Hearn v. Truesdale, et al.

Filing 46

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - Ada County Defendants Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 13 ) is DISMISSED as MOOT. State Defendants Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 23 ) is DISMISSED as MOOT. Plaintiffs Motion for Default Judgment (Dkt. 16 ) is DENIED without prej udice. Plaintiffs Motion for Default Judgment (Dkt. 18 ) is DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiffs Motion for Default Judgment (Dkt. 25 ) is DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiffs Motion for Hearing (Dkt. 26 ) is DISMISSED without prejudice. Plaintiffs Motion for Hearing (Dkt. 44 ) is DISMISSED without prejudice. Signed by Judge David C. Nye. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (jd)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
PETER HEARN,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 1:24-cv-00326-DCN
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

KEVIN TRUESDALE, et al.,
Defendants.
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
On July 18, 2024, Plaintiff Peter Hearn initiated this suit. Dkt. 1. On October 28,
2024, he filed an Amended Complaint. Dkt. 27. In between these two filings, the parties
had filed several motions, including two Motions to Dismiss from Defendants 1 (Dkts. 13;
23), three Motions for Default Judgment from Hearn (Dkts. 16; 18; 25), and a Motion for
Hearing also from Hearn (Dkt. 26). The filing of the Amended Complaint impacted each
of these filings, and for the reasons set forth below, the Motions to Dismiss are
DISMISSED as MOOT, the Motions for Default Judgement are DENIED without
prejudice, and the Motion for Hearing is also DISMISSED without prejudice. Relatedly,

1

Docket 13 was filed by Defendants Ada County Prosecutor’s Office, Ada County Sheriff’s Office, Jan M.
Bennetts, Matt Clifford, and Tatiana Herrera (“Ada County Defendants”). Docket 23 was filed by
Defendants Kira Lynn Dale, Fourth Judicial District Court, Idaho State Police Department, Riley Irquidi,
Regan C. Jameson, David Manweiler, Tanis Ozuna, State of Idaho, and Kevin Truesdale (“State
Defendants”).

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1

Hearn’s recent Motion for Hearing (Dkt. 44) filed on February 21, 2025, is DISMISSED
without prejudice for the reasons set forth below.
II. DISCUSSION
1. Amended Complaint and Motions to Dismiss
The Ninth Circuit has explained, “an amended complaint supersedes the original
complaint,” thereby becoming the “operative pleading.” CDK Global LLC v. Brnovich, 16
F.4th 1266 (9th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). When an amended complaint is filed, any
previously-filed motions to dismiss are moot. See Barnes v. Dist. of Columbia, 42 F. Supp.
3d 111, 117 (D.D.C. 2014) (“When a plaintiff files an amended complaint as of right . . .
the amended complaint becomes the operative pleading . . . and any pending motion to
dismiss becomes moot.” (cleaned up)). 2 Accordingly, Defendants’ two Motions to Dismiss
(Dkts. 13; 23) filed before Hearn’s Amended Complaint (Dkt. 27) are DISMISSED as
MOOT. 3
2. Motions for Default Judgment
Hearn’s Motions for Default Judgment cannot be granted for several reasons
relating to the fact that he never served the Amended Complaint on the Defendants against
whom he is requesting default, and he failed to follow the procedure set forth in the Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(1).

2

The Defendants whose motions are being dismissed here likely recognized this principle, as both have
renewed their Motions to Dismiss now that the Amended Complaint has been filed. Dkts. 32; 36. The Court
will take up those Motions in a later decision.

3

To be sure, it appears the only change between Hearn’s original Complaint and his Amended Complaint
is the addition of Michael Greer as a named Defendant. But despite the size or scope of any change, the
legal and procedural parameters outlined above still apply.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2

First, as addressed above, once the Amended Complaint was filed, it became the
operative pleading in this case. Hearn’s motions for default all relate to the original
Complaint filed in this case, and since that is no longer the operative pleading, any
Defendants’ failure to respond to that Complaint is a moot issue. Further, there is no
indication that Hearn served the Amended Complaint on any Defendant in this case (which
will be addressed in more detail below), so it is not possible for the Defendants to have
defaulted based on the Amended Complaint at this time.
Second, even if the Motions did relate to the operative complaint, Hearn failed to
follow the two-step process required by Rule 55. When a defendant has “failed to plead or
otherwise defend,” the clerk must enter the party’s default. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). This is a
prerequisite to default judgement under Rule 55(b). See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 55; Eitel
v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986). Hearn, however, never asked the clerk to
enter default. Beyond that, it seems that Hearn is requesting an entry of default judgment
by the clerk under Rule 55(b)(1), as he refers in all his orders to a “sum certain.” Dkt. 16,
at 1; Dkt. 18, at 1; Dkt. 25, at 1. But his generic request in his Amended Complaint for
millions of dollars in damages does not qualify as a sum certain. See Franchise Holding II,
LLC. v. Huntington Rests. Grp., Inc., 375 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 2004).
In sum, as the Court has explained before:
Rule 55(b)(1) only applies to defendants that have defaulted for failure to appear
under Rule 55(a) and a person can only fail to appear if he or she had proper service
of the lawsuit. As just noted, because the amount requested is not a sum certain, the
Court would most likely need to undertake default judgment proceedings under Rule
55(b)(2) anyway—which requires notice to all parties—but that aside, [Hearn] has
failed to properly serve the parties [he] requests default against in the first place. In
other words, [Hearn] cannot seek Rule 55(b) default judgment because [he] has not
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3

