Morehouse v. State of Idaho et al

Filing 33

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER denying 26 Motion to Sever; denying as moot 28 Motion to Strike. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (cjm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

TERI MOREHOUSE, as an individual,
LORISA WELLOCK, as an individual,
LISA MILLER, as an individual,

Case No. 3:11-cv-00167-BLW
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

Plaintiffs,
v.
IDAHO STATE DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS; and BRENT D.
REINKE, individually and in his official
capacity; TEREMA CARLIN,
individually and in her official capacity;
THOMAS HOUDESHELL, individually
and in his official capacity; KENNETH
ALLDRIN, individually and in his
official capacity; ROBERT QUINN
DAVIDSON, individually and in his
official capacity; AARON KRIEGER,
individually and in his official capacity;
TERRI TOMISSER, individually and in
her official capacity; THOMAS
MCKINZIE, individually and in his
official capacity,
Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
The Court has before it Defendants’ Motion for Severance of Claims (Dkt. 26),
and Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of the Morehouse, Wellock, and Miller

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1

Affidavits (Dkt. 28). The motions are fully briefed and at issue. For the reasons
expressed below, the Court will DENY the Motion for Severance of Claims and will
DENY as moot the Motion to Strike.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Teri Morehouse, Lisa Miller, and Lorisa Wellock filed a joint First
Amended Complaint and Demand for a Jury Trial (Dkt. 13) against the Idaho State
Department of Corrections (IDOC) and seven IDOC employees on September 16, 2011.
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1.1-1.13, Dkt. 13. Plaintiffs are former correctional facility workers at
IDOC’s Idaho Correctional Institution located in Orofino, Idaho (ICI-O) and at the North
Idaho Correctional Institution, located in Cottonwood, Idaho (NICI). Id. ¶ 3.1, Dkt. 13.
1. Teri Morehouse
Plaintiff Morehouse began working as a correctional facility worker at the IDOC’s
ICI-O in April 2008. Id. at ¶ 3.3. Morehouse was assigned to report to training officer
Thomas Houdeshell for her mandatory training, evaluation, and advancement. Id. at ¶
3.5. Morehouse alleges that Houdeshell sexually harassed her during this training. Id. at
¶ 3.7. Houdeshell did not complete the mandatory training with Morehouse but
suggested he could help with Morehouse’s career advancement because he was friendly
with Warden Terema Carlin. Id. at ¶¶ 3.7-3.10. In October 2008, Houdeshell denied
Morehouse advancement to Peace Officer Standards Training (POST) by not signing her
training logs. Id. at ¶ 3.15. Morehouse was told she could not advance without
Houdeshell’s written approval. Id. Houdeshell suggested meeting at a bar to discuss
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Morehouse’s training logs but she refused. Id. at ¶ 3.16. Morehouse notified Lieutenant
Thomas McKinzie about Houdeshell’s conduct. Id. at ¶ 3.17. Lieutenant McKinzie
allegedly violated standard operating procedures (SOP) by failing to report the complaint
to the Office of Professional Standards (OPS) or to Human Resource Services (HRS).
Instead, he ordered Houdeshell to complete Morehouse’s training logs. Houdeshell
signed the training logs without conducting Morehouse’s mandatory training. Id.
In February 2009, POST officers and Warden Carlin characterized Morehouse as
being insufficiently tough for corrections work. Id. at ¶ 3.20. In response to this
characterization, Morehouse complained to the POST administration, OPS, and to
Warden Carlin that she was being mischaracterized because IDOC officials had been
sexually inappropriate with her. Id. at ¶ 3.21. Warden Carlin revoked Morehouse’s
status, placed her on probation, and assigned her to be closely supervised. Id. at ¶ 3.23.
Houdeshell continued to sexually harass Morehouse. Id. at ¶ 3.24. Morehouse again
complained of the harassment to IDOC supervisors. Id. at ¶ 3.25.
In May 2009, IDOC assigned Houdeshell to train Morehouse in remedial combat,
arrest, handcuff, and other hand-to-hand physical training. Id. at ¶ 3.27. Morehouse
protested this assignment to her supervisors and Warden Carlin. Warden Carlin
instructed Morehouse to file a report regarding her issues with Houdeshell and to not
discuss the situation with anyone other than her supervisors and Warden Carlin. On May
29, 2009, Morehouse submitted an IDOC Information Report Form regarding
Houdeshell’s sexual harassment towards her. Id. at ¶¶ 3.28-3.30. On June 10, 2009,
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Houdeshell received a Notification of Staff Investigation regarding his misconduct.
Houdeshell continued to make contact with Morehouse during their night shifts and
