Erlebach v. RAJ Enterprises of Central Florida et al
Filing
219
ORDER granting 184 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 188 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 191 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge M. Douglas Harpool. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (mem)
Case 1:18-cv-00173-MDH Document 219 Filed 01/27/22 Page 1 of 20
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
TYRELL CURTIS ERLEBACH,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 1:18-CV-00173-MDH
v.
RAJ ENTERPRISES OF CENTRAL
FLORIDA, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
Before the Court are Defendants Carol Bruce’s, Larry Church’s, Georgia Hanigan’s, Chad
Huff’s, Anne Marie Kelso’s, Payette County’s, Payette County Board of Commissioners’, Payette
County Sheriff’s Office’s, and Mark Shigeta’s (collectively, “Payette County Defendants”)
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 184); Defendants Rostad GPS & Monitoring Services
LLC’s, Kim Rostad d.b.a K&K Treatment’s, K&K Bail Bonds LLC d.b.a K&K Treatment’s
(collectively, “Rostad Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 188); and Defendant
Dennis Stokes’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 191). For the reasons set forth herein, all
Motions for Summary Judgment (Docs. 184, 188, 191) are GRANTED in their entireties.
BACKGROUND
In January of 2016, Plaintiff was arrested, and subsequently charged with several felonies,
all occurring in Payette County. Bail was set at $200,000, and the magistrate at first appearance
ordered Plaintiff, as a condition of bail, not to consume alcoholic beverages. Plaintiff was ordered
to report to the Misdemeanor Probation Office. That office was administered by an individual,
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Denis Stokes, who had contracted with the county to provide pretrial services in addition to
supervision of misdemeanor probationers. The contractor’s duties included “supervision duties for
persons with pretrial release conditions as ordered by a judge.” Among the duties agreed upon
were to sign up persons on pretrial release for alcohol monitoring, monitoring reports of alcohol
testing, and reporting “to the Court of any failed...alcohol tests.”
On April 20, 2016, the district court issued a bench warrant for the arrest of Plaintiff,
finding that there was probable cause to believe that Plaintiff had violated conditions of pretrial
release. The court further ordered that bail be set in the amount of $30,000 on the bench warrant,
and the court interlineated “or release in 72 hours in jail.” The Payette County booking sheet shows
that Plaintiff was booked into the jail the same day, posted bond, and was out of jail in 25 minutes.
On May 20, 2016, the district court exonerated bond after “being fully apprised of Defendant’s
objection to a positive alcohol test, as a false positive.”
Plaintiff’s retained expert opines that Pinnacle Laboratories, the lab that analyzed
Plaintiff’s urine sample and created the false positive report, had several shortcomings:
The cutoff level utilized by Pinnacle Laboratory was inappropriate to use as a tool
to evaluate alcohol consumption and can lead to misinterpretation
Pinnacle Laboratory did not report an error rate as commonly done by accredited
laboratories
The “corrected values” of 67.2 and 22.3 for EtG and EtS represents trace levels.
These “levels” also represent values below the laboratory’s instrument capabilities
to produce credible results
The chemical products utilized [by Plaintiff] will produce trace levels of EtG and
EtS
The reported levels are consistent with the association/contact of the described
chemicals and can be misinterpreted as alcohol ingestion (i.e. false positive)
At a minimum, 500 ng/ml or higher must be used for positive cut-off values for
EtG and EtS levels to eliminate false positive interpretations
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(Doc. 128-1, Ex. 2). Plaintiff’s expert identifies no misconduct or even relevant action on the part
of the Defendants that could have contributed to or affected Pinnacle Laboratory’s false positive
report.
Plaintiff has brought claims against several defendants in his Amended Complaint (Doc.
128) stemming from the false positive result. Plaintiff against Payette County, individuals serving
as its Board of Commissioners, the Payette County Sheriff’s Office as well as the Payette County
Sheriff individually and the former Payette County Prosecuting Attorney (collectively, “Payette
County Defendants”). The basis for Plaintiff’s lawsuit against the municipality and its
decisionmakers is (1) negligence, and, (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based upon failure to adequately train
and supervise amounting to deliberate indifference.
