Hall v. Ramirez

Filing 11

ORDER (Capital Case) - IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners Motion to Extend Stay (Dkt. 7 ) is DENIED. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (cjs) Modified on 7/31/2018 (cjs).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Case No. 1:18-cv-00218-BLW
Petitioner,
CAPITAL CASE
v.
ORDER
AL RAMIREZ,
Respondent.

On July 9, 2018—following the State’s obtaining a death warrant against
Petitioner—the Court entered a temporary stay of execution in this capital habeas corpus
matter. (Dkt. 6.) Because 28 U.S.C. § 2251(a)(3) restricts the authority of the Court to
stay an execution when the petitioner has not yet filed a habeas petition, the stay was
limited to 90 days from the date counsel was appointed, as set forth in that statute. The
Court explained that once the petition was filed, the stay could be extended. (Id. at 3.)
Petitioner has now filed a Motion to Extend the Stay, and the Court ordered
expedited briefing. (Dkt. 7, 8.) Petitioner asks that the Court extend the temporary stay
for the duration of the proceedings, notwithstanding the fact that Petitioner has yet to file
his Petition.
The Court recognizes that Petitioner “did not request a stay pursuant to
§ 2251(a)(3). Rather, he invoked Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 9.2(c).” (Id. at 3 (internal
citation omitted).) That Local Rule provides that the Court “must immediately review the
ORDER - 1

... preliminary initial filings [in a capital habeas case], and, if the matter is found to be
properly before the court, the court will issue an initial review order ... staying the
execution for the duration of the proceedings in this court.” (emphasis added).
However, what Petitioner fails to recognize is that this provision of the Local Rule
can apply only if it is within the statutory authority of the Court. If § 2251(a)(3) limits a
pre-petition stay of execution to 90 days after counsel is appointed—as the Court
previously held—then the Local Rule is not in compliance with that statute and,
therefore, must yield.1
Thus, we come to the crux of Petitioner’s argument—that § 2251 does not, in fact,
prohibit an indefinite pre-petition stay. Petitioner is correct that subsection (a)(1)
authorizes an indefinite stay of execution in a “pending” habeas corpus proceeding: “A ...
judge of the United States before whom a habeas corpus proceeding is pending[] may ...
stay any proceeding against the person detained ... for any matter involved in the habeas
corpus proceeding.” (See Dkt. 7-1 at 3.) But Petitioner is incorrect in asserting that
nothing in § 2251 prohibits an indefinite pre-petition stay. (See generally Dkt. 7-1, 10.)
The reason that a district court has the statutory authority to issue a stay of
execution in a habeas case is because “legislation governing federal habeas corpus
proceedings” constitutes an express exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. Mitchum v.
Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 234-35; see 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (“A court of the United States may
not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized

1

The Court notes that a proposed amendment to Local Rule 9.2, which would eliminate the
conflict between 9.2(c) and § 2251, is currently being considered by the Local Rules Committee.

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by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate
its judgments.” (emphasis added).)2 Therefore, the Court’s authority to issue a stay of
execution is limited to the terms of that express exception.
Section 2251, by its terms, allows a judge “before whom a habeas corpus
proceeding is pending” to issue an indefinite stay; however, the statute also explicitly
states that “a habeas corpus proceeding is not pending until the application is filed.” 28
U.S.C. § 2251(a)(2) (emphasis added). Therefore, § 2251(a)(1)’s express authorization to
issue a stay of execution applies only once the petition is actually filed. The immediate
problem one can see from reading these two subsections is that, if a petitioner does not
yet have counsel to aid him in preparing a petition in the first place, how is the petitioner
to obtain a stay of execution?
Congress solved that problem with subsection (a)(3), which grants a federal court
the authority to issue a stay of execution where a person has filed an application for the
appointment of counsel in a capital habeas matter, “but such stay shall terminate not later
than 90 days after counsel is appointed.” The Court does not have the authority to issue

2

The other two exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act do not apply to a pre-petition habeas matter.
An indefinite stay in such a case is not necessary to aid the Court in its jurisdiction because the Court
does not have jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus in the first place, absent a pending petition
seeking that writ. The Court does not agree that potential habeas jurisdiction permits an indefinite stay of
execution in a pre-petition case under this exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, or under the All Writs Act
for that matter. Cf. Brown v. Vasquez, 743 F. Supp. 729, 732 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (“The All Writs Act ...
furnishes an adequate basis for the granting of both the 45-day stay and the 120-day stay in order to
preserve this court’s potential habeas jurisdiction.”) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d on other
grounds, 952 F.2d 1164 (9th Cir. 1991), as amended (Feb. 19, 1992). And there is no federal judgment
that such a stay would protect or effectuate.

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an indefinite stay until a petition is filed. The Court cannot simply ignore or rewrite the
statutory language, no matter how practical and desirable such an endeavor might be.
Petitioner relies on McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849 (1994), for the proposition
that a “more extended stay is mandatory” in a pre-petition case.3 (Dkt. 7-1 at 3 (emphasis
omitted).) In that case, the United States Supreme Court concluded,
[O]nce a capital defendant invokes his right to appointed
counsel, a federal court also has jurisdiction under § 2251 to
enter a stay of execution. Because section 2251 expressly
authorizes federal courts to stay state-court proceedings “for
any matter involved in the habeas corpus proceeding,” the
exercise of this authority is not barred by the Anti-Injunction
Act.
512 U.S. at 858. In so holding, the Court rejected the state’s argument that a “habeas
corpus proceeding” could not be deemed “pending” prior to the filing of a petition. Id. at
857-58.
But McFarland was decided long before subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) were added
to § 2251. See 62 Stat. 966 (June 25, 1948). Before 2006, the statute read, in its entirety,
as follows:
A justice or judge of the United States before whom a
habeas corpus proceeding is pending[] may ... stay any
proceeding against the person detained ... for any matter
involved in the habeas corpus proceedings.

