Collier v. Eastridge et al
Filing
93
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER denying 49 Motion in Limine/Motion to Exclude. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by cjm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
WANDA COLLIER,
Case No. 4:CV 09-596-BLW
Plaintiff,
v.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER
TURNER INDUSTRIES GROUP, L.L.C., a
Louisiana limited liability company; DAVID
EASTRIDGE; NU-WEST INDUSTRIES, INC.,
a Delaware corporation, d/b/a Agrium Conda
Phosphate Industries, and JACK DANIELL, an
individual,
Defendants.
INTRODUCTION
The Court has before it a motion in limine filed by defendant Agrium. The motion
is fully briefed and at issue. For the reasons expressed below, the Court will deny the
motion.
ANALYSIS
The factual background of this case was set forth in detail in the Court’s earlier
decision and will not be repeated here. Agrium seeks to exclude the testimony of Collier
that (1) David Eastridge told her that “Jack [Daniell, Agrium’s Maintenance
Superintendent] has a gender issue with you,” and that (2) “Eastridge used the phrase ‘old
school’ when discussing Jack’s attitude toward my role in the workplace.” See Collier
Affidavit (Dkt. 34-2) at p. 2, ¶ 2. Agrium also seeks to exclude testimony by Collier’s
Memorandum Decision & Order - 1
direct supervisor, Fred Keller, that “Jack Daniell was harder on her due to the fact that she
was a woman” and that Daniell was “old school.” See Keller Deposition at pp. 43-44, 77.
The Court’s earlier opinion analyzed the evidentiary issues and concluded that
these statements were admissible for purposes of the summary judgment proceeding. In
the present motion, Agrium does not take issue with the Court’s analysis of the hearsay
issues, but argues instead that “Collier cannot establish that Eastridge had the requisite
personal knowledge to form an admissible opinion about whether Daniell ‘had an issue’
with Collier’s gender” as required by Rules of Evidence 602 and 701. See Agrium Brief
(Dkt. No. 49) at p. 2.
Agrium’s motion essentially asks the Court to reconsider its prior ruling. While
Collier argues that this is an improper request, the Court has the authority to reconsider an
interlocutory decision such as this at any time before final judgment.
In its earlier decision, the Court discussed the Rule 602 issue, identifying evidence
showing that Eastridge had numerous personal interactions with Daniell from which
Eastridge could form an opinion about Daniell’s attitudes. Agrium now argues that
“[m]ere opportunity, however, is inadequate to establish foundation under [Rules] 602 or
701. Case law is patently clear in holding that not only must a witness have had an
opportunity to observe a fact but that the witness must also have actually observed the
fact.” Id. at p. 7. Agrium points out that Eastridge has denied making these statements,
and that there is no evidence showing that Eastridge had any personal knowledge of
Daniell’s attitudes toward female workers.
Memorandum Decision & Order - 2
Personal knowledge under Rule 602 does require that the witness/declarant have
“had an opportunity to observe and actually observed the fact.” U.S. v Owens, 789 F.2d
750, 753-54 (9th Cir. 1986) overruled on other grounds, 484 U.S. 554 (1988) (quoting
Advisory Committee Note to Rule 602). As the Court discussed in detail in its earlier
decision, Eastridge actually worked with Daniell and thus could observe his behavior and
attitudes. That is all Rule 602 requires: “[M]ost modern authorities permit the testimony
if the witness had sufficient opportunity to observe the behavior or appearance of the
person whose state of mind is in issue.” 27 Wright and Gold, Federal Practice &
Procedure, § 6026 (2007) at p. 266. Agrium misreads Owen to create a declarant’s veto –
that is, to require exclusion of a statement simply because the declarant denies having
made the statement and observed the fact at issue. But such a decision would be based on
an implicit assumption that Eastridge was more credible than Collier and Keller, an
assumption the Court cannot make. See U.S. v. Kranovich, 401 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir.
2005) (holding that determining the credibility of witnesses is “the exclusive province of
the jury”).
For all these reasons, the Court will deny Agrium’s motion.
ORDER
In accordance with the Memorandum Decision set forth above,
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the motion in limine
(docket no. 49) is DENIED.
Memorandum Decision & Order - 3
DATED: October 20, 2011
Honorable B. Lynn Winmill
Chief U. S. District Judge
Memorandum Decision & Order - 4
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?