Strickholm v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society et al

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER denying 4 Motion to Compel arbitration and stay proceedings. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by dks)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

ERIC STRICKHOLM
Plaintiff,

Case No. 4:11-CV-00059-BLW

v.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

THE EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN GOOD
SAMARITAN SOCIETY d/b/a GOOD
SAMARITAN SOCIETY – IDAHO FALLS
VILLAGE, a corporation,
Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
The Court has before it a motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings. The
Court has reviewed the parties’ submissions and finds that it would not be significantly
aided by oral argument. For the reasons explained below, the Court will deny the motion.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This is a medical negligence action brought by Eric Strickholm against
Good Samaritan, a nursing home in Idaho Falls, Idaho. Eric Strickholm’s mother,
Alma Strickholm, was admitted into Good Samaritan on June 30, 2008, upon her
release from the hospital where she had been treated for pneumonia.
Upon his mother’s admission to Good Samaritan, Strickhom filled out all

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necessary forms on her behalf, as he held both a Financial and a Medical or Health
Care Power of Attorney on her behalf. Among these forms was an agreement to
arbitrate “[a]ny legal controversy, dispute, disagreement or claim of any kind
arising out of, or related to this Admission Agreement, or the breach thereof, or,
related to the care of stay at the Facility.” Resolution of Legal Disputes, Ex. A to
Duke Aff., Dkt. 4-2. The agreement further states that it “binds all parties whose
claims may arise out of or relate to treatment or service provided by the center
including any spouse or heirs of the resident.” Id.
While in the care of Good Samaritan, Alma suffered further health
complications. She was readmitted to the hospital in late July to address these
complications, and she was released August 7, 2008. Strickholm’s mother died on
August 25, 2008. Strickholm maintains the complications resulting in his
mother’s death were caused by “the improper and negligent treatment provided by
Good Samaritan.” Compl. ¶ 15, Dkt. 1-4.
On February 17, 2011, Strickholm filed a Complaint against Good
Samaritan alleging a wrongful death claim arising from the care his mother
received while at the Good Samaritan facility. Good Samaritan now moves to
compel arbitration, arguing that the arbitration agreement between Alma and Good
Samaritan, which Strickholm signed as the “responsible party,” applies to
Strickholm’s wrongful death claim. Strickholm responds that the arbitration
agreement does not apply to his wrongful death claim because (1) his wrongful
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death claim belongs to him solely, and his mother had no right to waive his
constitutional right to a jury trial; and (2) he did not sign the arbitration agreement
in his personal capacity, and therefore he did not agree to arbitrate his wrongful
death claim.
ANALYSIS
Under both federal and Idaho law, there is a strong presumption in favor of
arbitrability; however, if the parties did not agree to arbitrate they may not be forced to
do so. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002); Mason v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 177 P.3d 944, 947 (Idaho 2007).1 Determining if the parties
agreed to arbitrate is the first task of a court asked to compel arbitration. Mason, 177
P.3d at 948. Additionally, the presumption in favor of arbitration is not more important
than the parties’ intent. Id. at 948 (citing Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int’l Union v.
EG& G Idaho, Inc., 769 P.2d 548, 551 (Idaho 1989)).
The parties do not dispute that the arbitration agreement binds Alma’s estate for
claims relating to the care, treatment, and services Alma received at Good Samaritan.
But, as Strickholm correctly notes, the Idaho Supreme Court recently held that wrongful
death claims are not derivative but rather independent actions belonging to a decedent’s

1

Good Samaritan cites to the Federal Arbitration Act as the governing law rather than Idaho’s Uniform Arbitration
Act. Traditionally, the FAA applies in all cases in which the underlying transaction affects interstate commerce. 9
U.S.C. § 2 (2003). This issue has not been briefed by the parties, and as noted by the Idaho Supreme Court, “the
distinction between state and federal substantive arbitration law is largely a distinction without a difference…”
Wattenbarger v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 246 P.3d 961, 969 (Idaho 2010). For these reasons, the Court declines
to resolve this question. In any event, “issues of substantive law concerning the formation and interpretation of a
contract are matters of state law.” Id. (citing First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995)