Plaintiff furthermore brought claims against Dennis Stokes, an employee of Indianhead
Resources, LLC, (“Indianhead”) which contracts with Payette County as an independent contractor
to provide misdemeanor probation services for the County. Plaintiff brings (1) a negligence claim
and (2) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Stokes.
Lastly, Plaintiff brings suit against K & K Treatment; Rostad GPS & Monitoring Services,
LLC; Kim Rostad, d.b.a. K & K Treatment; K & K Bail Bonds, LLC, d.b.a. K & K Treatment
(collectively, “Rostad Defendants”) alleging negligence only.
A. Defendant Stokes
Defendant Stokes is the sole employee of Indianhead. Indianhead entered into a contract
with Payette County (“County”) on May 1, 2015 to provide misdemeanor probation services. The
contract renews automatically each fiscal year. Indianhead serves as an independent contractor for
the County, and Stokes is not an employee of the County.
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Stokes supervised Plaintiff during the time Plaintiff was court-ordered to comply with
pretrial conditions of release. Stokes referred Plaintiff to Rostad GPS & Monitoring Services, LLC
(“Rostad”) for his drug and/or alcohol testing. Plaintiff submitted to a drug and/or alcohol test at
Rostad on April 14, 2016. After the subject sample was collected, Rostad sent the sample to
Pinnacle Laboratory Services (“Pinnacle”). Pinnacle then analyzed the subject sample and created
a report of its findings. Pinnacle’s report of the subject sample indicated a positive result for Ethyl
Glucuronide and Ethyl Sulfate. The report of the subject sample was then sent back to Rostad
which then forwarded the report to Stokes. Payette County had no contract with Pinnacle.
The report received by Defendant Stokes showed “positive” results for Ethyl Glucuronide
(EtG) and Ethyl Sulfate (Ets). (Doc. 128-1, Ex. 1). There was no other information on the report
that would have directed Stokes to read the “positive” results in any other way, nor was there any
sort of chart or guide instructing how to further interpret any portion of the report. Id.
Soon after Stokes received a copy of the report that indicated Plaintiff tested positive for
alcohol use, Stokes submitted a Failure to Comply with Court Order Affidavit (“Affidavit”) to the
Court, which indicated that Plaintiff had failed to comply with his conditions of release as ordered
by the Court. After Stokes submitted his Affidavit to the Court on April 19, 2016, the Court
revoked Plaintiff’s bond and issued a warrant for his arrest.
On May 17, 2016, Stokes received from Rostad a follow-up report from Pinnacle
concerning the original subject sample. This follow-up report included an additional paragraph in
the “comments” section (which had been blank on the original report) which indicated that the
positive alcohol test could have been the result of other circumstances besides the consumption of
alcohol. It stated:
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FINAL REPORT – 5/10/2016
Negative ethyl alcohol results recovered by EIA screening. Positive ETG and ETS
(ethanol metabolites) results recovered indicating exposure to ethyl alcohol within
the past 72 hours. ETG and ETS results are to be considered non-forensic testing,
for medical purposes only. Positive results may indicate ingestion of, or exposure
to ethyl alcohol within the past 72 hours. These results will not differentiate
between ethyl alcohol consumed from medications (over the counter cold or cough
formulas) or from other sources. Positive ETG and ETS results may also indicate
recent skin exposure to alcohol-containing hand sanitizers and/or disinfectants.
Under certain conditions, ETG may also be produced in vitro (outside of the body
in the sample container) by certain bacteria which may be present in the urine
sample.
(Doc. 128-1, Ex. 3). After receiving a copy of Pinnacle’s follow-up report, Stokes submitted that
report with a follow-up Affidavit on May 17, 2016, indicating to the court that Pinnacle Laboratory
had determined that Plaintiff’s sample may have been a false positive. As a result of that affidavit,
the court held a hearing on May 20, 2016. At the hearing, the court exonerated Plaintiff’s bond
and lifted the requirement that Plaintiff had to submit to drug and/or alcohol testing.
