Padilla v. Blades

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. 1 ) is DENIED and DISMISSED with prejudice. The Court does not find its resolution of this habeas matter to be reasonably debatable, and a certificate of appealability will not issue. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (alw)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

TARANGO D. PADILLA,
Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 1:17-cv-00527-BLW
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

RANDY BLADES,
Respondent.

Earlier in this matter, the Court granted Respondent Randy Blades’ Motion for
Partial Summary Dismissal of Petitioner Tarango D. Padilla’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus. (Dkts. 8, 12.) Petitioner is challenging his state court grand theft and persistent
violator convictions. Petitioner was permitted to proceed to the merits of a subclaim
contained in Claim Two, alleging Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel.
Respondent has filed a Response and Brief in Support of Dismissal as to the remaining
claim. (Dkt. 13.) Petitioner has elected not to file a reply.
The Court takes judicial notice of the records from Petitioner’s state court
proceedings, which have been lodged by the parties. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); Dawson v.
Mahoney, 451 F.3d 550, 551 (9th Cir. 2006). Having carefully reviewed the record,
including the state court record, the Court finds that the parties have adequately presented

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1

the facts and legal arguments in the briefs and record and that oral argument is
unnecessary. See D. Idaho L. Civ. R. 7.1(d). Accordingly, the Court enters the following
Order.
REVIEW OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM
1. Standard of Law
Title 28 U.S.C.§ 2254(d), as amended by the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), applies when a petitioner files a federal habeas corpus
action to challenge a state court judgment. That section limits relief to instances where
the state court’s adjudication of the petitioner’s claim:
1.

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

2.

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the state court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Where a petitioner contests the state court’s legal conclusions, including
application of the law to the facts, § 2254(d)(1) governs. That section consists of two
alternative tests: the “contrary to” test and the “unreasonable application” test.
Under the first test, a state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established
federal law “if the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in
[the Supreme Court’s] cases, or if it decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court]

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[has] done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694
(2002).
Under the second test, to satisfy the “unreasonable application” clause of
§ 2254(d)(1) the petitioner must show that the state court—although it identified “the
correct governing legal rule” from Supreme Court precedent—nonetheless “unreasonably
applie[d] it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000). “Section 2254(d)(1) provides a remedy for instances in which
a state court unreasonably applies [Supreme Court] precedent; it does not require state
courts to extend that precedent or license federal courts to treat the failure to do so as
error.” White v. Woodall, 572 U.S 415, 426 (2014).
When a petitioner contests the reasonableness of the state court’s factual
determinations based entirely on the state court record, a federal court must undertake a §
2254(d)(2) analysis. Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated on
other grounds as recognized in Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2014). There
are two general ways to challenge factual findings as unreasonable under § 2254(d)(2).
“First, a petitioner may challenge the substance of the state court’s findings and attempt
to show that those findings were not supported by substantial evidence in the state court
record. Second, a petitioner may challenge the fact-finding process itself on the ground
that it was deficient in some material way.” Hibbler v. Benedetti, 693 F.3d 1140, 1146
(9th Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted).
If a federal district court concludes that the state reasonably found the facts and
applied the correct federal legal precedent but nevertheless came to an incorrect
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conclusion, habeas corpus relief is not necessarily warranted. Rather, the federal district
court also must conclude that the state court decision is objectively unreasonable.
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003); Bell, 535 U.S. at 694. If fairminded jurists
could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision, then the decision is
considered “objectively reasonable,” and relief is not warranted under § 2254(d)(1).
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011). Stated differently, if all fairminded
jurists would agree that the state court decision is incorrect, that equates to a finding that
the decision is “objectively unreasonable.” After any mandatory harmless error review,
then habeas corpus relief can be granted. The Supreme Court emphasized that “even a
strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was
unreasonable.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) is the clearly-established law
governing Sixth Amendment claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland
dictates that, to succeed on an ineffective assistance claim, a petitioner must show that (1)
counsel’s performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, and that (2) the petitioner was prejudiced by the deficient performance.
Id. at 684.
In assessing trial counsel’s performance under Strickland’s first prong, a
reviewing court must view counsel’s conduct at the time that the challenged act or
omission occurred, making an effort to eliminate the distorting lens of hindsight. Id. at
689. The court must indulge in the strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id.
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In assessing prejudice under Strickland’s second prong, a court must find that,
under the particular circumstances of the case, there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 684,
694. A reasonable probability is one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.
Id. at 694.
A petitioner must establish both deficient performance and prejudice to prove an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 466 U.S. at 697. On habeas review, the court may
consider either prong of the Strickland test first, or it may address both prongs, even if
one is deficient and will compel denial. Id.
The foregoing standard, giving deference to counsel’s decisionmaking, is the de
novo standard of review. Another layer of deference—to the state court decision—is
afforded under AEDPA. In giving guidance to district courts reviewing Strickland claims
on habeas corpus review, the United States Supreme Court explained:
The pivotal question is whether the state court’s application
of the Strickland standard was unreasonable. This is different
from asking whether defense counsel’s performance fell
below Strickland’s standard. Were that the inquiry, the
analysis would be no different than if, for example, this Court
were adjudicating a Strickland claim on direct review of a
criminal conviction in a United States district court. Under
AEDPA, though, it is a necessary premise that the two
questions are different. For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), “an
unreasonable application of federal law is different from an
incorrect application of federal law.” Williams, supra, at 410,
120 S.Ct. 1495. A state court must be granted a deference and
latitude that are not in operation when the case involves
review under the Strickland standard itself.
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011).

