Eby v. Idaho, State of, et al
Filing
45
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER granting 38 Respondent's MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer; granting 41 Petitioner's MOTION for Extension of Time to File Reply. Claims One and Four of the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corp us (Dkt. 13 ) are DENIED. Because all other claims in the Amended Petition have been dismissed, this entire action is DISMISSED with prejudice.The Court does not find its resolution of this habeas matter to be reasonably debatable, and a certificate of appealability will not issue. Signed by Judge Mikel H. Williams. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (cjs)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
DANIEL LEE EBY,
Case No. 3:02-cv-00113-MHW
Petitioner,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
v.
STATE OF IDAHO and RANDY
BLADES,
Respondents.
Pending before the Court is Petitioner Daniel Lee Eby’s Amended Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus, which challenges Petitioner’s January 1999 convictions for
murder and conspiracy to commit robbery. (Dkt. 13.) On April 8, 2014, the Court granted
Respondents’ motion for partial summary dismissal and dismissed Claims Two, Five, and
Six as procedurally defaulted. (Dkt. 29.) On September 22, 2014, the Court also
dismissed Claim Three as procedurally defaulted. (Dkt. 37.)
The merits of Claims One and Four, Petitioner’s only remaining claims, are now
fully briefed. 1 Having carefully reviewed the record in this matter, including the state
1
The Court will grant the parties’ respective motions for extensions of time to file their merits
briefing.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1
court record, the Court concludes that oral argument is unnecessary. See D. Idaho L. Civ.
R. 7.1(d).
All parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge
to conduct all proceedings in this case in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 73. (Dkt. 20.) Accordingly, the Court enters the following Order
denying habeas corpus relief on Claims One and Four and dismissing this case with
prejudice.
BACKGROUND
The Court takes judicial notice of the records from Petitioner’s state court
proceedings, lodged by Respondents on September 6, 2013, and January 9, 2015. (Dkt.
22, 39.) See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); Dawson v. Mahoney, 451 F.3d 550, 551 (9th Cir.
2006). Petitioner’s convictions stem from the murder of Mel Evenson.
The Idaho Court of Appeals described the underlying facts as follows:
Mel Evenson[] was murdered late in the night of March 25 or
early the next morning. On that night, [Petitioner], Jeremy
Schmitz, Cliff Hicks and Evenson were working on cars in a
garage belonging to Gerald Smith. Inside the adjacent
residence were Smith and several other individuals. While in
the garage, Evenson was repeatedly struck in the head with a
baseball bat and with a large wrench. His clothing was
removed and was then burned in a wood stove in the garage.
Evenson’s body was wrapped in a tarp and placed in the bed
of his own truck. The body was then covered with flattened
cardboard boxes, and the truck was abandoned in the
countryside.
Approximately one month later, law enforcement officers
found Evenson’s body. An autopsy revealed that he had died
of multiple cranial cerebral injuries due to blunt force impacts
to his head. Further investigation led law enforcement officers
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2
to the garage where they discovered blood on the wood stove
and on a motorcycle. Persons who had been present at Gerald
Smith’s residence on the night of Evenson’s death were
questioned by police. . . . It was the prosecution’s theory that,
on the evening in question, [Petitioner], Schmitz and Hicks
believed that Evenson was carrying a substantial amount of
narcotics and cash because he had just returned from an outof-town drug transaction, and the three decided to kill
Evenson in order to steal his money and drugs.
State v. Eby, 37 P.3d 625, 627 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001.)
Petitioner was charged in the First Judicial District Court in Kootenai County,
Idaho, with first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit robbery, and attempted robbery.
The charging document asserted that Petitioner committed first-degree murder under
alternative theories—premeditated murder or murder during the course of a felony. (See
State’s Lodging A-1 at 78-79.)
Petitioner’s trial attorneys, Lynn Nelson and John Bradford Chapman, were
deputy public defenders for the Kootenai County Public Defender’s Office. Petitioner’s
two accomplices, Schmitz and Hicks, were also charged. Schmitz was represented by
John Adams, the Kootenai County Public Defender (who had supervisory authority over
Petitioner’s attorneys). Prior to trial, the state raised the issue of a potential conflict of
interest between Schmitz’s and Petitioner’s attorneys. Brad Chapman, one of Petitioner’s
attorneys, told the court that he and his co-counsel had “thought about this [issue] very
seriously.” (State’s Lodging A-4 at 50.) Mr. Chapman continued:
We have a wall, a very serious wall erected between
[Petitioner’s] counsel, [Petitioner’s investigator and the
codefendant Mr. Schmitz in this case, that wall has not been
broken.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3
....
