Milton v. Valley
Filing
7
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER - The Clerk of Court shall serve (via ECF) a copy of the Petition (Dkt. 1 ), together with a copy of this Order, on L. LaMont Anderson, on behalf of Respondent, at Mr. Andersons registered ECF address.. Signed by Senior Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (lm)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
BISHOP PATRICK MICHAEL
MILTON,
Case No. 1:23-CV-00520-BLW
Petitioner,
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER
vs.
RANDY VALLEY,
Respondent.
Petitioner Bishop Patrick Michael Milton (Petitioner) has filed a Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus challenging his state court conviction. Dkt. 1. Federal habeas corpus
relief is available to petitioners who are held in custody under a state court judgment that
violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
The Court is required to review each newly-filed habeas corpus petition to
determine whether it should be summarily dismissed, amended, or served upon the
respondent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If “it plainly appears from the face of the petition and
any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court,” the
Court must summarily dismiss the petition. Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254
Cases.
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Having reviewed the Petition, the Court concludes that Petitioner may proceed to
the next stage of litigation.
REVIEW OF PETITION
1. Background
In a criminal case in the Fourth Judicial District Court in Ada County, Idaho,
Petitioner was convicted of possession of a controlled substance, criminal trespass, and
resisting arrest. He was sentenced to a unified term of imprisonment of five years.
Petitioner filed several direct appeal actions, but it appears that they were rejected by
the Idaho appellate courts, possibly on procedural grounds. See Dkt. 1, pp. 2-3.
2. Discussion of Threshold Procedural Issue: Exhaustion of State Court
Remedies
Habeas corpus law requires that a petitioner “exhaust” his state court remedies
before pursuing a claim in a federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To exhaust a
claim, a habeas petitioner must fairly present it as a federal claim to the highest state
court for review in the manner prescribed by state law. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526
U.S. 838, 845 (1999). Unless a petitioner has exhausted his state court remedies for a
particular claim, a federal district court cannot grant relief on that claim, although it does
have the discretion to deny the claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).
State remedies are considered technically exhausted, but not properly exhausted, if
a petitioner failed to pursue a federal claim in state court and there are no remedies now
available. O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 848. A claim may also be considered exhausted,
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though not properly exhausted, if a petitioner pursued a federal claim in state court, but
the state court rejected the claim on an independent and adequate state law procedural
ground. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-732 (1991). Such a claim is considered
“procedurally defaulted” in federal court. Id. at 731.
A threshold issue in this case will be whether the state appellate courts’ rejection
of Petitioner’s direct appeal filings was based on an independent and adequate state law
procedural ground. If that is the case, then Petitioner must meet one of the exceptions for
procedurally defaulted claims. If not, he may be able to proceed to the merits of his
claims.
A procedurally defaulted claim will not be heard in federal court unless the
petitioner shows either (1) legitimate cause for the default and prejudice resulting from
the default, or, alternatively, (2) the petitioner is actually innocent and a miscarriage of
justice would occur if the federal claim is not heard. Id.
To show “cause” for a procedural default, a petitioner must ordinarily demonstrate
that some objective factor external to the defense impeded his or his counsel’s efforts to
comply with the state procedural rule at issue. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488
(1986). To show “prejudice,” a petitioner bears “the burden of showing, not merely that
the errors [in his proceeding] created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to
his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire [proceeding] with error of
constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982).
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If a petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice for a procedurally defaulted claim,
he can still raise the claim if he demonstrates that the court’s failure to consider it will
result in a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404. A miscarriage
of justice means that a constitutional violation probably has resulted in the conviction of
someone who is actually innocent. Murray, 477 U.S. at 496. To show a miscarriage of
justice, a petitioner must make “a colorable showing of factual innocence.” Herrera, 506
U.S. at 404. Where the petitioner pleaded guilty and did not have the evidence in his case
evaluated by a jury, he must show that, based on all of the evidence, “it is more likely
than not that no reasonable juror would have found Petitioner guilty.” Van Buskirk v.
Baldwin, 265 F.3d 1080, 1084 (9th Cir. 2001), citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327
(1995). Types of evidence that may establish factual innocence include “credible
declarations of guilt by another,” Pitts v. Norris, 85 F.3d 348, 351 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing
Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 340 (1992)), “trustworthy eyewitness accounts,”
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, and “exculpatory scientific evidence.” Pitts, 85 F.3d at 351.
It is important to note the distinction that actual innocence is not a substantive
claim that warrants relief in noncapital cases. See Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 934 (9th
Cir. 2011) (en banc) (statute of limitations context) (relying on House v. Bell, 547 U.S.
518, 538 (2006) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327)). Instead, if a petitioner brings forward
evidence that demonstrates “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have
found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt”, actual innocence serves only as a
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“gateway” to permit the federal court to hear the petitioner’s otherwise procedurallybarred constitutional claims on the merits. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327.
