Little et al v. City of Nampa et al

Filing 26

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - Defendants Motion to Set Aside Default (Dkt. 13 ) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs Motion to Strike (Dkt. 23 ) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as outlined herein. Plaintiffs Motion for Default Judgment (Dkt. 16 ) is DENIED. Signed by Judge David C. Nye. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (jd)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
SHANNON LITTLE and GAYLE F.
LITTLE, individually, and as husband and
wife

Case No. 1:24-cv-00258-DCN
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF NAMPA; CHIEF JOE HUFF,
Chief of Police of Nampa Police
Department;
and
DETECTIVE
ELLOUISE SCOTT, individually and in
her official capacity as a law enforcement
officer of Nampa Police Department,
Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION
Before the Court are a Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 10), a Motion to
Dismiss (Dkt. 11), and a Motion to Set Aside Default (Dkt. 13) filed by Defendants, and a
Motion for Default Judgment (Dkt. 16) and a Motion to Strike (Dkt. 23) filed by Plaintiffs
Shannon Little and Gayle F. Little (together, the “Littles”).
Having reviewed the record and briefs, the Court finds that the facts and legal
arguments are adequately presented. Accordingly, in the interest of avoiding further delay,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1

and because the Court finds that the decisional process would not be significantly aided by
oral argument, the Court will decide the Motions on the record and without oral argument.
Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1)(B). For the reasons outlined below, the Court GRANTS
IN FULL Defendants’ Motion to Set Aside Default and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES
IN PART the Littles’ Motion to Strike. The Court will hold in abeyance Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment until the Littles have an opportunity
to respond to each. Finally, the Court DENIES the Littles’ Motion for Default Judgment.
II. BACKGROUND
On May 24, 2024, the Littles filed the instant lawsuit. In their Complaint, they
allege that Defendants violated of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Federal Constitution, and various
Idaho tort laws based on Defendants’ allegedly inappropriate disclosure of information
found during a cellphone search. Dkt. 1. The Littles served summonses on all Defendants
on June 3, 2024. Under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants had
until June 24, 2024, to file an answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(a)(1)(A). Defendants failed to do so. On June 25, 2024, Plaintiffs moved for Entry
of Default. Dkt. 7. Consistent with Rule 55, the Clerk of the Court entered default the
next day—June 26, 2024. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). The following day, counsel for
Defendants entered an appearance and filed all three of Defendants’ pending motions.
Dkts. 10, 11, & 13.
On July 4, 2024, the Littles moved the Court for default judgment. Dkt. 16. A few
weeks later, instead of responding to Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment and
Dismissal, the Littles asked the Court to strike the two motions from the record. Dkt. 23MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2

1, at 2.1 The briefing deadlines for all pending motions have now passed and the motions
are ripe.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
“The court may set aside an entry of default for good cause . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P.
55(c). Courts have discretion in determining whether the “good cause” standard has been
met. In re Bernal, 223 B.R. 542, 546 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998), aff’d 207 F.3d 595 (9th Cir.
2000); see also Wright, Miller, & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2694 (4th ed.
2024). “The different treatment in Rule 55(c) of the default entry and default judgment
frees a court considering a motion to set aside a default entry from the restraints of Rule
60(b) and entrusts the determination to the discretion of the court.”). In exercising such
discretion, courts must consider: (1) whether the defendant’s culpable conduct led to
default, (2) whether the defendant is without a meritorious defense, and (3) whether setting
aside the default entry would prejudice the plaintiff. United States v. Signed Pers. Check
No. 730 of Yubran S. Mesle, 615 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010).
The good cause standard “is disjunctive, such that a finding that any one of these
factors is true is sufficient reason for a court to refuse to set aside an entry of default.” Scofield
v. Guillard, 2023 WL 3098412, at *2 (D. Idaho Apr. 26, 2023). However, again, courts
maintain discretion in determining whether default is appropriate. Thus, a finding that one
of the factors weighs against granting relief from default may support but does not compel a

