Meadows v. Atencio et al

Filing 53

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER. IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 48 ) is GRANTED. This case is DISMISSED with prejudice. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (kt)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
DAISY MEADOWS, a/k/a ROY
TROST,

Case No. 1:18-cv-00265-BLW
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
v.
HENRY ATENCIO et al,
Defendant(s).

INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the remaining
Defendants: Eric Blair, Jacob Taylor, Charles Sanders, Chester Martin, Rona
Siegert, and Walter Campbell. Dkt. 48. The Court has fully reviewed the record,
including the briefs submitted by the parties and has determined that this matter
will be decided on the record without oral argument. For the reasons explained
below, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that
Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted.
BACKGROUND

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Plaintiff was in the custody of the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC)
between June 2017 and November 2019. She was born a male but identifies as a
transgender female. Compl., Dkt. 3 at 2. Before Plaintiff was incarcerated in Idaho,
she was diagnosed with gender dysphoria while in the custody of the Nevada
Department of Correction and again was diagnosed with gender dysphoria in
Idaho. Id. While in IDOC custody, Plaintiff received hormone therapy prescribed
by Dr. Marvin Alviso, IDOC’s contract medical provider, as a treatment for her
gender dysphoria. Dkt. 48-1 at 2. Plaintiff is currently an inmate in the custody of
the Nevada Department of Correction. See Dkt. 50.
Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants Blair, Taylor, Sanders, and Martin
alleging federal and state claims arising from an alleged sexual assault by her
cellmate that occurred in June or July of 2017. Compl., Dkt. 3 at 22-26. She also
alleges that Campbell and Siegert violated her Eighth Amendment rights to
adequate medical assistance by interfering with Dr. Alviso’s determination that
gender reassignment surgery was medically necessary. Id. at 3,8,19. Defendants
move for summary judgment, asserting that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her prison
remedies as to the claims arising from the alleged sexual assault. Defendants
further assert that Plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact
exists as to her Eighth Amendment claim of inadequate medical assistance and that

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they are entitled to summary judgment in their favor. See Dkt. 48.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF LAW
Summary Judgment is appropriate where a party can show that, as to any claim
or defense, “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). One of the principal
purposes of the summary judgment rule “is to isolate and dispose of factually
unsupported claims or defenses.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24
(1986). It is not “a disfavored procedural shortcut,” but is instead the “principal
tool[] by which factually insufficient claims or defenses [can] be isolated and
prevented from going to trial with the attendant unwarranted consumption of
public and private resources.” Id. at 327.
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must consider the
facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, unless the non-moving
party’s version of the facts is “blatantly contradicted by the record.” Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (“When opposing parties tell two different
stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable
jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes
of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”). “[T]he mere existence of some
alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly

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supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no
genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
247-48 (1986). The Court is “not required to comb through the record to find some
reason to deny a motion for summary judgment. Carmen v. San Francisco Unified
Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Instead, the “party opposing summary judgment must direct [the Court’s] attention
to specific triable facts.” S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 889
(9th Cir. 2003).
The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden to show that
each material fact cannot be disputed. To show that the material facts are not in
dispute, a party may cite to particular parts of materials in the record or show that
the adverse party is unable to produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) & (B). The Court must consider “the cited materials,” but it
may also consider “other materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
If the moving party meets this initial responsibility, then the burden shifts to
the non-moving party to establish that a genuine dispute of material fact does exist.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party’s position is
insufficient. Rather, “there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonable

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find for the [non-moving party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “[I]f a defendant
moving for summary judgment has produced enough evidence to require the
plaintiff to go beyond his or her pleadings, the plaintiff must counter by producing
evidence of his or her own.” Butler v. San Diego Dist. Attorney’s Office, 370 F.3d
956, 963 (9th Cir. 2004). If the plaintiff fails to produce evidence, or if the
evidence produced is insufficient to establish a genuine and material factual
dispute, the Court “is not required (or even allowed) to assume the truth of the
challenged allegations in the complaint.” Id.
If a party “fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly
address another party’s assertion of fact,” the Court may consider that fact to be
undisputed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3). The Court must grant summary judgment for
the moving party “if the motion and supporting materials—including the facts
considered undisputed—show that the movement is entitled to id.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(e)(3). Statements in a brief, unsupported by evidence in the record, cannot be
used to create a genuine dispute of material fact. See Barnes v. Indep. Auto.
Dealers, 64 F.3d 1389, 1396 n.3 (9th Cir. 1995).
Pro se inmates are exempted “from strict compliance with the summary
judgment rules,” but not “from all compliance.” Soto v. Sweetman, 882 F.3d 865,
872 (9th Cir. 2018). In opposing a motion for summary judgment, a pro se inmate

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must submit at least “some competent evidence,” such as a “declaration, affidavit,
[or] authenticated document,” to support his allegations or to dispute the moving
party’s evidence. Id. at 873 (upholding grant of summary judgment against pro se
inmate where the “only statements supporting [plaintiff’s]…argument are in his
unsworn district court responses to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment
and to the district court’s show-cause order.”).
ANALYSIS
A.

Procedurally Barred Claims

Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s federal and state claims, except for her §
1983 claim of inadequate medical treatment, are procedurally barred.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides that “[n]o action shall be
brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any
other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional
facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “There is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the
PLRA and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court.” Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199, 211 (2007). This requirement is intended to give “prison officials an
opportunity to resolve disputes concerning the exercise of their responsibilities
before being haled [sic] into court.” Id. at 204.