B. Rostad Defendants
Defendants K & K Treatment, Rostad GPS and Monitoring Services LLC; and K & K Bail
Bonds LLC are all owned and controlled, in whole or in part, by Defendant Kim Rostad. Random
drug and alcohol testing of Plaintiff was conducted by Rostad Defendants under a contract between
Rostad and Payette County, through Payette County’s agent Defendant Stokes/Indianhead or a
third-party. (Doc. 128 at ¶ 64). Plaintiff provided a urine sample to Rostad on April 14, 2016. The
sample was sent by Rostad Defendants to and evaluated by Pinnacle. At that time, Rostad used
Pinnacle to analyze and report on drug/alcohol testing conducted by Rostad. On April 18, 2016, a
report was sent to Rostad Defendants by Pinnacle indicating a positive result concerning alcohol.
As noted above, that result was later determined to be a “false positive” or otherwise unreliable.
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C. Payette County Defendants
Idaho Code § 1-1613 provides, “[e]ach county in the state shall provide suitable and
adequate facilities for the district court, including the facilities and equipment necessary to make
the space provided functional for its intended use, and shall provide for the staff, personnel,
supplies, and other expenses of the district court.”
Pursuant to this statutory duty, on or about May 1, 2015, Payette County and Indianhead
entered into a Contract for Misdemeanor Probation Services (“Contract”) which states that
Indianhead will “provide active supervision of adults placed on supervised misdemeanor
probation…perform all supervision duties for persons with pretrial release conditions as ordered
by a judge in Payette County….” The Contract also states that Indianhead “is an independent
contractor and is not an employee, servant, agent, partner, or joint venture of Payette County.”
Payette County contracted with Rostad Defendants to conduct random drug and alcohol testing for
the County through the County’s agent Defendant Stokes/Indianhead, or third-party. Payette
County had no contract with Pinnacle. Payette County Defendants had no other active role with
respect to pretrial services or misdemeanor probation services.
STANDARD
One of the primary purposes of the summary judgment rule is to “isolate and dispose of
factually unsupported claims.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548
(1986). Summary judgment is proper if the “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FRCP 56(a). On a
motion for summary judgment, the court must determine, when viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, whether there exists any genuine issue of material fact. Olsen
v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2004). Material facts are those that may
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affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505
(1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable
jury to find in favor of the non-moving party. See Id.
Motions for summary judgment are governed by a shifting burden of proof under Rule 56.
Nursing Home Pension Fund, Local 144 v. Oracle Corp. (In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig.), 627 F.3d
376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010). The moving party bears the “initial responsibility of informing the district
court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any which it
believes demonstrate the absence of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (internal quotation
omitted).
Once the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing
party to establish that a genuine dispute as to a material fact actually exists. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (1986). In order to defeat
summary judgment, the opposing party must establish the existence of a factual dispute that is both
material and genuine. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret
Store Brand Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2010); Freecycle Sunnyvale v. Freecycle
Network, 626 F.3d509, 514 (9th Cir. 2010). If the non-moving party fails to do this, then “the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
The Ninth Circuit has emphasized that summary judgment may not be avoided merely
because there is some purported factual dispute, but only when there is a “genuine issue of material
fact.” Hanon v. Dataproducts, Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 500 (9th Cir. 1992). The Ninth Circuit has
found that in order to resist a motion for summary judgment:
[T]he non-moving party (1) must make a showing sufficient to establish a genuine
issue of fact with respect to any element for which it bears the burden of proof; (2)
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must show that there is an issue that may reasonably be resolved in favor of either
party; and (3) must come forward with more persuasive evidence than would
otherwise be necessary when the factual context makes the non-moving party’s
claim implausible.
British Motor Car Distributors, Ltd. v. San Francisco Automotive Indus. Welfare Fund, 882 F.2d
371, 374 (9th Cir. 1989).
DISCUSSION
A. Federal Claims
a. Defendant Stokes
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Stokes violated Plaintiff’s civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. In order to establish a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show two things: (1) “deprivation of
a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,” and (2) “that the defendant acted
under color of state law.” Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir.2002). A § 1983 action
typically does not lie against a private person. Id. It is presumed that private individuals and entities
do not act “under color of state law” within the meaning of § 1983. Rabieh v. Paragon Systemslnc.,
316F.Supp.3d 1103, 1109 (2018).