This wall within our office is tight, it’s one where we don’t
have access to their evidence, we don’t have access to their
investigation, we don’t have access to anything they have. . . .
(Id.) Petitioner was present for this colloquy, and it does not appear that he objected to
the concurrent representation. The trial judge did not appoint new counsel or otherwise
indicate concern with the situation.
Schmitz ultimately confessed, telling police that he and Petitioner had beaten
Evenson to death. (Id. at 628.) Schmitz pleaded guilty to second-degree murder. (State’s
Lodging A-4 at 589-90.) Petitioner pleaded not guilty and proceeded to trial.
Schmitz was called to testify at Petitioner’s trial, but he refused to do so. (Id. at
577-80, 602.) The trial court then allowed—over Petitioner’s objection—the testimony of
Detective Paul Middlemore, the officer who took Schmitz’s confession. (Id. at 594-98.)
The detective testified that although Schmitz initially denied knowledge of the crimes,
Schmitz eventually stated that “there was an idea to rob Mel Evenson and it was
[Petitioner’s] idea.” (Id. at 607-08.) Detective Middlemore testified that, according to
Schmitz’s statement, Petitioner beat the victim to the ground with some type of hammer
or splitting maul, and Schmitz then “joined in” and beat the victim with a baseball bat.
(Id. at 609, 647.)
The jury found Petitioner guilty of all charges. The verdict did not identify
whether Petitioner’s first-degree murder conviction was based on a theory of
premeditated murder or of felony murder. Petitioner was sentenced to a unified sentence
of life imprisonment with 25 years fixed for the first-degree murder count, and fixed 15MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4
year sentences for the attempted robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery counts, with
the sentences to be served concurrently. The Idaho Court of Appeals later vacated the
attempted robbery conviction.
On direct appeal, Petitioner raised a number of claims, including a claim that the
admission of co-conspirator Schmitz’s statement violated Petitioner’s right to
confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. (State’s Lodging B-1.) The Idaho Court of
Appeals held that although the admission of Schmitz’s statements violated the Sixth
Amendment, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (State’s Lodging B-3 at
4-7.) The Idaho Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review. (State’s Lodging
B-9.)
Petitioner later pursued postconviction relief in the Idaho state courts. Petitioner
argued, among other things, that he was denied his right to conflict-free counsel under the
Sixth Amendment. (State’s Lodging E-1 at 4.) The state district court denied the
postconviction petition after an evidentiary hearing. (State’s Lodging E-1 at 49-59; E-4.)
Petitioner filed a pro se appeal and raised two issues, one of which was his conflict
of interest claim. (State’s Lodging F-5.) The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the denial
of postconviction relief, holding that there was no evidence in the record that any conflict
of interest was likely to result in prejudice to Petitioner. (State’s Lodging F-8 at 8-9.) The
Idaho Supreme Court denied review. (State’s Lodging F-11.)
In 2002, Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition, which was stayed for a time
while Petitioner exhausted his claims in state court. Petitioner then filed an Amended
Petition. As noted above, the Court has dismissed all but two of Petitioner’s claims:
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5
Claim One, that the admission of Schmitz’s statement implicating Petitioner in the
murder violated the Sixth Amendment; and Claim Four, that Petitioner was denied his
right to conflict-free counsel. The Court now turns to the merits of those two claims.
HABEAS CORPUS STANDARD OF LAW
Federal habeas corpus relief may be granted on claims adjudicated on the merits in
a state court judgment when the federal court determines that the petitioner “is in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(a). Under § 2254(d), as amended by the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), federal habeas relief is further limited to instances
where the state court’s adjudication of the petitioner’s claim
(1)
resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2)
resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light
of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A federal habeas court reviews the state court’s “last reasoned
decision” in determining whether a petitioner is entitled to relief. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501
U.S. 797, 804 (1991).
When a party contests the state court’s legal conclusions, including application of
the law to the facts, § 2254(d)(1) governs. That section consists of two alternative tests:
the “contrary to” test and the “unreasonable application” test.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6
Under the first test, a state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established
federal law “if the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in
[the Supreme Court’s] cases, or if it decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court]
[has] done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694
(2002).