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Within an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Court also reviews the law
governing the subject of the alleged deficient performance—here, Fourth Amendment
search and seizure issues. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. U.S. Const.
amend. IV. This protection extends to brief investigatory stops of persons that fall short
of traditional arrest. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (citing Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)).
2. State Court Decision
Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move to
suppress unconstitutionally-obtained evidence. The Court does not recite the complete
history of Petitioner’s case, which is included in Respondent’s briefing, but focuses on
that which is relevant. After the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed denial of his postconviction review petition, Petitioner’s claim was heard anew by the Idaho Supreme
Court.
That Court characterized the relevant facts as follows:
On August 7, 2011, at about 2:00 a.m., Mr. Padilla was walking
down an alley when a police car pulled up with its headlights off.
The officer turned on the car's headlights and turned the vehicle so
that Mr. Padilla could see that it was a clearly marked police car.
After stopping the car, the officer began getting out, and Mr. Padilla
turned and began running away. The officer shouted several times
for Mr. Padilla to stop, but he kept running. The officer ran after
him. Mr. Padilla ran between some houses and jumped over a fence,
twisting his ankle when he landed and fell to the ground. As he lay
in the bushes where he had fallen, he tossed everything that he did
not want found on him into the bushes. Those items included a
stolen credit card and pieces of a spark plug, which can be used to

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6

break into vehicles. Another officer heard the first officer's radio call
for assistance, and he located Mr. Padilla where he had fallen. He
immediately handcuffed Mr. Padilla and patted him down for
weapons, but did not feel anything that felt like a weapon. When the
first officer arrived, he searched the area where Mr. Padilla had been
and found a credit card issued to a Mr. Mauch, some money, and the
pieces of the spark plug, which he knew from his training and
experience could be used to break into vehicles. He observed that all
of these items were clean and appeared to have been recently placed
there. The officer then searched Mr. Padilla's person and found two
other credit cards belonging to a Ms. Labrum and more pieces of a
spark plug.
Padilla v. State of Idaho, 389 P.3d 169, 171 (Idaho 2016).
The state district court made the following findings of fact on post-conviction
review, as cited in the Idaho Court of Appeals’ opinion affirming denial of postconviction relief:
[T]he district court found the facts to be those as stated by the
officer. In fact, Padilla’s claims that he ran because he
thought he was going to get jumped by someone and that he
would have stopped had he known it was a police officer,
were specifically found by the district court to not be credible.
The district court explained that Padilla’s testimony was
“simply not credible” because his statement that he ran
because he feared he would “get jumped” was “totally
inconsistent” with his prior statement: “I was trying to make
sure I didn't have nothing on me in case I got found. I mean, it
wasn't—I had a misdemeanor warrant for a misdemeanor
DUI at that time also, so I was panicking. I didn't want to pick
up more charges because I thought I might have some weed
on me.” The district court’s factual findings support at least
the reasonable inference that Padilla knew police were
present, and that police believed he was aware of their
presence.
Padilla v. State of Idaho, No. 43292, 2016 WL 2746922, at *4 (Idaho Ct. App. May 12,
2016), aff'd, 389 P.3d 169 (2016).

