Sadid v. Idaho State University et al

Filing 59

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER denying 35 Motion to Stay; denying 47 Motion to Strike. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (cjm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
HABIB SADID, an individual,
Case No. 4:11-cv-00103-BLW

Plaintiff,
v.
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY,
ARTHUR VAILAS, RICHARD
JACOBSEN, and JOHN/JANE DOES 1
through X, whose true identities are
presently unknown,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is defendants’ Motion to Stay (Dkt. 35) and plaintiff’s Motion to
Strike Reply (Dkt. 47). The Court has determined oral argument would not significantly
assist the decisional process and will decide the motion without a hearing. For the
reasons expressed below, the Court will deny both motions.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Habib Sadid has filed three lawsuits generally relating to Idaho State
University’s alleged adverse actions against him. In November 2011, defendants asked
the Court to stay this action pending the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in one of the
state court actions.
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Briefly, the three lawsuits described in the stay motion are as follows:
State Lawsuit No. 1. In September 2008, Sadid sued ISU and various university
officials in state court. See Sadid v. Idaho State Univ., Case No. 2008-3942-OC. He
alleged that the university retaliated against him because of his comments criticizing the
administration that had been published in a local newspaper over several years. See
Sadid v. Idaho State Univ., 265 P.3d 1144, 1148 (Idaho 2011). He sought damages under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the grounds that defendants violated his freedom of speech
guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court granted summary
judgment in defendants’ favor and, in November 2011 – after defendants filed this
motion – the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. See id.
Federal Lawsuit. Meanwhile, in March 2011, Sadid filed this action against ISU
and individual defendants Arthur Vailas and Richard Jacobsen. Here, Sadid alleges a
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for denial of his First Amendment, Substantive and
Procedural Due Process and Equal Protection rights. He also alleges breach of contract,
defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Sadid asserts that this action differs in at least one respect from the state lawsuit
described above. He says that here, he is focused on his April 2009 speech at a faculty
meeting, whereas the state lawsuit focused on earlier speech. See Sadid’s Response, Dkt.
37, at 3. Sadid argues that the prior speech – the speech at issue in the state action – was
protected because he spoke as a private citizen on matters of public concern whereas the
speech at issue here – the April 2009 speech – “should be protected by the academic
freedom exception to the Garcetti analysis.” Id. (referring to Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2

U.S. 410 (2006)); see also id. at 4 (“Plaintiff must have a speedy resolution to his
complaint on the new, not previously litigated issue of whether his speech at the April 21,
2009 meeting was protected by academic freedom under the First Amendment.”)
In any event, in August 2011, this Court dismissed the claims against defendant
ISU, as well as the claims against Vailas and Jacobsen in their official capacity. Sadid is
continuing to pursue Jacobsen and Vailas in their individual capacity.
State Lawsuit No. 2. Roughly two weeks after this Court dismissed ISU as a
defendant, Sadid filed a second lawsuit against the same defendants (ISU, Vailas and
Jacobsen) in state court. He asserted claims for defamation, intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress and violation of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. See Sadid v. Idaho State University, Case No. CV-2011-3455-OC. Defendants
indicate that in this lawsuit, Sadid asks the state court to find an “academic freedom
exception” for his April 2009 speech for the same reasons asserted here.
At the time defendants filed their original motion, they focused on the first state
lawsuit identified above because the Idaho Supreme Court had not yet issued its
November 30, 2011 ruling. (The stay motion was filed November 11, 2011). When the
Supreme Court did hand down its decision, Sadid pointed out the obvious – the motion
had become moot. Nonetheless, defendants continued to argue that a stay was still
advisable. In their reply brief, defendants alerted the Court to a fourth case – Sadid’s
appeal of an Industrial Commission case. See Reply, Dkt. 41, at 3. The Industrial
Commission determined that ISU terminated Sadid for employment-related misconduct
and was therefore ineligible for unemployment benefits. See id. Sadid has appealed that
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decision to the Idaho Supreme Court. On appeal, Sadid is arguing that the Industrial
Commission erred when it concluded that his April 2009 faculty meeting speech fell
below a standard of behavior reasonably expected by his employer. Sadid contends that
his faculty speech falls within the “academic freedom exception” to Garcetti. See
Defendants’ Reply, at 3.
Defendants now ask the Court to stay this action until the unemployment case is
decided.
ANALYSIS
1.

