
Defendant.
INTRODUCTION
Currently pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction
and Temporary Restraining Order (Dkt. 4).1 The Motion is fully briefed and ripe for the
Court’s consideration. Having fully reviewed the record, the Court finds that the facts and
legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record. Accordingly, in the
interest of avoiding further delay, and because the Court conclusively finds the decisional
process would not be significantly aided by oral argument, the Motion shall be decided on
the record before this Court without a hearing.

1

Also pending before the Court are: Plaintiffs’ Motion to Proceed Anonymously (Dkt. 3),
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Seal (Dkt. 5), Defendant’s unopposed Request to Take Judicial Notice (Dkt.
11), and Defendant’s unopposed Motion to Seal (Dkt. 18). The unopposed Request to Take Judicial
Notice (Dkt. 11) is granted. The remaining motions will be determined in a separate order.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- 1

BACKGROUND/ FACTS
Plaintiffs, D.T. and R.T., are the parents and guardians of L.T., a nineteen-year-old
man with profound intellectual and developmental disabilities. He will turn 20 in August
2017. (Dkt. 6-3.)
Defendant, Richard Armstrong, is the Director of the Idaho Department of Health
and Welfare (“IDHW”). (Dkt. 1). Plaintiffs bring this action to enjoin the IDHW from
closing Kyler House, an Intermediate Care Facility for the Intellectually Disabled
(“ICF/ID”) operated by IDHW in Hayden, Idaho. (Dkt. 1, Dkt. 4.) L.T. currently resides at
Kyler House. (Dkt. 4). Plaintiffs argue L.T. will be irreparably harmed if the Kyler House
is allowed to close on June 15, 2017 as planned. (Dkt. 4). Plaintiffs further argue that
closing Kyler House under current circumstances violates the Americans with Disabilities
Act and the Rehabilitation Act. (Dkt. 1, Dkt. 4.) Therefore, they seek a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction prohibiting the closure of Kyler House until
such time as closure can be accomplished without violating federal law. (Dkt. 4.) For the
reasons set forth below, the Court denies the Plaintiffs’ motion.
1.

L.T.’s Background: from Expert Testimony of Dr. Derby
Dr. Mark Derby is a licensed psychologist and Professor of Special Education at

Gonzaga University. (Dkt. 6-6.) Dr. Derby’s specialty is the assessment and treatment of
intellectually impaired children with serious problem behaviors. (Dkt. 6-6.) Dr. Derby has
provided services to L.T. and the Plaintiffs for 16 years and has known L.T. since
preschool. (Dkt. 6-6.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- 2

Learning has always been difficult for L.T., who is prone to elopement and does not
do well in group settings due to extreme behavioral issues. (Dkt. 6-6.) This behavior
includes physically assaulting others and “grabbing” females inappropriately. (Dkt. 6-6.)
Without well-trained staff and ongoing behavioral intervention with trained staff,
classroom learning is nearly impossible for L.T. (Dkt. 6-6.)
L.T. lived at home with his mother, father, and two younger sisters until he was 14
years old. (Dkt. 6-6, 14.) At that point, it became apparent that L.T. needed 24-hour care,
a fact Defendant does not dispute. (Dkt. 6-6.) The parties agree that L.T. requires constant
supervision with well-trained personnel and consistent staffing patterns. (Dkt. 6-6.)
Dr. Derby offers the opinion that L.T. requires ICF/ID level care. (Dkt. 6-6).
Plaintiffs moved L.T. to Kyler House to receive ICF/ID level care close to Plaintiffs’ home.
(Dkt. 6-6.) At Kyler House, D.T. receives comprehensive, round-the-clock, skilled care
provided by highly trained care workers who implement a detailed program to assist L.T.
(Dkt. 4-1, Dkt. 6-6.) His current treatment plan allows him to attend an educational
program developed by and with the Coeur d’Alene School District, and to interact with his
sisters, parents, and grandparents both at school and in the community. (Dkt. 4-1.)
Since moving to Kyler House, L.T.’s problem behaviors have significantly
decreased and he is learning in school. (Dkt. 6-6.) However, L.T. will turn 20 in August
2017. The record is in conflict as to whether L.T. will receive services through the Coeur
d’Alene School District until he is 20 or 21 years old. (Dkt. 6-6, ¶ 10.) Nevertheless,
according to Dr. Derby, this two-month (or 14 month) period is “critical” for L.T. so he
can learn as much as possible to ensure greater independence in his adult life. (Dkt. 6-6.)
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- 3

