Orozco v. Valley, et al.

Filing 6

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE - The Clerk of Court shall provide an electronic copy of this Order and the Complaint (Dkt. 3 ) to: Aynsley Harrow Mull. Within 90 days after entry of this Order, Defendant HSA Howard, a current or former empl oyee of Centurion, shall make a limited special appearance and provide the following to Plaintiff and the Court in the form of a Martinez report. Within 30 days after the filing of the Martinez report, Plaintiff may file a response to the Report. Signed by Judge David C. Nye. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (jd)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
JORGE A.L. OROZCO,
Case No. 1:24-cv-00166-DCN
Plaintiff,
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER
BY SCREENING JUDGE

v.
WARDEN RANDY VALLEY,
CENTURION MEDICAL, ISCC HSA
HOWARD, and OFF-SITE SURGEON,
Defendants.

The Complaint of Plaintiff Jorge Orozco, who is in custody of the Idaho Department
of Correction (IDOC), was conditionally filed by the Clerk of Court. A “conditional filing”
means that Plaintiff must obtain authorization from the Court to proceed. Upon screening
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (applicable to fee-paid prisoner cases), the Court must dismiss
claims that state a frivolous or malicious claim, fail to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
Having reviewed Plaintiff’s filings, the Court has determined that more information
is needed about Plaintiff’s health care to complete screening. Therefore, the Court will
order Defendant Centurion Health Services Administrator (HSA) Howard to file a
Martinez report.

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REVIEW OF COMPLAINT
1. Standard of Law for Review of Complaint
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the civil rights statute, a plaintiff must
allege a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute
proximately caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. Crumpton v.
Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). A complaint fails to state a claim for relief
under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if the factual assertions, taken as true,
are insufficient for the reviewing court plausibly “to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
To state a § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim, a plaintiff must allege facts meeting
both an objective standard (the deprivation “was harmful enough” to constitute cruel and
unusual punishment) and a subjective standard (deliberate indifference). Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5, 8 (1992). As to the objective factor, the medical need must be
“serious.” Id. at 9.
As to the subjective factor, a prison official must act in a manner that amounts to
deliberate indifference, which is “more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s
interests or safety,” but “something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of
causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
835 (1994). Stated another way, deliberate indifference exists when an “official knows of
and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety,” which means that an official
“must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 838.
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Differences in judgment between an inmate and prison medical personnel regarding
appropriate medical diagnosis and treatment are not enough to establish a deliberate
indifference claim. See Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). Medical
negligence or malpractice alone will not support a claim for relief under the Eighth
Amendment. Broughton v. Cutter Lab, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980). Rather, a
constitutional tort requires the plaintiff show subjective deliberate indifference by bringing
forward facts demonstrating that the defendant acted deliberately, intentionally, or so
recklessly that the conduct can be equated with a desire to inflict harm. See Farmer, 511
U.S. 835-38. Likewise, gross negligence and ordinary negligence are not actionable under
§ 1983, because such actions are not an abuse of governmental power, but rather a “failure
to measure up to the conduct of a reasonable person.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327
(1986).
2. Facts Alleged
Plaintiff asserts that, between 2019 and 2023, Defendants failed to treat his serious
eye condition, resulting in pain and impaired vision. He asserts that the prison medical
contractor, Centurion, refused to provide him with eye surgery for years. When Plaintiff
was finally provided with surgery in August 2023, he asserts that Centurion “used a subpar, cut-rate surgeon, in an attempt to ‘save costs’ (custom and/or policy), and this surgeon
botched my eye surgery.” Dkt. 1 at 5. After the surgery, Plaintiff suffered an additional
25% loss of his eyesight, which now makes him 55% blind in his left eye. Id. at 16. He also
asserts that the pain in his left eye and head have increased by 200%. Plaintiff asserts that
Centurion and prison officials have refused to disclose the identity of the surgeon to him.
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3. Discussion
It does not appear that Warden Randy Valley had anything to do with the medical
decisionmaking for Plaintiff. The only allegations are that prison officials route medical
grievances to the medical unit instead of reviewing the grievances themselves. This
practice does not show a causal connection to the injury or indicate the warden’s personal
participation in the alleged violation to permit Plaintiff to proceed on any individual
capacity claims. However, Plaintiff requests prospective injunctive relief, and, therefore,
he may be able to proceed against Valley in his official capacity only. The Court will revisit
this issue after it has reviewed the Martinez report.
It is unclear what facts underlie Plaintiff’s claim that Centurion “used a sub-par, cutrate surgeon.” To bring a § 1983 claim against a private entity performing a government
function, a plaintiff must allege that officials carried out an official policy or unofficial
custom that inflicted the injury at issue. Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of New York, 436
U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012)
(Monell applicable to private entities performing government functions). That is, “[an
entity] can be found liable under § 1983 only where the [entity] itself causes the
constitutional violation at issue.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).
Under Monell, requisite elements of a § 1983 claim against a municipality or private
entity performing a state function are the following: (1) the plaintiff was deprived of a
constitutional right; (2) the municipality or entity had a policy or custom; (3) the policy or
custom amounted to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4)
the policy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. See Mabe
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v. San Bernardino County, Dep't of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1110-11 (9th Cir.
2001).
The simplest way to obtain more information about the medical care, policies, and
s surgeon selection known only to Centurion and its employees or contractors is to order
Centurion employee HSA Howard to provide a Martinez report, limited to the time frame
beginning two years and one month1 before the filing of the Complaint on March 28, 2024.2
In Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1978), the trial court ordered (before answer)
that the prison officials conduct an investigation of the incident to include an interrogation
of those concerned, and file a report with the court, to enable the court to decide the
jurisdictional issues and make a determination under § 1915(a). Id. at 319. The Ninth
Circuit approved of the use of Martinez reports in In re Arizona, 528 F.3d 652, 659 (9th
Cir. 2008).
All relevant exhibits addressing these issues should be attached to the report. The
Martinez report must be filed within 90 days. Plaintiff may file a response to the Martinez

