Columbia Grain, Inc. v. Hinrichs Trading, LLC, et al

Filing 46

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER the motion to take the deposition of Janes (docket no. 40 ) is DENIED. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (jp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
COLUMBIA GRAIN, INC., a Corporation,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 3:14-CV-115-BLW

v.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

HINRICHS TRADING, LLC, dba HINRICHS
TRADING COMPANY; HINRICHS AND
COMPANY, a general partnership; and JOHN
DOES I-V,
Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
The Court has before it a motion filed by defendant Hinrichs to take the deposition
of Kenneth Janes. Following an unsuccessful mediation session, the parties filed
simultaneous briefs, and the motion is now at issue. For the reasons explained below, the
Court will deny the motion.
ANALYSIS
This case arises from a fire in defendant Hinrichs’ garbanzo bean crib elevator that
spread to plaintiff Columbia’s crib elevators. Both elevators were destroyed. In the days
following the fire, investigators examined the scene. One of the investigators was
Kenneth Janes, retained by Columbia’s insurer, Lloyds of London Insurance Company.
Janes visited the site and wrote a report on his findings and conclusions.
Columbia filed this lawsuit against Hinrichs to recover its losses. The Court
entered a Case Management Order setting a deadline of October 24, 2014, for factual
Memorandum Decision & Order – page 1

discovery, and a deadline of October 31, 2014, for Columbia to identify its expert
witnesses. In its initial disclosures, Columbia identified Janes as a possible witness, and
produced his written report to Hinrichs. But the deadlines for identifying Janes as either
a fact witness or an expert witness came and went, and Columbia did not identify him as
either. Hinrichs likewise did not identify Janes as a witness.
On January 12, 2015, Hinrichs’ counsel informed Columbia’s counsel that they
wanted to take a video deposition of Janes to preserve his testimony for trial. Columbia
objected, arguing that the deadlines for identifying fact and expert witnesses had passed.
Following an unsuccessful mediation with the Court’s staff, Hinrichs filed a
motion to take Janes’ trial deposition. In support of its motion, Hinrichs cites Lucas v.
Pactiv Corp., 2009 WL 5197838 (W.D.Va. Dec. 22, 2009) for the proposition that there
is a distinction between discovery depositions and trial depositions, and that trial
depositions may be taken even after the discovery deadlines have passed.
But Lucas is distinguishable. In that case, the court allowed trial depositions to be
taken only after finding that the deponents were “adequately identified . . . in a timely
manner pursuant to the . . . court’s Scheduling Order.” Id. at *1. In contrast, Janes was
not timely identified as either a factual or expert witness. Those deadlines expired at the
end of October 2014, but Hinrichs did not seek his deposition until January of 2015.
Hinrichs must show good cause to extend the deadlines in the Court’s Case
Management Order. Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b); Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975
F.2d 604, 607-08 (9th Cir.1992). The focus of the good cause inquiry is “upon the
moving party’s reasons for seeking modification,” not on the “degree of prejudice to the
Memorandum Decision & Order – page 2

party opposing the modification.” Id. Good cause means scheduling deadlines cannot be
met despite a party’s diligence.
Here, Hinrichs argues that it would be “unjust” to require it to identify or depose
Jane “when his role relative to Columbia Grain was not clear.” See Hinrichs Brief (Dkt.
No. 40) at pp. 3-4. But a simple phone call would have cleared up any confusion. If
Hinrichs is arguing that it was misled into thinking that Columbia would identify Janes as
a witness – because Columbia identified him in the initial disclosures and produced his
report – the Court disagrees with that assessment. Columbia’s actions actually fostered
transparency, not opacity. By identifying Janes and turning over his report, Columbia
gave Hinrichs a full and fair opportunity to determine whether to identify him as a
witness well within the deadlines.
Under these circumstances, the Court cannot find that Hinrichs has shown good
cause to extend the deadlines set forth in the Court’s Case Management Order.
Accordingly, the motion to take Janes’ deposition will be denied.
ORDER
In accordance with the Memorandum Decision above,
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the motion to take the
deposition of Janes (docket no. 40) is DENIED.

Memorandum Decision & Order – page 3

DATED: February 19, 2015

_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
Chief Judge
United States District Court

Memorandum Decision & Order – page 4