2.

Closure of Kyler House: Defendant’s Perspective
Kyler House is part of the Southwest Idaho Treatment Center (“SWITC”). (Dkt.

16.) Kyler House is not a community-based residential setting; it is an institutionalized
environment and the most restrictive setting for an individual with intellectual and
developmental disabilities in the IDHW system. (Dkt. 13, Dkt. 16.)
The mission of both Kyler House and SWITC is to serve as a last resort, safety-net
placement for individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities. (Dkt. 16.) Kyler
House, like SWITC in Nampa, provides an institutionalized setting designed to provide
short-term treatment and stabilization for individuals with intellectual and developmental
disabilities who cannot be served in the community and cannot be stabilized in short-term
crisis beds. (Dkt. 16.) This mission reflects an over-all IDHW policy in favor of community
placement as opposed to long-term residential or institutionalized living. (Dkt. 16.)
When L.T. was first admitted to Kyler House, Plaintiff R.T. signed an Admission
Agreement on behalf of L.T. (Dkt. 16-1.) Consistent with the IDHW’s policy preference
in favor of community placement, rather than institutionalized care, Plaintiff R.T.
specifically agreed: (1) the reason for admission is to support the individual to develop the
skills needed to return to a community placement and (2) when a community placement
that can meet the needs of the individual is found or the services of SWITC are no longer
needed, discharge to a more appropriate facility will be initiated. (Dkt. 16-1.)
Kyler House is a duplex in a residential neighborhood built and owned by a private
entity and leased to IDHW. (Dkt. 16.) Consistent with its stated mission, Kyler House was
designed to provide eight beds: two crisis beds and six short-term stabilization beds. (Dkt.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- 4

16.) The intent was for Kyler House to serve all individuals in northern Idaho who
experienced a crisis and could not maintain their community placement. (Dkt. 16.)
Nevertheless, Kyler House was unable to fulfill its intended mission and, instead,
became a long-term residence for minors and youth with difficult behaviors. (Dkt. 16.) The
flaws that prevented Kyler House from fulfilling its intended mission include: (1) it was
located in a residential neighborhood presenting a risk of having volatile clients near
vulnerable community members; (2) Kyler House was filled with minors making it difficult
to place difficult adults there; (3) because the duplex was built to serve as a residence, it is
vulnerable to extensive damage from violent or self-abusive clients; and (4) the building
has blind spots and areas of easy egress, making clients and staff vulnerable to assault.
(Dkt. 16.) As a result of these flaws, the adults Kyler House was intended to serve were
transferred to SWITC in Nampa. (Dkt. 16.)
The Kyler House lease is set to expire on July 31, 2017. (Dkt. 16.) IDHW did not
exercise its option to renew that lease and, instead, made a decision to close Kyler House.
(Dkt. 16.) Between the closure date of June 15, 2017 and lease expiration on July 31, 2017,
the IDHW intends to return the Kyler House property to the state it was when the lease first
began. (Dkt. 16.)
Rather than continue to operate Kyler House, IDHW decided that it would be less
expensive to serve the minors and young adults currently residing at Kyler House in a
community Intermediate Care Facility or another community based placement. (Dkt. 16.)
As a result of Kyler House closing, SWITC in Nampa will now serve as the ICF/ID safety
net for the entire state of Idaho. (Dkt. 16.)
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- 5