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The Littles also asked the Court to strike Defendants “objection to motion to set aside default,” however,
no such document was ever filed, and from the remainder of their Motion, it does not appear the Littles are
asking the Court to strike Defendants’ Motion to Set Aside Default.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3

court’s decision to deny such relief. See, e.g., Brandt v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla., 653
F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2011) (“A district court may exercise its discretion to deny relief
to a defaulting defendant based solely upon a finding of defendant’s culpability, but need
not.”). Finally, in Mesle, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that “judgment by default is a drastic
step appropriate only in extreme circumstances,” and it elaborated that cases should be
decided on the merits whenever possible. 615 F.3d at 1091.
IV. ANALYSIS
The Court will take up each of the requirements from Mesle in turn. Next, it will
address Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike and Motion for Default Judgment. Then, it will briefly
revisit the bond requirement imposed by Idaho Code § 6-610(2).
A. Mesle Requirements
1. Defendants’ Culpability
“A defendant’s conduct is culpable if he has received actual or constructive notice
of the filing of the action and intentionally failed to answer.” Mesle, 615 F.3d at 1092
(cleaned up) (emphasis in original). The requirement of intentional failure means that a
defendant “cannot be treated as culpable simply for having made a conscious choice not to
answer; rather, to treat a failure to answer as culpable, the movant must have acted with
bad faith[.]” Id. Bad faith in this context generally involves manifesting an “intention to
take advantage of the opposing party, interfere with judicial decisionmaking, or otherwise
manipulate the legal process.” Id. (cleaned up). The Ninth Circuit typically reserves
findings of culpability under this test for situations where the failure to respond was
“devious, deliberate, [or] willful[.]” Id. (cleaned up).
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4

Notably, when investigating culpability, the Ninth Circuit has distinguished
between parties who are represented by counsel and parties who are representing
themselves. See, e.g., id. at 1093. In Mesle, the Ninth Circuit stated that, where a defendant
is legally sophisticated—i.e. represented by counsel—a reviewing court may, in its
discretion, assume intentionality. Id. But such an assumption is not required. See Idaho
Golf Partners, Inc. v. Timberstone Mgmt. LLC, 2015 WL 1481396, at *4 (D. Idaho 2015)
(“[The district court] retains the discretion (but not the obligation) to infer intentionality
from the actions of a legally sophisticated party and to thereby find culpability.”).
Here, Defendants assert that their untimely filings were the product of a simple
calendaring mistake. Dkt. 13-1, at 3. In support of this assertion, Defendants note that they
filed two substantive motions simultaneously with their Motion to Set Aside Entry of
Default. Id. Defendants argue these filings support an inference that they were planning on
responding and were late only because of the calendaring issue. Id. Defendants’ point is
well-taken. Despite their delayed engagement, Defendants appear ready and willing to
litigate this case, and the Court has no reason to assume that their failure to respond was
an act of bad faith. They have gained no advantage from their three-day delay, nor have
they manipulated the legal process or interfered with judicial decisionmaking.
Accordingly, the Court is content to allow them to proceed under the expectation that they
will meet future deadlines.
Plaintiffs, seemingly, do not share the Court’s understanding. They argue
vehemently that Defendants’ three-day delay is somehow indicative of sinister intent or
gamesmanship. See generally Dkt. 18. They claim that Defendants’ apparent plan to file
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5

on the final day of their deadline “is evidence of bad faith and culpable conduct.” Id. at
9. But parties regularly utilize all their allotted time before filing. Without more evidence
of malintent, the Court will not infer bad faith. Further, Plaintiffs’ calls for rigid
adherence to the filing deadlines ring somewhat hollow when one considers the fact that
the Court has already indulged Plaintiffs’ own procedural missteps in this relatively
young case. See Dkt. 17.
Although Defendants are represented by counsel, considering the shortness of the
delay and the benign explanation therefor, the Court declines to classify Defendants’
untimely answer as intentional. Accordingly, this factor supports a setting aside of the
Court’s entry of default.
2. Defendants’ Meritorious Defense
The Ninth Circuit has described the burden of showing a meritorious defense as
“minimal.” Mesle, 615 F.3d at 1094. “All that is necessary to satisfy the ‘meritorious
defense’ requirement is to allege sufficient facts that, if true, would constitute a
defense . . . .” Id. In their Motion for Summary Judgment and their Motion to Dismiss,
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs lack standing, improperly asserted constitutional
violations in the collective, failed to state a due process claim, fourth amendment claim, or
first amendment claim, and failed to comply with the requirements of the Idaho Tort Claims
Act. See generally Dkts. 10 & 11.

