Baxter v. Rivers
Filing
40
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER; Defendant Hendrickson is immune from liability for perjury. Claims in Plaintiffs Complaint under § 1983 asserting Hendricksons liability for perjury are therefore DISMISSED. denying 32 MOTION to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Ken Rivers, Justin Hendrickson,. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by dks)
Baxter v. Rivers
Doc. 40
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F O R THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
J O S E P H JACKSON BAXTER, C a s e No. 3:08-cv-00455-BLW Plaintiff, v. K E N RIVERS and JUSTIN H E N D R IC K S O N , Defendants. M E M O R A N D U M DECISION A N D ORDER
B e f o re the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment (D k t. 32). The Court finds that oral argument would not significantly assist the decisional p ro c e s s , thus the Court considers the motion on the parties' briefing, without a hearing. The Court rules as follows. BACKGROUND O n January 12, 2005, a bondsman falsely identified Plaintiff Joseph Baxter as J a re d Hillier, for whom a bench warrant had been issued. The bondsman contacted p o lic e . On the bondsman's information, Officer Rivers stopped the car in which Baxter w a s a passenger; three other people were in the car. Baxter got out and identified himself a s Joseph Baxter. Baxter indicated he had no identification with him. Other officers,
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including Officer Hendrickson, began to arrive at the scene. Rivers frisked Baxter and a s k e d to remove his wallet. During search of Baxter's wallet, Rivers and Hendrickson f o u n d baggies of methamphetamine, and placed Baxter under arrest. In Baxter's criminal proceedings, the state court judge found that Baxter consented to the search of his wallet, although Baxter denied having given consent. The judge c o n c lu d e d that the search of Baxter's wallet was reasonable, and denied his motion to s u p p re s s . On November 2, 2005, a jury found Baxter guilty of possession of m e th a m p h e ta m in e and being a persistent violator, and Baxter was sentenced to a unified te rm of seven years. See State v. Baxter, 144 Idaho 672 (2007). On appeal, Baxter argued that Rivers and Hendrickson lacked reasonable grounds to believe he was armed and dangerous, and thus lacked justification to frisk Baxter under T e r r y v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). Citing to a then-newly issued Idaho Supreme Court d e c is io n , the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the facts in Baxter's case did not support a n "objectively reasonable" basis for the officers to conclude it was necessary to frisk B a x te r to protect the officers or others. Baxter, 144 Idaho at 679, citing State v. Henage, 1 4 3 Idaho 655, 661 (2007). The Court concluded that the state court erred in finding that B a x te r's frisk was justified. Baxter's convictions for possession of a controlled substance a n d being a persistent violator were thus vacated. O n October 29, 2008, Baxter filed a Complaint against Rivers and Hendrickson u n d e r 42 U.S.C. � 1983, asserting violations of his Fourth Amendment right to be free
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from unlawful search. Baxter filed an Amended Complaint (Dkt. 21) on May 15, 2009. Defendants Rivers and Hendrickson now move to dismiss, asserting absolute and q u a lif ie d immunity. ANALYSIS 1. L e g a l Standard S u m m a ry judgment is "not a disfavored procedural shortcut," but is instead the " p rin c ip a l tool[ ] by which factually insufficient claims or defenses [can] be isolated and p re v e n te d from going to trial with the attendant unwarranted consumption of public and p riv a te resources." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). In a motion for s u m m a ry judgment, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonm o v in g party, and the Court must not make credibility findings. " Anderson v. Liberty L o b b y , Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In this case, the sole basis for Defendants' motion to dismiss and for summary ju d g m e n t is that Defendants are immune as a matter of law, under the doctrines of a b s o lu te and qualified immunity. The Court addresses these arguments in turn. 2. I m m u n ity From Liability For Perjury In support of his � 1983 claim, Baxter asserts that Officer Hendrickson committed p e rju ry in the October 2005 suppression hearing. See Complaint, Dkt. 21 at 6. Baxter a rg u e s that Officer Hendrickson's false testimony was intended to persuade the court that B a x te r was less credible than the officers, and thus to support Baxter's conviction.
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The United States Supreme Court has held that 42 U.S.C. � 1983 does not a u th o riz e damages claims against a police officer for giving perjured testimony in a c la im a n t's criminal proceedings. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983). Relying on B ris c o e , the Ninth Circuit concluded similarly in Holt v. Castaneda, 832 F.2d 123 (1987). A p p lie d here, Baxter is precluded from maintaining an action for damages against H e n d ric k s o n based on allegations that the officer gave perjured testimony in Baxter's s u p p re s s io n hearing. Under Briscoe and Holt, Hendrickson has absolute immunity from d a m a g e s under � 1983 with respect to Baxter's allegations of perjury. 3. Q u a lifie d Immunity In � 1983 actions, the doctrine of qualified immunity protects state officials from p e rs o n a l liability for on-the-job conduct, so long as the conduct is objectively reasonable a n d does not violate clearly established federal rights. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 8 0 0 , 818 (1982) (citations omitted). A qualified immunity analysis thus consists of two p ro n g s : (1) whether the facts as alleged by plaintiff establish a violation of a c o n s titu tio n a l right, and (2) whether that right was clearly established given the state of th e law at the time of the alleged misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S.Ct. 808, 8151 6 (2009), citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Courts may "exercise their s o u n d discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis s h o u ld be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand." Id. a t 818.