In support of the financial justification for its decision to close Kyler House, IDHW
offers the following cost information:
 The average daily rate to house a resident at Kyler House in 2016 was $612.69.
 The average daily rate to house a resident at a community Intermediate Care
Facility in 2016 was $245.32.
 The average daily rate of community based placements for the most intense adults
with intellectual and developmental disabilities is $455.02 per day.
(Dkt. 16.)
At the time IDHW decided to close Kyler House, there were four individuals living
there. (Dkt. 14.) All but L.T. have accepted transition plans to transfer them into
community based residential settings. (Dkt. 14.)
Effective June 15, 2017, when Kyler House closes, all but four of the Kyler House
staff will be laid off. (Dkt. 16.) The remaining four Kyler House staff members will help
transition the Kyler House residents into their community-based settings. (Dkt. 16.)
3.

Impact of Closure of Kyler House: Plaintiffs’ Perspective
On April 3, 2017, IDHW informed Plaintiffs in person that it would be closing Kyler

House. (Dkt. 6-2.) IDHW followed this oral notice with a written Notice of Closure dated
April 11, 2017. (Dkt. 6-2.) IDHW informed Plaintiffs that L.T. was eligible for placement
in a certified family home, in supported living, or in another ICF/ID. (Dkt. 6.)
Since then, Plaintiffs have worked to find an alternative placement and provider for
L.T. (Dkt. 6.) According to Plaintiffs, and their expert Dr. Derby, this alternative placement
must meet two criteria: (1) the residential setting must be a highly structured ICF/ID facility
and (2) L.T. must remain in the North Idaho area.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- 6

Because there are is not another ICF/ID option available to Plaintiff in North Idaho,
Plaintiffs argue L.T. will have to be transferred to the SWITC in Nampa either immediately
or after a community-based placement fails. (Dkt. 6, Dkt. 22.) Plaintiffs believe that
moving L.T. away from Coeur d’Alene will be devastating for L.T. for a number of reasons.
(Dkt. 6, Dkt. 6-6.) Fundamentally, change and transitions are extremely difficult for L.T.
(Dkt. 6-6.) Moreover, L.T. will lose the extended school year services he receives in Coeur
d’Alene, as well as regular access to his family, including his sisters, parents, and
grandparents all of whom live in North Idaho. (Dkt. 6, Dkt. 6-6.) Presently, L.T. sees his
sisters daily at school; he has weekly contact with his parents; and he regularly spends time
with his grandparents. (Dkt. 6-6.)
4.

Other Community Based Alternatives Available to L.T.
IDHW offers expert testimony from Blake Blumfield, the Program Manager and

former Clinical Supervisor for the Crisis Prevention and Court Services Team, Division of
Family and Community Services (“FACS”) at the IDHW (Dkt. 16) and Amanda DeYoung,
current Clinical Supervisor for the Crisis Prevention and Court Services Team, FACS at
the IDHW. (Dkt. 17.) Essentially, these agency experts offer two opinions: (1) L.T. is ready
for a community based placement and (2) a community based placement is generally
preferred to an ICF/ID placement because it is less restrictive. In addition, IDHW offers
the supporting testimony of Amanda Barras, the North Hub Clinical Supervisor for the
Crisis Prevention Team, FACS at the IDHW who describes IDHW’s transition plan for
L.T. and the efforts made to ensure that L.T. continues to receive the same supports and
services at his new residence that he currently receives at Kyler House. (Dkt. 14.)
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- 7