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heirs. Castorena v. General Elec., 238 P.3d 209, 218-19 (2010). Under Idaho law, a
wrongful death action vests in the statutorily designated survivors at the moment of
death. Id. Here, then, Strickholm’s wrongful death claim is his solely, and it never
belonged to his mother or her estate. Id. at 219. Therefore, Strickholm’s mother had no
right to waive Strickholm’s personal right to a jury trial on the wrongful death claim
because it did not arise until after her death.
Good Samaritan argues, however, that Castorena does not provide any assistance
in resolving whether a decedent’s arbitration agreement binds an heir to submit nonsurvivor claims to arbitration because Castorena only addressed the application of the
statute of limitations to a wrongful death claim. Because Castorena does not address the
exact issue raised here, Good Samaritan asserts that “the Castorena decision should not be
considered as providing any ruling which determines whether plaintiff’s wrongful death
action is subject to the arbitration agreement.” Def’s Reply Br. at 4, Dkt. 6.
While Good Samaritan is technically correct, this argument is not particularly
helpful. No Idaho court, to this Court’s knowledge, “provides any ruling” on this precise
issue. In such situations where the state's highest court has not decided an issue, the task
of federal courts sitting in diversity is to predict how the state high court would resolve it.
Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931, 939 (9th Cir. 2001). In making this
assessment, this Court may extrapolate from other related state court decisions even if not
exactly on point. Therefore, while Castorena does not directly speak to the question at
issue here, its discussion of Idaho’s wrongful death statute as an independent cause of
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action is instructive on whether or not Alma had the power to waive her son’s potential
wrongful death claim.
In addition, the Court may “look[] to well-reasoned decisions from other
jurisdictions” as a source for other persuasive authority. Takahashi v. Loomis Armored
Car Serv., 625 F.2d 314, 316 (9th Cir.1980). Other courts have held that nonsignatory
heirs do not forfeit their wrongful death claims because of arbitration agreements such as
the one at issue in this case. See Fitzhugh v. Granada Healthcare and Rehabilitation
Center, LLC, 58 Cal.Rptr.3d 585, 588 (2007); Woodall v. Avalon Care Center-Federal
Way, LLC, 321 P.3d 1252 (Wash. 2010).
In Woodall, the decedent signed a contract agreeing to arbitrate all claims arising
from personal injury or medical care, including any claims brought by a spouse or an
heir. 321 P.3d at 921. After the decedent died while in the care of the defendant nursing
home, the decedent’s son and personal representative sought to bring various survival
claims on behalf of the estate. He also brought a wrongful death claim. The court found
that the arbitration agreement applied to the survival claims under the ordinary contract
principle of agency, i.e., a personal representative stands in the shoes of a decedent when
bringing a survival action. In contrast, Washington considers a wrongful death claim a
separate cause of action belonging to the surviving heir and not the estate. The court
therefore found that the arbitration agreement did not apply to the wrongful death claim
because a decedent cannot restrict his beneficiaries’ right to a jury trial for a claim that
does not belong to him. Id.
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Similarly, in Fitzhugh, the plaintiff, the decedent’s spouse, signed an arbitration
agreement in his capacity as an agent for the decedent. 58 Cal.Rptr.3d at 588. The Court
held that because there was no evidence that the plaintiff signed the agreement in his
personal capacity, there was no basis to infer that he waived his personal right to a jury
trial on the wrongful death claim. Id.
The Court finds the reasoning of both these cases persuasive. General principles
of contract law mandate that one is only bound by an arbitration agreement to which he
or she is a party, unless some exception applies. Dan Weibold Ford v. Universal
Computer, 127 P.3d 138 (Idaho 2005); Comer v. Micor, Inc., 436 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th
Cir. 2006). There are five recognized theories under which nonsignatory parties may be
bound “1) incorporation by reference; 2) assumption; 3) agency, 4) veil-piercing/alter
ego; and 5) estoppel. Thomson-CSF, 64 F.3d at 776. If any of the nonsignatory
exceptions applied, Strickholm could be bound by the agreement. But Good Samaritan
did not provide any argument to establish nonsignatory liability, and the Court sees no
relevant exception.
