Bryntensen et al v. Camp Automotive, Inc. et al

Filing 165

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER. IT IS ORDERED: Motion for Fees 143 is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiffs shall pay Defendants $5,853 in fees for the sanctions imposed by the Court in its earlier Order. Ex Parte Motion to Seal BMW o f North America, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment Materials and Entry of Amended Protective Order 136 is DENIED. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (st)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

CASEY AND SHEREE
BRYNTENSEN, husband and wife, C.B.,
A minor child, and J.B., a minor child,

Case No. 2:13-cv-00491-BLW
MEMORAND DECISION AND
ORDER

Plaintiff,
v.
CAMP AUTOMOTIVE, INC., a
Washington Corporation d/b/a CAMP
BMW; LITHIA MOTORS, INC., and
Oregon Corporation; BMW OF NORTH
AMERICA, LLC, a Delaware limited
company; SCOTT GRUMBLY;
MATTHEW RYDMAN; and STEVE
WILSON, JOHN and JANE DOES 1-10,
whose true names are unknown,
Defendant.

INTRODUCTION
The Court has before it Defendant Camp Automotive, Inc’s, Lithia Motors, Inc.’s,
Scott Grumbly’s, Matthew Rydman’s and Steve Wilson’s Motion for Fees Pursuant to
January 20, 2015 Order (Dkt. 143), and Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Motion to Seal BMW of
North America, LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment Materials and Entry of Amended
Protective Order (Dkt. 136).
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1

ANALYSIS
1.

Attorney Fees
In an earlier motion, Defendants asked the Court to sanction Plaintiffs for late

disclosure of three videos. The Court determined that Plaintiffs failed to timely disclose
the videos as required by Rule 26(a) and (e), and that the late disclosure was not
substantially justified or harmless – as is necessary to avoid Rule 37 sanctions. Dkt. 109.
Accordingly, the Court sanctioned Plaintiffs by precluding them from using the videos on
a motion, at a hearing, or at trial, and by ordering Plaintiffs to pay Defendants’ fees and
costs for bringing the motion for sanctions. Dkt. 109. The Court asked the parties to try to
agree on the amount of those fees. The parties could not agree, and they have now asked
the Court to make that determination.
Defendants ask for $8,895. Plaintiffs object to some of the fees, arguing that they
include time spent on items for which no fees were awarded, and unreasonable,
duplicative, and excessive time. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs’ argument that time
spent reviewing discovery, and time spent preparing for and participating in informal
conferences with the Court’s staff where multiple issues were at play, are not recoverable
under the Court’s Order.
But the Court disagrees with Plaintiffs assertion that Defendants’ counsel spent
unreasonable, duplicative or excessive time preparing the briefs on the motion for
sanctions, or that the hourly rates are inappropriate. The time spent on the matter was
reasonable, and the rates of $210 and $150 per hour are well within the reasonable rates
in this district. To determine a reasonable hourly rate, the district court looks to hourly
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2

rates prevailing in the relevant legal community for similar work performed by attorneys
of comparable skill, experience, and reputation. Ingram v. Oroudjian, 647 F.3d 925, 928
(9th Cir.2011) (per curiam). The “relevant legal community” is generally the forum in
which the district court sits. Mendenhall v. NTSB, 213 F.3d 464, 471 (9th Cir.2000).
After making these findings, the Court has combed through the list of attorney fees
submitted by Defendants and determined that Defendants are entitled to recover $5,853
for time charged by attorneys Jackson and Shockley. Exhibit A to Jackson’s declaration
lists the time entries for which he claims fees. Although the entries are not numbered,
there are 61 separate entries. The Court has determined that Defendants shall recover for
entry numbers 2-15; 27-28; 33; and 45-61, totaling $5,103. Dkt. 144. Exhibit A to
Shockley’s declaration lists his time entries. If they were numbered, there would be 29
separate entries. Defendants are entitled to recover for entry numbers 21-22; and 26-29,
totaling $750. Dkt. 144-1.
2.

Seal
Courts have historically recognized the public’s general right to inspect, review,

and copy public records and documents. This includes judicial records. Kamakana v. City
and County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir.2006) (Internal citation omitted).
Access to judicial records is not absolute though. Id. Records traditionally kept secret for
important policy reasons, such as grand jury transcripts and warrants, have not been
subject to the right of public access. Id. For almost all other documents, a strong
presumption of access is the starting point. Id.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3

Therefore, a party seeking to seal a judicial record bears the burden of overcoming
the presumption by showing compelling reasons why material should be sealed. Id. The
party must “articulate[ ] compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings that
outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure, such as
the public interest in understanding the judicial process.” Id. at 1178–79 (Internal
quotations and citations omitted). The Court must not base its decision whether to seal
documents on hypothesis or conjecture. Id. at 1179.
Generally, compelling reasons “exist when such court files might have become a
vehicle for improper purposes, such as the use of records to gratify private spite, promote
public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets.” Id. (Internal
quotation and citation omitted). The mere fact that the production of documents may
embarrass, incriminate or create further litigation for a party is not enough to compel a
court to seal the documents. Id. The strong presumption of public access to judicial
documents applies fully to dispositive pleadings because the resolution of a dispute on
the merits is at the heart of the interest in ensuring that the public understands the judicial
process. Id.
Here, Plaintiffs ask the Court to seal the following documents: (1) Memorandum
in Support of BMW’s Motion for Summary Judgment of Dismissal; (2) BMW’s
Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment of
Dismissal; (3) Exhibit A to the Declaration of Joe Hochman In Support of BMW's
Motion for Summary Judgment of Dismissal (Casey Bryntesen’s deposition excerpts);

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4

and (4) Exhibit B to the Declaration of Joe Hochman In Support of BMW's Motion for
Summary Judgment of Dismissal (Sheree Bryntesen’s deposition Excerpts).
A review of the Memorandum in Support of BMW’s Motion for Summary
Judgment of Dismissal and BMW’s Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Its
Motion for Summary Judgment of Dismissal reveals that they do not contain the medical
records which apparently concern Plaintiffs.1 Even if they did, the Court could not seal
the entire documents simply because of a brief reference to such documents. Accordingly
the Court will deny the request to seal those documents in their entirety as requested by
Plaintiffs.
The deposition transcripts of the Bryntesens do contain brief references to
infidelity. But there is very little detail discussed other than the fact of infidelity. These
limited references, although potentially embarrassing to Plaintiffs, are not enough for
Plaintiffs to meet their burden of overcoming the presumption that the documents remain
public by showing any compelling reason why material should be sealed. Embarrassment
does not outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring
disclosure. Id. Accordingly, the Court will deny the motion.

1

If the Court overlooked a specific document, Plaintiffs may file another motion asking the Court
to seal specific documents or specific references to documents. The Court will still need to apply the
balancing test set forth above, but the Court will entertain the motion. However, the Court will not seal
entire documents based upon general references to medical records – particularly when the documents are
not apparent to the Court.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5

ORDER
IT IS ORDERED:
1. Defendant Camp Automotive, Inc’s, Lithia Motors, Inc.’s, Scott Grumbly’s,
Matthew Rydman’s and Steve Wilson’s Motion for Fees Pursuant to January
20, 2015 Order (Dkt. 143) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Plaintiffs shall pay Defendants $5,853 in fees for the sanctions imposed by the
Court in its earlier Order.
2. Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Motion to Seal BMW of North America, LLC’s Motion for
Summary Judgment Materials and Entry of Amended Protective Order (Dkt.
136) is DENIED.

DATED: May 1, 2015

_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
Chief Judge
United States District Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6