The Court finds these arguments to constitute

meritorious defenses.
Plaintiffs contend that that the Court is barred from considering the Motion for
Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss because they were filed after the Clerk of Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6

entered default. It is true that once the Clerk enters default, “the only procedure available
to the defendant is to file a motion to set aside the default . . . .” Schwarzer, Tashima, and
Wagstaffe, Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial § 6:43 (Rutter Group 2021). Other filings
should be stricken. Id. However, district courts have often considered premature filings—
like the two motions here—for purposes of determining whether a defendant has presented
a meritorious defense. See Rozich v. MTC Fin. Inc., 2-24 WL 1344458, at *4–5 (D. Ariz.
Mar. 29, 2024); Scofield v. Guillard, 2023 WL 3098412, at *4 n.4 (D. Idaho Apr. 26, 2023);
Brooks v. Fast Park and Relax, 2022 WL 954845, at *3 (D. Ariz. Mar. 20, 2022).
The Court acknowledges that in Rozich, Scofield, and Brooks, the untimely filings
were attached to the defendants’ motions to set aside default, whereas here, they were filed
separately. However, to refuse to consider the two motions for purposes of evaluating
whether Defendants possess a meritorious defense simply because they were not attached
to the Motion to Set Aside Default would elevate form over substance at a stage in the case
where the Ninth Circuit has instructed courts to resolve doubt in favor of reaching the
merits. Schwab v. Bullock’s Inc., 508 F.2d 353, 355(9th Cir. 1974). The two untimely
motions were filed on the same day as the Motion to Set Aside Default and may reasonably
be referenced in support thereto. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants have
established a meritorious defense.2

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Even if the Court were to embrace Plaintiffs’ more-technical approach and find that, because the two
untimely motions were filed separately from Defendants’ Motion to Set Aside Default, they should not be
considered, the Court could still, in its discretion, grant Defendants’ Motion. See Brandt, 653 F.3d at 1112
(stating that a court need not refuse to set aside default even where it finds that one of the good-cause factors
weighs against doing so).

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 7

3. Prejudice to Plaintiff
“To be prejudicial, the setting aside of a judgment must result in greater harm than
simply delaying resolution of the case.” TCI Grp. Life Ins. Plan v. Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691,
701 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner,
532 U.S. 141 (2001).3 Instead, Courts must look to whether the delay has hindered the
plaintiff’s ability to pursue his or her claim. Id. Here, Defendants filed a mere three days
after their deadline passed. The Court is confident that such a meager delay has not
hindered Plaintiffs’ ability to pursue their claims. Plaintiffs assert baldly that setting aside
default would prejudice them “because Defendants have deliberately made no attempt to
defend this lawsuit.” Dkt. 18, at 11. This argument is (1) untrue, considering the instant
motions, and (2) better directed at Defendants’ culpability. In sum, setting aside the Clerk’s
entry of default will not prejudice Plaintiffs.
4. Conclusion
Defendants have shown that they were not culpable for their late filing, that they have
meritorious defenses, and that plaintiffs will not be prejudiced if the Court sets aside the
entry of default. Accordingly, the Court finds good cause to set aside the entry of default.
B. Plaintiffs Motion to Strike and Motion for Default Judgment
Plaintiffs ask the Court to strike from the record Defendants’ Motion for Summary

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The Court in TCI elaborated, “It should be obvious why merely being forced to litigate on the merits
cannot be considered prejudicial for purposes of lifting a default judgment. For had there been no default,
the plaintiff would . . . have had to litigate the merits of the case, incurring the costs of doing so.” Id. It went
on to say, “A default judgment gives the plaintiff something of a windfall by sparing her from litigating the
merits of her claim because of her opponent’s failure to respond; vacating the default judgment merely
restores the parties to an even footing in the litigation.” Id.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 8