While Plaintiff included Stokes as a “Governmental Defendant” in his Amended
Complaint, it is undisputed that Stokes serves as an independent contractor—through Indianhead
Resources, LLC (“Indianhead”)—to provide misdemeanor probation services for Payette County
(“County”). Payette County contracted with Rostad Defendants to conduct random drug and
alcohol testing for the County through the County’s agent Defendant Stokes/Indianhead, Stokes
argues that because he is not an employee of the County, he did not act under the color of state law
as required by § 1983.
However, “[w]hile generally not applicable to private parties, a § 1983 action can lie
against a private party when ‘he is a willing participant in joint action with the State or its agents.’”
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Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 2003), quoting Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27,
101 S.Ct 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980). The 9th Circuit has identified at least four criteria used to
identify state action: (1) public function, (2) joint action, (3) governmental compulsion or coercion,
and (4) governmental nexus. Id. Satisfaction of any one test is sufficient to find state action, so
long as no countervailing factor exists. Id.
The Court agrees with Plaintiff that Defendant Stokes likely was a “willing participant in
joint action with the State or its agents,” in the course of his duties performing misdemeanor
probation services for the district court. Kirtley, 326 F. 3d at 1092. However, even assuming Stokes
is a proper party to a § 1983 action, the evidence is woefully inadequate to conclude that Stokes
violated any constitutional rights of Plaintiff under § 1983. Plaintiff does not identify the actions
or inactions of Defendant Stokes which would be actionable under § 1983. Nor has Plaintiff
provided any facts to establish Stokes wrongfully or inaccurately reported the positive test result
to the court based on the report he received.
The evidence is undisputed that Defendant Stokes received a copy of a drug/alcohol test
and forwarded it to the Court. Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that would indicate that
Stokes’ actions here violated Plaintiff’s rights. Furthermore, while Plaintiff’s expert described how
Pinnacle may have erred in the course in creating its false positive report, Plaintiff provides no
evidence that Stokes, as a pretrial services officer, failed to accurately communicate with the court
based on the information available to him. Plaintiff’s supports his allegations with mere argument,
not fact. This is insufficient. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s
Secret Store Brand Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2010); Freecycle Sunnyvale v.
Freecycle Network, 626 F.3d509, 514 (9th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff provides no reason Stokes should
have doubted the accuracy of the initial test result and report from Pinnacle.
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Furthermore, Stokes would also be entitled to absolute immunity. Absolute immunity is
reserved to those persons “performing a duty functionally comparable to one for which officials
were rendered immune at common law.” Swift v. State of California, 384 F.3d 1184, 1190 (9th
Cir. 2004) (quoting Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc)). The Ninth
Circuit has repeatedly held that judges and other officers of government whose duties are related
to the judicial process are immune from liability for damages under § 1983 for conduct in the
performance of their official duties. Burkes v. Callion, 433 F.2d 318, 319 (1970); Agnew v. Moody,
330 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1964); Harmon v. Superior Court, 329 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1964). “An official
derives the appropriate degree of immunity not from his or her administrative designation, but by
the function he or she performs.” Swift, 483 F.3d at 1188 (quoting Anderson v. Boyd, 714 F.2d
906, 908 (9th Cir.1983)).
Defendant Stokes maintains that he, at all times relevant to this case, was acting on behalf
of the court and/or as a judicial officer and is entitled to immunity. Plaintiff, as noted, maintains
that Stokes did act under the color of state law through his actions with the court. It has been
established that the functions of a deputy probation officer are an integral part of the judicial
process so as to afford immunity from suit under the Civil Rights Act. Friedman v. Younger, 282
F. Supp. 710, 716 (1968). Specifically, a probation officer who prepares and submits a probation
report in a criminal case is performing a ‘quasi-judicial’ function and is entitled to a similar, if not
the same, immunity that is accorded to judges for acts done by them in the exercise of their judicial
functions. Burkes, 433 F.2d at 319; see Demoran v. Witt, 781 F.2d 155, 157-58 (9th Cir.1985)
(probation officers do receive absolute immunity for preparing and submitting pre-sentence
reports). The rationale is that when a probation officer prepares and submits a probation report on
a defendant in a criminal case, such officer is performing a ‘quasi-judicial’ function, in that they
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are acting under orders of the Court in rendering a report to that Court. Friedman, 282 F.Supp. at
716. Further, in performing such actions, the probation officer is engaging in impartial fact
gathering for the judge, and to allow liability would impair the judge’s ability to carry out his
judicial duties. Demoran, F.2d at 157.