The goal of the Crisis Prevention Team is to “support[] people with developmental
disabilities in the least restrictive environment possible.” (Dkt. 16.) This means keeping
people out of institutions and into long-term community placements and settings. (Dkt. 16.)
L.T. is eligible for the Idaho Adult Medicaid Developmental Disability Waiver
(“DD Waiver”) program which allows participants to choose a residential placement in a
Certified Family Home, in Supported Living, or in another ICF/ID. (Dkt. 6, Dkt. 16.)
Neither Plaintiffs nor Dr. Derby believe that a Certified Family Home or Supported Living
are viable options for L.T. given his need for one-on-one care, 24 hours a day. (Dkt. 16.)
However, IDHW offers expert witness testimony supporting IDHW’s conclusion that L.T.
can receive one-on-one care, 24 hours a day through a community-based placement,
including a Certified Family Home or Supported Living option. (Dkts. 14, 16, 17.)
Furthermore, IDHW has a transition plan in place for L.T. (Dkt. 14.) This includes
a move to a community-based residential setting and accessing supported living services
through the DD Waiver program with an intense budget for supported living in the annual
amount of $167,533.10. (Dkt. 14.)
The transition team has identified a house in Coeur d’Alene for L.T. that will be
ready for him to occupy no later than June 15, 2017. (Dkt. 14.) L.T. will receive 24-hour
support services there. (Dkt. 14.) IDHW’s goal is to provide L.T. with the same supports
and programs he received while a resident at Kyler House. (Dkt. 14.)
The specific plan is for L.T. to receive 24-hour residential habilitation supported
living services through Renewed Horizons, a Developmental Disability agency in North
Idaho. (Dkt. 14.) The target date for those services to begin is July 1 contingent upon
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- 8

Renewed Horizons having appropriate staff to provide for L.T. (Dkt. 14.) In the meantime,
L.T. will receive 24-hour care through two agencies: (1) 11 hours of hourly support per
day from SL Start, an agency that provides habilitation services under a DD Waiver in
North Idaho and (2) 13 hours of support from either A Better Personal Care agency (a
personal care services provider) or from Kyler staff directly. (Dkt. 14.)
In addition, Kyler House staff will provide up to 16 hours per day of training to staff
from SL Start and a Better Personal Care Agency for the first two weeks of L.T.’s transition
to his new home. (Dkt. 14.) During this transition, the current supports and programs that
L.T. receives from Kyler House will be transitioned to his new home. (Dkt. 14.) During
the up to 16 hours per day of training, Kyler House staff will also provide L.T. with
supplemental direct care to integrate him into his new home. (Dkt. 14.) This same transition
plan will be followed during the first two weeks that L.T. transitions to staff support from
Renewed Horizons. (Dkt. 14.)
L.T. will also have support through the IDHW Targeted Service Coordinator for
linking, coordinating, and assisting with L.T.’s personal care services and DD Waiver
services. (Dkt. 14.) IDHW will also be able to assist with safety planning, transitioning to
supportive living services, and follow-up monitoring to ensure that L.T.’s needs are
addressed in the least restrictive environment. (Dkt. 14.) In addition, during the transition
period, L.T. will also have either a behavioral specialist or the IDHW Crisis Prevention
Team available to take calls from L.T.’s new staff and family and to check in regularly to
ensure L.T. and his new staff have what they need to ensure that L.T. is transitioned
successfully into his new community based residential setting. (Dkt. 14.)
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- 9

Plaintiffs argue that by moving L.T. into an inappropriate setting and then closing
the only ICF/ID in Coeur d’Alene, IDHW is ensuring that L.T. will end up in a far more
distant and restrictive ICF/ID in the future. (Dkt. 22.) According to Plaintiffs, closing Kyler
House will inevitably lead to L.T.’s failure in a community-based setting and the next step
in the chain of causation is necessarily institutionalization and isolation from the
community. (Dkt. 22.).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The legal principles applicable to requests for temporary restraining orders and
preliminary injunctions are well established and “substantially identical.” Stuhlbarg Intern.
Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brushy and Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). A
party seeking injunction relief must demonstrate “that he is likely to succeed on the merits,
that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the
balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”
American Trucking Ass’n v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009)
(citing Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24-25 (2008)).
Injunctive relief “is an extraordinary remedy, never awarded as of right.” Winter,
555 U.S. at 24. The principal purpose of preliminary injunctive relief is to preserve the
court’s power to render a meaningful decision on the merits of the case by preserving the
status quo pending a determination on the merits. 11A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2947 (2d ed. 2010); Sierra Forest Legacy v. Rey,
577 F.3d 1015, 1023 (9th Cir. 2009).

