Wilder v. Stegner

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM DECISION. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (cjm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
MARK WILDER,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 3:12-CV-304-BLW

v.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

JOHN R. STEGNER, Individually and
in his official capacity as District Court
Judge for Latah County,
Defendant.

INTRODUCTION
The Court has before it a motion to dismiss filed by defendant Judge John R.
Stegner. The motion is fully briefed and at issue. For the reasons explained below, the
Court will grant the motion.
LITIGATION BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Wilder brings this action against Judge Stegner, an Idaho District Court
Judge. Wilder claims that Judge Stegner, in ruling against him, denied him due process
of law. That ruling came in Wilder’s appeal from a decision of an Idaho Magistrate
Judge holding Wilder in contempt for his failure to obey prior orders to pay child support.
The Docket Sheet shows that a Notice of Appeal was filed from the Magistrate’s
ruling on October 21, 2011. The appeal was assigned to Judge Stegner, and a stay of the
Magistrate Judge’s contempt citation was issued to allow Wilder to pursue his appeal.

Memorandum Decision - 1

On November 9, 2011, an Order was issued setting deadlines for briefing, and
scheduling an oral argument on February 13, 2012. About two weeks later, Wilder filed
challenges to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate Judge, and then in early December filed a
motion to stay the substantive issues on appeal until his jurisdictional challenges could be
resolved.
On February 3, 2012, Judge Stegner issued a written ruling denying Wilder’s
motion for a stay, and reaffirmed that the hearing set for February 13, 2012, would go
forward as previously scheduled. That hearing was held, but Wilder did not attend.
Judge Stegner issued a well-reasoned decision addressing Wilder’s jurisdictional
allegations, and affirming the Magistrate Judge’s decision. When Wilder failed to file an
appeal within the thirty day deadline, the Clerk issued a remittitur, remanding the case to
the Magistrate Judge.
About two months later, Wilder filed this lawsuit against Judge Stegner. Wilder
complains that he never received any notice of the briefing schedule or hearing date
before Judge Stegner, and that he was therefore deprived of his due process rights.
Wilder asks this Court to issue injunctive relief “commanding [Judge Stegner] to allow
for appeal of [the State-Court] Magistrate’s order . . . .” and “commanding [Judge
Stegner] to set aside his Memorandum Decision and grant a hearing on Jurisdiction with
at least a 14 day notice.” See Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) at p. 6.
ANALYSIS
Defendants ask this Court to dismiss this case pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman
Memorandum Decision - 2

doctrine. Under Rooker-Feldman, lower federal courts are precluded from exercising
appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments, because jurisdiction over such
appeals is vested exclusively with the United States Supreme Court. See Lance v. Dennis,
546 U.S. 459, 464 (2006) (citing Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and
D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983)). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine
states that “[i]f the constitutional claims presented to a United States District Court are
inextricably intertwined with the state court’s denial in a judicial proceeding of a
particular plaintiff’s application for relief, then the District Court is in essence being
called upon to review the state court decision. This the District Court may not do.”
Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing D.C. Court of Appeals
v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983)).
The doctrine does not, however, prohibit a plaintiff from presenting a generally
applicable legal challenge to a state statute or rule in federal court, even if the statute or
rule has previously been applied against the plaintiff in state court litigation. See
Mothershed v. Justices of Supreme Court, 410 F.3d 602, 606 (9th Cir. 2005). Moreover,
the Supreme Court has observed that neither Rooker nor Feldman elaborated a rationale
for a wide-reaching bar on jurisdiction of lower federal courts, and the cases since
Feldman have emphasized the narrowness of the Rooker-Feldman rule. See Lance, 546
U.S. at 464. The Supreme Court explained that Rooker-Feldman is “a narrow doctrine,
confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by
state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before
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the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection
of those judgments.” Id.; (citing Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 286).
This case falls within the “narrow” Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Wilder is not
challenging a state statute or rule, but is instead complaining about a specific decision
rendered against him by Judge Stegner, prior to filing this lawsuit, and “inviting district
court review and rejection of [that decision].” Id. For that reason, this action must be
dismissed.
Moreover, Wilder’s prayer for relief seeks to compel a state judicial officer to take
specific action. Although Wilder states that he is seeking “injunctive” relief, a request for
injunctive or declaratory relief, which asks a federal court to order a state court or state
judicial officer to perform certain duties, is not a request for injunctive or declaratory
relief – it is a request for a writ of mandamus. See e.g., Oliver v. Superior Court of
Plymouth County, 799 F.Supp. 1273, 1274 (D.Mass. 1992) (plaintiff’s ostensible request
for injunctive relief against the Superior Court, asking the court to perform various
administrative functions, is a request for a writ of mandamus); Johnson v. Bigelow, 2007
WL 1170756, *1 (5th Cir. 2007) (Court acknowledged that judicial immunity does not
bar claims for injunctive or declaratory relief in civil rights actions, but federal courts
have no authority to direct state courts or their judicial officers in the performance of their
duties).
That is fatal to this lawsuit because“federal courts are without power to issue writs
of mandamus to direct state courts or their judicial officers in the performance of their
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duties . . . .” Clark v. State of Washington, 366 F.2d 678, 681 (9th Cir. 1966); see also
Spencer v Clark, 2010 WL 2735696 (S.D.Cal. April 19, 2010) at *1(citing Clark,
confirming the continued vitality of its holding). This analysis provides an independent
basis for dismissal.
For all of these reasons, the Court will grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss.
The Court will issue a separate Judgment as required by Rule 58(a).

DATED: April 17, 2013

Honorable B. Lynn Winmill
Chief U. S. District Judge

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