Oliver v. Rowley et al

Filing 4

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - Plaintiffs application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. 1 ) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs Complaint (Dkt. 2 ) is DISMISSED with leave to amend. Any amended complaint must be filed within 30 days of this order. (Notice sent to Finance). Signed by Senior Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (lm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
DARON M OLIVER,
Case No. 1:24-cv-00102-BLW
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

v.
JIM ROWLEY, and HEATHER
(MANAGER),
Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Plaintiff Daron M. Oliver’s application for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. 1). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will
grant his IFP application but dismiss his complaint with leave to amend.
DISCUSSION
A.

The IFP Application

Oliver, proceeding pro se, has conditionally filed a complaint against
Defendants Jim Rowley and Heather (Manager).1 See Compl., Dkt. 2. Oliver did

1

Oliver does not provide a last name for Heather.

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not pay the usual filing fee due when filing a complaint in federal court. Instead, he
asks the Court to allow him to proceed in forma pauperis (without payment of
fees). See IFP Application, Dkt. 1.
Plaintiffs who wish to pursue civil lawsuits in this District must pay a filing
fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). If plaintiffs wish to avoid that fee, they must submit
an affidavit showing they are unable to pay. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). “An affidavit in
support of an in forma pauperis application is sufficient where it alleges that the
affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo
v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). “[A] plaintiff seeking IFP status
must allege poverty with some particularity, definiteness and certainty.” Id.
(internal citations omitted). The granting or denial of leave to proceed IFP in civil
cases is within the district court’s sound discretion. O’Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d
614, 616 (9th Cir. 1990).
The Court reviewed Oliver’s affidavit and finds that it sufficiently states
facts supporting his poverty. The Court will, therefore, grant his IFP application.
B.

Screening Order

Because Oliver is seeking to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court is
required to screen the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which requires the Court
to dismiss a case if the Court determines that the case is “(i) frivolous or malicious;

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(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii); see also O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2008).
1. The pleading standard
During this initial review, courts construe pro se pleadings liberally, giving
pro se plaintiffs the benefit of any doubt. See Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447
(9th Cir. 2000). Even so, plaintiffs – represented or not – must articulate their
claims clearly and allege facts sufficient to support the review of each claim. Pena
v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a complaint must include “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). A plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007),
which requires that “the plaintiff plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court must “accept factual
allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most
favorable to the” plaintiff. Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d

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1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). The Court is not, however, required to “assume the
truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual
allegations.” Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal
citation omitted).
2. Screening of Complaint
a. Failure to Comply with Rule 8(a)
As set forth above, Rule 8(a) requires a complaint to contain “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although a complaint is not required to include detailed factual
allegations, it must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). It must also contain “sufficient allegations of
underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself
effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Moreover, the
complaint must demonstrate that each named defendant personally participated in
the deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77.
A court may dismiss a complaint for failure to comply with Rule 8(a) if it is
so confusing that “its true substance, if any, is well disguised.” Bailey v. BAC
Home Loan Servicing, LP, No. CIV. 11-00648 LEK, 2012 WL 589414, at *1 (D.

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Haw. Feb. 21, 2012) (quoting Hearns v. San Bernardino Police Dep’t, 530 F.3d
1124, 1131 (9th Cir. 2008)); see also McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-80
(9th Cir. 1996) (upholding a Rule 8(a) dismissal of a complaint that was
“argumentative, prolix, replete with redundancy, and largely irrelevant”); Nevijel v.
North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that Rule
8(a) is violated when a complaint is excessively “verbose, confusing and almost
entirely conclusory”).
Although Oliver’s complaint is not too lengthy or verbose as to violate the
basic principles of Rule 8(a), it is confusing, vague, and replete with errors—so
much so that the Court finds that its true substance is nearly impossible to
determine. See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 11, Dkt. 2 (“As part of the promotion process for the
Conductor position HEATER THE MANAGER, plaintiff was discharged and
threaten call police IF plaintiff return to location Idaho fitness under CRUNCH
CORPRATION and all other locations under CRUNCH CORPRATION
throughout international countries.”) (verbatim); id. ¶ 18 (“estranged person
confronted with the alleged results of the estranged light skin baby girl, plaintiff
ever having baby girl unconformable”) (verbatim). From the best that the Court
can discern, Oliver is attempting to make a wrongful termination claim.
Throughout the complaint, however, Oliver refers to himself as both “cleaner,”

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“customer,” and mentions a promotion process for a “conductor” position.
It goes without saying that being a “customer” cannot be the basis for a
wrongful termination claim. It also appears that Oliver’s alleged employment with
Crunch Corporation ended in February 2021, but almost all the factual allegations
in the complaint occurred long after his employment ceased. See id., ¶ 24. Not only
do the allegations not relate to any possible employment, but it is also unclear what
the “conductor” position could be, or how it could possibly relate to Oliver’s
employment that ended months earlier. Simply put, the Court is unable to discern
what happened, who was involved, and on what basis Oliver is seeking relief.
Thus, Oliver has failed to meet the most basic requirements of Rule 8(a).
Despite finding that Oliver’s complaint fails to comply with Rule 8(a), it will
nevertheless address what it believes Oliver’s claims may be in order to provide
guidance for any potential amendment.
b. Failure to State a Claim for Relief
In his complaint, Oliver attempts to make four claims. Although Oliver
alleges violations of both the United States Constitution and the Idaho
Constitution, the underlying basis for all his claims is the improper discharge of a
“class civil service position” under the “Civil Service Law of the State of Idaho.”
See Compl. ¶¶ 29-33, Dkt. 2 (claiming that the failure to provide a fair and