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- 10

The propriety of a request for injunctive relief hinges on a significant threat of
irreparable injury that must be imminent in nature. Caribbean Marine Serv. Co. v.
Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988). Speculative injury does not constitute
irreparable harm. See id.; Goldie's Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Court, 739 F.2d 466, 472
(9th Cir. 1984). A presently existing actual threat must be shown, although the injury need
not be certain to occur. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 13031 (1969); FDIC v. Garner, 125 F.3d 1272, 1279-80 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S.
1020 (1998).
ANALYSIS
1.

Probability of Success on the Merits
Plaintiffs argue that closing Kyler House will violate the integration mandate of

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act. For the
reasons set forth below, the Court is not so persuaded.
The parties agree that IDHW must administer its Medicaid program, including its
programs of services for those with severe developmental disabilities “in the most
integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.”
Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 592 (1999). The parties disagree as to what this means for
L.T. Plaintiffs argue that L.T. relies on the services of Kyler House to maintain
independence, avoid remote institutionalization, and successfully reside in the community.
Defendant argues that Kyler House is an institution and the integration mandate is one of
the reasons why IDHW seeks to transition Plaintiff from Kyler House to a communitybased program.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- 11

Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act both prohibit
discrimination on the basis of disability. The ADA applies to public entities, whereas the
Rehabilitation Act applies to federally-funded programs.
Title II of the ADA states:
Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability,
be excluded from participation in or be denied benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be
subjected to discrimination by any such entity.
42 U.S.C. § 12132. Similarly, the Rehabilitation Act states:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the
United states . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability,
be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving federal financial assistance.
29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
To establish a violation of Title II of the ADA, a claimant must show that he or she:
(1) is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) was excluded from participation in or
otherwise discriminated against with regard to a public entity’s services, programs, or
activities, and (3) such exclusion or discrimination was by reason of his or her disability.
Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002). To establish a violation of the
Rehabilitation Act, a claimant must show that he or she: (1) is handicapped within the
meaning of the Act; (2) is otherwise qualified for the benefit or services sought; (3) was
denied the benefit or services solely by reason of her handicap; and (4) the program
providing the benefit or services receives federal financial assistance. Id.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- 12

It is undisputed that, for the purposes of this dispute, the requirements of the ADA,
42 U.S.C. § 12132, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), are “co-extensive.” See
Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir. 2005); Zukle v. Regents of Univ. of
California, 166 F.3d 1041, 1045, n. 11 (9th Cir. 1999).
As directed by Congress, the Attorney General issued certain regulations designed
to implement the discrimination prohibitions of Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation
Act. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 591-92. The integration mandate is set forth in these
regulations. The Title II integration regulation states, “A public entity shall administer
services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of
qualified individuals with disabilities.” Id. at 592 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d)).
Similarly, the Rehabilitation Act integration regulation “requires recipients of federal funds
to ‘administer programs and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the
needs of qualified handicapped persons.’” Id. at 591-92 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(d).
“‘[T]he most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with
disabilities’ . . . means[s] ‘a setting that enables individuals with disabilities to interact with
non-disabled persons to the fullest extent possible.” Id. at 592 (citing 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, App.
A, p.450 (1998)).
Based on these regulations, the United States Supreme Court in Olmstead
recognized the unjustified isolation of people with disabilities constitutes discrimination
based on disability. Id.at 597. In addition, the Supreme Court recognized a strong federal
policy preference for community-based care. Id.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- 13