3. Discussion of Substance of Petitioner’s Claims
In Claim One, Petitioner alleges that the state court lacked in personam and
subject matter jurisdiction over him. The basis for this claim is that Petitioner is not a
United States citizen but an “Ecclesiastical Sovereign and duly recognized by CommonLaw Court,” and, hence, was not subject to arrest or prosecution as a result of immunity.
Dkt. 1, p. 6.
Several issues arise with this claim. One is that theories by persons asserting that
they are a “sovereign ecclesiastical ‘state’” have been rejected by courts as “factually and
legally frivolous.” Harley v. Cir. Ct. of Chesapeake, No. 3:07CV439, 2008 WL 2626996,
at *2 (E.D. Va. July 2, 2008) (finding that the plaintiff stated no cause of action under the
Vienna Convention). See also Tracy v. Cooley, No. CV 09-8645 AHM DTB, 2010 WL
4318876, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV
09-8645-AHM DTB, 2010 WL 4316971 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2010) (rejecting as without a
legal and factual basis Plaintiffs’ contention that they are immune under various federal
statutes and international treaties as officers of a “Foreign Neutral Sovereign
Ecclesiastical STATE”, and as such, their constitutional rights were violated by the
issuance of traffic citations).
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A second is whether the question of state subject matter jurisdiction is beyond the
province of the federal habeas court. Generally, federal courts have held that they have no
jurisdiction to review a state court’s determination of its own jurisdiction, which is a
matter of state, not federal, law. See Chandler v. Armontrout, 940 F .2d 363, 366 (8th Cir.
1991); United States v. Mancusi, 415 F.2d 205, 209 (2nd Cir. 1969) (“no federal court to
our knowledge has ever granted a writ where a state court’s asserted lack of jurisdiction
resulted solely from the provisions of state law”).
Claim Two asserts that Petitioner is actually innocent of the crimes of which he
was convicted. Federal habeas corpus is a unique and narrow cause of action. The United
States Supreme Court has made it clear that “[c]laims of actual innocence based on newly
discovered evidence have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief
absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal
proceeding.” Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993). This prohibition exists
because “federal habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in
violation of the Constitution—not to correct errors of fact.” Id. (citing Moore v. Dempsey,
261 U.S. 86, 87-88 (1923) (Holmes, J.) (“[W]hat we have to deal with [on habeas review]
is not the petitioners’ innocence or guilt but solely the question whether their
constitutional rights have been preserved.”). Accordingly, a claim based solely on actual
innocence is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review.
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Claim Three is that law enforcement officers unlawfully searched, seized, and
arrested him in violation of his federal constitutional rights. Two issues arise.
One is that Petitioner asserts that “an Ecclesiastic Sovereign is not subject to arrest
by any law enforcement except U.S. Marshal[] for a major felony not for a
misdemeanor.” Dkt. 1, p. 8. This, again, seems to rely on a frivolous theory, as discussed
above.
The second is that Fourth Amendment search, seizure, and arrest claims are treated
in a unique manner in habeas corpus actions. When a State has provided a defendant with
an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, it may not be
relitigated by a federal district court in a habeas corpus action, “regardless of its view of
the correctness of the state decision.” Mack v. Cupp, 564 F.2d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 1977)
(relying on Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481–82 (1976) (Fourth Amendment issues are
not cognizable on federal habeas review)); Caldwell v. Cupp, 781 F.2d 714, 715 (9th Cir.
1986). Thus, the threshold issue for a Fourth Amendment claim is whether petitioner had
an initial opportunity for a fair hearing in state court. See Caldwell, 781 F.2d at 715. The
narrow question is “whether petitioner had the opportunity to litigate his claim, not
whether he did in fact do so or even whether the claim was correctly decided.” OrtizSandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Gordon v. Duran, 895
F.2d 610, 613-14 (9th Cir. 1990). The petitioner bears the burden of establishing that the
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state courts did not consider the Fourth Amendment claim fully and fairly. Mack, 564
F.2d at 901.
Powell does not specify a particular test for determining whether a state provided a
defendant with an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim.
To aid in determination of this question, federal district courts in the Ninth Circuit review
the transcripts and briefing from the state trial and appellate courts. See Terrovona v.
Kincheloe, 912 F.2d 1176, 1178-1179 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Abell v. Raines, 640 F.2d
1085, 1088 (9th Cir. 1981)), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 979 (1991).
Claim Four asserts that Petitioner’s convictions have resulted in a manifest
injustice, because the state violated his constitutional rights at every stage of the criminal
proceeding. Some of Petitioner’s reasons supporting his claim arise from his frivolous
sovereignty theory, for example, that the state court violated federal and international
copyright laws by illegally using Petitioner’s fictitious name, or that he was wrongly
issued a trespassing citation, even though he remained at a rest area in his status as a
sovereign.1
Page 12 of Petitioner’s habeas petition appears to have encountered a scanning error during
filing. The top three-quarters of the page is blank, and only the bottom of the page has content:
“no good reason. All state actions were in bad faith, extremely harmful & inhumane, this court
must issue its Extra-Ordinary Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant 28 U.S.C § 2254 granting all
Rights, Entitlements & Renumerations [sic].” Dkt. 1, p. 12. Petitioner may re-file that page.