In this case, Defendant Stokes was ordered by the Court to supervise Plaintiff during
Plaintiff’s conditional release. Plaintiff was ordered by the Court to submit to drug and/or alcohol
testing as a part of his conditions of his release. As part of his supervision duties, Defendant Stokes
was to monitor Plaintiff’s drug and/or alcohol test results and submit any positive result to the
Court. When Defendant Stokes submitted the Failure to Comply with Court Order Affidavit
(“Affidavit”) on April 19, 2016, Defendant Stokes was performing a “quasi-judicial” function in
that he was submitting a positive drug and/or alcohol test report to the Court. See Friedman, 282
F.Supp. at 716. After Stokes submitted his Affidavit to the Court, the matter was entirely outside
of his control, and any actions or inactions concerning the alcohol tests was wholly at the discretion
of the district judge. It is undisputed that the decision to issue a bench warrant was made by the
Court, not Defendant Stokes. Similarly, the Court Judge decided or determined the need for a
second bond, not Defendant Stokes.
Plaintiff does not point to any language, cite any other law, or provide reasoning for why
well-established case law, such as Demoran v. Witt, does not apply to the instant case. While
Defendant Stokes was not a probation officer and his duties did not include preparing
presentencing reports, Plaintiff ignores that “an official derives the appropriate degree of immunity
not from his or her administrative designation, but by the function he or she performs.” Swift, 384
F.3d at 1188 (quoting Anderson, 714 F.2d at 908). Stokes performs analogous duties to the
probation officer by submitting impartial factual reports to the court.
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For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant
Stokes are not supported by sufficient facts, and therefore cannot survive Defendant Stokes’
motion for summary judgment. The Court also finds that Defendant Stokes is entitled to absolute
immunity for his actions taken in relationship to Plaintiff as they were quasi-judicial in function.
Because there remains no genuine issue of material fact, summary judgment is entered in favor of
Defendant Stokes with respect to the § 1983 claim asserted against him by Plaintiff.
b. Payette County Defendants
Plaintiff has brought claims against Payette County, individuals serving as its Board of
Commissioners, the Payette County Sheriff’s Office as well as the Payette County Sheriff
individually and the former Payette County Prosecuting Attorney. Plaintiff asserts a § 1983 action
against both the individually-named Payette County Defendants as well as the County itself based
upon alleged failure to adequately train and supervise amounting to deliberate indifference.
Plaintiff argues, “[a]s the individuals who hired and paid Stokes, the county commissioners and
the sheriff unquestionably had a duty to properly determine his qualification as well as properly
train and supervise him to prevent him from violating the rights of innocent people.” (Doc. 213 at
3).
Pursuant to the County’s duty under Idaho Code § 1-1613 to supply suitable staff and
personnel for the court, Payette County entered into a contract to hire an independent contractor
to supervise pretrial individuals who were released by a judge in Payette County pursuant to
judicial arrangement. Toby Hauntz, Captain of the Payette County Sheriff’s Office, was
approached by Dennis Stokes and given a proposal to contract with Payette County to provide
misdemeanor probation services, including pretrial release services. Captain Hauntz presented the
proposal to the Payette County Commissioners who approved, and a Contract for Misdemeanor
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Probation Services (“Contract”) was entered into and signed by Larry Church on behalf of Payette
County, Toby Hauntz on behalf of the Payette County Sheriff, and Dennis Stokes, as owner of
Indianhead Resources, LLC. The Contract states that Indianhead Resources, LLC “is an
independent contractor and is not an employee, servant, agent, partner, or joint venture of Payette
County.” Payette County also contracted with Rostad Defendants to conduct random drug and
alcohol testing for the County through the County’s agent Defendant Stokes/Indianhead. There is
no evidence that the person or entities contracted by the County were not “suitable”.
