Manhart v. Madison Memorial Hospital

Filing 37

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER Defendant' Motion for Attorney Fees (Docket No. 33 ) is DENIED. However, Defendant is entitled to recover from Manhart $446.25 in costs. Signed by Judge Ronald E. Bush. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (jp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF IDAHO
GINA MANHART, an individual,

Case No.: 4:11-cv-00265-REB

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES

vs.
MADISON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, a hospital
owned and operated by Madison County, Idaho,

(Docket No. 33)

Defendant.

Now pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Attorney Fees (Docket No. 33).
Having carefully considered the record and otherwise being fully advised, the Court enters the
following Memorandum Decision and Order:
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Gina Manhart (“Manhart”) worked at Defendant Madison Memorial Hospital
(“Madison Memorial”) as a nurse from September 2003 until she voluntarily resigned in May
2007. This lawsuit relates to her unsuccessful attempt to be re-hired in 2009.
Manhart claimed that on or around November 2, 2009, the North Fork Surgery Center
(then in the process of being acquired by Madison Memorial) asked if she was interested in
working there as a nurse. Manhart claimed she contacted Madison Memorial to follow up on the
offer and learned that a “no re-hire” notation had been placed in her personnel file based on
excessive absenteeism while pregnant during her previous employment with Madison Memorial.
Manhart did not get the job. She claimed that “[t]he decision to place her on the “no re-hire”
status was clearly related to her pregnancies as was the decision to not hire her for the vacant
position in contravention of State and Federal law.”

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1

Manhart sued Madison Memorial, asserting the following causes of action: (1) gender
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act; (2) gender discrimination in
violation of the Idaho Human Rights Act; (3) retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act; (4) retaliation in violation of the Idaho Human Rights Act; (5) intentional infliction
of emotional distress; and (6) negligent infliction of emotional distress.
On January 24, 2012, this Court granted, in part, Madison Memorial’s first motion for
summary judgment and dismissed Manhart’s state law gender discrimination and retaliation
claims.1 Through a second motion for summary judgment, Madison Memorial sought to dismiss
Manhart’s remaining claims. On March 14, 2013, this Court granted Madison Memorial’s
second motion for summary judgment and dismissed Manhart’s federal gender discrimination
and retaliation claims, as well as her intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress
claims. A Judgment followed on March 19, 2013, dismissing Manhart’s claims with prejudice.
On March 27, 2013, Madison Memorial filed a Bill of Costs (Docket No. 32) and the atissue Motion for Attorney Fees (Docket No. 33). Manhart opposes Madison Memorial’s Motion
for Attorney Fees (Docket No. 34).2

1

The undersigned denied Madison Memorial’s first motion for summary judgment as to
(1) Manhart’s gender discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act, finding that Manhart complied with the filing requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); and
(2) Manhart’s intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress claims, finding that
there is no tie to the dismissed state law gender discrimination and retaliation claims that
requires dismissal. See 1/24/12 Order, p. 2 (Docket No. 21).
2

Manhart’s opposition does not speak to Madison Memorial’s Bill of Costs, except to
say in its last sentence: “The Defendant’s motion for fees and costs should be denied.” See
Opp., p. 5 (Docket No. 34) (emphasis added). Manhart offers no separate argument for denying
Madison Memorial’s recovery of its costs under FRCP 54(d)(1) and Local Civil Rule 54.1.
Madison Memorial seeks $446.25 in transcript costs and $176.88 in attorney travel costs, the
latter of which are not recoverable. Therefore, to the extent necessary, Madison Memorial is
entitled to recover from Manhart $446.25 in costs.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2

II. DISCUSSION
Madison Memorial seeks attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 200e-5(k) and I.C. § 12-121.
Both statutes vest in district courts the discretion to award a prevailing defendant a reasonable
attorney fee upon finding that the plaintiff’s action was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation.” See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978); Hoagland v.
Ada Cnty., 303 P.3d 587, 603 (Idaho 2013). With this standard in mind, Madison Memorial
argues that it is entitled to its attorney fees as the prevailing party on Manhart’s Title VII claims
and state law claims.
A.

Manhart’s Title VII Claims
1.

