Blumhorst v. Pierce Manufacturing Inc. et al

Filing 250

ORDER Re: Plaintiff's Motion to Amend to Add a Claim for Punitive Damages at the Close of Plaintiff's Case in Chief denying 223 MOTION to Amend/Correct to Add Claim for Punitive Damages. Signed by Judge Ronald E. Bush. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (cjm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

ERVIN E. BLUMHORST,
Plaintiff,
v.
PIERCE MANUFACTURING, INC., a Wisconsin
corporation, AKRON BRASS COMPANY, a
Delaware corporation, and john Does I through X,

Case No. 4:10-cv-00573-REB
ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
TO AMEND TO ADD A CLAIM FOR
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AT THE
CLOSE OF PLAINTIFF’S CASE IN
CHIEF
(Docket No. 223)

Defendants.
__________________________________________
PIERCE MANUFACTURING, INC., a Wisconsin
corporation,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
v.
WATEROUS COMPANY, a Minnesota
corporation
Third-Party Defendant.

Now pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s renewed Motion to Amend to Add a Claim
for Punitive Damages at the Close of Plaintiff’s Case in Chief (Docket No. 223). Having
carefully considered the record, participated in oral argument, and otherwise being fully advised,
the undersigned delivered his oral ruling as to the above-referenced motion following oral
argument on February 26, 2013. This Order formally memorializes that decision.

ORDER - 1

DISCUSSION
On February 11, 2013, this Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend to assert a claim
for punitive damages (Docket No. 126). See 2/11/13 Order, p. 7 (Docket No. 188). Plaintiff’s
renewed motion follows evidence presented in his case-in-chief, from which Plaintiff repeats his
argument that Pierce (1) chose not to warn of a known danger associated with the “Instantaneous
On-Off Switch” for more than two years before Plaintiff’s injury, and then (2) continued to
refuse to warn of that danger for more than two additional years after Plaintiff’s injury is
sufficient to support an award of punitive damages.
“[A] prayer for punitive damages is not a stand-alone cause of action, but flows from an
underlying cause of action, such as a breach of contract or a tort, when the conduct of a party
meets the threshold level of being oppressive and outrageous.” See Boise Tower Assocs. LLC v.
Washington Capital Joint Master Trust, 2006 WL 1749656 at *12 (D. Idaho 2006). Conduct
justifying punitive damages requires “an intersection of two factors: a bad act and a bad state of
mind.” See Linscott v. Rainier Nat. Life Ins. Co., 606 P.2d 958, 962 (Idaho 1980). The
defendant must (1) act in a manner that was an extreme deviation from reasonable standards of
conduct with an understanding of – or disregard for – its likely consequences, and must (2) act
with an extremely harmful state of mind, described variously as with malice, oppression, fraud,
gross negligence, wantonness, deliberately, or willfully. See Myers v. Workmen’s Auto Ins. Co.,
95 P.3d 977, 983 (Idaho 2004). For Plaintiff to be entitled to amend his Complaint to add a
claim for punitive damages, he needs to show “a reasonable likelihood of proving facts at trial
sufficient to support an award of punitive damages.” See I.C. § 6-1604(2). The decision as to
whether such an amendment should be allowed is one placed in the discretion of the Court.
ORDER - 2

At the outset, Pierce’s alleged failure to forward along the 2006 Waterous “warnings” in
the two years before Plaintiff’s 2008 accident (and, even, since then) – in essence, the foundation
for Plaintiff’s renewed effort to assert a claim for punitive damages1 – arguably represents an
deviation from reasonable standards of conduct. Indeed, the record contains evidence that
Plaintiff can draw upon to argue that Pierce breached a duty to so warn. However, that breach
does not rise to the level of egregiousness that warrants the relief Plaintiff now seeks.
Although Plaintiff’s expert witness Richard Gill generally testified to such issues at trial,2
his testimony did not contrast Pierce’s actions with others in the relevant business – such
evidence was significant within the case Plaintiff relied upon, i.e., Sliman v. Aluminum Co. of
America, Inc., 112 Idaho 277 (Idaho 1986). In Sliman, the plaintiff’s expert, George Greene,
specifically testified that the defendant’s conduct amounted to “an extreme deviation from
customary and usual action taken by manufacturers of consumer products.” See Sliman, 112
Idaho at 285 (“The record affords evidence that Mr. Greene was a qualified safety engineer and
was familiar with customary practices in the consumer products industry. His testimony as to
ALCOA’s ‘extreme deviation’ from these customary practices was relevant tot he issue of
punitive damages.”). Unlike in Sliman, such focused testimony/evidence does not exist here.