As with Defendant Stokes, discussed above, Plaintiff again fails to produce sufficient facts
or evidence to support his argument that the County breached any alleged duty to Plaintiff. Plaintiff
fails to show how Payette County did not comply with § 1-1613. 1 As far as the “suitable staff and
personnel” requirement in § 1-1613 is concerned, Plaintiff provides no facts or reason why Payette
County Defendants should have doubted the credentials of the parties it contracted with,
Stokes/Indianhead and Rostad. Nor does Plaintiff provide any facts as to why the County should
have doubted the credentials Pinnacle, an entity the County had not contracted with. Therefore,
Plaintiff cannot adequately refute Payette County Defendants’ contention that they did not violate
§ 1-1613 and did not breach any duty to Plaintiff. Once again, Plaintiff’s contentions rely on mere
argument rather than facts or evidence, which is insufficient to overcome a motion for summary
judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Store Brand
Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2010); Freecycle Sunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, 626
F.3d509, 514 (9th Cir. 2010).
Payette County also cannot be held liable in this case under the Monell doctrine. A
municipality is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for monetary relief for the violation of a plaintiff’s
1
The Court notes that rights created by state stature are not federal rights and cannot normally be the basis of a §
1983 claim.
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constitutional rights when the violation results from the municipality’s official policy or custom.
Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). It is not liable for injuries inflicted
by its employees so long as the acts of such employees are not pursuant to the government’s
policies or customs. Id. Thus, a municipal entity is not liable “solely because it employs a tortfeasor-in other words, a local government cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat
superior theory.” Id. at 691. In order to prevail against a municipality in a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff
must show one of four things. These are: (1) a written policy demonstrating a constitutional
violation; (2) proof of widespread custom or practice; (3) ratification by the policymakers; (4) or
a constitutional violation by a policymaker.
A policy “generally implies a course of action consciously chosen from among various
alternatives.” Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985). Municipal policies are typically
intended to “establish fixed plans of action to be followed under similar circumstances consistently
and over time.” Pembaur v City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480-81 (1986). Further, enforcement
of state law does not, without adopting any particular policy of its own, give rise to § 1983 liability.
Doby v. DeCrescenzo, 171 F.3d 858 (3rd Cir. 1999).
Plaintiff argues that the single contract between Payette County and Defendant
Stokes/Indianhead represents the County’s policy on its training and supervision of persons who
are subject to pretrial alcohol and drug testing. Plaintiff’s argument is tenuous at best. The drug
testing pursuant to the pretrial release program was a court-run program, funded by Payette County
as required by Idaho Code § 1-1613 but not otherwise administered by Payette County.
Even if Payette County officials rather than court officials supervised the independent
contractor, Plaintiff cannot establish deliberate indifference. As to a municipality, “the inadequacy
of [training] may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to
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deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [employees] come into contact.”
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. at 388, 109 S.Ct. 1197. This means that Plaintiff “must
demonstrate a ‘conscious' or ‘deliberate’ choice on the part of a municipality in order to prevail on
a failure to train claim.” Price, 513 F.3d at 973. As to an official in his individual capacity, the
same standard applies—Plaintiffs must show that individual Payette County Defendants were
deliberately indifferent to the need to train subordinates, and the lack of training actually caused
the constitutional harm or deprivation of rights. Flores v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 758 F.3d 1154,
1158–59 (9th Cir. 2014).
Under this standard, Plaintiff must allege facts to show that the Payette County Defendants
“disregarded the known or obvious consequence that a particular omission in their training
program would cause [county] employees to violate citizens' constitutional rights.” Id. at 1159.
A “pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ordinarily
necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train,” though there
exists a “narrow range of circumstances [in which] a pattern of similar violations might not be
necessary to show deliberate indifference.” Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1360-61 (2011).