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Petitioner made three Fourth Amendment arguments to the Idaho Supreme Court.
This Court will examine whether any argument provides grounds for habeas corpus
relief.

A.

Seizure Argument

Petitioner first argues that police had no reasonable suspicion to begin chasing him
for a purported investigative purpose, and, therefore, the evidence found near and on him
should have been suppressed. The Idaho Supreme Court recognized the correct legal
precedents for determining the moment when Petitioner was seized:
A seizure does not occur until a person is either
physically restrained by the police or yields to a show of
authority and stops. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621,
626–29 (1991). “[T]he police can stop and briefly detain a
person for investigative purposes if the officer has a
reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that
criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’ even if the officer lacks
probable cause.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7
(1989). Stated differently, the Supreme Court has
acknowledged “the authority of the police to make a forcible
stop of a person when the officer has reasonable, articulable
suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be
engaged in criminal activity.” United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696, 702 (1983).
Padilla, 389 P.3d at 171-72.
Petitioner argues that the police did not have reasonable suspicion simply because
he started running away. He proposed that the State had to prove that Petitioner knew the
car was a police car and that the police believed that Petitioner was aware of their
presence. The Idaho Supreme Court rejected that confining formulation and instead
turned to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968), which requires consideration of the
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“totality of the circumstances.” Further, the Idaho Supreme Court quoted Illinois v.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000), where the United States Supreme Court observed:
“Headlong flight—wherever it occurs—is the consummate act of evasion: It is not
necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such.” Id. at 124.
With this precedent in mind, the Idaho Supreme Court listed the circumstances
that constituted “articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot’”—a standard
which does not have to equate with probable cause. See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7. Those
fact included that Petitioner was walking down an alley at 2:00 a.m.; the officer
purposely positioned his car when parking so that Petitioner could clearly see that it was
a marked police car; and Petitioner did not just run down the alley or street, but ran
between two houses and jumped over a fence. Additional facts in the record are that the
officer observed Petitioner enter the alley, “shuffling” and “fumbling around,” and the
officer shouted several times for Petitioner to stop (which would have relieved Petitioner
of his fear that the officer was a potential assailant), but he kept running. (State’s Lodging
A-3, p. 73.)
In U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981), the Court instructed that the “totality of
circumstances-the whole picture-must be taken into account” by the detaining officers
who “must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person
stopped of criminal activity.” Id. at 417. Based on the facts above and according to
correct Fourth Amendment legal principles, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that
Petitioner was not seized while he was running from the police and, thus, the “totality of
circumstances” and “investigative stop” principles applied. Padilla, 389 P.3d at 171-72.
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While Petitioner continues to press his position that he is entitled to suppression
of the evidence because he ran to safety only because he feared he was going to “get
jumped” by an assailant, his subjective opinion is not the proper standard upon which to
judge this issue. Petitioner’s argument has been rejected multiple times by the United
States Supreme Court. In Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000), the Court reasoned:
Respondent and amici also argue that there are innocent
reasons for flight from police and that, therefore, flight is not
necessarily indicative of ongoing criminal activity. This fact
is undoubtedly true, but does not establish a violation of the
Fourth Amendment. Even in Terry, the conduct justifying the
stop was ambiguous and susceptible of an innocent
explanation. The officer observed two individuals pacing
back and forth in front of a store, peering into the window and
periodically conferring. 392 U.S., at 5–6, 88 S.Ct. 1868. All
of this conduct was by itself lawful, but it also suggested that
the individuals were casing the store for a planned robbery.
Terry recognized that the officers could detain the individuals
to resolve the ambiguity. Id., at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868.
In allowing such detentions, Terry accepts the risk that officers may
stop innocent people. Indeed, the Fourth Amendment accepts that
risk in connection with more drastic police action; persons arrested
and detained on probable cause to believe they have committed a
crime may turn out to be innocent. The Terry stop is a far more
minimal intrusion, simply allowing the officer to briefly investigate
further. If the officer does not learn facts rising to the level of
probable cause, the individual must be allowed to go on his way.
Id., pp. 125-26.
First, Petitioner has brought forward nothing that would cause this Court to
question the fact-finding of the state district court that was adopted by the state appellate
courts. Petitioner’s facts are quite similar to those in Wardlow and Terry; thus, Petitioner
is hard-pressed to show objective unreasonableness, let alone error, in the Idaho Supreme