sought a Rule 55(a) clerk’s entry of default and [he] cannot seek a Rule 55(a) clerk’s
entry of default because [he] has not correctly served the defendants against whom
[he] seeks default judgment.
Paddock v. Ballou, 2018 WL 1902678, at *1 (D. Idaho Apr. 20, 2018). As such, Hearn’s
Motions for Default Judgment (Dkts. 16; 18; 25) are DISMISSED without prejudice.
Returning to the issue of the lack of service of the Amended Complaint, Rule 4(m)
mandates that the Court must dismiss an action without prejudice or order that service be
made within a specific time when a plaintiff fails to serve a defendant within 90 days after
a complaint is filed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). The Amended Complaint in this case was filed
on October 28, 2024—thus, Hearn was required to serve the Amended Complaint on all
Defendants by January 26, 2025. There is no indication on the docket or in the records
before the Court that he did so. However, the parties involved have already expended
significant time and effort in litigating this case, as evidenced by the multitude of filings
here. The Court does not intend to dismiss the case and force Hearn to file a new case
which will ultimately result in a duplication of work, time, and expense for the parties
currently participating. 4 Therefore, Hearn has thirty (30) days from the issuance of this
Order to either officially serve the Amended Complaint on all Defendants or obtain a
waiver of service from defense counsel. If he fails to do so, the Defendants which he does
not serve will be dismissed without prejudice.

4

Said another way, despite Hearn’s failure to serve, the Ada County Defendants and the State Defendants
both renewed their Motions to Dismiss and Hearn responded. The Court will not make Hearn re-serve these
Defendants only to have the motions current at issue refiled. That would delay this case further and not be
economical.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4

3. Motions for Hearing
Finally, Hearn has filed two Motions for Hearing (Dkt. 26; 44): one before the
Amended Complaint was filed and one within the last few days. The first Motion relates
to a telephonic scheduling conference for the development of litigation and discovery
plans. The second is a request for a hearing on the various Motions to Dismiss. As to the
first, a telephonic scheduling conference was originally set for September 19, 2024, with
Magistrate Judge Deborah K. Grasham. Dkt. 3. Hearn requested that the hearing be vacated
and reset, and the new hearing was set for October 29, 2024. Dkt. 4. Hearn later requested
the hearing be reset again which it was. Dkts. 11, 12. The case was then reassigned to
District Judge Amanda K. Brailsford, and as is standard practice when cases are being
reassigned between judges, the previously-set hearing was vacated. Dkt. 20. Hearn then
filed his Motion asking that Judge Brailsford reset the scheduling hearing. Dkt. 26. Judge
Brailsford later recused herself (Dkt. 33), and the case was reassigned to the undersigned.
While the Court appreciates Hearn’s diligence, even after today’s Order, two
Motions to Dismiss remain pending which may be dispositive of the case. Until the Court
issues a ruling on those Motions, any litigation and discovery plans the parties might agree
to could be foiled either by the timing or the substance of the Court’s decision. Also, as
discussed above, Hearn needs to serve all the Defendants with the Amended Complaint
before the parties can successfully agree to discovery and litigation plans. In other words,
his first Motion for Hearing (Dkt. 26) is premature, and the Court will be sure to set the
appropriate hearings and deadlines when necessary.
As to the second Motion for Hearing (Dkt. 44), the Court often decides motions,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5

including motions to dismiss, on the briefing alone where oral argument would not
significantly aid its decision-making process. Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1)(B). 5 To
the extent that Hearn asks for a hearing related to the Motions to Dismiss at dockets 13 and
23, his Motion is MOOT because those Motions have been dismissed by this Order. Where
his Motion requests a hearing related to dockets 32 and 36, the Court will carefully consider
the briefing, and if it should find that a hearing is necessary to significantly aid the
decisional process, a hearing will be set accordingly. Otherwise, the Court will issue a
decision without a hearing in accordance with its standard practice. 6 In conclusion, both of
Hearn’s Motions for Hearing (Dkts. 26; 44) are DISMISSED without prejudice.
III. ORDER
1. Ada County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 13) is DISMISSED as MOOT.
2. State Defendants Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 23) is DISMISSED as MOOT.
3. Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (Dkt. 16) is DENIED without prejudice.
4. Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (Dkt. 18) is DENIED without prejudice.
5. Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (Dkt. 25) is DENIED without prejudice.
6. Plaintiff’s Motion for Hearing (Dkt. 26) is DISMISSED without prejudice.
7. Plaintiff’s Motion for Hearing (Dkt. 44) is DISMISSED without prejudice.
8. Plaintiff has thirty (30) days from the issuance of this Order to serve all Defendants

5

The Ada County Defendants filed a short opposition to Hearn’s Motion for Hearing noting this exact
thing—that the Court is in the best position to know if a hearing would be helpful in the resolution of any
motion. Dkt. 45.
6

See also Frost v. Diocese of San Bernadino Educ. and Welfare Corp. for ben. of Saint Catherine of
Alexandria, et al., 302 Fed. Appx. 729, 730 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding a district court does not violate due
process rights by denying oral argument on motions to dismiss).

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6

with the Amended Complaint (Dkt. 27). Any defendant that he fails to serve will be
dismissed without prejudice.

DATED: March 5, 2025
_________________________
David C. Nye
Chief U.S. District Court Judge

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