Under the second test, to satisfy the “unreasonable application” clause of
§ 2254(d)(1) the petitioner must show that the state court—although identifying “the
correct governing legal rule” from Supreme Court precedent—nonetheless “unreasonably
applie[d] it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000). “Section 2254(d)(1) provides a remedy for instances in which
a state court unreasonably applies [Supreme Court] precedent; it does not require state
courts to extend that precedent or license federal courts to treat the failure to do so as
error.” White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1706 (2014).
A federal court cannot grant habeas relief simply because it concludes in its
independent judgment that the decision is incorrect or wrong; rather, the state court’s
application of federal law must be objectively unreasonable to warrant relief. Lockyer v.
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003); Bell, 535 U.S. at 694. If there is any possibility that
fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision, then
relief is not warranted under § 2254(d)(1). Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102
(2011). The Supreme Court has emphasized that “even a strong case for relief does not
mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Id. (internal citation
omitted).
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 7
Though the source of clearly established federal law must come from the holdings
of the United States Supreme Court, circuit precedent may be persuasive authority for
determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme
Court precedent. Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir. 1999). Circuit
law may not be used, however, “to refine or sharpen a general principle of Supreme
Court jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that th[e] Court has not announced.”
Marshall v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1450 (2013).
As to the facts, the United States Supreme Court has clarified “that review under §
2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the
claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). This means that
evidence not presented to the state court may not be introduced on federal habeas review
if a claim was adjudicated on the merits in state court and if the underlying factual
determination of the state court was not unreasonable. See Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d
984, 999 (9th Cir. 2014).
When a petitioner contests the reasonableness of the state court’s factual
determinations, the petitioner must show that the state court decision was based upon
factual determinations that were “unreasonable . . . in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). A “state-court factual determination
is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a
different conclusion in the first instance.” Wood v. Allen, 130 S. Ct. 841, 849 (2010).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has identified five types
of unreasonable factual determinations that result from procedural flaws that occurred in
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 8
state court proceedings: (1) when state courts fail to make a finding of fact; (2) when
courts mistakenly make factual findings under the wrong legal standard; (3) when “the
fact-finding process itself is defective,” such as when a state court “makes evidentiary
findings without holding a hearing”; (4) when courts “plainly misapprehend or misstate
the record in making their findings, and the misapprehension goes to a material factual
issue that is central to petitioner’s claim”; or (5) when “the state court has before it, yet
apparently ignores, evidence that supports petitioner’s claim.” Taylor v. Maddox, 366
F.3d. 992, 1000-01 (9th Cir. 2004). State court findings of fact are presumed to be
correct, and the petitioner has the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and
convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
CLAIM ONE: ADMISSION OF SCHMITZ’S STATEMENT
In Claim One, Petitioner challenges, under the Confrontation Clause, the
admission of co-conspirator Schmitz’s hearsay statement that Petitioner, and then
Schmitz, beat Evenson to death.
1.
Clearly-Established Law Regarding Confrontation Clause Claims
The Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused the right to confront the witnesses
against him. In April 2001, when the Idaho Court of Appeals considered Petitioner’s
Confrontation Clause claim, the question of how the Confrontation Clause applied to
hearsay statements was governed by Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 2 Roberts held
2
Ohio v. Roberts was later abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-59 (2004),
which held that the Confrontation Clause prohibits the introduction of hearsay statements that are
testimonial, unless the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial and the defendant had a prior opportunity
to cross-examine the declarant. Crawford does not apply in this case, as it was decided after Petitioner’s
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 9
that a hearsay statement of an unavailable declarant was admissible under the
Confrontation Clause so long as the hearsay was “marked with such trustworthiness that
‘there is no material departure from the reason of the general rule.’” Id. at 65 (quoting
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934). That is, to be admissible, a hearsay
statement had to have sufficient “indicia of reliability,” which was established by
showing either (1) that the statement fell within “a firmly rooted hearsay exception,” or
(2) that the statement was imbued with “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Id.
at 66.
In Lilly v. Virginia, which was decided approximately five months after Petitioner
was convicted, the United States Supreme Court held that a non-testifying coconspirator’s hearsay statement inculpating a defendant did not fall within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception. 527 U.S. 116, 134 (1999). Further, because a co-conspirator’s
statement is inherently unreliable, the Court held that there is a rebuttable presumption of
unreliability attached to such statements; this presumption can rarely be rebutted when
the government is involved in securing the hearsay statement “and when the statements
describe past events and have not been subjected to adversarial testing.” (Id. at 137.)