Gender Discrimination

Under the familiar burden-shifting framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), a plaintiff alleging disparate treatment under Title VII must first
establish a prima facie case of discrimination by offering evidence that “give[s] rise to an
inference of unlawful discrimination.” E.E.O.C. v. Boeing Co., 577 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir.
2009) (citing Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)). A prima facie
case may be established either by (1) providing direct evidence suggesting that the employment
decision was terminated based on an impermissible criterion, or (2) the four-part test laid out in
McDonnell Douglas.
To establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas
framework, a plaintiff must show that (1) she belongs to a protected class, (2) she was qualified
for the position, (3) she was subjected to an adverse employment action, and (4) she was
replaced by someone outside the protected class or that similarly-situated individuals outside of

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3

her protected class received more favorable treatment. See, e.g., Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air,
Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1062 (9th Cir. 2002).
Once a prima facie case has been made, “[t]he burden of production, but not persuasion,
then shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
challenged action.” Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 115, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 2000). If the
employer provides such a reason, the plaintiff must show that the articulated reason is pretextual
“either directly by persuading the [fact-finder] that a discriminatory reason more likely
motivated the employer[,] or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is
unworthy of credence.” Burdine, 350 U.S. at 256. When the evidence is direct, “‘[w]e require
very little evidence to survive summary judgment’ in a discrimination case.” Lam v. University
of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551, 1564 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Cmty. Coll.
Dist., 934 F.2d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 1991)). “But when the plaintiff relies on circumstantial
evidence, that evidence must be specific and substantial to defeat the employer’s motion for
summary judgment.” Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co. LLC, 413 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2005).
Here, this Court determined that Manhart’s allegations established a prima facie case for
gender discrimination:
As to the discrete issue of Manhart’s ability to establish a prima facie case of gender
discrimination, as a woman, she belongs to a protected class. Further, there is no
evidence in the record that Manhart was unqualified to be a nurse. In both, (1) being
designated as a “no re-hire” and (2) not being hired in 2009, Plaintiff was arguably
subject to at least two adverse employment actions. To the extent these actions were
taken against Manhart but not other similarly-situated individuals outside of her
protected class, it can be argued that such other individuals were treated more
favorably. But see supra at n.2. Considering all reasonable inferences in Manhart’s
favor, these factors combine to establish a prima facie case for gender discrimination.
See MDO, p. 6 (Docket No. 30) (footnote omitted). However, Manhart was ultimately unable to
show that Madison Memorial’s legitimate and non-discriminatory justifications for not re-hiring

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4

her were pretextual. See id. at pp. 7-9. (“Therefore, aside from obliquely disputing Madison
Memorial’s reasons for not hiring her, [Manhart] has failed to introduce any persuasive, material
evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Madison Memorial undertook the
challenged employment action due to her gender. Simply put, her legal claim of gender
discrimination requires more. Otherwise, any adverse employment action would necessarily
amount to pretext. The law does not support such a conclusion and the undersigned declines any
invitation to hold differently here.”). Madison Memorial points to theses findings in support of
its argument in favor of recovering attorney fees. See Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Atty. Fees, pp.
3-4 (Docket No. 33, Att. 1) (“[T]he Court should find that [Manhart’s] failure to present any
evidence to meet her burden to establish a genuine issue of fact for trial on ‘pretext’
demonstrates that [Manhart] pursued this matter unreasonably and without foundation.”).
The Court is not so persuaded. It is true that Manhart was unable to support her gender
discrimination claim when contrasted against Madison Memorial’s retort and tested against the
above-referenced McDonnell Douglas framework. However, this is not a case where Manhart’s
claim was so obviously doomed from the beginning that its pursuit was objectively frivolous,
unreasonable, and/or without foundation. To be sure, Manhart initially established a prima facie
case of gender discrimination and, later, argued that Madison Memorial’s decision not to re-hire
her was indeed pretextual as evidenced by a secretly-recorded conversation she had with her
supervisor. That those arguments were rejected by this Court does not mean that her underlying
claim was frivolous, but only unsupported by law, based upon the then-existing facts in the
record. A contrary ruling would be tantamount to a rule that a plaintiff bringing a gender
discrimination claim is on the hook for the defendant’s attorney fees if she cannot survive a

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5

motion for summary judgment. The analysis is (as it should be) more nuanced than that to
ensure that vigorous enforcement of Title VII is not stymied. In short, the requisite “exceptional
circumstances” do not exist to warrant the recovery of Madison Memorial’s attorney fees
relating to Manhart’s gender discrimination claim. See See Harris v. Maricopa Cnty. Superior
Court, 631 F.3d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Our laws encourage individuals to seek relief for
violations of their civil rights, and allow a defendant to recover fees and costs from a plaintiff in
a civil rights case only ‘in exceptional circumstances’ in which the plaintiff’s claims are
‘frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation.’”).
2.

