Baxter v. Rivers
Filing
48
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER denying 43 Motion to Alter Judgment; granting 46 Motion to File Sur-Response. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by cjm)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
JOSEPH J. BAXTER,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 3:08-cv-00455-BLW
v.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
KEN RIVERS, and JUSTIN
HENDRICKSON,
Defendants.
Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Joseph J. Baxter’s Motion To Alter Judgment
(Dkt. 43) from the Court’s Memorandum Decision and Order (Dkt. 41) and Judgment
(Dkt. 42) dismissing this action. Also before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to File SurResponse (Dkt. 46), in light of arguments newly raised in Plaintiff’s reply. Having
considered the parties’ briefing, including the sur-response and Plaintiff’s response
thereto, the Court will grant Defendant’s Motion to File Sur-Response, and deny
Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter Judgment, as more fully expressed below.
LEGAL STANDARD
Reconsideration of a court’s prior ruling under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e) is appropriate “if (1) the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1
(2) the district court committed clear error or made an initial decision that was manifestly
unjust, or (3) there is an intervening change in controlling law.” S.E.C. v. Platforms
Wireless Int’l Corp., 617 F.3d 1072, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). If the motion
to reconsider does not fall within one of these three categories, it must be denied. Here,
Plaintiff asserts that the second category applies – that the court committed clear error.
ANALYSIS
In its Memorandum Decision and Order dismissing Plaintiff’s action, the Court
determined that Plaintiff’s false arrest and false imprisonment claims were barred by the
applicable statute of limitations, Idaho Code § 5-219(4) of two years. Mem. Dec. & Ord.,
Dkt. 41. The Court determined that Plaintiff’s claim accrued when he became “detained
pursuant to legal process,” citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 397 (2007). Id. In this
motion, Plaintiff contends that the Court erred in calculating the accrual date for his claim
of constitutional violation under § 1983. As a result, Plaintiff argues that the Court
incorrectly found that the statute of limitations had run. Plaintiff relies on a Ninth Circuit
decision holding that a § 1983 action for illegal search and seizure does not accrue until
criminal charges have been dismissed or conviction overturned. Harvey v. Waldron, 210
F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1994)).
However, the holding in Harvey, as relied on by Plaintiff, was effectively overruled by
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 394 (affirming Wallace v. City of Chicago, 440 F.3d 421, 42527 (7th Cir. 2006), which disagreed with the Harvey rule cited by Plaintiff here); see
Kamar v. Krolczyk, 2008 WL 2880414 at 6-7.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2
In Wallace, the plaintiff brought suit under § 1983 for unlawful arrest in violation
of the Fourth Amendment. The Wallace court noted that “the Heck rule for deferred
accrual is called into play only when there exists a conviction or sentence that has not
been . . . invalidated,” in other words, when there is an “outstanding criminal judgment.”
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). The court in
Wallace noted that a district court could stay a civil action under § 1983 “until the
criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 1098.
However, the Wallace court declined to “adopt a federal tolling rule” to toll the limitation
period from time of conviction until such time as a conviction is set aside, noting that “it
would not be known whether tolling is appropriate by reason of the Heck bar until it is
established that the newly entered conviction would be impugned by the not-yet-filed,
and thus utterly indeterminate, § 1983 claim.” Id. at 1099. Ultimately, the Wallace court
concluded that “the statute of limitations upon a § 1983 claim seeking damages for a false
arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, where the arrest is followed by criminal
proceedings, begins to run at the time the claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal
process.” Id. at 1100. The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Wallace squarely
applies to Plaintiff’s case here.
Plaintiff argues that Wallace should not apply because it was decided after his
claim arose. As noted by Defendant, the United States Supreme Court has held that
“when (1) the Court decides a case and applies the (new) legal rule of that case to the
parties before it, then (2) it and other courts must treat that same (new) legal rule as
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3
‘retroactive,’ applying it, for example, to all pending cases, whether or not those cases
involve predecision events.” Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 752 (1995)
(other citation omitted). Just as the new rule in Wallace applied to the parties in that case,
the rule also applies retroactively to the parties here. Accordingly, the Court finds no
error in its decision dismissing this matter as barred by the applicable statute of
limitations, and under Wallace. There being no error, or other basis for reconsideration or
to alter judgment, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED:
1.
Defendant’s Motion to File Sur-Response (Dkt. 46) is GRANTED.
2.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter Judgment (Dkt. 43) is DENIED.
DATED: August 26, 2011
_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
Chief Judge
United States District Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4
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