Considering neither Plaintiff nor Defendants point to any incident prior to Plaintiff’s April 14,
2016, false positive that would suggest any negligence or wrongdoing on the part of Defendants
Stokes or Rostad, nothing put the Payette County Defendants on “notice that a course of training
is deficient in a particular respect,” nor that the absence of such a course “will cause violations of
constitutional rights.” Id. Payette County Defendants were not faced with a pattern of similar
constitutional violations by untrained employees. Id. at 1360; Flores, 758 F.3d at 1159.
Nor does the County’s alleged failure to train claim fall within the “narrow range of
circumstances [in which] a pattern of similar violations might not be necessary to show deliberate
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indifference.” Connick, 131 S.Ct. at 1361 (internal citations omitted). In City of Canton, the “Court
posed the hypothetical example of a city that arms its police force with firearms and deploys the
armed officers into the public to capture fleeing felons without training the officers in the
constitutional limitation on the use of deadly force.” Id. at 1361 (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted). In its hypothetical, the Court “sought not to foreclose the possibility, however
rare, that the unconstitutional consequences of failing to train could be so patently obvious that a
city could be liable under § 1983 without proof of a pre-existing pattern of violations.” Id. As the
Court observed, this hypothetical recognizes that “[t]here is no reason to assume that police
academy applicants are familiar with the constitutional constraints of the use of deadly force.” Id.
There is no basis from which to conclude that the alleged unconstitutional consequences
of failing to train or supervise Stokes are so patently obvious that the Payette County Defendants
were deliberately indifferent. Flores, 758 F.3d at 1159–60. Defendant Stokes contracted with the
County to provide misdemeanor probation services. Stokes’ role involved directing bailees to
Rostad for the collection of a urine sample. Stokes later received a completed report of the sample
back from Rostad—after Pinnacle analyzed the sample and returned it to Rostad. Stokes simply
reported the results of that report to the court.
Plaintiff points to no facts that would suggest Payette County Defendants were deliberately
indifferent to a need to train or supervise Defendant Stokes. Plaintiff asserts that Stokes was
unqualified. However, as noted above, there are no facts before the Court that indicate that
Defendant Stokes’ actions were even the cause of Plaintiff’s false positive and alleged
constitutional deprivation. Stokes forwarded the lab results from Pinnacle exactly as they were
received. As noted, there are no facts demonstrating that Defendants Stokes or Rostad had any
previous incidents of producing false positives, negligence, or malpractice.
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For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations against Payette
County Defendants are not supported by sufficient facts, and therefore cannot survive Payette
County Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff cannot establish that Payette County
Defendants’ alleged “policy” was the cause of the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights, nor can Plaintiff identify any policies that violated his rights. Moreover, Plaintiff cannot
establish that Payette County Defendants failed in any duty to train or supervise Defendant Stokes.
There is no genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Therefore, summary
judgment is granted in favor of Payette County Defendants with respect to the § 1983 asserted
against them.
B. State Law Claims
Plaintiff brings state law claims of negligence against all Defendants. “The elements of a
common law negligence action are (1) a duty, recognized by law, requiring the defendant to
conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between
the defendant’s conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage.” Holdaway v.
Broulim’s Supermarket, 158 Idaho 606, 349 P.3d 1197 (2015), quoting Black Canyon Racquetball
Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, N.A., 119 Idaho 171, 175-76, 804 P.2d 900 904-05 (1991).
As with the federal claims discussed above, Plaintiff’s facts and evidence—or lack
thereof—are woefully inadequate to create a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the
common law negligence claim Plaintiff asserts against all defendants. Plaintiff generally, and
without factual support, argues that all defendants had a duty to Plaintiff and breached that duty.