The Olmstead decision identified two public policy justifications underlying the
preference for community integration as opposed to unjustified institutionalization:
First, institutional placement of persons who can handle and
benefit from community settings perpetuates unwarranted
assumptions that persons so isolated are incapable or unworthy
of participating in community life . . . . Second, confinement in
an institution severely diminishes the everyday life activities
of individuals, including family relations, social contacts, work
options, economic independence, educational advancement,
and cultural enrichment.
Id. at 600–01 (citations omitted).
Community-based care is part of an effort “to secure opportunities for people with
developmental disabilities to enjoy the benefits of community living.” Id. at 599. In
determining whether an individual is “qualified” for community-based care, “the State
generally may rely on the reasonable assessments of its own professionals.” Id. at 602.
Nonetheless, “nothing in the ADA or its implementing regulations condones
termination of institutional settings for persons unable to handle or benefit from community
settings.” Id. at 601-602. The integration mandate is for “qualified individual[s] with a
disability.” Id. at 602.
Furthermore, there is no requirement that community-based treatment be imposed
on patients who do not desire it. Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(e)(1) (1998) (“Nothing in
this part shall be construed to require an individual with a disability to accept an
accommodation . . . which such individual chooses not to accept”); 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, App.
A, p. 450 (1998) (“[P]ersons with disabilities must be provided the option of declining to
accept a particular accommodation.”)).
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- 14

Plaintiffs argue that the decision to close Kyler House “will result in segregating
L.T. from the broader, non-disabled community.” (Dkt. 4-1.) Two assumptions underlie
Plaintiffs’ position: (1) L.T. requires an ICF/ID setting and (2) L.T. must be in Coeur
d’Alene in order to avoid segregation from the non-disabled community. Plaintiffs
essentially argue that moving L.T. from Kyler House to a community-based setting is a
plan doomed to failure and will inevitably lead to further institutionalization of L.T. at
SWITC in Nampa if there is no other ICF/ID option available in North Idaho. Plaintiffs
argue, “If moving a person from an institution, into a community setting has the unintended
but predictable consequence of placing him in a more restrictive setting, then such a move
is prohibited by the ADA.” (Dkt. 22.)
The Court does not find Plaintiffs’ argument persuasive and finds it highly unlikely
that Plaintiffs will succeed on the merits of their discrimination claim. Plaintiffs rely on the
integration mandate in support of their disability discrimination claims. However, the
integration mandate is precisely why L.T. is being transferred from Kyler House to a
community based program. By transitioning L.T. to a community-based setting within
Coeur d’Alene, Defendant has essentially maximized L.T.’s community integration. This
decision alone simply cannot violate the integration clause or otherwise support a
discrimination claim.
Other federal courts have rejected similar “obverse Olmstead” arguments wherein
an individual challenges a state decision to close a treatment facility for the
developmentally disabled or relocate such disabled individuals to community settings. See
Sciarillo v. Christie, 2013 WL 6586569, * 4 (D. N.J. Dec. 13, 2013) (citing Richard S. v.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- 15

Dep’t of Developmental Servs. of the State of Cal., 2000 WL 35944246, *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar.
27, 2000); Richard C. ex rel. Kathy B. v. Houstoun, 196 F.R.D. 288, 292 (W.D. Pa. 1999);
Ill. League of Advocates for the Developmentally, Disabled v. Quinn, 2013 WL 3168758,
*5 (N.D. Ill. June 20, 2013). This Court agrees with the Central District of California’s
analysis of the issue:
[T]here is no basis for saying a premature discharge into the
community is an ADA discrimination based on disability.
There is no ADA provision that providing community
placement is a discrimination. It may be a bad medical
decision, or poor policy, but it is not discrimination based on
disability.
Richard S., 2000 WL 35944246, *3.
Nonetheless, Plaintiffs argue that closure of the Kyler House violates the integration
mandate because L.T. will likely fail in a community-based program and will ultimately
end up at the ICF/ID facility in Nampa, far away from his friends and family and with the
ultimate effect of discriminating against him on the basis of his disability. The Court finds
this threatened injury is too remote and speculative to support a claim.
IDHW has developed a transition plan for L.T. to ensure his success in a
community-based placement. This transition plan appears to reflect a great deal of effort,
represents a tremendous dedication of resources for the direct benefit of L.T., and is
supported by the expert opinion of IDHW’s trained staff. It is also a reasonable
accommodation of L.T.’s precise needs and a sufficient safeguard against the harm
Plaintiffs seek to prevent by enjoining closure of Kyler House.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- 16

