Miller et al v. The State of Idaho et al
Filing
20
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER denying as moot 17 Motion ; granting 18 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. The Court will enter judgment separately. Signed by Judge David C. Nye. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (st)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
KRISTIN MILLER and CACHE
MILLER,
Case No. 1:17-cv-00330-DCN
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
Plaintiffs,
v.
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel.,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Defendant.
I. OVERVIEW
There are two pending motions in this matter. Pro se Plaintiffs Kristin and Cache
Miller (“the Millers”) filed a “Motion for Relief (i.e. Injunctive Relief)” on November 14,
2017. Dkt. 17. Defendant The State of Idaho, appearing on behalf of the Idaho
Transportation Board (“the State”), filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on
December 5, 2017. Dkt. 18. Having reviewed the record, the Court finds that the parties
have adequately presented the facts and legal arguments in the briefs. Accordingly, in the
interest of avoiding further delay, and because the Court finds that the decisional process
would not be significantly aided by oral argument, the Court decides the pending Motions
on the record without oral argument. Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(2)(ii). For the
reasons set forth below, the Court finds good cause to GRANT the Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings. The Court also DENIES the Motion for Relief as moot.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER – PAGE 1
II. BACKGROUND
In May of 2012, the State served a complaint and summons on the Millers
declaring that it was exercising its eminent domain powers to condemn a portion of
property owned by the Millers in Eagle, Idaho.1 See State ex rel. Idaho Transp. Bd., No.
CV-OC-2012-08146, at 1 (Idaho 4th Jud. Dist. Mar. 11, 2013).2 The State was
endeavoring to extend State Highway 16 from State Highway 44 to U.S. Highway 20-26
across the Boise River. Id. At the time, the Millers’ property was accessible from both
Highway 16 and Schultz Court. The State sought to condemn any access rights to the
Millers’ property from Highway 16. Id. The State also sought temporary easements
across the property for construction purposes. Id. at 1-2.
At that time, the Millers were using the property, which consisted of three separate
parcels of land (known as Parcels 42, 43, and 44), as an event venue. Id. at 4. The
property had one building on it, which was located on Parcel 44. Id. The Millers used
Parcels 42 and 43 for additional parking. Id.
The Millers did not respond to the complaint. Accordingly, on October 19, 2012,
the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, entered
1
The Millers state that the listed address of this property is 8377 Schultz Court, Eagle, Idaho.
2
The Court takes judicial notice of all the state court documents cited in this case as they are
matters of public record not subject to reasonable dispute. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250
F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001). However, the Court notes that, in the future, any party asking the
Court to take judicial notice of any records—whether they are public or not—should attach those
records to their briefs in the appropriate manner.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER – PAGE 2
default against the Millers.3 Id. at 7. After the state court entered default, the only issue
that remained was the amount of compensation the State owed the Millers for the taking.
Id. at 7-8. The court held a hearing on this issue, and Cache Miller appeared on behalf of
the Millers. Id. at 7. After an extensive analysis, on March 11, 2013, the court entered a
Memorandum Decision and Order finding as follows:
1) The taking of the property involved was for a purpose and use authorized
by law, namely the construction and/or maintenance of roads and by roads.
2) The takings made necessary for such use are appropriate to and necessary
for such use.
3) That the complaint substantially complies with the requirements of section
7-707, Idaho Code.
4) That the amount needed to provide the condemnees’ with just
compensation for the taking in this case is . . . $381,721.64.
Id. at 18. The compensation included “costs of cure resulting from the taking,” which
included replacing the Millers’ well, installing new fencing, and constructing a new
gravel road to provide interconnectivity between the Parcels. Id. at 7. The court then
entered final judgment in the case. The Millers did not appeal the decision and the State
paid the Millers the awarded compensation.
In its decision on just compensation, the state court found it appropriate to treat
Parcels 42, 43, and 44 “as a single unified parcel under common ownership of the
3
Earlier, the same court entered default against three other defendants in the case. These
defendants were an individual, Standford Watts, and two financial institutions: Mortgage
Electronic Registration Systems, and Citibank, N.A., both of which held mortgages on portions
of the Millers’ property.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER – PAGE 3
Millers” because, as of the date of the summons, May 4, 2012, that was the status of the
Parcels. Id. at 13. In doing so, the state court rejected the Millers’ argument “that because
of a pending foreclosure involving one or more of the parcels, Parcel 44 must be
considered to be a ‘landlocked’ parcel that the state [was] obliged to purchase outright.”
Id. At some point after the condemnation final judgment Parcels, 42 and 43 were
foreclosed on and/or sold. As a result of these actions, the Millers no longer had road
access to Parcel 44. The State’s condemnation action had cut off their access to the Parcel
via Highway 16 and the foreclosure/sale had cut off their access to the Parcel via Schultz
Court. Parcel 44 was then land-locked.
The Millers were unable to sell or rent Parcel 44, so they began using it as their
home. Dkt. 1 at 5. After the condemnation, the Millers did not have a replacement well
installed, so the building does not have running water. Apparently, despite the
condemnation, the Millers have continued to use Highway 16 to access their home. The
Idaho Transportation Department has threatened (by letter and in person) to fence off this
access to prevent the Millers from using it. Id.
