Almerico et al v. Denney et al

Filing 40

MEMORANDUM DECISION & ORDER Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration (Dkt. 34 ) is DENIED. The stay in this case (Dkt. 36) is LIFTED. Plaintiffs have thirty days from the date of this Memorandum Decision and Order to file an amended complaint. I f an amended complaint is not filed, the Clerk of the Court is hereby ORDERED to close this case. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (jp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
ANNA ALMERICO, CHELSEA
GAONALINCOLN,
MICAELA AKASHA DE
LOYOLA-CARKIN and HANNAY
SHARP,

Case No. 1:18-cv-00239-BLW
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

Plaintiffs,
v.
LAWERENCE DENNEY, as Idaho
Secretary of State in his official capacity,
LAWRENCE WASDEN, as Idaho Attorney
General in his official capacity, RUSSELL
BARRON, as Director of the Idaho
Department of Health and Welfare in his
official capacity and THE STATE OF
IDAHO,

Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s
Memorandum Decision and Order. Dkt. 34. For the following reasons, the Court
DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration.
LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 59 is not intended to provide litigants with a “second bite at the apple.”
Weeks v. Bayer, 246 F.3d 1231, 1236 (9th Cir. 2001). Instead, reconsideration of a final
judgment under Rule 59(e) is an “extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the
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interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Carroll v. Nakatani, 342
F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003). A losing party cannot use a post-judgment motion to
reconsider as a means of litigating old matters or presenting arguments that could have
been raised before the entry of judgment. School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v.
ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993).
As a result, there are four limited grounds upon which a motion to alter or amend
judgment may be granted: (1) the motion is necessary to correct manifest errors of law or
fact; (2) the moving party presents newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence;
(3) the motion is necessary to prevent manifest injustice; or (4) there is an intervening
change in the law. Turner v. Burlington North. Santa Fe R.R. Co., 338 F.3d 1058, 1063
(9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration advances two arguments. First, Plaintiffs
argue that the court misapplied the Unite States Supreme Court’s decision in United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). Dkt. 34-1 at 5-14. Second, Plaintiffs argue that
the Court failed to address and improperly dismissed their distinct Equal Protection
Clause claim. Both mistakes, according to Plaintiffs, constitute clear error and result in
manifest injustice. Plaintiffs’ arguments are meritless.
1. Salerno Does Not Require the Court to Apply Strict Scrutiny
Plaintiffs’ first argument is that the Court, pursuant to Salerno, is required to apply
strict scrutiny to the Pregnancy Exclusion in evaluating its constitutionality. This

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2

interpretation of Salerno would turn the case on its head. Although the Supreme Court in
Salerno did analyze whether the Bail Reform Act complied with substantive and
procedural due process, it did so pursuant to the standard for facial challenges. The
Supreme Court could not have been clearer as to that standard:
A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to
mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid. The fact that the Bail
Reform Act might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of
circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid…
Id. at 745. Thus, the Supreme Court did not engage in its analysis of the Bail Reform
Act’s compliance with substantive and procedural due process for the purpose of
analyzing whether the Bail Reform Act satisfied strict scrutiny. Instead, the Supreme
Court engaged in the substantive and procedural due process analysis for the limited
purpose of answering the question of whether there might be a circumstance in which the
Bail Reform Act could be applied constitutionally.
This is the exact process used by this Court in its prior Memorandum Decision and
Order. After determining that Salerno’s “no set of circumstances” language applied to
Plaintiffs’ due process and equal protection challenges, see Almerico v. Denney, No.
1:18-CV-00239-BLW, 2019 WL 1413745, at *1-4 (D. Idaho Mar. 28, 2019), the Court
concluded that a potential set of circumstances existed in which the State could (1) limit a
woman’s ability to prospectively dictate her healthcare choices and (2) dictate the
medical care that a pregnant woman receives. Id. at *5-7. Salerno bars a more searching
analysis, as does precedent from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3

See, e.g., Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 556 (9th Cir. 2004) (limiting its
analysis of plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim to whether plaintiffs had presented
any evidence to “show that there are no circumstances under which the delegation could
be applied constitutionally”).
2. The Court Did Not Overlook Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Clause
Claim
Plaintiffs also argue that the Court failed to address their Equal Protection Clause
claim. Plaintiffs are wrong. The Court’s introduction in its prior Memorandum Decision
and Order posed the following question: “if Salerno applies, is there a set of
circumstances in which IC § 39-4510 can be applied in a manner that comports with the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution?” Almerico,
2019 WL 1413745, at *1 (emphasis added). Section 2 of the Court’s opinion answered
this question in the affirmative for both conceptions of the right at issue in this case. Id.
at *5-7. The Pregnancy Exclusion does not offend the Equal Protection Clause in all
circumstances, and therefore survives under Salerno.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration (Dkt. 34) is DENIED. The stay
in this case (Dkt. 36) is LIFTED. Plaintiffs have thirty (30) days from
the date of this Memorandum Decision and Order to file an amended
complaint. If an amended complaint is not filed, the Clerk of the Court
is hereby ORDERED to close this case.
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DATED: June 17, 2019
_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
U.S. District Court Judge

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