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impartial hearing prior to the discharge of a class civil service position deprived
Oliver of a “property interest in a tenured civil service position” and the “equal
protection of the laws guaranteed” under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of
the United States Constitution and the Idaho State Constitution). However, as
discussed below, Oliver has failed to sufficiently allege that he is entitled to any of
the protections he claims he is.
At the onset, it is unclear exactly what Oliver is referring to as the “Civil
Service Law of the State of Idaho.” Compl. ¶ 29, Dkt. 2. The Court assumes that
Oliver is referring to Idaho Code § 50-1601 et seq. Those statutes control various
aspects of a city’s Civil Service Commission. Importantly, the statutory civil
service scheme governs “employees” of cities. Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Loc. No.
672 v. City of Boise City, 30 P.3d 940, 944 (Idaho 2001). It “does not address
employer-employee relationships between cities and private individuals or entities
or other governmental entities.” Id.
Oliver claims that the “position of Cleaner AND Customer is a classified
civil service position in the competitive civil services class pursuant to law and the
rules and regulations of City Civil Service Commission.” Compl. ¶ 9, Dkt. 2
(verbatim). But Oliver’s conclusory statement is at odds with the allegations in his
complaint. Vaughn, 649 F.3d at 1064 (The Court is not required to “assume the

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truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual
allegations.”). First, Oliver fails to allege that Crunch Corporation is a municipal
entity or that he was somehow an employee of the City of Boise. Rather, Oliver
alleges that Crunch Corporation is a public benefit corporation organized for the
purpose of running Idaho Fitness facilities. Compl. ¶ 4, Dkt. 2.2 Equally as
important, the City of Boise does not appear to have currently adopted a civil
service system. See, e.g., Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Loc. No. 672, 30 P.3d at 944
(“Adoption of a civil service system is voluntary and not required either by statute
or by the Idaho Constitution.”). Thus, it is unclear how Oliver could be considered
a civil servant or be provided the protections of Idaho’s statutory service scheme.
Similarly problematic, Oliver fails to allege any facts regarding the
circumstances surrounding the actual termination of his employment. While there
are allegations that appear to depict some sort of altercation between himself and
Crunch Corporation—via “Heather the manager”—those allegations appear to
have taken place after July 2023, more than two years after Oliver’s employment

Interestingly, there are no filings with the Idaho Secretary of State that confirm Oliver’s
allegations that Crunch Corporation is even an entity formed in the State of Idaho. See Motul
S.A. v. USA Wholesale Lubricant, Inc., No. 4:22-CV-04841-JSW, 2023 WL 5061945, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2023) (“Filings with the California Secretary of State are also proper subjects
of judicial notice because they are matters of public record whose accuracy is not subject to
reasonable dispute.”).
2

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ended. See Compl. ¶ 24, Dkt. 2. (Oliver alleges that his employment ended in
February 2021).
To compound the timeline issues, Oliver alleges no conduct that connects
the named defendants to his employment or its termination. As mentioned, Oliver
is bringing this lawsuit against Jim Rowley and Heather. The complaint, however,
contains no allegations involving Mr. Rowley, and the only allegations regarding
Heather occurred years after his employment ended.3
In sum, Oliver’s complaint is too confusing and replete with errors to
understand the true substance of his complaint. Moreover, even giving Oliver the
benefit of any doubt, his complaint fails to allege that he is protected by the
statutory scheme on which all his claims are based. Thus, regardless of Oliver’s
failure to abide by Rule 8, the Court would similarly dismiss his complaint for
failure to state a claim after its initial screening.
3. Leave to Amend
Courts should “freely give leave to amend when justice so requires.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a)(2). This standard should be “applied with extreme liberality,”

3

Notably, Oliver has not named Crunch Corporation itself as a defendant.

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Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1987), and leave should only be
denied when “it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by amendment.”
Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008). Leave to amend
should be granted even when no request is made. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d
1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
Although the Court has grave concerns about Oliver’s ability to sufficiently
allege a viable claim, the Court will grant leave to amend. The Court bases this
conclusion predominately on its inability to understand the majority of the
complaint. Without a clearer understanding of the fundamental aspects of Oliver’s
claims, the Court cannot definitively say that Oliver cannot save his complaint.
If Oliver chooses to file an amended complaint, the amended complaint must
comply with Rule 8(a) by containing a short and plain statement of the facts
showing that he is entitled to relief. This short and plain statement must clearly and
understandably describe what each defendant allegedly did or did not do to create
liability under the alleged claims. Additionally, Oliver must allege the essential
facts that provide a clear path to establishing his claims. Oliver should note that
although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it is not for the purpose of
changing the nature of this suit or adding unrelated claims. George v. Smith, 507
F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” complaints).

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ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that:
1.

Plaintiff’s application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. 1)

is GRANTED.
2.

Plaintiff’s Complaint (Dkt. 2) is DISMISSED with leave to amend.

3.

Any amended complaint must be filed within 30 days of this order. If

no amended complaint is filed, the case will be dismissed without further notice.
Alternatively, Plaintiff may file a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal if Plaintiff no
longer intends to pursue this matter.

DATED: June 4, 2024

_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
U.S. District Court Judge

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