1

The statute of limitations is tolled while the inmate exhausts administrative grievance procedures pursuant
to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 943 (9th Cir. 2005). The IDOC
grievance process takes approximately 30 days.

2

Plaintiff appears to have a statute of limitations problem with claims that accrued more than two years
before the date he filed suit. The statute of limitations period for filing a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 is determined by the statute of limitations period for personal injuries in the state where the claim
arose. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985) (later overruled only as to claims brought under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, not applicable here). Idaho Code § 5-219, providing for a two-year statute of
limitations for personal injuries, governs federal civil rights actions arising in Idaho.
Under the “discovery rule,” the statute begins to run once a plaintiff knows of his injury and its cause.
Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1344 (9th Cir. 1986). A claim accrues upon awareness of an actual
injury, “and not when the plaintiff suspects a legal wrong.” Lukovsky v. City and County of San Francisco,
535 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2008).

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report within 30 days after receiving it. Thereafter, the Court will issue a successive review
order determining whether Plaintiff has stated a claim under the Eighth Amendment as to
his medical conditions, or whether his claims are in the nature of medical malpractice,
which is a non-actionable cause of action under § 1983.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED:
1. The Clerk of Court shall provide an electronic copy of this Order and the Complaint
(Dkt. 3) to: Aynsley Harrow Mull, Associate General Counsel for Centurion, at Ms.
Mull’s email address on file with the Court, on behalf of Defendant HSA Howard.
2. Within 90 days after entry of this Order, Defendant HSA Howard, a current or
former employee of Centurion, shall make a limited special appearance and provide
the following to Plaintiff and the Court in the form of a Martinez report: (1) a copy
of Plaintiff’s relevant medical/optometry eye care records from February 2021 to
date; (2) a copy of any of Plaintiff’s grievances and grievance appeals regarding his
eye care and surgery that were not attached to the Complaint; (3) a short statement
on the current status of Plaintiff’s condition, including information regarding the
most recent date he was seen by a medical provider, what treatment he received, and
whether his condition has been resolved (or if not, what treatment is planned in the
future, if any, to try to resolve the conditions); (4) the identity of the surgeon and
whether any recent disciplinary actions against the surgeon existed or licensing
issues were known before selection of that provider; (5) reasons for the length of
wait before surgery; (6) any information about whether the decisionmaking about
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Plaintiff’s eyecare was dictated or circumscribed by Centurion or IDOC policies;
(7) whether the surgeon had a contract with Centurion to provide surgery to IDOC
prisoners for purposes of state actor analysis.
3. Within 30 days after the filing of the Martinez report, Plaintiff may file a response
to the Report.
4. Nothing further shall be filed in this case until after the Court issues a successive
review order.

DATED: August 28, 2024
_________________________
David C. Nye
Chief U.S. District Court Judge

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