Ultimately, Plaintiffs request that L.T. receive ICF/ID services in Coeur d’Alene
and that is effectively what Defendant’s transition plan will achieve. While L.T. will not
reside in an ICF/ED environment, such as Kyler House, Defendant has demonstrated that
he will receive substantially the same level of care and support services in a new residential
setting. Furthermore, because Defendant will have intense support on supported living
services with one-on-one, 24-hour care, the Court is not persuaded that L.T.’s community
placement is likely to fail.
While L.T. will likely experience some transitional stress from the change, the Court
is convinced, based on the testimony of IDHW’s experts, that L.T. will ultimately benefit
from the new environment and requiring IDHW to continue to operate Kyler House for the
benefit of a single resident is not a reasonable accommodation under the circumstances.
In short, the Court finds Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on their claim that closing
the Kyler House on June 15, 2017 as planned would violate the integration mandate of the
ADA and Rehabilitation Act and result in unlawful discrimination.
2.

Irreparable Harm in the Absence of Relief
For an injunction to issue, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that L.T. is likely to suffer

irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief. Although a plaintiff is not required to
show actual harm at the preliminary injunction stage, a plaintiff “must establish that
irreparable harm is likely, not just possible.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at
1131. The likely harm must be supported by a “clear showing,” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520
U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam), and speculative injury is insufficient, Goldies
Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Court, 739 F. 2d 466, 472 (9th Cir. 1984).
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- 17

Plaintiffs, relying upon the expert opinion of Dr. Derby, argue that evicting L.T.
will result in increased problem behaviors, loss of educational opportunity, and ultimately
institutionalization. While this is the type of irreparable harm injunctive relief is designed
to protect, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ arguments do not survive careful scrutiny.
A.

Disruptions Will Lead to Problem Behaviors

Plaintiffs argue that closing Kyler House as planned will result in an increase in
L.T.’s behavior problems. The Court is sensitive to Plaintiffs’ concerns and the impact this
change may have on L.T. in the short term. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs argument has its limits.
First, literally, any change in L.T.’s environment has the risk of increasing L.T.’s
problem behaviors. Yet it is not realistic to ask IDHW to provide L.T. with a completely
static environment.
Second, L.T.’s living situation is going to be disrupted whether Kyler House is
closed or not in light of the changes that have already occurred in anticipation of the
planned June 15, 2017 closure. While the Court can enjoin the IDHW from closing Kyler
House, it cannot force the other residents or the Staff, who have been notified of a pending
lay-off, to remain on-site.
Third, there is expert testimony in the record from the IDHW that supports the
conclusions that these short-term disruptions will likely lead to long-term gains for L.T.
Accordingly, the short term harm Plaintiffs expect will not be permanent or irreparable.
B.

Lost Educational Opportunities

The Court finds that the loss of educational opportunity is a limited concern under
the circumstances.
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First, Plaintiff is less than two months away from his 20th birthday. His educational
opportunities through the Coeur d’Alene School District will end either in August 2017 or
a year later. This is a relatively short period of time.
Second, while the Court recognizes that Dr. Derby believes this time is critical, the
Court finds that the transition plan is set up in a way to address this concern. L.T. will
continue to reside in Coeur d’Alene and remain eligible for the services he received through
the Coeur d’Alene School District. While the transition may temporarily escalate L.T.’s
problem behaviors, he will continue to receive intense support in his community
placement. These accommodations will ensure that L.T. can continue to learn the life skills
necessary for him to best succeed.
C.