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Similarly, under Idaho law, “no…civil action shall be brought by any person
confined in a state or county institution. . .with respect to conditions of
confinement until all available administrative remedies have been exhausted.”
Idaho Code § 19-4206(1); see also Drennon v. Idaho State Corr. Inst., 181 P.3d
524, 529 (Idaho Ct. App. 2007) (Section 19-4206(1) requires a prisoner to exhaust
all available administrative remedies prior to bringing any civil action with respect
to the conditions of her confinement unless she establishes that she is in imminent
danger of serious physical injury). Idaho law also requires plaintiffs asserting
claims against the state or state employees to file notice of tort claims with the
Idaho Secretary of State within 180 days of the time the claim arose. Idaho Code §
6-905; see also McQuillen v. City of Ammon, 747 P.2d 741, 744 (1987)
(compliance with the Idaho Tort Claims Act’s notice requirement is mandatory and
failure to abide is fatal to a claim).
Proper exhaustion is required, meaning that “a prisoner must complete the
administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules,
including deadlines, as a precondition to bringing suit in federal court.” Woodford
v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88 (2006).
Here, Plaintiff was required to exhaust administrative review under IDOC’s
“Grievance Procedure for Offenders” (Grievance Procedure). The Grievance

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Procedure consists of a three-step process. See Dkt. 48-5 at 2. First, an inmate is
required to seek an informal resolution on the matter by completing an Offender
Concern Form (OCF) addressed to the staff member most directly involved with
the inmate’s issue. Second, if the OCF does not resolve the matter, the offender
must complete a Grievance From containing specific information, including the
nature of the complaint, date, place, and names of the specific issue being grieved
within 30 days of the incident giving rise to the matter. Third, an inmate may
appeal an adverse grievance outcome. Id at 2-3. Upon proper completion of all 3
steps, the inmate’s grievance process will be deemed complete. Id. at 4.
Plaintiff alleges that the sexual assault incident occurred sometime between
June 25 and July 25, 2017. Dkt. 48-3 at 22. While Plaintiff asserts that she filed
OCFs with Defendants, id. at 25, 30, Plaintiff untimely filed a Grievance Form on
March 14, 2018. See Dkt. 48-5 at 36. Still, Plaintiff sought only injunctive relief
and did not raise a damages or monetary compensation claim. Id. As a result of her
transfer out of IDOC custody, her administrative claim for injunctive relief is
moot.1 Also, Plaintiff has not provided evidence demonstrating that she filed notice
of tort claims with the Idaho Secretary of State as required. See Dkt. 48-6 at 2. Nor

1

Furthermore, there is no evidence that Plaintiff appealed the adverse decision as
required by the Grievance Procedures.

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has Plaintiff provided evidence challenging, explaining, or justifying her late
Grievance Form or her noncompliance with the required administrative steps as to
raise a genuine issue of material fact. As such, her failure to exhaust is fatal, and
therefore her Eighth Amendment claim as to Blair, Taylor, Sanders, and Martin
and negligence claims will be dismissed.
B.

Inadequate Medical Treatment Claim

Campbell and Siegert further assert that they are entitled to summary
judgment as to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim that they interfered with medical necessary
treatment in violation of her Eighth Amendment rights.
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a civil cause of action against any person
who subjects another to the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and the law” of the United States. Prison officials may
violate an inmate’s Eighth Amendment right to receive medical treatment only if
he or she intentionally denies, delays, or intentionally interferes with medically
necessary treatment once prescribed. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-105
(1976). To survive summary judgment, Plaintiff must establish a genuine dispute
that Campbell and Seigert 1) intentionally interfered with treatment that Dr. Alviso
or Eldredge deemed medically necessary, and that 2) Campbell and Siegert were
subjectively aware that their alleged denial, delay, or interference with the

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purported recommendations of Dr. Alviso and Eldredge created a “substantial risk
of serious harm” to Plaintiff’s health. Id.; see also Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d
1051, 1057. Plaintiff has failed to establish either requirement or meaningfully
oppose Defendants’ motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Alviso and Eldredge “agreed that [Plaintiff] in fact
needed ‘GRS’ [(Gender Reassignment Surgery)],” but that Campbell and Siegert
interfered with the recommendation. Compl., Dkt. 3 at 3, 8, 18. However, the
evidence belies her claim. Plaintiff admitted that no medical doctor had determined
that any form of gender confirmation surgery was medically necessary to treat her
gender dysphoria. Dkt. 48-3 at 14. Instead, she simply asserted, without support,
that Dr. Alvisio said he would have determined the surgery necessary if he had the
authority to do so. Id. at 15.
But neither Campbell nor Seigert ever instructed any medical provider,
including Dr. Alviso, not to recommend sex reassignment surgery. Dkts. 48-4 at 2,
48-7 at 2. To the best of their knowledge, neither Dr. Alviso or Eldridge ever
recommended, intended to recommend, or desired to recommend sexual
reassignment surgery. Id. Furthermore, the scope of Dr. Alviso’s practice was
limited to providing hormone therapy, not sex reassignment surgery. Dkt. 48-3 at
40. Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence that Dr. Alviso determined that sex

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reassignment surgery was medically necessary, that he intended to provide that
surgery, or that Campbell and Siegert interfered with his intent to do so.
Moreover, because both Campbell and Siegert believed that Plaintiff’s
treatment for gender dysphoria was medically adequate, Plaintiff cannot establish
that they subjectively disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to plaintiff.
Dkts. 48-4 at 3, 48-7 at 3. Indeed, Plaintiff offers no evidence in her response to
establish a genuine issue of material fact; rather, she appears to concede the
lawsuit. Dkt. 50 at 1. (“…I am fairly certain I will now lose this case. . .at this
point all I would be attempting to do is push for policy changes…”). See Butler,
370 F.3d at 963. Accordingly, her complaint will be dismissed.

ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 48) is
GRANTED. This case is DISMISSED with prejudice.

DATED: March 4, 2021

_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
U.S. District Court Judge

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