Pedersen et al v. State of Idaho et al
Filing
23
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER granting 21 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (cjm)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
REV. JAMES EINAR PEDERSEN;
REV. HAROLD DAVID BAILEY,
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 4:11-cv-00601-BLW
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
v.
STATE OF IDAHO; CASSIA
COUNTY; FIFTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT; SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO; CITY OF
BURLEY; CITY OF BURLEY
PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE; CASSIA
COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT,
Defendants.
INTRODUCTION
The Court has before it Defendants Cassia County and City of Burley’s motion to
dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) (Dkt. 21).
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," in order to "give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007). While a complaint
attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss "does not need detailed factual
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1
allegations," it must set forth "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. at 555. To survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
"state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 556.
The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. Where a complaint
pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, it "stops short of the
line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.' " Id. at 557.
In a more recent case, the Supreme Court identified two "working principles" that
underlie Twombly. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). First, the tenet
that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions. Id. "Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure
from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the
doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions." Id. at 1950.
Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to
dismiss. Id. "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . .
be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense." Id.
Providing too much in the complaint may also be fatal to a plaintiff. Dismissal may
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2
be appropriate when the plaintiff has included sufficient allegations disclosing some
absolute defense or bar to recovery. See Weisbuch v. County of L.A., 119 F.3d 778, 783,
n. 1 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that "[i]f the pleadings establish facts compelling a decision
one way, that is as good as if depositions and other . . . evidence on summary judgment
establishes the identical facts").
A dismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it is beyond doubt that the
complaint "could not be saved by any amendment." Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 573 F.3d 728,
737 (9th Cir. 2009)(issued 2 months after Iqbal).1 The Ninth Circuit has held that "in
dismissals for failure to state a claim, a district court should grant leave to amend even if
no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could
not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v.
Northern California Collection Service, Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990). The
issue is not whether plaintiff will prevail but whether he "is entitled to offer evidence to
support the claims." Diaz v. Int'l Longshore and Warehouse Union, Local 13, 474 F.3d
1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2007)(citations omitted).
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court may consider matters that are subject to judicial
notice. Mullis v. United States Bank, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987). The Court
1
The Court has some concern about the continued vitality of the liberal amendment
policy adopted in Harris v. Amgen, based as it is on language in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
45-46 (1957), suggesting that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim.
. . ." Given Twombly and Iqbal's rejection of the liberal pleading standards adopted by Conley,
it is uncertain whether the language in Harris v. Amgen has much of a life expectancy.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3
may take judicial notice "of the records of state agencies and other undisputed matters of
public record" without transforming the motions to dismiss into motions for summary
judgment. Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 866
(9th Cir. 2004). The Court may also examine documents referred to in the complaint,
although not attached thereto, without transforming the motion to dismiss into a motion
for summary judgment. See Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005).
ANALYSIS
1.
Motion to Dismiss
Defendants asked the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ original Complaint pursuant Rule
12(b)(6), Twombly and Iqbal because Plaintiffs’ claims were essentially unintelligible.
The Court agreed. The Court explained that although Plaintiffs made some general
allegations suggesting that they were improperly prosecuted, and that Defendants lacked
jurisdiction over them, they gave no clear indication of the basis for their claims. They
referenced all types of statutes and constitutional provisions, but failed to tie them to their
claims. The Court simply could not understand Plaintiffs’ claims. Moreover, Plaintiffs
failed to respond to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, and the time for filing a response has
passed.
Under those circumstances, the Court granted the Motion to Dismiss. However, the
Court gave Plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their complaint to comply with the
pleading rules and case law. The Court cautioned Plaintiffs that if they filed an amended
complaint which again simply listed statutes and constitutional provisions, without tying
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4
them to their claims and explaining their claims in a more intelligible way, the Court
would dismiss their amended complaint without leave to amend.
Plaintiffs did just that. The Amended Complaint does nothing to clarify their
original claims, and it is just as unintelligible as the first. Moreover, although the Court
notified Plaintiffs that Defendants had filed a second motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs again
failed to respond to the motion. Accordingly, the Court will grant the motion to dismiss,
and the Court will not give Plaintiffs a third bite at the apple – the Court will dismiss their
Amended Complaint with prejudice.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED:
1.
The Court has before it Defendants Cassia County and City of Burley’s
motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint Pursuant to F.R.C.P.
12(b)(6) (Dkt. 21) is GRANTED. This case will be dismissed in its entirety
with prejudice.
2.
The Court will enter a separate Judgment in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P.
58.
DATED: June 6, 2012
Honorable B. Lynn Winmill
Chief U. S. District Judge
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5
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