2.
Harmless Error Standard of Law
Some constitutional errors—such as the denial of the right to counsel—are
considered structural errors, meaning that the right affected is so fundamental that the
verdict cannot stand, regardless of whether the error affected the outcome of the trial;
conviction became final. See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 418-21 (2007) (holding that Crawford
does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review).
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 10
such errors result in automatic reversal of the conviction. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499
U.S. 279, 294 (1991). “[I]n the absence of ‘the rare type of error’ that requires automatic
reversal, relief is appropriate only if the prosecution cannot demonstrate harmlessness.”
Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2197 (2015) (quoting Glebe v. Frost, 135 S. Ct. 429, 430
(2014) (per curiam)). Confrontation Clause violations, like most constitutional errors, are
not structural and, therefore, are subject to harmless error analysis. See Bain v. Cambra,
204 F.3d 964, 977-78 (9th Cir. 2000).
On direct appeal, a constitutional error can be considered harmless only if the
government proves that the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,” as
explained in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). The test for harmless error
is different on collateral review. Habeas petitioners are not “entitled to habeas relief
based on trial error unless they can establish that [the error] resulted in ‘actual
prejudice.’” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). Under the “actual
prejudice” standard of Brecht, an error is not harmless—and habeas relief must be
granted—only if the federal court has “grave doubt about whether a trial error of federal
law had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.”
O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U. S. 432, 436 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). A
“reasonable possibility” of prejudice is not sufficient. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637.
The restrictions of § 2254(d) apply to state courts’ harmlessness determinations.
Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2198-99. Thus, in addition to considering the Brecht standard, a
federal court on habeas review also considers whether fairminded jurists could debate
whether the state court’s Chapman analysis was reasonable. See Harrington v. Richter,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 11
562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011). A Brecht analysis “subsumes” the standards of § 2254(d), Fry v.
Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 120 (2007), and although a federal court “need not formally apply
both Brecht and AEDPA/Chapman,” § 2254(d) “nevertheless sets forth a precondition to
the grant of habeas relief.” Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2198 (internal quotation marks and
alteration omitted).
3.
The Idaho Court of Appeals’ Rejection of Claim One on Harmlessness
Grounds Was Reasonable, and Petitioner Has Not Shown Actual Prejudice
under Brecht v. Abrahamson
The trial court allowed Detective Middlemore to testify, under the statement-
against-interest exception to the rule against hearsay, that Schmitz had said Petitioner was
the one who came up with the idea to rob Evenson and that Petitioner initiated the beating
from which Evenson died. (State’s Lodging A-4 at 593-95.) The Idaho Court of Appeals
recognized that, under the Supreme Court’s then-recent Lilly decision, the admission of
that testimony violated Petitioner’s rights under the Confrontation Clause. (State’s
Lodging B-3 at 6.)
However, the Court of Appeals held that the admission of Schmitz’s statements
was harmless. The court pointed to the “properly admitted” and overwhelming evidence
that Petitioner participated in the robbery and, therefore, was guilty of felony murder
without regard to whether he beat the victim at all. (Id. at 7.) Gerald Smith, the owner of
the property where the crimes took place, testified that, on the night of the murder,
Petitioner told Gerald, “We are going to mug Mel.” (Id.) Smith testified further that
Petitioner encouraged other people present at the house to leave, telling them to go to the
store and buy food and cigarettes. (Id.) And Petitioner’s own incriminating statements
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 12
established that “he stood guard while Hicks and Schmitz beat Evenson to death with a
baseball bat and a large pipe wrench,” that he searched Evenson’s clothes for drugs and
money, and that he concealed the body in the victim’s truck. (Id.) Faced with this
evidence, the court of appeals was “persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that . . . the jury
would have found that [Petitioner] participated in the attempt to rob Evenson and
therefore was guilty of felony murder even if the jury had never heard the hearsay
evidence of Schmitz’s confession.” (Id.)
Having reviewed the transcripts of Petitioner’s trial, the Court concludes that
Petitioner has not established that the admission of Schmitz’s hearsay statement resulted
in actual prejudice under Brecht v. Abrahamson. Further, the record supports the Idaho
Court of Appeals’ harmlessness determination, and, therefore, that court’s application of
Chapman v. California was reasonable, and habeas relief is prohibited under
§ 2254(d)(1). The factual findings of the state court are also well-supported by the record,
and Petitioner has therefore not shown that any such findings are unreasonable under
§ 2254(d)(2). The evidence of Petitioner’s participation in the underlying felony—
conspiracy to commit robbery—was overwhelming. Therefore, the jury would have
found Petitioner guilty of first-degree felony murder even without hearing evidence of
Schmitz’s statements. Claim One must be denied on the merits because Petitioner has not
shown that he was prejudiced by the admission of Schmitz’s out-of-court statements.