Contrary to Petitioner’s argument, McFarland actually stated that § 2251 “does not mandate the
entry of a stay, but dedicates the exercise of stay jurisdiction to the sound discretion of a federal court.”
512 U.S. at 858 (emphasis added). Though McFarland also noted that “approving the execution of a
defendant before his petition is decided on the merits would clearly be improper,” it did not hold that a
death-sentenced prisoner seeking the appointment of counsel would be entitled to an automatic and
indefinite stay without filing a federal habeas petition.
3

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After the granting of such a stay, any such proceeding
... shall be void. If no stay is granted, any such proceeding
shall be valid as if no habeas corpus proceedings or appeal
were pending.
28 U.S.C. § 2251 (1948). McFarland thus found authority to issue a stay, “for any matter
involved in the habeas corpus proceeding.”
However, the PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 amended
§ 2251 and defined “pending” to exclude a habeas corpus proceeding where a petition has
not actually been filed. See Pub. L. 109-177, 120 Stat 192, (March 9, 2006); § 2251(a)(2).
That Act also added subsection (a)(3), permitting the temporary stay issued by the Court
in this case. As can be seen from the statutory text—and as supported by this recitation of
legislative history—Congress has spoken on the length of time that a petitioner’s
execution may be stayed prior to the filing of a habeas petition.4 The Court must respect
it.5
The Court understands the difficulty of Petitioner’s position. Though Petitioner’s
briefs attempt to convince the Court that he should be allowed the full one-year period of

Contrary to Petitioner’s argument, authority to issue an indefinite pre-petition stay is not granted
by the All Writs Act, see 28 U.S.C. § 1651, because that Act “does not confer jurisdiction on the federal
courts” where such jurisdiction is otherwise lacking. Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 33
(2002). Further, because § 2251 specifically addresses stays of execution in capital habeas proceedings,
the All Writs Act does not govern the issuance of such a stay. See Pa. Bureau of Corr. v. U.S. Marshals
Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 43 (1985) (“Where a statute specifically addresses the particular issue at hand, it is
that authority, and not the All Writs Act, that is controlling.”).
4

That other courts have issued indefinite pre-petition stays does not alter the Court’s statutory
analysis, and the Court’s understanding of this fact does not, as Petitioner argues, constitute “unwarranted
disparagement of the federal judiciary.” (Dkt. 10 at 6.) It is simply an acknowledgement that different
courts might construe statutes in different ways, particularly where there is no Supreme Court or binding
circuit authority addressing the issue at hand.
5

ORDER - 5

the statute of limitations in order to file his petition, the Court needs no such
convincing—it agrees with Petitioner on that point. Capital habeas counsel will almost
always require the entire limitations period to properly prepare and draft a petition, and
even then, many petitions must be amended at a later date to include additional claims.
Were it within the Court’s power to issue an indefinite stay at this point in this case, it
would most assuredly do so. But the Court has no such power.
Judicial efficiency has been sacrificed in this matter because the Court has had to
issue orders such as this one and its previous order granting the temporary stay. Such
orders have been necessitated solely because the State—despite knowing that Petitioner
had filed a motion for appointment of counsel in this Court and that Petitioner obviously
planned to file a federal habeas petition within the applicable limitations period—
nonetheless decided to seek a death warrant against Petitioner.
It is true that no provision of law prohibited the State from seeking the death
warrant when it did, as no stay of execution had been issued at that time. But the Court
certainly would have appreciated it had the State shown enough respect for the Court’s
heavy docket to refrain from seeking a death warrant when it knew that Petitioner would
immediately come to this Court for a stay and that this Court would be required to
intervene. Though the Court believes the State acted unreasonably in seeking the death
warrant, its actions in doing so were neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
As already explained, the Court would have preferred to issue an indefinite prepetition stay so that Petitioner would have the entire limitations period to draft his

ORDER - 6

Petition, but it cannot do so. Therefore, the Court attempted to craft an order that was
within the Court’s statutory authority, but that still would allow Petitioner sufficient time
to research his claims. The Court did so by (1) explaining why the Court lacked the
authority to issue an indefinite stay absent the filing of a petition, (2) informing the
parties that the stay could be extended “[o]nce a habeas petition is filed in this matter[] ...
if the state again chooses to seek a death warrant,” and (3) stating that the Court “may
also grant a request for a reasonable period of time to allow amendment of any such
petition.” (Dkt. 6 at 3.)
It appears the Court was too subtle. Let the Court now be clear—if, after the
temporary stay of execution expires, the State chooses once again to seek a pre-petition
death warrant, Petitioner will be required to file a petition, along with a motion seeking a
stay of execution for the duration of these proceedings, if he seeks an indefinite stay. The
Court will grant any such motion, and the Petition will be permitted to be skeletal. The
Court will also grant Petitioner through the end of statute of limitations period to amend
his Petition before it schedules a case management conference or issues a case
management order—meaning that the Court will not grant any motion to dismiss before
the limitations period expires and the Petition is amended at least once. The Court also
will likely decide to allow an additional period of time for further amendment if the
parties cannot agree to a case management schedule that includes an amendment period.
The Court would prefer not to have to jump through such hoops but cannot see a
way around them if the State continues its quest to execute Petitioner before a federal

ORDER - 7

court can consider his habeas claims. Therefore, the Court strongly encourages—as it
lacks the authority to require—the State to refrain from seeking a new death warrant until
Petitioner’s federal habeas case has been fully adjudicated. Just because the State can do
something does not mean that it should.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion to Extend Stay (Dkt. 7) is DENIED.

DATED: July 31, 2018

_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
Chief U.S. District Court Judge

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