Ethereal Enigmatic Euphoric Movement Towards Civilized Hedonism LTD v. State of Idaho

Filing 27

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER granting 16 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Candy W Dale. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by dks)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

THE ETHEREAL ENIGMATIC
EUPHORIC MOVEMENT TOWARDS
CIVILIZED HEDONISM, LTD.,

Case No. 4:11-cv-00097-CWD
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Defendant.

INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Defendant State of Idaho’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction, and alternatively under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6), on the grounds that Plaintiff Ethereal Enigmatic Euphoric Movement towards
Civilized Hedonism, LTD has failed to state actionable claims under either 42 U.S.C. §
1983 or Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The parties have fully briefed the motion and it is now ripe for the Court’s
consideration. Having reviewed the record herein, the Court finds that the facts and legal
arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record. Accordingly, in the interest

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1

of avoiding further delay, and because the Court conclusively finds that the decisional
process would not be significantly aided by oral argument, the motion will be decided on
the record before this Court without oral argument. Dist. Idaho L. Rule 7.1(d).
For the reasons discussed herein, the Complaint will be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
BACKGROUND
The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff is an organization comprised of individuals
who believe that the “consumption of distilled spirits is both [a] moral obligation and
sacred right.” (Compl. at ¶ 5, Dkt. 1.) It further alleges that, using Idaho’s local-option
law, the City of Preston enacted a prohibition on the sale of liquor by the drink, and that
this prohibition violates the rights of Plaintiff’s members to freely exercise their religion
and discriminates against them because of their religious beliefs. (Id. at ¶¶ 5-6.)
Apparently, Plaintiff holds its services on the premises of the Owl Club, a local beer and
wine saloon operating in Preston, which does not sell distilled spirits pursuant to the
city’s prohibition. (Response to Mot., Dkt. 23-1 at 2.) The Complaint seeks injunctive
relief against the State of Idaho under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
and under the Twenty-First Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, under Title II, and
under state law.
DISPOSITION
1.

Legal Standards for a Motion to Dismiss
A federal court may dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). In a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), “the district
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court is not confined by the facts contained in the four corners of the complaint – it may
consider facts and need not assume the truthfulness of the complaint.” Americopters LLC
v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 441 F.3d 726, 732 n.4 (9th Cir. 2006). Further, the plaintiff has
the burden of proving jurisdiction exists. Tosco Corp. v. Communities for a Better Env’t,
236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2001).
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s claim for
relief. The relevant inquiry is whether the plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a), which sets forth the minimum pleading requirement, i.e., that the plaintiff
provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief,” and “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all nonconclusory, factual (not legal) allegations made in the complaint, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --U.S. ----, ----, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), and
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan,
Inc., 579 F.3d 943, 949 (9th Cir. 2009). When considering a motion to dismiss, “[t]he
issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled
to offer evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).
2.

The Eleventh Amendment Bars Plaintiff’s Claims
Although the Eleventh Amendment does not expressly preclude federal

jurisdiction over suits brought against an un-consenting state by its own citizens, the
United States Supreme Court held in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), that the
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3

Eleventh Amendment prohibits a federal court from entertaining a suit brought by a
citizen against his own state. The Supreme Court has consistently applied the Eleventh
Amendment’s jurisdictional bar to states and state entities “regardless of the nature of the
relief sought.” See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984).
A state may waive sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment by
consenting to suit in federal court. However, the law requires a clear expression of
consent to be sued in federal court or a clear showing that the state intended to waive
immunity. Yakama Indian Nation v. Washington Dept. of Revenue, 176 F.3d 1241 (9th
Cir. 1999) (for a state to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity, its consent must be
unequivocally expressed, meaning that the consent is effective only where stated by the
most express language); Petty v. Tennesee-Missouri Bridge Comm’n., 359 U.S. 275, 276,
79 S.Ct. 785, 787 (1959) (the conclusion that there has been a waiver of immunity will
not be lightly inferred).
In this matter, the State of Idaho contends that it is immune from suit in federal
court and that it has not consented to jurisdiction. Plaintiff has produced no contrary
evidence or law to show that the State of Idaho has waived its Eleventh Amendment
immunity in this matter. Rather, Plaintiff contends that the State of Idaho, by collecting
liquor license fees, is a vested business partner in establishments that serve alcoholic
beverages. Plaintiff therefore argues that the State of Idaho, as a participating partner in
such business establishments, discriminates against individuals who wish to consume
distilled spirits on such premises. However, Plaintiff’s argument lacks any legal
foundation. The State of Idaho has not expressly abrogated its immunity. Nor does the
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4

collection of liquor license fees alter the State of Idaho’s status. Accordingly, Defendant
State of Idaho is entitled to the relief it seeks, and the Complaint will be dismissed.
Alternative grounds exist for dismissal because Plaintiff, a recognized business
entity, cannot be represented by Mr. Mockli, who is not an attorney. The fact that
Plaintiff has not appeared with counsel after being given an opportunity to do so
constitutes alternative grounds for dismissing the complaint. See Church of the New
Testament v. United States, 783 F.2d 771, 773-74 (9th Cir. 1986); Dist. Idaho L. Rule
83.4(d). 1
Although Defendant presented several alternative arguments supporting its motion
to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), because the Court conclusively finds that the
Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), it does not reach the
alternative arguments presented for dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
ORDER
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1) Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 16) is GRANTED.
October 24, 2011

1

Mr. Mockli requested additional time to locate an attorney willing to represent Plaintiff. (Dkt. 25.) However, even
assuming the Court was willing to entertain such a request, it would not alter the Court’s analysis that it lacks
jurisdiction.

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