The Millers filed this suit on August 8, 2017. They first allege that they did not
receive just compensation for the taking of their property. They also allege that, by
threatening to fence off the access to their property, the State is “deny[ing] the Millers
residence/citizenship in Idaho,” “deny[ing] the Millers their federal civil/constitutional
rights in Idaho,” and “depriv[ing] [the Millers] of housing, jobs, property, opportunities,
hope, and good names.” Id. On August 30, 2017, the State filed its Answer, in which it
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER – PAGE 4
asserted that it was immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and that the Millers’ claims were barred by res judicata. Dkt. 4, at 3.
This case was originally assigned to Judge Ronald E. Bush. After an initial
telephonic scheduling conference, Judge Bush issued a scheduling order. Judge Bush
gave the parties until December 5, 2017, to file a motion for judgment on the pleadings or
a motion for preliminary injunction. On November 15, 2017, the case was reassigned to
the undersigned.
Both parties met the December 5 deadline set by Judge Bush. The Millers filed
their Motion for Relief (Dkt. 17) on November 17, 2017, and the State filed its Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings (Dkt. 18) on December 5, 2017. The State also filed a
Response to the Millers’ Motion for Relief (Dkt. 19) on December 5, 2017. The Millers
have neither filed a reply brief on their Motion for Relief nor a response to the State’s
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. The time has run for filing any addition briefing;
therefore, these Motions are ripe for review.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, “After the pleadings are
closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the
pleadings.” The standard governing a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is
“functionally identical” to that governing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. United States ex rel.
Caffaso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1054 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2011). “For
purposes of the motion, the allegations of the non-moving party must be accepted as true,
while the allegations of the moving party which have been denied are assumed to be
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER – PAGE 5
false.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir.
1989). “Judgment on the pleadings is proper when the moving party clearly establishes
on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that
it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. “However, judgment on the pleadings is
improper when the district court goes beyond the pleadings to resolve an issue; such a
proceeding must properly be treated as a motion for summary judgment.” Id.
“When considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, this court may
consider facts that ‘are contained in materials of which the court may take judicial
notice.’” Heliotrope Gen., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F.3d 971, 981 n.18 (9th Cir. 1999)
(citation omitted). “A court may take judicial notice of ‘matters of public record,’” such
as court documents. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001).
IV. ANALYSIS
The State argues judgment on the pleadings is proper under the doctrine of res
judicata. Res judicata “bars litigation in a subsequent action of any claims that were
raised or could have been raised in the prior action.” Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health
Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 2001). The State argues this suit is barred because
the issues the Millers raise now were already addressed in the state court condemnation
action. “Res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, applies only where there is ‘(1) an
identity of claims, (2) a final judgment on the merits, and (3) privity between parties.’”
Turtle Island Restoration Network v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 673 F.3d 914, 917 (9th Cir.
2012) (citation omitted).
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER – PAGE 6
A. An Identify of Claims
Courts consider four factors in determining whether there is an “identity of
claims” between two actions:
(1) whether rights or interests established in the prior judgment would be
destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the second action; (2) whether
substantially the same evidence is presented in the two actions; (3) whether
the two suits involve infringement of the same right; and (4) whether the two
suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.
Id. at 917-18 (quoting Costantini v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199, 1201–02 (9th
Cir. 1982). All of these factors weigh in favor of finding an identity of claims in this case.
The state court action and this action arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts:
the State’s taking of portions of the Millers’ property, namely their access rights via
Highway 16. The Millers asserted the same rights in both actions: their right to just
compensation and their right to access their land. The state court resolved both of these
issues. The court determine the amount of compensation the Millers were entitled to and
determined that the State’s taking did not cause the Millers’ property to be landlocked.
Prosecuting this action would require reexamination of the same evidence presented in
the state court action, and a ruling in the Millers’ favor could destroy the condemnation
final judgment the state court issued in 2013. If the Millers had an issue with the state
court’s decision, they should have appealed it through the proper channels. The Millers
cannot now turn to this Court to undo this result. Accordingly, the Court finds there is an
identity of claims here.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER – PAGE 7
B. A Final Judgment on the Merits
There is no question as to whether there was a final judgment on the merits in the
state court action. The state court issued a final judgement on March 11, 2013, awarding
the Millers $381,721.64 with interest at the judgment rate of 5.25% from May 4, 2012.
See Final Judgment, State ex rel. Idaho Trans. Bd., NO. CV-OC-2012-08146 (Idaho 4th
Jud. Dist. Ada Mar. 11, 2013).
C. Privity Between the Parties.
There is also no question as to whether there is privity between the parties in this
action and the parties in the state court action. The parties in this case are identical to the
parties in the state court action. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l
Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1081 (9th Cir. 2003).
Because all three res judicata elements are satisfied, the Court finds the Millers’
action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. See id. at 1084. Because the action is
barred by res judicata, judgment on the pleadings is appropriate and necessary. Owens v.
Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 715 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming grant of
motion for judgment on the pleadings because plaintiffs’ claims were barred by res
judicata).
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER – PAGE 8
V. ORDER
THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS:
1. The State’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Dkt. 18) is GRANTED.
2. The Millers’ Motion for Relief (i.e. Injunctive Relief) (Dkt. 17) is DENIED AS
MOOT.
3. The Court will enter judgment separately in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 58.
DATED: January 18, 2018
_________________________
David C. Nye
U.S. District Court Judge
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER – PAGE 9
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