Richardson et al v. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare et al

Filing 63

AMENDED MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER re: 62 Memorandum Decision and Order granting 56 MOTION to Dismiss. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by cjm) Modified on 2/10/2012 to edit text from deny to grant (cjm).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF IDAHO
SAMANTHA RICHARDSON, the
natural mother of decedent KARINA
MOORE; AALIYAH MOORE, sibling
of decedent KARINA MOORE;
SHAWN MOORE, sibling of decedent
KARINA MOORE, and KARIN
ROGERS, the Maternal Grandmother of
KARINA MOORE, and the Estate of
KARINA MOORE,
Plaintiffs,
v.
The IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND WELFARE, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho;
STACEY WHITE, personally and in her
official capacity; JENNIFER DUNCAN,
personally and in her official capacity;
JEREMY M. CLARK and AMBER M.
CLARK and the marital community;
John Doe 1 and John Doe 2 and others to
be named hereafter; and the real property
located at: 1605 E. 2nd Avenue, Post
Falls, Idaho,legally described as:
Lot 3 Block 6, RIVERVIEW PARK
ADDITION AT POST FALLS, Kootenai
County, State of Idaho, according to the
plat recorded in Book “D” of Plats, Page
161, records of Kootenai County, Idaho,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1

Case No. 2:10-cv-00648-BLW
AMENDED MEMORANDUM
DECISION AND ORDER

INTRODUCTION
Minor child, K.M., died from a series of blunt force blows to her heard while in
the care of her foster parents, Defendants Jeremy M. Clark and Amber M. Clark. Compl.
¶ 6, Dkt. 1. Plaintiff Samantha Richardson, K.M.’s mother, claims that she complained
to Defendants Stacy White and Jennifer Duncan, both social workers employed by the
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, that K.M. had sustained injuries while under
the foster care of the Clarks. Richardson maintains that both White and Duncan did
nothing in response to her complaints. Now, K.M.’s family, the plaintiffs in this action,
claim that the Clarks, White and Duncan, and the Department are responsible for K.M.’s
death.
In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the Department “had a duty to
competently investigate allegations of abuse against the CLARKS and reported by
Plaintiff RICHARDSON,” and the Department “negligently and with reckless
indifference failed to comply with their duty to competently investigate these claims of
abuse….which “resulted in increased danger to decedent KARINA MOORE resulting in
her death.” Am. Compl., Claims Section ¶ 5. In addition, Plaintiffs contend that the
Department (1) failed to comply with its “duty to train foster care providers to protect
against abuse such as perpetrated by the CLARKS,” id. ¶ 10; and (2) failed to comply
with its “duty to competently supervise foster care homes to minimize the abuse such as

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that perpetrated by the CLARKS,” id. ¶ 11. Plaintiffs have filed and served a Notice of
Tort Claim on the Department. Id. ¶ 2.
Plaintiffs also allege that the Department acted in concert with the Clarks to
deprive Plaintiffs and the decedent of certain rights protected under the federal and state
constitutions. Id. ¶¶ 12-28. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that they “represent a protected
class as a racial minority who has suffered as a result of their racial heritage” and “[s]aid
joint action between IDHW and CLARKS constitute a conspiracy involving state action
resulting in the depravation [sic] of [K.M.]’s constitutionally protected rights” in
violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and1986. Id.
The Department moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, arguing that
the claims against it are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. For the reasons set forth
below, the Court will grant the Department’s Motion.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “‘a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’” in order to “give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests, . . .” Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While a complaint attacked by a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “does not need detailed factual allegations,” it must set forth
“more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.” Id. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain

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sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Id. at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged. Id. at 556. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability
requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully. Id. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a
defendant's liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. at 557.
In a more recent case, the Supreme Court identified two “working principles” that
underlie Twombly. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). First, the tenet
that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions. Id. “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure
from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the
doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Id. at 1950.
Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to
dismiss. Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . .
be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id.