Motion to Stay Proceedings
The Court will deny the stay motion for two reasons. First, as Sadid has pointed

out, the Idaho Supreme Court’s November 30, 2011 decision in Sadid’s original state
action mooted the stay motion. The unemployment appeal was not even mentioned in the
original motion and defendants have not adequately explained why this appeal has
suddenly assumed such importance. Sadid asserts that he filed this appeal in February
2011 – well before the stay motion was filed.
Second, even assuming defendants had raised the unemployment appeal in their
motion, the Court would not be persuaded to stay this action. Generally, the pendency of
an action in state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in federal
court. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813
(1975). Ordinarily, federal courts have “virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise
the jurisdiction given them,” so a stay or dismissal is appropriate only in exceptional
circumstances. Id. at 817.
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District courts consider a variety of factors to determine whether “exceptional
circumstances” justify a stay. See Nakash v. Marciano, 882 F.2d 1411, 1415 (9th Cir.
1989) (listing factors). But before these factors are consulted, the Court must satisfy
itself that the federal and state proceedings are indeed parallel. See Moses H. Cone
Mem’l Hosp v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 28 (1983) (application of the
Colorado River doctrine “presumably concludes that the parallel state-court litigation will
be an adequate vehicle for the complete and prompt resolution of the issues between the
parties.”). The two proceedings need not be exactly parallel; it is enough if they are
“substantially similar.” Nakash, 882 F.2d at 1415. The district court must, however,
have “full confidence” that the state court action will end the ligation; “the existence of a
substantial doubt as to whether the state proceedings will resolve the federal action
precludes the granting of a stay.” Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 12 F.3d
908, 913 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).
Here, defendants concede that it is unclear if the Idaho Supreme Court will even
reach an issue that is being litigated here – namely, whether an “academic freedom”
principle protects Sadid’s April 2009 speech. Within the unemployment appeal,
defendants are arguing that Sadid is judicially estopped from raising that issue. See
Defendants’ Opp. to Motion to Strike, Dkt. 49, at 2 (“Defendants have argued on the
unemployment appeal that the Plaintiff is judicially estopped from relying on his April
21, 2009 faculty meeting speech as a causal factor for Defendants’ alleged retaliatory
actions where he failed to point to that speech in the original action.”). They nonetheless
assert, however, that “because there is a question as to whether the Supreme Court will
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consider the academic freedom arguments . . . it still is most appropriate to stay this
action pending the Supreme Court’s decision of the unemployment appeal.” Id. at 2.
A Colorado River stay is inappropriate with a contingency of this sort. See, e.g.,
Intel, 12 F.3d at 913. As the Ninth Circuit explains, “[u]nder the rules governing the
Colorado River doctrine, the existence of substantial doubt as to whether the state
proceedings will resolve the federal action precludes the granting of a stay.” Id. In Intel
v. Advanced Micro Devices, 12 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 1993), the Ninth Circuit faced a
somewhat similar situation. There, concurrent state proceedings would resolve the issues
in the federal action, but only if the state court confirmed an arbitration award and if the
state court’s decision had a collateral estoppel effect in federal court. Id. at 913. If,
however, the state court overturned the arbitration award, further proceedings would be
necessary in federal court. Id. The court found that “substantial doubt” precluded a
Colorado River stay. Id.
And so it is here. The pending unemployment appeal may or may not resolve the
“academic freedom” issue raised in this lawsuit. Additionally, Sadid points out that the
unemployment appeal will not resolve his pending state law tort claims. The Court will
therefore deny defendants’ request to stay this action pending the outcome of the
unemployment appeal.1

1

Because the Court finds substantial doubt as to whether the unemployment appeal will
resolve the disputed issues in this case, the Court need not weigh the other factors included in the
Colorado River analysis. See Intel, 12 F.3d at 913 n.7.
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2.

Motion to Strike Reply
The Court will also deny the motion to strike defendants’ reply. Sadid moved to

strike the reply based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). That rule is designed to
strike immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter from pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(f); Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a) (describing the only pleadings allowed). It is not properly
invoked to attack a reply brief on the grounds that it exceeds the scope of the motion. As
noted above, the reply brief did indeed exceed the scope of relief sought in the motion,
and Sadid did not have an opportunity to oppose the newly requested relief. The
appropriate procedural move at that point would have been to request an opportunity to
file a sur-reply. Nonetheless, in the context of the motion to strike, the parties briefed the
new issue relating to the unemployment appeal. After considering that briefing, the
Court has determined not to grant the relief requested in the reply brief. The Court will
not, however, strike the reply under Rule 12(f).
ORDER
Defendants’ Motion for a Stay of Proceedings (Dkt. 35) is DENIED. Plaintiff’s
Motion to Strike (Dkt. 47) is DENIED.

DATED: March 12, 2012

_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
Chief Judge
United States District Court

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