demanded shift-change status reports from Morehouse while physically blocking her exit.
Id. at ¶ 3.34.
On June 17, 2009 Morehouse was interviewed by OPS personnel regarding her
complaint. Id. at ¶ 3.35. Morehouse alleges OPS did not provide a safe environment to
conduct the interview because she was escorted into the OPS interview while the swing
and graveyard shifts passed through the main lobby of the prison, in plain view of many
co-workers. Accordingly, fellow officers asked her about the interview. Id. at ¶¶ 3.363.38. OPS terminated its investigation in June 2009. Id. at ¶ 3.36.
On July 16, 2009, Warden Carlin terminated Morehouse for failing to complete
her probation training and accused her of publicizing her OPS complaint. Id. at ¶ 3.42.
On November 21, 2009, Morehouse filed a Notice of Claim with the United States Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) describing sex discrimination, quid pro
quo, hostile work environment, and retaliatory dismissal. On January 20, 2011,
Morehouse received a Notice of Right to File Suit from the EEOC. Id. at ¶¶ 3.44-3.45.
2. Lisa Miller
Plaintiff Miller began working as a correctional officer at the IDOC’s ICI-O in
December 2008. Id. at ¶ 3.46. On June 18, 2009, she was interviewed by an OPS
investigator regarding Morehouse’s complaint against Houdeshell. Id. at ¶ 3.48. After
her interview, Houdeshell approached her at home regarding her OPS interview. Id. at ¶
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3.49. On July 28, 2009, Miller was contacted regarding a potential transfer to IDOC’s
NICI facility in Cottonwood, Idaho and in August 2009 she was transferred. Id. at ¶¶
3.50-3.51.
At NICI, Miller’s supervisors reported anonymous, unwritten inmate grievances
against her for improper sexual boundaries and flirtation. Id. at ¶ 3.53. Miller also
alleges she was often put in unsafe situations, where the ratio of inmates to corrections
officers was overwhelming and exceeded standards. Id. at ¶ 3.54. Miller further alleges
that despite written evaluations asserting her effectiveness at managing inmates, Deputy
Warden Aaron Krieger told her that she was a weak link, crediting anonymous,
unspecified, and unwritten grievances by inmates stating Miller lured inmates into
unlawful romantic entanglements. Id. at ¶ 3.58. Warden Krieger stated that the next
grievance would be her last and advised her to look for other work. Id. On May 26,
2010, Miller resigned from employment at IDOC NICI for health reasons based on her
physician’s suggestion. Id. at ¶ 3.59.
Miller filed harassment, discrimination, and retaliation complaints with OPS. Id.
at ¶ 3.60. She alleges that OPS violated their standard operating procedures (“SOP”) by
not recording her complaints or the investigation and by not making formal or informal
findings. Id. at ¶ 3.61. On February 10, 2011, Miller delivered an executed Notice of
Claim to the EEOC describing sexual harassment and retaliation. Id. at ¶ 3.62. On July
28, 2011, Miller requested a right to sue letter from the EEOC. Id. at ¶ 3.63. Her claim is
still pending. Id.
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3. Lorisa Wellock
Plaintiff Wellock began working as a food service officer at the IDOC’s NICI in
November 2006. Id. at ¶ 3.64. In July 2007 she made a complaint against a female coworker. According to Wellock, as a result of her complaint, her supervisor Robert Quinn
Davison retaliated against her. The alleged retaliation included excessive and baseless
criticism of her job performance, publicizing embarrassing details of her being sexually
propositioned at work (at issue in her complaint), placing her in at-risk work assignments
where she was alone behind locked doors with up to four violent inmates, denying her
training benefits, and causing IDOC to falsely certify that her training was complete. Id.
at ¶ 3.66.
In October 2008 Wellock filed an EEOC complaint and an internal “Problem
Solving Request Form” against her supervisor, Davidson. Id. at ¶¶ 3.68- 3.69. She
claims that her complaints were not taken seriously and instead she was falsely accused
of misconduct – having unlawful sexual relations with inmates. Id. at ¶¶ 3.70, 3.71.
From February to April 2009, Wellock was placed on medical leave and doctorapproved light duty work due to pain in her neck, right shoulder, and arm. Id. at ¶¶ 3.723.75. During this period, Warden Carlin allegedly rescinded Wellock’s approval for light
duty work and sent her home for 50 days without pay. Id. at ¶ 3.76. On April 29, 2009,
Wellock received a letter stating that IDOC was considering a medical layoff because she
had exhausted her 84 days of Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave, and on May
21, she was laid off. Id. at ¶¶ 3.77- 3.78. The paperwork she received when she was laid
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6