Judgment and Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. 23. As already explained, they argue that the
motions were improperly filed after entry of default. It is likely for this reason that Plaintiffs
did not respond to the motions.
Having already found good cause to set aside the Clerk’s entry of default and to
allow the case to move forward, the Court is presented with two options. Technically, the
Court could strike the motions and require Defendants to refile them once the entry of
default has been set aside. See Schwarzer, Tashima, and Wagstaffe, Federal Civil
Procedure Before Trial § 6:43 (Rutter Group 2021) (“Defendant fails to answer or
otherwise respond within the requisite time period. Plaintiff requests entry of default and
entry is made. Defendant then seeks to file an answer . . . . The court will not accept the
answer for filing. Should the clerk do so, the court will order it stricken.”). Plaintiffs would
then have a chance to respond, and Defendants to reply. But this exercise would be
duplicative, as Defendants have already filed their motions, untimely as they may be.
Alternatively, pursuant to the Court’s inherent power to control its docket, it could
hold the two motions in abeyance and grant Plaintiffs opportunity respond to them under a
typical briefing schedule. See, e.g., Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254–55
(1936); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1991). This would save Defendants
from redundant filing requirements, while at the same time resolving Plaintiffs’ concerns
that they have been deprived of an opportunity to respond to the two motions. In the interest
of “secur[ing] the just, speedy, and inexpensive” resolution of this case, the Court opts for
this latter approach. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Thus, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike is GRANTED to the
extent that briefing on the two motions will be reopened. It is DENIED to the extent that the
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 9

Court will not remove the motions from the record.
Turning now to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment, as noted above, default
judgment is appropriate only in “extreme circumstances.” Mesle, 615 F.3d at 1091. The
circumstances here are anything but extreme. Defendants were a few days late in appearing
and responding to Plaintiffs’ Complaint. This case can still be fairly decided on the merits.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment.
C. Bond Requirement
Prior to initiating a lawsuit against a law enforcement officer, Idaho Code Section
6-610(2) requires a plaintiff to post a bond. The purpose of the bond is two-fold: it ensures
diligent prosecution by the plaintiff, and it can reimburse the fees and costs of the law
enforcement officer should the plaintiff lose. Id. As noted in the Court’s prior order, the
statute does not set an amount for the bond. Dkt. 17, at 2. Instead, Courts usually tailor the
bond amount to the particular circumstances of the plaintiff. See, e.g., Yantis v. Adams
Cnty., Idaho, 2017 WL 4682966 (D. Idaho Oct. 17, 2017); Rehms v. City of Post Falls,
2022 WL 2069113 (D. Idaho May 5, 2022); Clements v. Pocatello Police Dep’t, 2023 WL
2354894 (D. Idaho Mar. 2, 2023).
In its prior order, the Court stated that it would set a bond, but it granted Plaintiffs an
opportunity to apprise the Court of their financial circumstances to allow the Court to
appropriately tailor their bond. Dkt. 17, at 3. Plaintiffs have now done so. See Dkt. 19. Having
considered Plaintiffs financial resources, the Court finds that a bond in the amount of $1,000
is sufficient to serve the purposes outlined by the statute. Plaintiffs shall pay such amount to
the Clerk of Court within seven (7) days from the issuance of this Order.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 10

V. CONCLUSION
Because Defendants have shown good cause, the Court grants their Motion to Set
Aside Default. In the interest of avoiding duplicative work from the Court or the parties,
the Court will not strike from the record Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment or
Motion to Dismiss. It will, however, hold those motions in abeyance until Plaintiffs can
respond to them, and Defendants can reply. Because this course is partially consistent with
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike, that motion is granted in part and denied in part. Finally,
because the circumstances surrounding Defendants’ delay are rather ordinary, and not
extreme, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment.
A caution: this case was filed less than six months ago. In that time, both parties have
misunderstood and misapplied procedural rules. Thus far, the Court has been permissive in
the interest of steering this case toward a resolution on the merits. However, moving forward,
the Court expects the parties to be more conscientious about following the rules. Otherwise,
the parties will find that the Court’s leniency is not inexhaustible.
VI. ORDER
1. Defendants’ Motion to Set Aside Default (Dkt. 13) is GRANTED.
2. Plaintiffs shall have twenty-one (21) days from the issuance of this Order to respond
to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 10) and Motion to Dismiss
(Dkt. 11). Thereafter, Defendants shall have fourteen (14) days to reply.
3. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike (Dkt. 23) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART as outlined herein.
4. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment (Dkt. 16) is DENIED.
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5. Plaintiffs shall secure and post a bond in the sum of $1,000.00 pursuant to Idaho
Code § 6-610 within seven (7) days from the issuance of this Order.

DATED: August 29, 2024
_________________________
David C. Nye
Chief U.S. District Court Judge

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