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As to the first prong, the court considers whether, "[t]aken in the light most f a v o ra b le to the party asserting the injury, . . . the facts alleged show the [defendants'] c o n d u c t violated a constitutional right." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. As discussed herein, th e Idaho Court of Appeals determined that Officer Rivers violated Baxter's Fourth A m e n d m e n t rights when he frisked Baxter. See Baxter, 144 Idaho 672. In light of the Id a h o Court of Appeals' decision, and given the facts as alleged by Baxter, this Court f in d s that the first prong has been established. In q u iry of the second prong � whether the law was clearly established � is a q u e s tio n of law. Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994). However, consideration o f this question "must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a b ro a d general proposition." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. The Court must consider the " o b je c tiv e legal reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were c le a rly established at the time it was taken." Pearson, 129 S.Ct. at 822, quoting Wilson v. L a y n e , 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999). If the public official can demonstrate he did not know, n o r should he have known the relevant legal standard, then qualified immunity applies. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819. The Supreme Court has recognized that "it is inevitable that law enforcement o f f ic ia ls will in some cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is p re s e n t, and we have indicated that in such cases those officials � like other officials who a c t in ways they reasonably believe to be lawful � should not be held personally liable."
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Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987). True to its dual purposes of protecting s ta te actors who act in good faith, and redressing clear wrongs caused by state actors, the q u a lif ie d immunity standard "gives ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all b u t the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Hunter v. Bryant, 5 0 2 U.S. 224, 227 (1991). The conduct at issue here concerns Rivers' frisk of Baxter. Defendants argue that th e law regarding grounds for a lawful frisk was not clearly established, citing the state tria l court's finding that the officer's action was reasonable. Defendants also assert that, in reversing Baxter's conviction, the Idaho Court of Appeals relied on an Idaho Supreme C o u rt decision that was issued after Baxter's arrest and conviction. It is true that the Id a h o Court of Appeals cited to Henage, a case decided after Baxter's arrest. But D e f e n d a n t points to no split or relevant controversy in the law at the time that Rivers f ris k e d Baxter. Nor does it appear that Henage was in some way a groundbreaking d e c is io n . In its qualified immunity analysis here, this Court looks only at case law in e x is te n c e at the time of Baxter's arrest in January of 2005. At that time, the law provided th a t an officer is justified in frisking a suspect if "a reasonably prudent [person] in the c irc u m s ta n c e s would be warranted in the belief" that he or others were in danger. Terry v . Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). Where the officer can point to "specific and articulable f a c ts " that would cause a reasonably prudent person to believe the suspect posed a
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danger, the officer is justified in frisking the suspect. State v. Babb, 133 Idaho 890, 892 (C t. App. 2000). The Court must look to the totality of circumstances in analyzing the d a n g e r reasonably perceived by the officers. Id. The case law appears consistent. The q u e s tio n becomes whether, given the facts and circumstances, Rivers' conduct could re a s o n a b ly be construed as "mistaken judgment," as described in Hunter, or if a re a s o n a b le person would conclude that Rivers knew or should have known his conduct v io la te d the law. T h e unchallenged facts include that Officer Rivers stopped Baxter's car in midday. There were three people in the car other than Baxter. Rivers believed there was a warrant f o r Baxter's arrest, based upon his mistaken belief that Baxter was actually Hillier, for w h o m there was a warrant. But, according to Rivers' own testimony, Rivers did not k n o w the nature of the warrant. Baxter immediately stepped out of the car when Rivers s to p p e d the car. Baxter identified himself as Joseph Baxter, but Rivers suspected that he w a s Hillier, and lying about his identity. Baxter told Rivers he did not have identification w ith him. Rivers frisked Baxter, and during this frisk, Rivers felt what he believed was a w a lle t in Baxter's rear pocket. According to Rivers, other officers began to arrive at the s c e n e soon after Rivers made contact with Baxter. T h e re is no evidence that Rivers believed Baxter was armed. There is no evidence " th a t Baxter or his companions were uncooperative, violent, or abusive while being d e ta in e d ." Baxter, 144 Idaho at 679. The circumstances fail to support that Rivers
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reasonably and justifiably believed that his or others' safety was at risk, as contemplated in Terry or Babb. The only specific and articulable facts supporting a risk of danger are that there w e re three other people in the car with the suspect, and that there was a warrant for the s u s p e c t's arrest. However, these facts must be balanced by the facts that back-up officers w e re arriving at the time Rivers stopped Baxter's car, that it was midday, and that all p e rs o n s in the car � including Baxter � were being cooperative and non-threatening. Considering the totality of circumstances, the Court finds that a reasonably prudent p e rs o n in Rivers' position knew or should have known that a frisk of Baxter was in v io la tio n of Baxter's Fourth Amendment rights. This Court is mindful that the trial judge in Baxter's criminal case found no c o n s titu tio n a l violation by the arresting officers. However, the trial judge's decision was re v e rse d unanimously by the Idaho Court of Appeals on consideration of the legal p rin c ip le s articulated by the United States Supreme Court more than 40 years ago in T e r r y . While the Idaho Court of Appeals also cited to Henage, a more recent decision of th e Idaho Supreme Court, that decision was an unremarkable and routine application of th e well-established principles set forth in Terry. Given the undisputed facts and a p p lic a b le law, it is clear to the Court that Baxter's trial judge simply got it wrong. His d e c is io n provides no basis for an assertion of qualified immunity here. F o r these reasons, this Court finds that the law was clearly established, Baxter's
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Fourth Amendment rights were violated, and qualified immunity does not apply. The C o u rt will therefore deny Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. ORDER I T IS ORDERED: 1. D e f e n d a n t Hendrickson is immune from liability for perjury. Claims in P la in tif f 's Complaint under � 1983 asserting Hendrickson's liability for p e rju ry are therefore DISMISSED. 2. Q u a lif ie d immunity does not apply to Rivers, with respect to Rivers' illegal f ris k of Baxter. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (D k t. 32) is DENIED. D A T E D : September 30, 2010
B. LYNN WINMILL C h ie f U.S. District Court Judge
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