1

Though not contained within Plaintiff’s written materials, during oral argument,
Plaintiff’s counsel asserted that Pierce’s alleged failure to forward along the 2006 warnings
following Plaintiff’s 2008 accident represented additional evidence supporting a claim for
punitive damages. Plaintiff offers no evidence in support of such an argument – that is, whether
alleged conduct that existed independent of Plaintiff’s claims (and, therefore, without any causal
relationship to Plaintiff’s claims) can support a claim for punitive damages. The Court has also
not located any legal authority in support of such an argument.
2

Other than referencing “Plaintiff’s evidence” that is now “all in the record” (see Pl.’s
Mot. to Am., p. 4 (Docket No. 223), Plaintiff cites to no actual evidence supporting his argument
in favor of adding a claim for punitive damages against Pierce.
ORDER - 3

However, even if Pierce’s failure to warn departed from industry norms, Plaintiff points
to no evidence that it was performed with an extremely harmful state of mind – an additional
requirement under Idaho law. In Sliman, evidence existed of 229 claims involving allegedly
similar, and earlier, “blow-off” accidents with which the defendant was familiar prior to the atissue accident. See id. at 284. Here, the record thus far contains no similar evidence that Pierce
(or the supplier, Waterous) had notice of comparable incidents before Plaintiff’s accident in
2008. Further, the decision in Sliman focused upon the duties of the component supplier, and
Plaintiff chose not to sue Waterous. Here, Waterous changed the language on the control panel
to more strongly emphasize the potential for injury in operation of the discharge relief valve.
Mr. Negro, Pierce’s representative, testified in Plaintiff’s case-in-chief that no one at Pierce took
any particular note of that change in language. Waterous also changed, in arguably significant
fashion as testified to by Dr. Gill, the nature of the warnings in the operation manual for the
pump. However, Mr. Negro said that such manuals were simply “passed on” by Pierce to their
customers, in the same original plastic packaging in which the manuals were received from
Waterous.
The Court understands that the Plaintiff has every right to argue that Pierce’s conduct in
failing to communicate the fact of such changed warnings supports Plaintiff’s claims of strict
liability and negligence. But, those facts still come from an otherwise barren landscape of facts
to support a punitive damages claim. There is no evidence of prior accidents. There is no
evidence of complaints from customers about the operation of the discharge relief valve, or the
language of the instructions or warnings. There was no express request or concern raised by
Waterous, to Pierce, at the time of the change in the wording on the pump panel or the manuals,

ORDER - 4

to the effect that the customers who had purchased trucks with such pumps in the past needed to
be notified of the changes in instructions and warnings. Plaintiff certainly can argue that Pierce
should have acted to notify prior purchasers even without such a directive from Waterous, but
the failure to do so against the other facts in the record simply does not rise to the level the
statute would require in order to allow proof of either an extreme deviation from reasonable
standards of conduct, or a state of mind that can be characterized as malicious, oppressive,
fraudulent, grossly negligent, wanton, deliberate, and/or willful.
Punitive damages are disfavored in the law. Such damages are an extraordinary remedy,
available only in the extraordinary circumstances that Idaho statutory and case law permits.
Those extraordinary circumstances are not present in this case. Therefore, after weighing the
evidence presented in Plaintiff’s case-in-chief, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff has not
presented a reasonable likelihood of proving facts at trial sufficient to support an award of
punitive damages.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend
to Add a Claim for Punitive Damages at the Close of Plaintiff’s Case in Chief (Docket No. 223)
is DENIED.
DATED: March 8, 2013

Honorable Ronald E. Bush
U. S. Magistrate Judge

ORDER - 5