CLAIM FOUR: CONFLICT OF INTEREST
In Claim Four, Petitioner claims that he was denied the right to conflict-free
counsel because (1) his trial attorneys were members of the same public defender’s office
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 13
as Schmitz’s attorney, (2) the investigator who worked on Petitioner’s case was married
to the investigator on Schmitz’s case, and (3) Petitioner was not informed of any potential
conflict. (Am. Pet. at 8.)
1.
Clearly-Established Law Regarding Attorney Conflicts of Interest
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to the effective
assistance of defense counsel, which includes the right to be represented by conflict-free
counsel. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981). A potential conflict of interest,
however, is not enough. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980) (stating that the
mere “possibility of [a] conflict is insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction”). Instead,
a petitioner asserting an attorney conflict-of interest claim must “show that potential
conflicts impermissibly imperil[ed] his right to a fair trial.” 3 Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348
(internal citations omitted).
A potential conflict exists where the same counsel represents two defendants in
criminal actions arising from the same set of facts. In such a case, the representation of
two defendants “could prejudice either or both clients.” Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776
(U.S. 1987). Where, as here, multiple defendants are represented by different attorneys in
a single public defender’s office, that representation, which the Court will refer to as
“concurrent representation,” might also give rise to a conflict of interest. However, it is
3
Prejudice arising from a conflict of interest is presumed “only if the defendant demonstrates that
counsel ‘actively represented conflicting interests’ and that “an actual conflict of interest adversely
affected his lawyer’s performance.’” Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 783 (1987) (internal citations
omitted). See also Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 172-73 (2002) (rejecting the proposed rule of
automatic reversal of a conviction where there existed a conflict that did not actually affect counsel’s
performance).
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 14
well established that “[r]equiring or allowing a single attorney to represent two codefendants, often referred to as joint representation, is not per se violative of
constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel.” Holloway v. Arkansas, 435
U.S. 475, 482 (1978). It follows, then, that multiple county public defenders representing
different co-defendants is also not a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment. Rather,
joint representation—and, by extension, concurrent representation of co-defendants by
different attorneys in the same public defender’s office—violates the Constitution only if
the defendant’s attorney has an actual conflict of interest “that affected counsel’s
performance—as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties.” Mickens v. Taylor,
535 U.S. 162, 170 (2002).
When a trial court is made aware of an attorney’s potential conflict of interest, the
court must either appoint new counsel or take adequate steps to determine whether the
risk of an actual conflict is too remote to warrant appointment of new counsel. Holloway,
435 U.S. at 484.
2.
The Idaho Court of Appeals’ Rejection of Claim Four Was Reasonable
As noted previously, the issue of a potential conflict of interest between
Petitioner’s attorneys and Mr. Adams, who was Schmitz’s attorney, was presented to the
trial court during a pretrial hearing. (State’s Lodging A-4 at 50.) One of Petitioner’s
attorneys stated that they had erected, and would continue to maintain, a “Chinese wall”
between the two cases so that no information or staff participation would be shared. No
one present at the pretrial hearing, including Petitioner and the trial judge, expressed any
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 15
dissatisfaction with that explanation or otherwise expressed concern to the concurrent
representation.
In state postconviction proceedings, the state court held an evidentiary hearing on
Petitioner’s claim that his defense team had a conflict with the attorney representing
Schmitz. John Adams, the supervising public defender and the attorney who represented
Schmitz, testified that although he did not independently recall the conflict issue in
Petitioner’s and Schmitz’s case, he and the other public defenders involved would have
erected “what lawyers call a ‘Chinese Wall’”—that is, they would not have shared
information, discussed the case, or shared staff on the matters. (State’s Lodging E-4 at
11.) Adams testified that the attorneys in the public defender’s office no longer engage in
concurrent representation, “because I think that was probably an ethical violation.” (Id. at
14.) In hindsight, Adams stated that concurrent representation of co-defendants within the
public defender’s office was a “bad practice,” but he was unable to articulate any specific
prejudice that may have resulted for either Petitioner or Schmitz. (Id. at 18.)