off indicated that she had one year to place herself on IDOC’s register to be rehired, and
for a period of one year, “the Department must re-employ [Wellock] before filling the
vacancy in [her] classification through other means.” Id. at ¶ 3.78. On July 22, 2009,
Wellock was medically cleared to return to work with no restrictions. Id. at ¶ 3.79.
Between August 2009 and April 2010 Wellock applied for approximately five IDOC
food service job openings but was not hired for any of them. Id. at ¶¶ 3.79-3.83. Wellock
alleges that IDOC violated its recall policy by hiring persons who were not on the
Department rehire list. Id. at ¶ 3.85.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 provides that persons may join in one action as
plaintiffs if:
(A)

(B)

they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the
alternative with respect to or arising out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences; and
any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise
in the action.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1)(A)-(B). The permissive joinder rule “is to be construed liberally
in order to promote trial convenience and to expedite the final determination of disputes,
thereby preventing multiple lawsuits.” League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Reg’l
Planning Agency, 558 F.2d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 1977). The purpose of Rule 20(a) is to
address the “broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties;

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 7

joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged.” United Mine Workers of
Am. V. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966).
For there to be transactional relatedness under Rule 20(a)(1)(A), the claim must
arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1)(A). There is no bright-line definitions of “transaction,”
“occurrence,” or “series,” and courts assess the facts of each case individually to
determine whether joinder is sensible in light of the underlying policies of permissive
party joinder. Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir. 1997). Although the
case may involve different occurrences, where the claims involve enough related
operative facts, joinder in a single case may be appropriate. Id.
The second part of the joinder test requires commonality. Commonality under
Rule 20(a)(1)(B) is not a particularly stringent test. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. 11C Music,
202 F.R.D. 229, 231 (M.D. Tenn. 2001) (“the common question test [ ] is usually easy to
satisfy”). The common question may be one of fact or of law and need not be the most
important or predominant issue in the litigation. See Mosley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497
F.2d 1330, 1333 (8th Cir. 1974) (Rule 20(a) does not establish a quantitative or
qualitative test for commonality).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 provides that “[m]isjoinder of parties is not a
ground for dismissing an action. On motion or on its own motion, the court may at any
time, on just terms, add or drop a party. The court may also sever any claim against a
party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. Thus, if the test for permissible joinder is not satisfied, a
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court, in its discretion, may sever the misjoined parties, so long as no substantial right
will be prejudiced by severance. Coughlin, 130 F.3d at 1350.
ANALYSIS
1.

Severance of Claims
The Court begins its analysis with the premise that Rule 20 serves to “promote

trial convenience and to expedite the final determination of disputes, thereby preventing
multiple lawsuits.” League to Save Lake Tahoe, 558 F.2d at 917. Based upon Plaintiffs’
complaint, there are common occurrences or series of occurrences as well as common
questions of law and fact to deny severance of claims at this point in the litigation.
A.

Same transaction or occurrence

The Ninth Circuit defines the terms “transaction or occurrence,” in Rule
20(a)(1)(A), to mean “similarity in the factual background of a claim.” Bautista v. Los
Angeles County, 216 F.3d 837, 842-43 (9th Cir. 2000). Claims that “’arise out of a
systematic pattern of events’ arise from the same transaction or occurrence.” Id.
Courts have found that employees who have been discriminated against under a
continuing pattern and practice have claims arising out of the same transaction or
occurrence. See Puricelli v. CNA Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. 139 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (former
employees who brought age-discrimination suit against the same employer satisfied the
“same transaction or occurrence” prong of the permissive-joinder rule, when they alleged
a pattern of conduct, which discriminated against them on the basis of age); see also
Mosely, 497 F.2d 1330 (same transaction or occurrence prong satisfied where claim by
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 9