For the foregoing reasons, and the further reasons discussed below, the Court finds that Plaintiff
has not met his burden on summary judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Fortune Dynamic,
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Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Store Brand Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2010); Freecycle
Sunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, 626 F.3d509, 514 (9th Cir. 2010).
a. Rostad Defendants
Plaintiff only brings a state law negligence claim against Rostad. Rostad Defendants played
no role in testing Plaintiff’s urine sample or publishing the results in any manner which was
inconsistent with its contract with the County. There is nothing in the record, nor in Plaintiff’s
arguments, upon which one could reasonably infer that the Rostad Defendants failed to perform
their responsibilities relating to the collection of Plaintiff’s urine sample, relay of that sample to
Pinnacle for testing, and subsequent relay of Pinnacle’s results to Defendant Stokes/Indianhead.
Moreover, the only evidence in the record suggests that it was Pinnacle’s actions alone that led
Plaintiff’s alleged harm. From the evidence before the Court, Rostad Defendants had no reason to
know that Pinnacle might act negligently nor did Rostad have any reason to doubt Pinnacle’s
credentials or ability to process samples Rostad Defendants sent to it. Therefore, summary
judgment is appropriate, and summary judgment is granted in favor of Rostad Defendants.
b. Defendant Stokes
Plaintiff’s negligence claim in his Amended Complaint fails to mention Defendant Stokes
and fails to allege any specific wrongdoing by Stokes. Despite this, Plaintiff now argues that
Defendant Stokes had a duty to Plaintiff to “not falsely report a violation of [his] release
conditions.” (Doc. 214 at 7). Plaintiff’s supports his allegations with mere argument, not fact.
There is no evidence that Defendant Stokes falsely reported a violation of Plaintiff’s release
conditions to the court. Based on the available information, a report from a drug and alcohol testing
facility indicating the presence of alcohol in Plaintiff’s system, Defendant Stokes notified the
Court of the results which would constitute a potential violation of Plaintiffs release orders.
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Plaintiff has offered no evidence that Defendant Stokes knew or should have known that the test
results may have only indicated mere exposure to alcohol rather than the consumption of alcohol
by the Plaintiff. As such, even if Defendant Stokes owed Plaintiff a duty, there is no evidence that
said duty was breached. Summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendant Stokes with respect
to the state law negligence claim asserted against him.
c. Payette County Defendants
Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants Payette County, Payette County Sheriff’s Office, Payette
County Sheriff Chad Huff…had a non-delegable duty to Plaintiff Erlebach and other similarly
situated individuals to exercise due care in the process of overseeing the administration, analysis
and reporting the results of court-ordered drug/urine tests” and delegated that duty. (Doc. 107).
Plaintiff’s argument is purely that the Payette County Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiff
relating to pretrial services for no other reason than that Idaho Code § 1-1613 requires the County
to provide staff and personnel for the district court and accordingly entered into a contract with
Defendant Stokes/Indianhead to fulfill that statutory requirement.
The responsibility for Plaintiff’s false positive, if any, lies with former defendant Pinnacle,
considering that Pinnacle is the lab that actually produced the report at issue. As noted, Plaintiff’s
arguments that Rostad Defendants and/or Defendant Stokes were negligent with respect to the
false positive fail. Similarly, Plaintiff cannot establish that the Payette County Defendants
breached any alleged duty—an alleged failure to train and supervise Defendant Stokes had no
effect on Pinnacle’s lab report at issue, and any training or supervision would not have altered the
outcome of Plaintiff’s false positive. Plaintiff’s argument for the purported existence of a duty
owed by Payette County and any alleged breach of that duty is not supported by any evidence.
Plaintiff attempts to support his claim with mere argument and allegations, which is not sufficient
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to overcome a motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted in favor
of Payette County Defendants with respect to the state law negligence claim asserted against them.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants Carol Bruce’s, Larry Church’s, Georgia
Hanigan’s, Chad Huff’s, Anne Marie Kelso’s, Payette County’s, Payette County Board of
Commissioners’, Payette County Sheriff’s Office’s, and Mark Shigeta’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 184); Defendants Rostad GPS & Monitoring Services LLC’s, Kim Rostad d.b.a
K&K Treatment’s, K&K Bail Bonds LLC d.b.a K&K Treatment’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. 188); and Defendant Dennis Stokes’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 191) are
GRANTED in their entireties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 27, 2022
/s/ Douglas Harpool______
DOUGLAS HARPOOL
United States District Judge
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