Lynn Nelson, one of the attorneys who represented Petitioner, testified that the
metaphorical wall was, indeed, erected between the attorneys and investigators working
on Petitioner’s and Schmitz’s respective defenses and that Nelson did not have any
concerns about the issue. (Id. at 25-26.) Nelson testified that concurrent representation by
different attorneys in the public defender’s office should be avoided if possible, but that
he did not consider it unethical to offer such representation if the metaphorical wall is
maintained. (Id. at 47-48.) Nelson stated that the defense teams used different
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 16
investigators and that, although the two investigators were married to each other, they
were “dedicated professionals, and they guard[ed] their secrets very closely.” (Id. at 66.)
Petitioner’s other attorney, John Bradford Chapman, testified that the fact that
Petitioner and Schmitz were represented by different attorneys in the same public
defender’s office raised a concern because of the “appearance of impropriety.” (Id. at 70.)
Chapman did not specifically recall discussing the conflict issue with Petitioner or with
the attorney representing Schmitz. Petitioner’s attorneys both testified as to their general
practice of discussing issues with their clients and had no reason to believe that they
deviated from that practice while representing Petitioner. (Id. at 44-68, 75-90.)
Petitioner testified at the postconviction evidentiary hearing as well. He stated that
he was never informed that Schmitz’s attorney worked in the same public defender’s
office as, and in fact supervised, his own attorneys or that the representation could pose a
potential conflict of interest. (Id. at 96.) Petitioner also testified that he was not aware that
the investigators on his and Schmitz’s cases were married to each other. (Id. at 101.)
The investigator assigned to Petitioner’s case also testified at the evidentiary
hearing that he and his wife, who was working on Schmitz’s case, never discussed their
work with each other:
There was a Chinese wall from day one. No, we could not
talk about the case. To this day, we still haven’t talked about
what either one found out in their investigations. I know that
we both went out to the crime scene at the same time, both
saw the same thing, but we didn’t do interviews together nor
did we do anything that would have conflicted or jeopardized
the Chinese wall.
(Id. at 150.)
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 17
Faced with this evidence, the Idaho Court of Appeals first held that because the
trial court “held a hearing on the record in the criminal case and gave both sides the
opportunity to address the potential conflict,” Petitioner could not obtain an automatic
reversal, but rather was required to show that a conflict of interest actually imperiled his
chance of a fair trial. The state court then determined that there was no actual conflict
because Petitioner’s attorneys were not “acting in a manner adverse to [Petitioner’s]
interests” and “took steps to ensure that [Petitioner] received diligent representation” by
erecting and maintaining the metaphorical wall. (State’s Lodging F-8 at 7.) The court
further held that any conflict—if one existed—was not “likely to result in prejudice.”
(Id.)
In reaching its conclusions, the Idaho Court of Appeals reasonably applied Wood
v. Georgia and Cuyler v. Sullivan. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Petitioner did not—and to
this day has not—come forward with any evidence suggesting that his attorneys had an
actual conflict of interest with Schmitz’s attorney or that the concurrent representation of
different attorneys in the public defender’s office resulted in any prejudice to Petitioner.
Further, Petitioner has not shown that the court of appeals’ decision rested on an
unreasonable determination of fact. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Therefore, Plaintiff is not
entitled to habeas relief on Claim Four.
CONCLUSION
The Idaho Court of Appeals’ decisions rejecting Claims One and Four were not
contrary to, or unreasonable applications of, clearly-established Supreme Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 18
precedent, nor were those decisions based on unreasonable factual determinations.
Therefore, § 2254(d) precludes habeas relief on these two claims.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED:
1.
Respondents’ Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer (Dkt. 38) is
GRANTED.
2.
Petitioner’s Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply (Dkt. 41) is
GRANTED.
3.
Claims One and Four of the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
(Dkt. 13) are DENIED. Because all other claims in the Amended Petition
have been dismissed, this entire action is DISMISSED with prejudice.
4.
The Court does not find its resolution of this habeas matter to be reasonably
debatable, and a certificate of appealability will not issue. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c); Habeas Rule 11. If Petitioner wishes to appeal, he must file a
timely notice of appeal with the Clerk of Court. Petitioner may seek a
certificate of appealability from the Ninth Circuit by filing a request in that
court.
DATED: August 20, 2015
Honorable Mikel H. Williams
United States Magistrate Judge
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 19
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?