The Court therefore concludes that Strickholm is not required to arbitrate his
wrongful death claims against Good Samaritan despite the language in the arbitration
agreement purporting to bind heirs of the resident. As noted above, under ordinary
principles of contract law, heirs should not be bound by an arbitration agreement they did
not sign in their personal capacity.
Good Samaritan seeks to save its attempt to compel arbitration by arguing that
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Strickholm did sign the agreement in his personal capacity and attested to understanding
its terms and conditions; therefore, he is bound by it. The Court disagrees. The
arbitration agreement was made between the “Resident” and Good Samaritan. Resolution
of Legal Disputes, Ex. A to Duke Aff., Dkt. 4-2. There is no doubt that Alma was the
resident and not her son. And nothing in the agreement indicates that Strickholm is a
signatory in his personal capacity.
To the contrary, there is strong evidence demonstrating Strickholm did not sign
the agreement in his personal capacity. Strickholm signed as the “responsible party,”
which suggests that he was signing in his representative capacity and not in his personal
capacity. Serenic Software, Inc. v. Protean Technologies, Inc. 2007 WL 1366547, *7
(D.Idaho April 26, 2007) (finding that a corporate office who signed an agreement for the
corporation as the “President” only signed in his representative capacity). Moreover, in
clarifying his role as the responsible party, Stickholm did not check the Relative box and
did check the relevant Power of Attorney boxes when defining his relationship to the
Resident. Duke Affidavit Exh. A, Dkt. 4-2. Signing under his Power of Attorney, the
Plaintiff was literally signing as his mother; Eric Strickholm was not a signatory of the
agreement.
Strickhom’s circumstances are thus similar to those of an heir in Goliger v. AMS
Properties, Inc., 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 819, 821 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. 2004). There, the heir signed
an arbitration agreement between a nursing home and her mother as the “responsible
party.” When the daughter attempted to bring a wrongful death claim, the court held that
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the arbitration agreement did not bind her because she did not sign it in her personal
capacity. Id. See also Fitzhugh, 58 Cal.Rptr.3d at 588. Like the nursing home in
Goliger, Good Samaritan has not come forward with any evidence to suggest Strickholm
signed the arbitration clause in his personal capacity.
Good Samaritan tries to argue in the negative: it maintains that because the
agreement did not indicate that Strickhom signed the agreement solely on behalf of his
mother, he must have signed in his personal capacity as well. Def.’s Reply at 6, Dkt. 6.
Good Samaritan supports this by quoting the language of the agreement, “The Resident
and those signing this Agreement, including the Responsible Party, certify that they have
read and understand this Agreement.” Duke Aff. Exh. A, Dkt. 4-2. The alleged inference is
that having read the agreement, Strickholm should be held accountable for the terms and
conditions it contains – that is, he must arbitrate his claim.
The Court finds this line of reasoning unpersuasive. Strickholm made clear that he
signed the forms as his mother’s Power of Attorney. Despite language in the agreement
to suggest that the heirs were to be bound by the agreement, it does not necessarily follow
that Strickholm, approaching the forms as his mother’s Power of Attorney, was
knowingly waiving his personal constitutional right to a jury trial. Additionally, Good
Samaritan’s attempt to distinguish Woodall is unconvincing. In Woodall no heir signed
the agreement in any fashion and the court made note of such. While it is true that the
plaintiff in Woodall never touched a pen to the agreement, legally speaking, Strickholm
did not either.
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Good Samaritan is unable to establish a basis for subjecting Strickholm to
arbitration. Whether or not the terms of the agreement are broad enough to cover the
claims of heirs, parties who did not agree to the terms of a contract are not bound by it.
Moreover, as noted above, the wrongful death claim was personal to Eric Strickholm.
Accordingly,, neither Alma Strickholm, nor any person acting with her Power of
Attorney, could subject Eric to arbitration.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to compel arbitration and stay
proceedings (docket no. 4) is DENIED.

DATED: June 24, 2011

_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
Chief Judge
United States District Court

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