Retaliation

To establish subject matter jurisdiction in a suit under Title VII, a claimant must exhaust
remedies “by filing a timely charge with the [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission]
[(“EEOC”)].” Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 644 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002)). Under
Title VII, the charges must be “in writing under oath or affirmation.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
The purpose of this requirement is to allow the agency an opportunity to investigate the
charge(s) against it. See Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 644 (citing B.K.B., 276 F.3d at 1100).
Accordingly, “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction extends to all claims of discrimination that fall within
the scope of the EEOC’s actual investigation or an EEOC investigation that could reasonably be
expected to grow out of the charge.” Id. Through its second motion for summary judgment,
Madison Memorial argued that Manhart’s retaliation claim should be dismissed because Manhart
failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. The Court agreed.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6

As pointed out in the Memorandum Decision and Order, within Manhart’s March 5, 2010
“Charge of Discrimination” with the EEOC, she indicated (by checking a box on the form) that
the “[c]ause [o]f [d]iscrimination” was based on (1) “sex” and (2) “other.” Manhart did not
indicate (by likewise checking the “retaliation” box on the form) that her claim was premised
upon retaliation theories. Manhart reasoned that any failure to check the applicable “retaliation”
box was immaterial when considering that she described a retaliation claim within the attached
March 3, 2010 letter to the Idaho Human Rights Commission (“IHRC”). Yet, the Court’s review
of Manhart’s March 3, 2010 letter revealed that no retaliation claim was alleged, other than the
already-discussed, underlying gender discrimination claim.
Madison Memorial now argues that “[Manhart’s] filing of a retaliation cause of action
knowing that this claim had not been raised at the EEOC stage of proceedings coupled with her
complete failure to produce any legal basis to support the filing represents a frivolous,
unreasonable, and unfounded pleading.” See Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Atty. Fees, p. 5 (Docket
No. 33, Att. 1). Except that such shortcomings, in and of themselves, do not justify an order
requiring Manhart to account for Madison Memorial’s attorney fees. Manhart, acting on her on
behalf at the time she submitted charges to the EEOC, very well thought she was adequately
identifying a retaliation claim – by either selecting the “other” box, describing her claims in a
separate letter, or through some other heretofore unidentified method/reason. The fact that such
conduct was rejected at the summary judgment stage only means that it did not amount to an
exhaustion of administrative remedies, not that her claim was bogus to begin with. Additionally,
it must be remembered that Manhart’s claims were fundamentally grounded in Madison
Memorial’s alleged discrimination; any shortcomings vis à vis her retaliation claim does not taint
the rest of her since-dismissed case.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 7

B.

Manhart’s State Claims
1.

Gender Discrimination and Retaliation

Under the Idaho Human Rights Act, “any person who believes he or she has been subject
to unlawful discrimination . . . may file a complaint under oath with the commission stating the
facts concerning the alleged discrimination within (1) year of the alleged unlawful
discrimination.” I.C. § 67-5907(1). “A complaint must be filed with the commission as a
condition precedent to litigation. A complainant may file a civil action in district court within
ninety (90) days of issuance of the notice of administrative dismissal pursuant to section 675907(6), Idaho Code.” I.C. § 67-5908(2).
Here, Manhart did not bring this action within 90 days of receiving her notice of right to
sue and, as a result, her state law gender discrimination and retaliation claims were dismissed.
Whatever procedural impediments existed to foreclose Manhart’s state discrimination/retaliation
claims (as significant as they may be to Manhart’s “day in court”) do not operate to likewise
render those claims as clearly without a factual basis. In other words, legally, Manhart’s state
law gender discrimination and retaliation claims may have ran contrary to Idaho’s statutory law;
they were not, however, frivolous or unreasonable to the extent required to support a fee award
to Madison Memorial.
2.

Intentional Infliction and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

The Idaho Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”) generally permits claims against government
entities “for money damages arising out of its negligent or otherwise wrongful acts or omissions
and those of its employees . . . .” I.C. § 6-903. However, before proceeding with such an action,
the ITCA requires that “[a]ll claims against a political subdivision arising under the provisions of

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 8

this act and all claims against an employee of a political subdivision . . . shall be presented to and
filed with the clerk or secretary of the political subdivision.” I.C. § 6-906.
Here, Manhart did not provide the requisite notice pursuant to the ITCA relative to her
intentional infliction and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims against Madison
Memorial (an entity which is owned and operated by Madison County and, therefore, a “political
subdivision” under the ITCA). However, again, Manhart’s falling short of this procedural
requirement – in essence, a jurisdictional defect – does not mean that these claims are so
groundless as to support an attorney fees award in favor of Madison Memorial.
III. ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Attorney Fees (Docket No. 33) is
DENIED. However, Defendant is entitled to recover from Manhart $446.25 in costs.
DATED: February 19, 2014

Honorable Ronald E. Bush
U. S. Magistrate Judge

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 9