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Court’s analysis of his first Fourth Amendment argument underlying the Sixth
Amendment ineffective assistance claim.

B. Submission to Police Authority Argument
Petitioner’s second point of contention is that he believes the items he discarded
while lying in the bushes should have been suppressed because he “submitted himself to
police authority” when he decided to hide in the bushes after he had injured his ankle and
before the police found him. Clearly-established law governing this point is found in
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991), where Hodari, upon finding himself being
pursued by a police officer, “tossed away what appeared to be a small rock,” later
identified as crack cocaine. The issue before the United States Supreme Court was
whether, at the time he dropped the drugs, Hodari had been “seized” within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court held that a seizure requires either
touching by the police officers or submission to authority by the suspect. Id., pp. 623-27.
The Idaho Supreme Court determined that the record in Petitioner’s case does not
support his assertion that he had submitted himself to authority of the officers and was
seized before he discarded the items in the bushes, based on Petitioner’s testimony:
Q.

Did you stop yourself or did the police stop you?

A.

I didn't stop ’cause my ankle, I was hurt, and I was laying in the
bushes, and I believe it was then, ’cause I heard numerous other
vehicles racing, vroom. A lot of commotion was happening like right
then. I was like, oh, those officers, those cops.

Q.

They found you?

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A.

Yeah, they eventually found me behind Fuller Law Office, right
there behind the office.

Padilla, 389 P.3d at 172.
The Idaho Supreme Court rejected Petitioner’s argument readily because he did
not let the police know he was submitting to their authority. Id., pp. 172-73. Rather, he
was hiding from them, which would lead to the opposite conclusion of a passive but
conscious decision to not submit to their authority. There is no unreasonableness apparent
in this decision of the Idaho Supreme Court.

C. “But For” Argument
Petitioner’s third alternative argument was that the discarded items should be
suppressed, because police officers would not have found them but for their
unconstitutional seizure of him. Rejecting this argument, the Idaho Supreme Court stated,
“As discussed above his seizure was not unconstitutional, and the items were just lying
on the ground where they could be found without seizing him.” Padilla, 389 P.3d at 173.
This is sound reasoning based on the foregoing discussion and does not require further
comment.
3. Whether Counsel was Ineffective
Wrapping the Fourth Amendment analysis into the Sixth Amendment ineffective
assistance of counsel determination, the Idaho Supreme Court determined that a motion
to suppress the evidence found at the scene and on Petitioner’s person would not have
been successful because the evidence presented at the hearing showed that Petitioner’s

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 12

search and seizure were within constitutional bounds. Accordingly, the Idaho Supreme
Court concluded, there was no ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to file a motion
to suppress.
To prevail on his claim in habeas corpus, Petitioner must show that the Idaho
Supreme Court applied the foregoing precedent in an objectively unreasonable manner.
Stated another way, he “must show that the decision “was so lacking in justification that
there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any
possibility for fair-minded disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103.
As discussed in detail above, the Idaho Supreme Court’s opinion tracks governing
precedent and is reasonable and sound based on the facts and circumstances of the case.
There is nothing in the record supporting a conclusion that all reasonable jurists would
conclude that the decision is objectively unreasonable, or even erroneous. This Court
concludes that the claim fails either under AEDPA’s doubly-deferential review or plain
de novo review for lack of supporting facts to support Petitioner’s claims that his Fourth
or Sixth Amendment rights were violated. Accordingly, the Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus will be denied and dismissed in its entirety.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED:
1.

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. 1) is DENIED and
DISMISSED with prejudice.

2.

The Court does not find its resolution of this habeas matter to be reasonably
debatable, and a certificate of appealability will not issue. See 28 U.S.C.

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