ten plaintiffs for a racially discriminatory workplace alleged injury by a company-wide
policy designed to discriminate against African-Americans).
Furthermore, distinctive treatment of each plaintiff does not indicate that the
claims are outside the scope of the “same transaction and occurrence.” Mosley, 497 F.2d
at 1333-34 (joinder proper where discriminatory nature of defendant’s act was basic to all
plaintiffs even though each may have suffered different effects from the alleged
discrimination); see also Kohn v. American Housing Foundation I, Inc., 170 F.R.D. 474
(D. Colo. 1996) (joinder appropriate in action alleging breach of Medicare contracts,
negligence, and violations of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act although there might
have been distinctive treatment of each plaintiff).
Here, Plaintiffs all point to one agency-wide policy under which they allegedly
suffered discrimination. Pl.’s Resp. at 13, Dkt. 27. Plaintiffs allege a common practice
through a series of harassment based on their gender, with the underlying concept that
they were unable to perform their job requirements. Id. Plaintiffs further allege that they
shared the same abuses of gender stereotyping and sexual harassment, were all retaliated
against, and had their complaints mishandled by the IDOC. Id. at 16. Specifically,
Plaintiffs allege five patterns of conduct that they all suffered while working for the
IDOC to constitute their cause of action: (1) All Plaintiffs experienced sexual
harassment; (2) IDOC had knowledge of the sexual harassment; (3) the complaints were
not handled in accordance with IDOC policy; (4) the Plaintiffs were retaliated against
after complaining or participating in sexual harassment investigations; and (5) all
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Plaintiffs were the object of sex appeal or accusations of sex appeal. Pl.’s Resp. at 2-12,
Dkt. 27.
While Defendants focus on the factual differences among the Plaintiffs’ claims,
they fail to recognize the common allegation of IDOC’s policy of discrimination which
affected the Plaintiffs. Def.’s Br. at 6-8, Dkt. 26-1. Accordingly, Plaintiffs satisfy the
same transaction or occurrence prong.
B.

Common Question

The second prong of the joinder rule requires only that there be some common
question of law or fact as to all the of the plaintiffs’ claims, not that all legal and factual
issues be common to all plaintiffs. Mosley, 497 F.2d at 1333. Accordingly, when
multiple plaintiffs bring suit for employment discrimination alleging a pattern of
discriminatory behavior, a broad variation of circumstances relating to the merits of
individual performance of each of the plaintiffs will not nullify a common question of
fact. Disparate v. Corporate Executive Bd., 224 F.R.D 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2004); see also
Mosley, 497 F.2d 1330 (common question of law or fact found where alleged
discriminatory character was basic to the plaintiffs, even though the individual members
may have suffered different effects).
Defendants argue that because Plaintiffs’ claims arose from separate transactions
at more than one facility, they do not share a common question of law or fact. See Def.’s
Br. at 6-9, Dkt. 26-1. There are, however, common questions of law and fact among the
Plaintiffs’ claims. First, each Plaintiff filed claims alleging sex discrimination and
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retaliation for filing the claim. Pl.’s Resp. at 17, Dkt. 27; Am. Compl., ¶ 7.4, Dkt. 13.
Likewise, the Plaintiffs all worked for the same entity experiencing similar circumstances
and treatment. Id. Finally, each Plaintiff alleges a § 1983 claim for deprivation of
constitutional rights under color of law and breach of contract based on their experience
working for IDOC. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7.1- 8.5, Dkt. 13. These factual and legal
commonalities all satisfy the second prong.
While the Plaintiffs do not share in every claim, principles of trial convenience
and necessity weigh in favor of denying the motion to sever at this stage of the litigation.
Separate trials could be conducted as to those issues or claims not common among all the
Defendants or Plaintiffs. See Vulcan Soc. of Westchester County v. Fire Dept. of City of
White Plains, 82 F.R.D. 379 (S.D.N.Y 1979). However, separation of those issues would
be at the expense of judicial economy.
2.

Motion to Strike
Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’ Affidavits (Dkt. 28) is moot as

the affidavits (Dkts. 27-1, 27-2, & 27-3) were not material in the Court’s reasoning to
deny the motion to sever claims.
For all of the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs satisfy the liberal standards for
joinder of claims and Defendants will not suffer unnecessary delay, expense, or prejudice
at this early stage of litigation. Similarly, this Court evaluates judicial economy and the
administrative burdens of managing such cases in denying Defendants’ motion at this

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stage of the litigation. The Court may, however, entertain an additional motion to sever
as this case nears trial.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED:
1.

Defendants’ Motion for Severance of Claims (Dkt. 26) is DENIED.

2.

Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of the Morehouse, Wellock, and
Miller Affidavits (Dkt. 28) is DENIED AS MOOT.

DATED: April 23, 2012

_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
Chief Judge
United States District Court

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