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Providing too much in the complaint may also be fatal to a plaintiff. Dismissal
may be appropriate when the plaintiff has included sufficient allegations disclosing some
absolute defense or bar to recovery. See Weisbuch v. County of L.A., 119 F.3d 778, 783,
n. 1 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that “[i]f the pleadings establish facts compelling a decision
one way, that is as good as if depositions and other . . . evidence on summary judgment
establishes the identical facts”).
A dismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it is beyond doubt that the
complaint “could not be saved by any amendment.” Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 573 F.3d 728,
737 (9th Cir. 2009) (issued two months after Iqbal). The Ninth Circuit has held that “in
dismissals for failure to state a claim, a district court should grant leave to amend even if
no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could
not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N.
Cal. Collection Serv., Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990). The issue is not whether
plaintiff will prevail but whether he “is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.”
See Hydrick v. Hunter, 466 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2006).
ANALYSIS
“The Eleventh Amendment creates a jurisdictional bar to private damages actions
against states in federal court.” See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F. 2d 628, 631 (9th Cir. 1988).
Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to state agencies. Id. Yet, few rules are without
exceptions. For example, a state may waive its sovereign immunity. See Edelman v.

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Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). But the state of Idaho has not waived sovereign
immunity for state or federal constitutional violations. Id. Thus, Plaintiffs’ constitutional
claims against the Department are barred. In addition,
Plaintiffs suggest, however, that sovereign immunity does not protect a state
agency from Section 1983 seeking only prospective or injunctive relief. In Ex Parte
Young, the U.S. Supreme Court created an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity
when a private litigant sues a state official for the purpose of enjoining the enforcement
of an unconstitutional state statute. Under the Ex parte Young legal fiction, when an
official of a state agency is sued in his official capacity for prospective equitable relief, he
is generally not regarded as ‘the state’ for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment and the
case may proceed in federal court. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56) (1908). In
constructing this fiction, the Supreme Court reasoned “that if a state official violates
federal law, he is stripped of his official or representative character and may be
personally liable for his conduct; the State cannot cloak the officer in its sovereign
immunity.” Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 288 (1997).
But “the exception is narrow: It applies only to prospective relief, does not permit
judgments against state officers declaring that they violated federal law in the past, and
has no application in suits against the States and their agencies, which are barred
regardless of the relief sought.” Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf &
Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993) (internal citations omitted). Any such suit seeking

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prospective or injunctive relief is deemed to be against officials and not the States or their
agencies. Id. The Ex Parte Young doctrine therefore does not save the constitutional
claims against the Department from dismissal even though Plaintiffs only seek injunctive
relief and not monetary damages.
In addition, Plaintiffs’ tort claims against the Department are barred. Here,
Plaintiffs have asserted various negligence claims against the Department under the Idaho
Torts Claim Act (ITCA). “The purpose of the ITCA is to provide ‘much needed relief to
those suffering injury from the negligence of government employees.’” Rees v. State,
Dept. of Health and Welfare, 137 P.3d 397, 406 (Idaho 2006) (citation omitted). To
serve this purpose, “[t]he Act abrogates sovereign immunity and renders a governmental
entity liable for damages arising out of its negligent acts or omissions.” Van v. Portneuf
Med. Ctr., 557, 212 P.3d 982, 987 (2009). Liability is the rule and immunity is the
exception. Rees, 137 P.3d at 406.
Waiver of a state’s eleventh amendment immunity, however, must be express and
must explicitly extend to suits in federal court. Leer, 844 F.2d at 632. Statutes
expressing a general waiver of sovereign immunity, without expressly subjecting the state
to suit in federal court, do not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity. Atascadero State
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985). While the ITCA waives sovereign
immunity generally, it does not expressly subject the state of Idaho to suit in federal
court. Therefore, the ITCA does not waive Idaho’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.

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The Court will dismiss the claims against the Department. However, Plaintiffs’
claims against the Department’s individual employees remain.
ORDER
It is ORDERED that the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare’s Motion to
Dismiss is GRANTED.

DATED: February 10, 2012

_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
Chief Judge
United States District Court

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