Institutionalization

Plaintiffs’ institutionalization argument cuts both ways. Plaintiffs acknowledge that
Defendant seeks to de-institutionalize L.T. and place him in a community-based program.
They argue that they have demonstrated a “high probability” that closing Kyler House will
ultimately result in further segregating L.T. from the non-disabled community. (Dkt. 22.)
As discussed above, the Court finds that Defendant’s transition plan will, in fact, result in
greater deinstitutionalization and more expansive community integration. The Court is not
convinced by Plaintiffs’ argument that L.T. is destined to fail in that community placement.
At most, this argument is too speculative to constitute irreparable harm.
In short, while the Court is mindful of the fact that change is hard for L.T., the Court
is not convinced that, in the absence of their request for relief, L.T. will be irreparably
harmed in the long-term. Rather, L.T. is being presented with a residential change and a
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transition plan designed to ensure his long-term success and community integration in
North Idaho.
3.

Balance of Equities
In balancing the equities, the Court must consider the parties’ “competing claims of

injury” and consider the effect granting or withholding preliminary injunctive relief will
have on each party. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 542
(1987).
In this instance, Plaintiffs have made clear that they are concerned with the stress a
change will cause L.T. The Court is sensitive to those concerns but, as previously stated,
believes the IDHW experts have set forth a transition plan designed to address those
concerns and minimize the disruption to L.T.
From the Defendant’s standpoint, it made a decision to close Kyler House in at least
April and has taken steps consistent with a plan for closing Kyler House by June 15, 2017.
Accordingly, the other three residents have transition plans for new community-based
placements and all but four of the Kyler House staff were informed that they would be laid
off effective June 15, 2017. If the Court were to issue an injunction, IDHW would have to
come up with a last-minute plan to staff and operate Kyler House for the benefit of a single
individual, L.T.
Clearly, the financial and logistical challenges IDHW faces could be overcome.
Nonetheless, in light of the short-term harm to L.T. and long-term gains the transition is
designed for him to enjoy, the Court concludes that it makes little sense to require IDHW
to continue to operate Kyler House under the circumstances.
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4.

Public Interest Concerns
Both parties cite the public policy in favor of integration in support of their

respective positions. As discussed above, the Court finds that this integration mandate is
more likely to be achieved if Kyler House is closed and L.T. is transitioned to the
community based placement described in the IDHW’s transition plan.
Furthermore, the Court recognizes that the public also has an interest in providing
its state agencies with the flexibility necessary to manage their finances and provide for the
greatest good. IDHW has demonstrated that it made a choice to close Kyler House due to
cost concerns. Further, it has an institutional offering for ICF/ID support as a last resort at
the SWITC facility in Nampa, Idaho.
The Court recognizes Plaintiffs’ concerns for L.T. and the distance of the SWITC
facility in Nampa from L.T.’s family in North Idaho. However, the public interest weighs
in favor of allowing IDHW to determine where to operate an ICF/ID facility. Such
decisions cannot be made by the courts as a means of accommodating the needs of a single
individual.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the Court finds that neither a temporary restraining order nor a preliminary
injunction should issue in this case. Because Plaintiffs are unlikely to prevail on their
discrimination claims, the Court concludes that it would be unreasonable to order the
IDHW to continue to operate Kyler House for the benefit of a single resident. While the
closure of Kyler House may have a short-term impact on L.T., the Court finds the IDHW
has set in place accommodations to ensure L.T.’s long-term success in the Coeur d’Alene
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community so L.T. can enjoy access to the educational opportunities and family
relationships that are vitally important to him.
ORDER
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction (Dkt. 4) is DENIED and Defendant’s
unopposed Request for Judicial Notice (Dkt. 11) is GRANTED.

DATED: June 14, 2017
_________________________
Edward J. Lodge
United States District Judge

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