1
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4. Conclusion
On their face, Petitioner’s claims present obvious procedural and substantive
challenges. The Court is permitted to dismiss the claims outright, but will proceed to
review the state court record in this matter and a response from Respondent. The Court
will have the Petition served on Respondent, who may file a pre-answer motion for
summary dismissal on any grounds identified in this Order, or any other grounds evident
from the record (which the Court has not reviewed), including lack of merit.2
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED:
1. The Clerk of Court shall serve (via ECF) a copy of the Petition (Dkt. 1), together
with a copy of this Order, on L. LaMont Anderson, on behalf of Respondent, at
Mr. Anderson’s registered ECF address.
2. Within 120 days after Respondent is served with the pleadings, Respondent shall
have the option of filing either of the following: (1) a motion for summary
dismissal or partial summary dismissal on procedural grounds (which may be
2
Federal courts are not required to address a procedural issue before deciding against the
petitioner on the merits. Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518 (1997); cf. Franklin v. Johnson, 290
F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 2002) (“appeals courts are empowered to, and in some cases should, reach
the merits of habeas petitions if they are, on their face and without regard to any facts that could
be developed below, clearly not meritorious despite an asserted procedural bar”). Thus, where a
procedural question presents a complicated question of law and is unnecessary to a disposition of
the case, a court may proceed to the merits. Hudson v. Jones, 351 F.3d 212 (6th Cir. 2003);
Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409, 423-24 (5th Cir. 1997) (deciding against the petitioner on the
merits even though the claim was procedurally defaulted).
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followed by an answer if the motion is unsuccessful); or (2) an answer and brief
on the claims that were adjudicated on the merits by the Idaho Supreme Court, that
also includes a brief summary (between one paragraph and several pages) of any
procedural defenses for any claims (which may be argued in the alternative). If
Respondent files an answer and brief, the Court first will determine the claims that
were adjudicated on the merits by the Idaho Supreme Court; for any claims that
appear to warrant relief or for any claims not disposed of on the merits that appear
subject to procedural defenses, the Court next will determine whether those claims
are barred by any procedural defenses and will call for additional briefing,
evidence, or a hearing, if necessary.
3. Respondent shall file with the responsive pleading or motion, or within a
reasonable time period thereafter, a copy of all portions of the state court record
previously transcribed that are relevant to a determination of the issues presented.
Any presentence investigation reports or evaluations shall be filed under seal. The
lodging of the remainder of the state court record, to the extent that it is lodged in
paper format, is exempt from the redaction requirements, as provided in District of
Idaho Local Civil Rule 5.5(c).
4. If the response to the habeas petition is an answer, Petitioner shall prepare a reply
(formerly called a traverse), containing a brief rebutting Respondent’s answer and
brief, which shall be filed and served within 30 days after service of the answer.
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Respondent has the option of filing a sur-reply within 14 days after service of the
reply. At that point, the case shall be deemed ready for a final decision.
5. If the response to the habeas petition is a motion, Petitioner’s response to the
motion shall be filed and served within 30 days after service of the motion, and
Respondent’s reply, if any, shall be filed and served within 14 days thereafter.
6. No party shall file supplemental responses, replies, affidavits or other documents
not expressly authorized by the Local Rules without first obtaining leave of Court.
7. No discovery shall be undertaken in this matter unless a party obtains prior leave
of Court, pursuant to Rule 6 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.
8. The parties may, but need not, file the following in this matter: (1) notices of nonobjections to motions to which they do not object; (2) responses to motions for
appointment of counsel; (3) responses to motions that are meritless, frivolous, or
filed in contravention of this Order; or (4) notices of intent not to file a reply. If
additional briefing is required on any issue, the Court will order it.
9. Each party shall ensure that all documents filed with the Court are simultaneously
served via the ECF system or by first-class mail upon the opposing party (through
counsel if the party has counsel), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.
Each party shall sign and attach a proper mailing certificate to each document filed
with the court, showing the manner of service, date of service, address of service,
and name of the person upon whom service was made, or as specified by the
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applicable ECF rules. The Court will not consider ex parte requests unless a
motion may be heard ex parte according to the rules and the motion is clearly
identified as requesting an ex parte order, pursuant to Local Rule 7.2. (“Ex parte”
means that a party has provided a document to the court, but that the party did not
provide a copy of the document to the other party to the litigation.)
10. All Court filings requesting relief or requesting that the Court make a ruling or
take an action of any kind must be in the form of a pleading or motion, with an
appropriate caption designating the name of the pleading or motion, served on all
parties to the litigation, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 7, 10 and 11,
and Local Rules 5.2 and 7.1. The Court will not consider requests made in the
form of letters.
11. Petitioner shall at all times keep the Court and Respondent advised of any changes
in address.
12. If Petitioner’s custodian changes at any point during this litigation, counsel for
Respondent shall file a Notice of Substitution of Respondent within 30 days of
such change, identifying the person who is substituted as Respondent. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 25(d); Rule 2(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.
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